Political

Some background: In January 2009, North Korea “voided” all political-military agreements with South Korea, although this did not seem to include the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War, or economic agreements like the Kaesong Industrial Park or the Keumgangsan tours.

• On 27 May, Pyongyang announced it the Korean People’s Army (KPA), “will not be bound to the Armistice Agreement any longer,” due to South Korea’s participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), although legally speaking, that does not negate the boundaries.
• On 04 June, North Korea will try U.S. journalists Laura Ling and Euna Lee on charges of spying. The two reporters were arrested on the Chinese side of the North Korea-Chinese border on 17 March after briefing crossing into North Korea to conduct interviews. Some analysts believe the two, acting as pawns in the current struggle between North Korea and the U.S., will receive long sentences in labor camps.

Missiles

Bottom line: North Korea appears to be preparing for an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch, and I expect it to do so in the coming weeks.

• On 05 April, North Korea launched a Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) (대포동 2호) missile, most likely in a space launch vehicle (SLV) configuration.
• The UN Security Council (UNSC) condemned the launch on 13 April, and North Korea withdrew form disarmament talks the following day, declaring it would resort its partially disabled nuclear facilities.
• North Korea also demanded an immediate apology from the UNSC on 29 April, threatening both, “nuclear tests and test-firings of intercontinental ballistic missiles,” if one was not received. Note both references are plural.
• On 01 June, U.S. SecDef Gates stated North Korea, “may be preparing to launch another long-range missile.” South Korean intelligence sources have leaked that such a missile has been transported to a North Korean launch facility, Dongchang-ri, on the west cost via train (the April launch was from Musudan-ri on the east coast, so this is an entirely different launch facility).

West Coast Military Developments

Bottom line: Ongoing KPA preparations indication North Korea is bracing for possible military confrontations on the west coast, perhaps along the Northern Limit Line (NLL). North Korea recently declared the 1953 armistice voice, but has never recognized the NLL as a legal sea border.

• Military units on North Korea’s west coast are increasing ammunition reserves to twice the normal levels and there has been an increase in vehicle movement in the region.
• North Korea has also declared a large are of the Yellow Sea (West Sea) off limits until July. While closure areas for military exercises and live fire events are not uncommon, the length of time for this closure is anomalous.
• The Korean People’s Army (KPA) has also significantly reduced communications, effectively increasing security.
• The number of illegal Chinese fishing vessels near the NLL has significantly declined recently.

“We will not stand idly by as North Korea builds the capability to wreak destruction on any target in Asia — or on us,” Gates said, according to the Associated Press. He did not call North Korea’s nuclear program a direct threat to the United States but said it was a “harbinger of a dark future.”
[. . .]
“They create a crisis, and the rest of us pay the price to return to the status quo ante,” he said. “As the expression goes in the U.S., I’m tired of buying the same horse twice.”

“There are other ways perhaps to get the North Koreans to change their approach,” Gates said. “I think this notion that we buy our way back to the status quo ante is an approach that I personally at least think we ought to think very hard about.” (emphasis added)

For more on this and North Korea’s threat of nuclear war, see OneFreeKorea.

North Korea generally conducts several short-range ground-to-ship or ship-to-ship missile flight tests in either the Yellow Sea or the Sea of Japan (East Sea) every year. These tests can serve any combination of three purposes; (1) live fire training for the military, (2) research and development, and, at times, (3) to get attention with minor demonstrations of power during periods of regional tension.

Such launches should not get the attention they do unless they occur in the vicinity of opposing forces (e.g., along the NLL) or are part of actual attacks. Some of the missiles fired are said to be based on China’s Silkworm anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM), which it in turn based on Russian Styx. While these are dangerous under the right conditions, we’re talking about 1960s technology and a range of ~100 miles.

Unfortunately every minor launch carried out by North Korea is amplified beyond all reason. These launches aren’t genuine provocations unless one is looking to be provoked.

There are several reasons for a North Korea to conduct a nuclear test and it’s difficult if not impossible to rank them by importance as Kim Jong-il might. The lines also blur for some stated here, and no doubt some could be broken down further.

Proof of concept: Perhaps the simplest reason, and in light of the failure of the 2006 nuclear test – to prove to themselves (regime elite) and the rest of the world they in fact do have a no kidding nuclear weapons capability. Since this is something North Korea intends to keep, it’s important to know the design functions as intended. Look for another Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) to prove a delivery capability.

Domestic audiences: Two sides to this one; the population as a whole, the regime elite. Whatever the outcome of the test, all would be told it was a spectacular success that boosted the prestige and security of the regime, etc. But elites would find out sooner in and greater detail of any failure. In the case of elites, especially the military, a success gives them a bit of confidence in being able to maintain the status quo and their positions of power.

Succession – North Korea after the Dear Leader: There have been several adjustments to North Korea’s political system since Kim Jong-il’s stroke last August, for example changes to the National Defense Commission and many other changes of personnel in regime leadership. These changes appear to be geared towards leaving whomever succeeds Kim Jong-il (my pick is still Kim Jong-un) in a better position, both domestically and when it comes to dealing with outside powers. For more see, “What if Kim Jong-il Died… Today? (Part 1),” and “What if Kim Jong-il Died… Today? (Part 2).”

Setting the stage for negotiations: Whenever returns to the negotiating table, be it Six-Party Talks or some other forum, they want to there as a nuclear power. Perhaps with Kim Jong-il heading the regime, or his successor (assuming the regime survives Kim’s death). The first test was a failure and Washington could easily ignore that status for Pyongyang, but with a likely successful test North Korea is moving towards de facto nuclear power status. Just getting the U.S. to admit North Korea is a nuclear state would be seen as a wild victory in Pyongyang, and would also feed domestic propaganda.

Wheeling and dealing, someday: Not right away, but eventually (the test was not about near-term concessions). At some point someone in Washington may make North Korea another offer they can’t refuse (to renege on) in exchange for selling off or allowing the monitoring of some part of their nuclear program. But North Korea won’t give up its nuclear program as long as it a sovereign country.

No good reason not to: The U.S. and UN have demonstrated to North Korea that neither has the current capacity or willpower to respond in a way North Korea finds unacceptable. The 2006 missile and nuke tests, the April TD-2 test, and now this; the U.S. talked big but in reality there are no consequences for North Korea, and Kim Jong-il knows it. What could/should be done? See OFK’s “Plan B” (no, it’s not a pill).

What it’s not about: Finally, Pyongyang did not conduct this second nuclear test because it felt ignored or wanted more attention from the Obama administration. It’s a reason that gets attached to many North Korean actions as sometimes North Korean acts of brinkmanship are indeed meant to get America’s attention, but not this time I think. After the April TD-2 test, North Korea threatened to escalate – what we’re seeing now – if the UN even discussed the TD-2 issue. A ridiculous and absurd demand, since the UN Security Council was practically guaranteed to make some sort of watered down statement. North Korea likely had a nuclear test planned before April and only the most unrealistic of responses from the U.S. would have prevented it.

Probably I missed something obvious, but those are the main reasons as I see them.

Not sure if this effect was intentional or not, but there seems to be markedly less interest in this likely successful nuclear test than there was for the unsuccessful one in 2006. Perhaps this is due to it following the TD-2 test so closely and getting sort of numbed to North Korean antics – how many times can we go to the brink of brinkmanship? – but I detect a “so what” factor. There is indeed a reason to care about this, but that’s the topic for another post…