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NORTH
KOREA'S DIRECTION IN
LATE 2002:
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 1994 AGREED FRAMEWORK & THE JUNE 2000 NORTH-SOUTH ACCORD Contents
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 During a meeting in P’yŏngyang on October 4, 2002, North Korean Deputy Foreign Minster Kang Seok-Ju [1] admitted to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly [2] that North Korea has secretly continued a nuclear-weapons development program, in addition to possessing “more powerful things,” perhaps alluding to chemical or biological weapons. (McGeary, 2002 & Sanger, 2002 October 16) The October 4 confession is the single most significant event in a recent string of noteworthy changes and admissions to come from North Korea, leading to the question: what direction is North Korea taking in late 2002? Engagement? Status quo? Something else? Is this a bid to admit past wrongs, address international concerns over weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and human rights issues, move towards openness, and enter the international community with some level of credibility and legitimacy? Is it an attempt to get the U.S. to recognize North Korea as a sovereign power to be dealt with? Or is the North simply precipitating yet another security-related diplomatic crisis in order to extract more aid from the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, and temporarily boost its faltering economy? Recent North Korean actions could be interpreted either way. Over the summer of 2002 North Korea reportedly made several fundamental changes to the operation of its socialist economic system, including a sharp increase in wages, restructuring of food production and markets in a more capitalistic fashion, including the end of the food rationing system, as well as an end to rent and utility free housing. (Bray, 2002) In early September of 2002, the North announced plans to repatriate Japanese Red Army Faction [3] members who hijacked a Japanese airliner to North Korea in 1970, and who have been living in North Korea ever since. (Watts, 2002) North Korea again surprised the international community when Chairman Kim Jong-Il [4] admitted to visiting Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi that North Korea had indeed abducted twelve Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. The abducted Japanese were used to teach language and culture in North Korean espionage training centers. The surviving Japanese have since returned to Japan. Kim Jong-Il also volunteered to indefinitely extend a self-imposed moratorium on missile testing, and agreed to abide by nuclear related agreements. ( [5]Yang Bin,as the project leader. [6] The region will reportedly have a legal and judiciary system separate from that of North Korea, allowing “unfettered capitalism.” (FlorCruz, 2002) Again, the underlying motives of these actions and what direction they may indicate are debatable since they can also be viewed as disingenuous attempts to qualify for additional aid, colonial reparations from Japan, removal from the U.S. list of terrorist nations, and the basic need to have a functioning system. Assuming that North Korea is moving towards openness may be premature.
The object of paper is to address the question – what
direction is North Korea taking in late 2002? An
attempt to answer that question will be made by analyzing North Korean
actions and negotiating patterns over the past decade, and applying
those insights to recent developments. The patterns and conclusions
derived from analysis of the events leading to the 1994 Agreed
Framework and to the June 2000 North-South Accord are of major
importance for three reasons. First, they
both resulted in historic agreements, even if now in question, which
present the opportunity to isolate general patterns of North Korean
behavior, or tactics, that may be indicative of overall strategy. Second, they occurred under the guidance of
different leaders: President Kim Il Sung and Chairman Kim Jong Il. While it is true that Kim Il Sung died before
the 1994 Agreed Framework was finalized, that agreement was brokered
under his regime, and his son and successor, Kim Jong Il, accepted
those terms. Major differences in negotiating tactics under the Kim Jong Il regime may reveal that regime’s strategy, and if that strategy has been altered significantly, therefore aiding in the understanding of actions North Korea will be likely to take in the future. Finally, the agreements were made between North Korea and two different states: the U.S. and South Korea. This provides the opportunity to see if and how North Korea interacts differently with those two nations. This is significant, since the U.S. and South Korea are North Korea’s two primary targets of engagement. Thus the goal is to recognize general patterns of behavior, the circumstances in which those patterns normally occur and will likely be repeated in future relations with North Korea, and the implications for recent and future developments. Methods In order to approach a “big picture” analysis of events related to the 1994 Agreed Framework and the June 2000 North-South Accord, two chronologies that reflect the most important period of diplomatic and related activity were constructed. For the 1994 Agreement the focus is on events from late 1991 until late 1994. However, North Korea’s motivations for and attempts at becoming a nuclear power will also be explained from this chronology, extending the starting point of the chronology back to 1945 (Appendix 1). For events leading to the June 2000 Accord, the concentration is on events from January 1999 until June 2000 (Appendix 2). These timelines contain the details and results of significant official and unofficial contacts, regional military events and policies such as international agreements, joint exercises, changes in troop levels, and other events that are related to or influence the primary areas of analysis. Emphasis is placed on recognizing patterns as well as the circumstances in which they normally occur, i.e., causal relationships. Data are to be interpreted in the context of current and developing events, with the intention of producing a set of observations indicating the normal actions and responses that may be expected when negotiating with North Korea, general recommendations for policy, and related observations.
The majority of data related to the historical context of
North Korea’s motivations for becoming a nuclear power, and related to
the 1994 Agreed Framework, Appendix 1, are drawn from secondary
sources: books, journal articles, etc., especially those that include
smaller chronologies or timelines. [7] The collection of data for the
compilation of chronologies focused on combining existing chronologies,
as well
as pulling dates, descriptions, and related information from a variety
of texts.
Due to the more recent events related to the June
2000 North-South Accord (Appendix 2), most data have been extracted
from primary sources: newspapers and electronic sources. Because many Internet resources are notoriously unreliable,
preferred electronic sources include established news organizations,
official governmental websites, educational institutions, or other
reputable organizations.
North
Korea as an Independent and Adaptive Actor
The first mention of Kim Il Sung’s Chuch’e doctrine occurred on December 28, 1955 after Stalin died and de-Stalinization was underway in the Soviet Union, which made Kim’s position less secure. The development of Chuch’e is largely attributed to the difficulties North Korea faced during the Sino-Soviet, Soviet-Korean, and Sino-Korean disputes, which weakened ties on all sides and forced North Korea to choose between becoming more independent and self-sufficient, or assuming a more submissive posture. “Contrary to the common view that the North Korean pendulum swung back and forth in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the North Koreans viewed their position as firm as they tried to maintain their independence between Soviet revisionism and Chinese dogmatism.” (Suh, 1988: 189)
Kim Il Sung wanted to stay neutral during the Sino-Soviet dispute, however Khrushchev’s position of “peaceful coexistence” with the West was incompatible for a divided Korea, and the anti-Stalin revisionism bothered Kim, who had idolized Stalin. Eventually Kim supported China on the basis that China, consisting of two-thirds of the socialist population, could not be ignored and that leadership should be Sino-Soviet rather than not Soviet alone. Kim’s support for China led to the Soviet-Korean dispute, but after “the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964, the North Koreans did try to readjust their relationship with the Soviet Union, irrespective of the persistent Chinese difficulties with the new leadership.” (Suh, 1988: 189) However, the relationship was an adjustment to the new circumstances rather than a restoration of old ties.
The Sino-Korea
problems, which were resolved in 1970, did not come so much from the
Korean efforts to normalize with Russia, but from the “radical Red
Guard movement of the Cultural Revolution.” (Suh, 1988: 190) The Chuch’e
doctrine matured during these disputes, but had “little relevance to the tenets of Marxism
and Leninism,” (Suh, 1988: 305) which is
an indication of ideological independence.
In December of 1972 the North
Korean constitution was altered for the first
time since 1948. One of the major changes promoted Kim from
Party Premier to national President, which was significant because it
officially shifted from Communist Party orientation to that of an
independent state and autonomous leader with a title separate from the
Party. Even more significant was the
replacement of
communist doctrine with that of Chuch’e. The change may also have
been to help promote his “leadership of the non-aligned nations, and to
equalize his position with that of the South Korean president.” (Suh, 1988: 275)
The
Sino-Soviet, Soviet-Korean, and
Sino-Korean disputes damaged the ties between North Korea, Russia, and
China, and caused North Korea to take a more independent stance
ideologically as well
as militarily. In light of current events, it is very important
to
recognize the relatively limited influence that China and Russia now
exert
over North Korea, indicating that North Korea must be engaged more
directly
by the U.S. and South Korea.
Motivations for and
Attempts at Becoming a Nuclear Power
As awareness of the North Korean nuclear program began to grow, so did international pressure for North Korea to comply with the NPT and allows safeguards inspections and ensure safety. However, “at critical points North Korea chose to cultivate uncertainty instead.” (Downs, 1999: 212) Even after the US announced the withdraw of nuclear weapons worldwide, which had been a North Korean precondition for continuing inspections, the North never did fully cooperate. (Sigal, 1998: 30) The lesson learned for North Korea was that: The more the outside world feared it, the more its nuclear program was a valuable asset to North Korea, which had few other resources of external worth after the decline of its alliances with the Soviet Union and China. There is no evidence that P’yŏngyang saw the nuclear program as a bargaining chip at its inception, but the record is clear that by the 1990s it had learned the program’s value in relations with the world outside. (Oberdorfer, 2001: 249-250)
The events leading to the 1994 Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North Korea weave a complex tapestry of roller coaster-like negotiations, [14] and varying levels of talks, meetings, military posturing, sanctions, and threats. This section critically examines these events in order to locate and understand patterns in North Korean negotiating behavior with the U.S., and to some extent, South Korea. In order to evaluate these events one must first know what events occurred and, perhaps more importantly, in what context they occurred. A literature review reveals several books and journals that devote articles or chapters [15] to describing these events, as well as several brief chronologies in the form of appendices. However, most of theses studies focus on a larger range of historical events, or are confined to a narrower scope of events related to the 1994 Agreed Framework, which prompted the compilation of a more inclusive chronology [16] for this paper. The importance of having a “big picture” timeline available becomes even more apparent when attempting to evaluate the rhetoric of North Korea, which often does not match its actions, and where one must assume that actions speak louder than words. Commenting on a report issued by the KCNA, [17] which seemed to dismiss the possibility of resuming U.S.-DPRK talks, South Korean spokesman Lim Dong-Won [18] stated that: “You have to differentiate between real policy and proclaimed policy,” Lim told Reuters. “This is proclaimed policy,” he said, waving a copy of the KCNA report. He said it did not reflect the North's real thinking, but signaled it wanted the Bush administration to tone down its rhetoric against the North. (Nesirky, 2002)Officially stated goals “can be either incomplete or misleading; they need to be supplemented or even modified by latent goals – those that have not been revealed or acknowledged” in the context of the need for regime survival, and therefore negotiations. (Koh, in Suh & Lee, 1998: 85) North Korean intent as demonstrated in the patterns found in actions, rather than in words alone, is the target of analysis. The timeframe of analysis for the 1994 Agreed Framework represents the most significant period of events from late 1991 until the agreement was reached on October 21, 1994. As with most negotiations of this type, there are both positive and negative periods of interaction. For the purpose of this analysis, the natural breaks which occurred where changes from positive to negative were identified and evaluated, or vice versa. In this case “negative” indicates a general period of non-cooperation, hostile behavior, or any other actions or gestures that tend to harm relations, while “positive” indicates cooperation, compromise, or any otherwise positive progress. When the state of relations were in a certain condition (i.e., positive or negative), the majority of actions taken by either side tended to follow that general direction, until one of the actors initiated a change, or an action that was contrary to ongoing positive or negative state, and the other actors followed suit. Any actor involved may have taken actions contrary to the then current state of relations, but if the state of relations remained generally the same, a change in the state is not considered to have occurred. For example, consider the following scenario: the U.S. and North Korea are hostile toward one another, resulting in negative state of affairs. North Korea then unilaterally initiates some positive form of action. If the U.S. reciprocates, a change in the state of affairs has occurred, shifting towards the positive. However, if the positive action or gesture is ignored and the state of relations remains the same, no change or shift in the state of relations has occurred.
Table 1. Major Shifts in
North Korean Nuclear Negotiations
As Table 1 [19] above demonstrates, an analysis of events from September 1991, when international awareness and pressure rapidly increased, until the Agreed Framework was reached in October 1994 reveals sixteen definite changes in the state of relations during the negotiating process. Table 1 above lists these changes, identifies the initiator, and gives a brief explanation. The “initiator” refers to the nation (or nations, in one case) that initiated that particular change in the state or relations. The “relations” column refers to the state of relations, either positive or negative, while the “from” and “to” columns give the dates. The
tallies in Table 2 clearly indicate that North Korea was the major
initiator of changes in the state of relations, being wholly
responsible for eight of the sixteen changes and one joint change,
deciding the nature of relations about twice as much as either South
Korea or the U.S. On the other hand, South Korea was not responsible
for any of the positive changes in relations, and the U.S. was involved
in only three such changes.
Table 2. Who Initiated What
Change?
However, changing the
state of relations does not necessarily equate to a sincere action,
necessitating a closer look at each change to determine causal
relationships. When examining the conditions and outcomes of the
positive shifts associated with North Korea, several appear to be
insincere attempts to gain time while continuing to stave off IAEA
inspections, or gain concessions from the U.S.
A change for the positive came on November 11, 1991 when North Korea declared it would sign the IAEA safeguards accord if the U.S. removed nuclear weapons from South Korea. (Sigal, 1998: 31-32) Since the U.S. had already announced that it was removing nuclear weapons worldwide, this was indeed a cooperative move by North Korea. Following this shift to the positive, North and South Korea concluded the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation on December 13, (Snyder, 1999: 163), and on December 18 South Korean president Roh announced on television that all nuclear weapons had been removed from the nation. (Oberdorfer, 2001: 262) This led to the December 31, 1991 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which went beyond the requirements of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). (Oberdorfer, 2001: 264) [20] In a late January 1992 meeting between under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Arnold Kanter and Korean Workers Party Secretary for International Affairs Kim Yong Sun, the U.S. tried to emphasize that they did not pose a nuclear threat to North Korea by inviting them to make inspections in the South. (Downs, 1999: 219) Soon thereafter, North Korea finally signed the IAEA safeguards agreement, in accordance with the 1985 NPT. (Oberdorfer, 2001: 267 & Downs, 1999: 219) On March 14, 1992 the North and South provisionally agreed to establish a Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) to monitor the 1991 denuclearization accord, (Sigal, 1998: 39), and on May 4 North Korea gave the IAEA a 150-page inventory of nuclear material and equipment. (Downs, 1999: 219) The information given was more detailed than required, and disclosed that they had reprocessed 90 grams (about 3 ounces) of plutonium. (Kwan, 1995: 73) [21] However, relations again became negative in September of 1992 after the IAEA discovered that it had been supplied with incorrect nuclear data by North Korea, and the North-South subcommittee for Nuclear Matters broke down. [22] The IAEA pushed for special inspections, and South Korea announced the discovery of an alleged North Korean spy ring as relations deteriorated. (Snyder, 1999: 164) On November 11 the IAEA announced that it had “indisputable” evidence that North Korea had created and concealed a trench between the Yongbyon reprocessing plant and an undeclared building believed to be a nuclear waste storage facility. In a face saving move, chief inspector Hans Blix decided to allow a change to the original declaration with little admission of North Korean fault. The North Korean representatives at first seemed amenable, but reversed their position the next day, perhaps after word from higher up: they then accused one of the IAEA inspectors of being a CIA agent. (Oberdorfer, 2001: 275) At a closed session of the IAEA board on February 22, 1993, several U.S. intelligence satellite photos showing North Korean nuclear installations and attempts at concealing them were reveled. North Korea representative Ho Jin Yun declared the photographs to be “fakery,” but it was a significant loss of face for the North. (Oberdorfer, 2001: 277) The situation went from bad to worse when North Korea gave a 90-day notice of intent to withdrawal from NPT, effective June 12. (Sigal, 1998: 50) Reasons cited for withdrawing where Team Spirit, which North Korea said violated the North-South denuclearization accord, and the IAEA demand of special inspections. (Downs, 1999: 227; Oberdorfer, 2001: 279-280 & Snyder, 1999: 164) This led the IAEA to take the unprecedented act of declaring an NPT signatory, North Korea, to be in violation of its safeguards agreement [23] on April 1, 1993. (Sigal, 1998: 57) Taking an unofficial approach in April of 1993, North Korean ambassador to the UN, Ho Jong, called Kenneth Quinones of the State Dept. Korea desk, and working-level talks followed their conversation (Oberdorfer, 2001: 283 & Sigal, 1998: 59), creating a positive state of affairs. Thereafter the IAEA then accepted a North Korean offer to allow inspectors to maintain cameras and other monitoring equipment. The IAEA wanted more, but had to take what they could get in order to maintain the validity of safeguards information, and the U.S. agreed to reopen high-levels talks with no preconditions. (Sigal, 1998: 61-62) Another call to Kenneth Quinones on June 7, 1993 led to informal meetings in a New York coffee shop for three days. (Oberdorfer, 2001: 285) This resulted in more formal working-level meetings with U.S. negotiator Robert Gallucci and Kang Seok-Ju where a six paragraph joint statement was crafted on June 11 (Downs, 1999: 230), and North Korea unilaterally suspended its decision to withdrawal from the NPT while talks continued. (Downs, 1999: 230-233) [24] During talks on July 17 and 18, North Korea first proposed the replacement of its gas-graphite reactors with two light-water (LW) reactors. The U.S. was not prepared for that offer and did not appear to know what to do with it, but later thought it was something they could work with. (Sigal, 1998: 68 & Snyder, 1999: 164) Despite U.S. “pleas,” unyielding South Korean demands for immediate inspections and for North Korea to scrap the reprocessing plant at Yongbyon, however, derailed the fragile negotiating process on July 21, 1993, causing a negative state of affairs. North Korea then limited IAEA inspections to routine maintenance, such as replacing camera film and batteries. When the IAEA inspectors tried to do more, they were physically intimidated. The IAEA said that they could not do their jobs. (Sigal, 1998: 71-72) In August of 1993, North Korea initiated a positive shift by contacting Kenneth Quinones for the third time. This led to North Korean representatives Kim Jong Su and Ho Jong meeting with and asking ask U.S. negotiator and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Hubbard to invite South Korean representatives to Panmunjom for working-level contacts. In September, the U.S. expressed a willingness to discuss the cancellation of Team Spirit, and the North suggested abandoning the step-by-step approach, which required pre-conditions, for a comprehensive package deal of quid pro quos. (Sigal, 1998: 77-78) At an IAEA General Conference, Hans Blix stated that IAEA access to North Korean sites (camera maintenance) was not enough, and by a vote of 72-2 it was decided to urge North Korea to immediately cooperate more fully. North Korea then suspended consultations with the agency on September 27, 1993, plunging the situation into crisis yet again. (Sigal, 1998: 73) Although talks continued, conditions remained tense and hostile until later in October, when North Korean negotiators again raised the subject of a possible comprehensive deal. Quinones asked for it in writing, and the next morning received a package that contained all the elements that would later be included in the 1994 Agreed Framework. This was a North Korean attempt to eliminate pre-conditions by laying out a “road map” of actions to be taken by each side at given times and simultaneously, getting past the “you go first” part of the process, while still retaining some leverage with unfulfilled promises. (Oberdorfer, 2001: 293 & Sigal, 1998: 78) However, North Korea’s continued non-compliance with IAEA inspections, which were becoming critical, led Hans Blix to report to the UN General Assembly. In November the Assembly called on North Korea to cooperate by a vote of 140-1, [25] (Bayer, 1995: 198) and the state of affairs was again tense and hostile. North Korean Foreign Minster Han stated that “It is not yet the stage to consider the package deal insisted [on] by” North Korea. “Instead of carrots [South Korea] began reaching for a stick.” (Sigal, 1998: 73 & 86) Changes in the U.S. approach led the way to continued talks with North Korea. Specifically, on November 15, 1993, the U.S. decided that direct contact was more appropriate, and that the normal diplomatic channels were something of a waste of time. There was considerable concern about the South Korean reaction, [26] but the U.S. pressed on and, with North Korea, accepted the idea of a package deal without specifying the contents. (Oberdorfer, 2001: 295 & Sigal, 1998: 82-85) U.S. fears about South Korea’s reaction were realized when, on November 23, South Korean president Kim Young Sam completely rejected any direct U.S.-North Korean contact that did not include the South. The U.S. was forced to choose between an ally that felt insecure, and reneging on earlier statements concerning direct contacts with North Korea – it chose the latter, and tensions rose. (Oberdorfer, 2001: 296) [27] Due to North Korean non-compliance with inspections, Blix reported to the IAEA board in December of 1993 that inspectors could not provide any assurance that North Korea was not producing new plutonium (Downs, 1999: 235), increasing the seriousness of the situation. In late December the U.S. and North Korea reached an agreement that would allow IAEA inspections at all facilities except for two nuclear waste sites (Downs, 1999: 235), decidedly shifting the state of affairs to the positive. After a few rough spots, another agreement was reached in February of 1994 that would reopen North-South talks, high-level U.S.-North Korea talks in Geneva, and more significantly (to North Korea), cancel Team Spirit 1994. Less than two weeks later a team of six IAEA inspectors were allowed into North Korea. (Bayer, 1995: 199-200) Perhaps fearing that they were giving up too much, or yielding to pressure from South Korea, the U.S. suddenly reversed course and insisted that the opening of high-level U.S.-North Korea talks were conditional on an actual exchanges of North-South nuclear envoys [28], rather than merely on talks to discuss such an exchange. (Bayer, 1995: 200) While the U.S. was correct about the spirit of the agreement, the letter of the agreement favored North Korea, placing responsibility for the ensuing negative state of affairs on the U.S. The situation deteriorated to the point that on April 15, 1994, the IAEA ordered inspectors to leave North Korea, since they could not carry out their duties, and it was decided to turn the matter over to the UN Security Council. (Oberdorfer, 2001: 303) The situation was again reversed to the positive when the U.S. and North Korea reached yet another agreement in May 1994. The U.S. agreed to cancel Team Spirit if North Korea would allow the IAEA to finish its March inspection, and to install inspectors to monitor the removal and storage of fuel rods. (Bayer, 1995: 204) On May 27, 1994 the IAEA reported that North Korea was blatantly disregarding agreements and restrictions by removing fuel rods “at a very fast pace,” which threatens to damage the value of the rods for testing purposes. IAEA wanted to test the rods for the core of the reactor for indications of how much plutonium had been processed in the past. (Bayer, 1995: 205) This was one of the most serious breaches of the NPT, and greatly increased military tensions on the peninsula. On June 2 the IAEA declared that its ability to verify the past history of the reactors had been lost due to the improper defueling carried out by North Korea. (Downs, 1999: 237-238 & Oberdorfer, 2001: 316) The U.S. announcement that it would seek sweeping UN sanctions against North Korea was met with North Korea’s announcement that it was immediately withdrawing from the NPT and expelling IAEA inspectors. (Bayer, 1995: 205-207; Downs, 1999 238 & Oberdorfer, 2001: 310-311) On June 5 former president Jimmy Carter learned from Robert Gallucci that there was no plan for direct contact with Kim Il Sung and decided to go to P’yŏngyang himself. (Oberdorfer, 2001: 317-318) Ten days later, Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter, along with a small group of aids, arrived in P’yŏngyang via the DMZ. (Bayer, 1995: 207 & Oberdorfer, 2001: 326) During the same period, Chinese diplomats were informing North Korea in both Beijing and P’yŏngyang that China may not be able to veto a UN Security Council resolution due to overwhelming international pressure. China recommended that North Korea cooperate [29] with the IAEA. (Oberdorfer, 2001: 320-321) Carter and Kim Il Sung concluded the historic agreement on June 16, 1994: North Korea would keep its spent fuel rods in storage and to resume negotiations with the U.S. if the U.S. would supply two light-water reactors. [30] (Bayer, 1995: 207-210; Downs, 1999: 243; Oberdorfer, 2001: 356-357 & Snyder, 1999: 165) With the benefit of hindsight we can look back and see that even as agreements were being made, many of them were not meant to be kept. For example, concerning a February 25, 1994 agreement of “sequence measures” between the U.S. and North Korea, “North Korean broadcasts were repeatedly beaming various implications that P’yŏngyang would implement the ‘sequence measures’ only in its own ways and not necessarily in a way agreed on with the other party.” (Kwan, 1995: 78-79) This approach was also combined with rational and reasonable requests. For example, one of the major preconditions the North had for allowing inspections was the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the South, but even after that precondition was met, reciprocation did not follow with the inspections that had been promised. (Oberdorfer, 2001: 256-257) This is also true of the cancellation of the 1992 Team Spirit joint exercise. Even though North Korea did not permit the agreed upon inspections after that 1992 cancellation, they protested loudly when the 1993 exercises were announced. (Downs, 1999: 216-217) It also becomes clear that North Korea has attempted to tie its long-term goals, related to legitimacy and more recently to regime survival, to the relatively new processes associated with the nuclear issue. These long-term goals have: ... been to realize the normalization of relations with the United States, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, the replacement of the current armistice agreement between communist forces and the U.N. Command with a peace pact between North Korea and the United States, the abolishment of the existing U.S. – South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty and then the introduction of U.S. economic aid, among others. This has been the main frame of the strategy the North has pursued for decades. (Kwan, 1995: 84)Not only would North Korea stand to gain in trade and aid from the U.S. if their goals were accomplished, but they also see the opportunity to weaken the security alliance between the U.S. and South Korea, and increasing perceived legitimacy. (Downs, 1999: 213) There is a difference between “crazy” and “brinksmanship.” Tactically, the chronology of events clearly shows patterns of aggressive or offensive behavior at first, followed either by a break in negotiations, or by more flexile behavior in order to gain maximum concessions. (Huh, 1996: 34-35) In this way, North Korea is predictable, and even logical: In a strict sense, then, North Korea’s reversal of its UN policy helped protect and even enhance its national interest; the reversal was therefore not a real setback but an act of pragmatic adaptation to a changing environment... In terms or results obtained thus far, [policy toward the US] can be rated as one of the most successful polices the DPRK has ever pursued. (Koh, in Suh & Lee, 1998: 86)The trick is in not going too far and causing some type of armed conflict, which is possible when the North engages in such brinksmanship since they cannot be entirely certain of when they have gone too far. This tactic is often combined with the tactic of stalling and ending talks: North Korea does not face the same time or electorate pressures that U.S. or South Korean administrations face, and in extreme cases they are able to wait for an administration change. The U.S. has not been entirely without blame in the troublesome negotiation process. U.S. policy makers and negotiators have, ironically, been accused of being too legalistic: “They ignore that the [NPT] itself embodies inducements for signing, most notably, help with nuclear power in return for foregoing nuclear-arming.” (Sigal, 1998: 7) However, the analysis reveals that North Korea is even more legalistic in its interpretation of agreements. For example, regarding the exchange of envoys between the North and South per the February 25, 1994 “sequence measures” stipulated, North Korea’s position has been that agreements spoke of contacts to discuss envoys, but did not require actual envoys. This shows that they do understand the wording of agreements very well, and are being extremely legalistic. Lawyers should be included with negotiation teams, if they are not already. (Kwan, 1995: 78-79) This basically amounts to ignoring understood obligations by professing a different interpretation of agreements. (Kwan, 1995: 85) When dealing with North Korea, the “spirit” of the agreement is meaningless. To be fair, North Korea might say the same of the U.S. The most prominent pattern revealed in the analysis of events, and again with the benefit of hindsight, is simply that North Korea cannot be trusted to keep international agreements. This refers to both the spirit and the letter of agreements. The examples are numerous. North Korea agreed to sign safeguard agreements, which it had in fact had already agreed to do by becoming a signatory of the NPT, but required separate preconditions to both the signing and implementation of the safeguard agreements. (Sigal, 1998: 31-32) Only then was the reprocessing of nuclear material halted, even though it was expressly forbidden by the NPT. (Oberdorfer, 2001: 267) This is apparent all through the events related to the 1994 agreement, including the removal of fuel rods in May and June of 1994 that nearly caused a war on the peninsula. It could be argued that the North Korean leadership does not fully comprehend the meaning of the agreements it has concluded, but the evidence indicates otherwise. If the legalistic dance of semantics concerning the exchange of envoys, or the neatly prepared light-water package deal indicates anything, it is that the North Korean negotiators know exactly what they are doing and how far to go – in the past, at least. This will be discussed further in the current events and the conclusions sections.
Events leading to the June 2000 North-South summit and Joint Agreement cannot be considered outside the context of the “Sunshine” policy. President Kim Dae-jung, who replaced President Kim Young-Sam on February 25, 1998, brought about a dramatic change in how South Korea interacted with the North. Rather than attempting to contain North Korea with the goal of reunification through absorption, Kim’s Sunshine policy emphasized peaceful coexistence and cooperation entity. Second, the South emphasized there would be no attempt at a hostile takeover or absorption of the North. Third, the South would help North Korea with massive infusions of food, agricultural, and related aid. The Sunshine policy also included expanding non-governmental organizational (NGO) activity in North Korea, especially those giving aid, and the attempted revival of stalled diplomatic talks. (Kampani, Medeiros, & Dutra, 1999) The success of the Sunshine Policy is debatable, and will be discussed in the following sections. Like the previous section concerning the 1994 Agreed Framework, the function of this section is to critically examine the events leading to the June 2000 Accord in order to locate and understand any significant patterns in North Korean negotiating behavior, and what factors might be most relevant to future relations. Unlike events leading to the 1994 Agreed Framework, however, which more or less followed the traditional method of problem resolution common to international negotiations, events preceding the June 2000 Accord stemmed overwhelmingly from a unilateral South Korean initiative to engage the North and facilitate peaceful interaction and positive change on the peninsula. Accordingly, these events must be evaluated differently than those of the 1994 agreement. The period of analysis for events leading to the June 2000 Accord is from January 1, 1999 until the agreement was concluded on June 15, 2000. The start date for analysis was chosen for three reasons. First, it began with South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung’s New Years address that included statements strongly indicating a renewed effort for engagement (Kim reaffirms, 1999 January 01). Second, following that speech South Korean actions generally followed the spirit of what was said, which resulted in a sort of revitalization of the Sunshine Policy. Third, using January 1 as a starting point makes for a relatively neat period of analysis, resulting in an approximately 18-month period to examine. While the structure of the chronology for these events is identical to the timeline for the 1994 agreement, the content is drastically different, making an evaluation based on direct reciprocal behavior impossible. Instead, events for each month were considered individually and the actions of both the North and South were judged to be either positive, neutral, or negative, and degrees thereof, for that month. This is admittedly a subjective process, but every attempt to include relevant contextual information has been made. Analysis of events reveals three relatively natural breaks in relations: January through June 1999 (six months), July through November 1999 (five months), and December 1999 through June 2000 (seven months). The first period was from January through June of 1999, which starts at the beginning of the period of analysis and ends just after the June 15 naval clash, in which South Korea sunk one North Korea vessel and heavily damaged another. (WuDunn, 1999 June 15) The period began with South Korean president Kim Dae Jung pledging to continue the Sunshine policy on engagement in the New Year. (Kim Reaffirms, 1999) The Rodong Sinmun replied that Kim Dae Jung should step down for bankrupting his country. (S. Korean Chief, 1999) For this entire time, leading up to and including the West cost naval clash in June, the South was very positive to a cool and generally hostile North. While South Korea was investing literally hundreds of millions of dollar in the North [31] and sending hundred of thousand of tons of badly needed fertilizer, the North was declaring that the 1994 Agreed Framework was useless (Nothing can, 1999), and accusing both the U.S. and South Korea of kidnapping a North Korean diplomat and his wife (U.S. will be, 1999 & Overseas Koreans, 1999) who had reportedly defected. (Jun, 1999 January 19) North Korea also made its usual demands that South Korea abolish the National Security Law and cease military exercises with “foreign powers,” i.e. the U.S. (N.K. repeats conditions, 1999) Living up to its reputation for bizarre accusations, North Korea accused South Korea of poisoning food aid in order “to achieve their sinister design… [of] killing a large number of people in the north.” (S. Korea's anti-DPRK, 1999) Finally on June 15, 1999, following several days of North Korean patrol boats making excursions into Southern waters, the two sides clashed, resulting in the sinking of a North Korean vessel and the deaths of all 17 crew member. (WuDunn, 1999 June 17) The South maintained amazing restraint, even following the naval clash, ensuring that economic issues remained separate from security, allowing South Korean business to continue to invest [32] in the North, and keeping aid flowing. During this time, and in contrast to the positive “Sunshine” coming from the South, the North made numerous verbal attacks on the South, including several on Kim Dae Jung. [33] The second period was from July through November 1999. In contrast to the first period above, the South became somewhat subdued and less enthusiastic after the June naval clash. The North, while not being friendly, became less hostile, resulting in a sort of cooling off period where both sides moved towards relative neutrality. Perhaps in response to the sinking of its naval vessel, North Korea detained several South Korean tourists at the Mount Kumgang facility, accusing them of being “spies.” After days of talks, and a South Korean threat to withhold fertilizer aid, the hostages were released. (Kim Ji-ho, 1999 June 24) Also probably a form of retribution, North Korea also refused to even discuss family reunions, one of Seoul’s highest priorities, following the June naval clash. (Shin Yong-bae, 1999 July 2) When South Korea refused to allow the Kumgang tours to resume (Kim Ji-ho, 1999 July 14), North Korea denounced the Sunshine policy. (S. Korea's, 1999 July 16) While still allowing substantial aid to flow to North Korea, the South took several steps that the North considered to be hostile, including agreements with both Japanese and Russian navies to hold joint exercises. (Korean, Japanese, 1999 June 22 & Lee Sung-yul, 1999 June 22) Additionally, the U.S. continued tests of the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system (Becker, 1999), Japan threatened to suspend cash remittances [34] from Koreans in Japan to North Korea if the North proceeded with plans to test fire another long-range missile (Sims, 1999), and the U.S. and South Korea held talks on extending the range of South Korean missiles up to 300 km. (Shin Yong-bae, 1999 November 19) However, it was not all threatening. South Korea also signed an agreement with the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to supply over three billion dollars to help finance the two proposed light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea. (Jun Kwan-woo, 1999 July 3) In September the U.S. and North Korea reached an agreement that tentatively stopped North Korean missile testing in exchange for the removal of some sanctions (Sanger, 1999 September 14), and South Korea followed suit by allowing Hyundai to construct a $34 million dollar stadium in the North. (Kim Ji-ho, 1999 September 21) Then in November North Korea simultaneously demanded that the U.S. lift sanctions and expelled a U.S. citizen of Korean ancestry who was accused of espionage. (Shin Yong-bae, 1999 November 19 & U.S. Citizen, 1999 November 19) This is similar to the actions taken in retaliation after the June naval clash, revealing a definite pattern of behavior. Overall, the North was less hostile and the South was slightly less friendly during this period, resulting in a sort of cooling off period where both sides moved towards relative neutrality. Having said this, the South did still continue to seek talks, family reunion, and to send aid, and the North’s less hostile but cool response could be responsible for the South’s frustration during this period. The
third and final period in this analysis is from December 1999 until
the accord was signed on June 15, 2000. In February the North began to
show signs it would accept Kim Dae-Jung’s summit offer, and the South
became even more positive than in the first period above. The North did
also become more positive than in previous times, but nowhere near the
level
of the South, and many actions seem disingenuous, particularly with the
benefit of hindsight.
In January of 2000 President Kim Dae Jung made the first mention of an inter-Korean summit if his party, the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), won elections, saying “If the people provide strength to the [MDP] through this election, I will propose an inter-Korean summit with North Korea's Chairman Kim Jong-il...” (Chon Shi-yong, 2000 January 21) A Japanese pledge of one billion dollars to KEDO in late January (KEDO, Japan, 2000 January 29) was followed by increased calls from South Korea for a summit, which received the full support of the U.S. (Kim Ji-ho, 2000 March 14) This immediately led to elation in South Korea, and was followed by a storm of wildly positive speculation by both South Koreans and foreigners alike, including conventional arms reduction, the establishment of liaison offices, possible World Bank aid to North Korea, normalization with several EU nations, as well as talk of more aid to help the North. [35] However, the international community was given a dose of reality when North Korea accused the South of having “massively stockpiled chemical weapons.” (Real danger, 2000) This was followed by the demand that the U.S. remit compensation for delays “in the construction of two light-water nuclear reactors” (Shin Yong-bae, 2000 May 30), as well as the standard demand for the withdraw of U.S. troops. (Kim Ji-ho, 2000 June 7) Even just a few days before the summit, North Korea released statements denying that they had kidnapped any Japanese citizens (Absurd assertion, 2000 June 11), and that former U.S. president Truman gave the order to begin the Korean War. (U.S. order, 2000 June 12) Still, South Korean and foreign governments kept aid pouring into North Korea (Japanese gov't, 2000 June 3), and journalists flocked to Seoul to cover the event, even if from afar. (Chang Jae-soon, 2000 June 3) Former U.S. president Jimmy Carter put in his two cents as well by suggesting that the U.S. lift all economic sanctions, and pledge not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea. ('N.K.'s desire to, 2000 June 8) Even though Seoul had a strict government budget following the 1997 financial crisis, the Ministry of Planning and Budget “hinted… that it [might] expand fund allocations toward economic cooperation and relief to the North.” (Cho Young-sam, 2000 June 14) When the North-South Joint Accord [36] was announced on June 15, it receive acclaim from all sides: Leaders of North and South Korea reach broad agreement to work for peace and unity on their bitterly divided peninsula, biggest step to ease tensions in 50 years; agreement, which comes on second day of summit meeting in North Korean capital, P’yŏngyang, is signed and toasted by Kim Dae Jung of South Korea and Kim Jong Il of North Korea… (French, 2000 June 15) The Joint Declaration resulting from the June 13-15, 2000 North-South summit is significant for several reasons, particularly in that North and South Korea recognized each other officially for the fist time, unlike previous agreements reached in 1972 and 1991. (Bradner, 2000) The summit was followed by an unprecedented meeting of the nations defense ministers in September 2000, several family reunions (Cossa, 2001: 1), and a visit to P’yŏngyang by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in October 2000. (North Korea’s Engagement, 2001) Initially hailed as a watershed in inter-Korean relations, little progress has been made since the agreement, prompting comparisons to previous declarations and attempts at engagement that amounted to little more than unimplemented promises, the 1972 joint declaration and the 1991 de-nuclearization accord being prime examples. The result has been growing international skepticism, which makes for a sharp contrast when compared to South Korean enthusiasm: All this preceded the 2000 summit, which produced grand plans - trans-DMZ road and rail links, above all - only for P’yŏngyang to back off, using Bush as flimsy excuse. This year alone, North Korea agreed to restart talks in April, cancelled in May, killed five ROK sailors in June, said sorry (sort of) in July, and now in August is talking again. This we should cheer? Once they get 300,000 tons of surplus Southern rice… what betting they find some pretext to pull out again? (Foster-Carter, 2002)While the above observation may seem rather skeptical, it also appears to be rather correct. Besides indicating that North Korea may expel U.S. or South Korean citizens in times of disagreement, and with the aid of hindsight, the most significant lesson from these events is that North Korea is willing to make agreements and accept aid, but not to make any concrete changes or concessions. Despite the family reunions, unprecedented summit, and increased contacts, what changes has North Korea made that cannot be reversed overnight? Precious few. As early as August of 2000, this speculative analysis was made following an Army War College sponsored workshop on Competitive Strategies: One suspects that [the June 2000 Accord] may ultimately fit the pattern of earlier agreements, when the first stage was agreement on a set of principles without specific commitments, the second was disagreement over correct interpretation of the principles, and the third was the breakup of the dialog amid mutual recriminations and P’yŏngyang's accusations that the ROK had betrayed the spirit of the agreement. (Bradner, 2000)Unfortunately, that assessment has been remarkably accurate, so far. Those patterns appear to be consistent. In the following section more current events will be analyzed, bringing the big picture into a sharper focus. If North Korea’s hostile actions and a general lack of cooperation following the 1994 Agreed Framework and June 2000 Summit caused skepticism, their actions in 2002 could arguably have been considered both very promising and progressive – until the October 4, 2002 admission of a nuclear weapons program. That admission necessarily altered the contextual framework from which North Korea must be viewed and evaluated, bringing any perceived good intentions into serious doubt. This section will explore the more current events of 2002 in that context. As mentioned in the introduction, North Korea reportedly made several fundamental changes to its economic system over the summer of 2002. Perhaps three of the most significant were reform of the food production system, moves away from the rationing system to a more market-type system for both food and consumer goods, and the introduction of both rent and fee-for-service utilities. (Bray, 2002) This came after several trips to China by Kim Jong Il, and has generally been met with positively in South Korea and abroad a sign of coming openness in North Korea. The changes, however, have not been followed with any sign of more openness, making such an assumption doubtful. Rather, these events should more likely be interpreted as a harsh realization by the North that their socialist system, if left unaltered, would cause the end of the regime. Anything that betters the lives of the North Korean people should be cheered, but to automatically consider such changes as a sign of impending openness is less than realistic. More recently, in early September of 2002, the North announced plans to repatriate Japanese Red Army Faction members who had hijacked a Japanese airliner to North Korea in 1970, and who have been living in North Korea ever since. (Watts, 2002) This was quickly followed by the surprising and long awaited for admission that North Korea had indeed abducted several Japanese citizens [37] in the 1970s and 1980s, and used them as language and culture instructors in North Korean espionage training centers. Kim Jong-Il, apparently on a roll, also volunteered to indefinitely extend a self-imposed moratorium on missile testing, and agreed to abide by its previous nuclear nonproliferation agreements. ( However, our long experience with North Korea teaches that North Korea's actual future behavior will determine whether these declarations are motivated by sincerity or by the old North Korean tactic of manipulation. (Niksch, 2002)[38][39] Yang Bin,as the project leader. [40] The region will reportedly have a legal and judiciary system separate from that of North Korea, allowing “unfettered capitalism,” (FlorCruz, 2002) assuming it is able to get underway. The: ... bizarre-sounding plan would involve sealing off the city from the rest of the Stalinist state with a specially-built wall and replacing many of the city's inhabitants with handpicked skilled workers. (China Detains, 2002)Again, while the SEZ has been hailed as proof of impending openness, the fact that areas exposed to foreigners would be walled off and specially selected workers would be used, perhaps referring to Chinese of Korean ethnicity, bring the possible benefits of openness into serious doubt. The plan, like the moves to appease the Japanese and win reparations, must be considered to be attempts to gain currency and prolong the life of the regime, not an indication of fledgling North Korean attempts at openness and reform. Finally the October 4 admission itself must be considered. With limited information, an optimistic interpretation could be that North Korea was admitting past infractions in an attempt to come clean. The rest of story, however, disappoints optimists. The revelation came one day after North Korean officials were confronted with U.S. intelligence information indicating that North Korea has been attempting to acquire large quantities of high-strength aluminum, a key element for the construction of a type of centrifuge [41] used to enrich uranium, as well as “reports of significant construction activity that appeared related to a uranium-enrichment facility.” (Warrick, 2002) In February of 1993, when confronted with U.S. intelligence satellite photos showing the construction of nuclear installations, and attempts at concealing them, North Korean negotiators declared the photographs to be “fakery,” but later had to concede the point. (Oberdorfer, 2001: 277) Perhaps that memory combined with the new U.S. intelligence reports convinced North Korean officials not to attempt to deny the “irrefutable evidence of culpability.” (Mansourov, 2002) The admission did not follow with offers or statements that would indicate North Korea had plans to halt their nuclear weapons program, but that they were entitled to have such a program, although in direct violation of several agreements, including the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the 1991 Denuclearization Accord, and most significantly the 1994 Agreed Framework. [42] Additionally, the admission did not occur as an offered confession, but came only after the U.S. showed enough evidence of the existence of such a program to make further denials useless. (Sanger, 2002 November 24) The North attempted to blame the continuation of its nuclear program on what it considers to be the hostile behavior of U.S. president George Bush, however, the U.S. was aware of the program in 1998, when Bush was governor of Texas, making the North Korean weak attempt even less plausible. (Sanger, 2002 November 24) Another issue that on October 17, 2002 Yonhap News, a South Korean news agency, reported that Radio P’yŏngyang had broadcast that they “had come to have nuclear weapons.” (Buk Haek Ka-ji-gui-tta, 2002). Further analysis, however, revealed that they might have broadcast that they “are entitled to have nuclear weapons,” and that the Northern accent may have “confused Southern listeners monitoring the broadcast.” [43] (N Korean nuclear, 2002) P’yŏngyang clarified the alleged admission the following day as the less controversial statement, which was still factually and legally incorrect since possession of a nuclear weapon would put them in violation of several treaties. However, since North Korea had already admitted that they had secretly continued their nuclear weapons program, they were already in violation of treaties. It would be hard to consider the carefully scripted announcement of Radio P’yŏngyang to have made an accidental slip, but a listening mistake on the part of Yonhap is more believable. The fact that the questionable broadcast was made the day before UN weapons inspectors arrived in Iraq is another aspect to consider, since that would make it possible to interpret the alleged announcement as some sort of vague threat not to attempt similar intervention in North Korea. However, because following evaluations of the original broadcast seem to indicate the less serious statement, and considering the swift clarification from the North, the November 17 statement can be classified as a non-issue at this time, at least. While the underlying motives of these actions and what direction they may indicate are debatable, the available facts strongly indicate that they are disingenuous attempts to extract additional international aid, colonial reparations from Japan, and to seek removal from the U.S. list of terrorist nations. The economic changes can be viewed as: ... a bid to boost a shattered economy and make central planning more efficient, rather than being a wholesale shift to capitalism. All this is part of a grand scheme to scale back state support, letting prices and wages rise and giving workers incentive to work harder. (Bray, 2002 July 31)Assuming that North Korea is moving towards openness may be premature.
In answering the main questions of this paper – what direction is North Korea taking in late 2002, and what are the general patterns of behavior, the circumstances in which those patterns normally occur and will likely be repeated in future – several conclusions and related observations are apparent. It would be hard to consider the North Korean nuclear program as anything other than a genuine attempt to produce a domestic nuclear arsenal. From its very beginning as a state, the value of nuclear weapons has been overbearingly apparent to North Korea. While the events leading to the October 4, 2002 admission of a program could be construed as an elaborate ruse on the part of the North Koreans as a blackmail ploy, in light of the nuclear history of the peninsula, that explanation is extremely unlikely. The alternate, more dangerous, theory that they are seeking to develop nuclear weapons is most probable. Indeed, for North Korea this presents a win-win scenario, where if the program were to go undiscovered, North Korea would become a nuclear power with a nuclear deterrent to invasion or attack, and if the program were to be uncovered or even strongly suspected, it could be used to renegotiate the 1994 agreement to extract more aid from the U.S. and other nations, and act as a strong disincentive to possible invasion or any other action that North Korea deems exceedingly hostile. That added deterrent, along with the North’s ability to inflict extreme damage on Seoul by means of long-range artillery from just north of the DMZ, is probably irresistible to the North Korean regime. However, while North Korea engages in brinksmanship that at times genuinely endangers peace on the peninsula, they have no intention of actually causing a war that would virtually guarantee the demise of their regime. In his 1999 review of U.S. policy towards North Korea, Perry stated that North Korea's military leaders must be aware that their regime would be defeated if they were to start a war. “Under present circumstances, therefore, deterrence of war on the Korean Peninsula is stable on both sides, in military terms,” he said. Noting that the possibility of miscalculation by North Korea exists, Perry stressed, "there is no military calculus that would suggest to the North Koreans anything but catastrophe from armed conflict.” Permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula, Perry emphasized, “is the lasting goal of U.S. policy.” (Perry, 1999) Nothing that would alter that analysis has occurred in the following years. Under present circumstances it is also highly likely that North Korea has abandoned any realistic expectation of reunification under its socialist system, although the rhetoric is sure to continue. The North Korean leadership realizes that reunification means the end of the North Korean system, since any military contest would ensure defeat, and any sane reunification policy would incorporate the Southern system in favor of the Northern one. But more importantly, the North cannot seek reunification since it would necessarily reveal to their population – a captive audience to decades of propaganda – that many of the fundamental claims [44] to legitimacy made by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are baseless. News of the Northern concentration camps [45] would be damaging as well. Even more damning would be the revelation that North Korea is not a socialist paradise, but more of a socialist hell. The fact that North Korea’s primary interactions with the outside specifically limit contact between North Koreans and foreigners, and can be easily controlled, or even reversed, indicates that such projects are not meant to be permanent. [46] Therefore negotiating will necessarily be geared towards seeming to cooperate, while merely prolonging the regime. As long as North Korea holds the possible nuclear card, and as long as South Korea and the U.S. consider the costs of war too high, this approach will continue to work well for North Korea. Along these lines, the October 4, 2002 admission of a nuclear weapons program is very similar to the action North Korea took on March 12, 1993 when they gave notice that they were withdrawing from the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). This could be termed a North Korean “kick start” for what it perceives to be stalled progress in its agenda:
Whenever the North has engaged in highly provocative behavior, the United States has responded by immediately re-engaging diplomatically and seeking to address some of P’yongyang’s concerns. (North Korea’s Engagement, 2001) This tactic had the desired effect with the Clinton administration in 1993, but faces almost certain failure with a conservative President Bush in 2002. Another aspect to note considering the October 4 admission is the then seemingly imminent U.S. military action in Iraq for treaty violations very similar to what North Korea is guilty of. Thus the revelation, which was undeniable due to the U.S. intelligence evidence, may also be an obscure warning – if the US were to somehow consider an Iraq style attack on North Korea, they would face possible nuclear retaliation (most likely in South Korea), in addition to their considerable conventional army on the border. I say obscure since any direct threat would open North Korea to Bush’s new policy of pre-emptive strikes to nations with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and who threaten to use said WMD. Another indication that North Korea has no intention of perusing positive engagement, from an international viewpoint, or any other policy leading to reunification is that fact that they have been actively resisting it the entire way. After the 1994 Agreed Framework North Korea had to take relatively little action to achieve its stated goals of receiving two light-water nuclear reactors. All they needed to do was to allow various inspections, and meet a few minor other obligations that called less for action than for not obstructing progress – passive cooperation. The 1998 missile over Japan, numerous roadblocks to agreed upon IAEA inspections, several naval clashes and spy incidents, and the total and willful disregard for agreements and accords add up to an impressive argument against any engagement theory. U.S. and South Korean policy makers should keep several items in mind when dealing with North Korea. First, only limited deals with North Korea are possible, and even those may not be kept. Second, North Korea will take much more than it gives, and what it does give may be only an illusion, considering the fate of past “watershed” agreements. Third, any abstract wording in agreements will be exploited to the fullest – the “spirit” of an agreement is completely worthless. Therefore, lawyers should be included on negotiating teams to ensure the preclusion of loopholes (real or perceived), although the usefulness of that is debatable, since the North regularly backtracks on, or attempts to re-negotiate, deals considered to be unfavorable to its position, and any deal made by North Korean negotiators can always be trumped by Kim Jong Il. Fourth, deal making will probably take more time than we have – North Korea can, and has, waited for U.S. or South Korean regime changes to conclude deals. And fifth, once deals are made, and if the North keeps its end of the agreement, the U.S. and South Korea must reciprocate in order to maintain credibility. Even the perceived infraction of a deal will be used by North Korea to disregard agreements, logical or not. In summary, it is clear that North Korea will make significant changes only in order to continue to survive. Any changes made will be very controllable and easily reversible (i.e., an isolated, controlled Sinuiju, Kumgang tours, etc.). Only changes that do not touch the general population will be made, reducing the possible spread of outside information or ideology (i.e., “infection”). Changes that do touch the population will be explained within the context of Chuch’e. Military conflict is not a desired outcome for North Korea, and it would take that route only as a very last resort. Finally,
the U.S. and South Korea must remain vigilant. While the overall
analysis is bleak, we should be careful to be watch for the critical
period when North Korea seeks genuine reconciliation, if and when it
does come, and not cause North Korea to balk and choose a devastating
path. [1]
Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Seok-Ju, who has been
described as Kim Jong-Il’s “right-hand man” (Rumsfeld: N. Korea,
2002), was a primary North Korean negotiator during the
process leading to the 1994 Agreed Framework. His name is also commonly
Romanized as “Kang Suk-Ju” or “Kang, Sok-Ju.”
[2]
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
Kelly previously served as president of the Pacific Forum, a part of
the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), based in
Honolulu. (Biography, 2001).
[3] “The
Red Army Faction members… have been on the international wanted list
since 1970, when they seized control of the Yodogo, a Japan Airlines
jet… The perpetrators were rewarded with military medals [in North
Korea], a personal audience with… Kim Il-sung, and luxury
accommodation… on the outskirts of Pyongyang. They even had marriages
arranged for them with brides secretly flown in from Japan between 1975
and 1978. When the wives were discovered, they were linked to a series
of abductions, counterfeiting and espionage.” (Watts, 2002)
[4] Kim
Jong-Il’s position is Chairman of the National Defense Commission. The
position of President is reserved for use only by Kim Jong-Il’s late
father and founder of the DPRK, Kim Il-Sung.
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