

Date	Event, Notes, & Observations	Sources
<p>This chronology has been compiled in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the events that led to the 1994 Agreed Framework, particularly in regard to negotiating patterns. Many historical events that are not directly related to nuclear issues are included as either background information, or as possible mitigating factors that affected the negotiating process. The events recorded may be either direct quotes from the sources, or in paraphrased form.</p>		
1945-09-02	As a result of an atomic bomb detonation at Hiroshima on 08-06 and a plutonium bomb detonation on Nagasaki on 08-09, Japan signs an instrument of surrender on the U.S.S. Missouri in Tokyo Harbor.	
1950-1953	US Gen. Douglas MacArthur requests the use of 26 atomic bombs for use in the Korean War. His replacement, Gen. Matthew Ridgway, renews the request.	(Oberdorfer, 252)
1953	Newly inaugurated US president Dwight Eisenhower begins dropping hints that he will use the atomic bomb if an armistice is not reached soon.	(Oberdorfer, 252)
1956-03	North Korea (NK) begins to send dozens of students to Dubuna Nuclear Research Center in the USSR after an agreement on the peaceful use of atomic energy.	(Yoo, 55)
1957	UN creates the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to check the spread of nuclear weapons. Also see; http://www.iaea.org/	(Oberdorfer, 267)
1957-12	President Eisenhower authorizes the deployment of nuclear warheads and nuclear long-range artillery to US bases in South Korea (SK).	(Oberdorfer, 257)
1958-01	280mm howitzers capable of launching nuclear shells are brought to SK by the US.	(Yoo, 54)
1962	US-Cuban missile crisis.	
1962	SK begins operating a small research reactor.	(Oh & Hassig, 164)
1963	NK asks the Soviets for help in building nuclear weapons.	(Sigal, 20)
1964	NK asks China for assistance with a nuclear program of its own. China declines the request.	(Oberdorfer, 252)
1964	Soviets assist NK is setting up research facility at Yongbyon.	(Sigal, 20)
1965	Soviets supply NK with a 2-4 megawatt (MWe) research reactor and help them mine uranium.	(Sigal, 20) (Yoo, 56)
1965-08	In an address to the Party Central Committee, Kim Il Sung states that NK must develop “various weapons” for self-defense. The implication was nuclear.	(Yoo, 56)
1967	NK’s research reactor goes online.	(Segal, 21)
1968	SK signs the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).	(Sigal, 20)

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1972	The peak number of US nuclear devices in SK is reached – 763 warheads.	(Oberdorfer, 257)
1972	US-China rapprochement.	
1973	After the US refuses to provide nuclear technology, SK arranges to purchase reprocessing technology from France, heavy water technology and equipment from Canada, and similar technology from Belgium.	(Oh & Hassig, 164)
1974	NK makes another request to China for assistance with its nuclear program, and is again refused. NK was aware of and prompted by SK attempts to establish a nuclear program.	(Oberdorfer, 252)
1975	France, Canada, and Belgium are pressured by the US to cancel nuclear related contracts with SK, eventually forcing SK to give up nuclear plans.	(Oh & Hassig, 164)
1975	SK ratifies the NPT.	(Sigal, 20) (Oh & Hassig, 164)
1975-06	US Sec. of Def. James Schlesinger publicly acknowledges the presence of atomic weapons in Korea, and notes it would not be wise to test US reactions concerning their actual use.	(Oberdorfer, 257)
1976-02	US temporality deploys nuclear capable planes; the event is well publicized.	(Oberdorfer, 257)
1976-06	The first annual US-ROK Team Spirit exercise takes place.	(Oberdorfer, 257)
1976-08	Two US officers are killed with axes by NK soldiers in the DMZ. The US deploys more air and naval nuclear weapons to the region.	(Oberdorfer, 257)
1977	US/Soviets get NK to place their reactor under international safeguards.	(Sigal, 21)
1977	SK President Park revives nuclear plans when US President Carter announces that the US will withdraw troops and nuclear weapons.	(Oh & Hassig, 164)
1979	With the assassination of SK President Park Chung Hee, SK nuclear plans are abandoned.	(Oh & Hassig, 164)
1979	NK begins construction of a 5-MWe reactor at Yongbyon.	(Sigal, 21)
1981	<i>Israel makes a raid on an Iraqi nuclear facility at Osirak.</i>	<i>(Downs, 215)</i>
1981-05	NK meets with East Germans over the acquisition of nuclear power stations and reportedly express interest in military applications, such as a bomb.	(Oberdorfer, 253)
1982-04	US surveillance satellite photographs what appears to be a nuclear reactor vessel under construction at the bend of a river near Yongbyon. US intelligence analysts mark the location for special attention in the future.	(Oberdorfer, 250)
1984-03	US surveillance satellite photographs the cylindrical nuclear smokestack under construction at Yongbyon.	(Oberdorfer, 250)

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1984-05	In talks with Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko, Kim Il Sung seeks to obtain nuclear power stations.	(Oberdorfer, 254)
1984-06	US surveillance satellite photographs the reactor, the cooling tower, and the beginnings of the wiring for an electrical grid for transmission of power at the Yongbyon facility.	(Oberdorfer, 250)
1985	NK begins construction of a 50 MWe gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon and a 200 MWe reactor at Taechon.	(Sigal, 22)
1985-12-12	NK enters the NPT under Soviet pressure, and with the promise of receiving 4 reactors from the USSR. NK has 18-months to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The reactors were never delivered.	(Sigal, 22) (Oberdorfer, 254) (Oh & Hassig, 161)
1986-03	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US satellite photos reveal cylindrical craters in the sand of the riverbank near Yongbyon. The craters appear to be consistent with experimental high-explosive detonations used for detonating nuclear devices. This type of precise explosion is basic to implosion, a standard means of detonation to nuclear weapons experts. • A huge 200M building is also noted to be under construction. 	(Oberdorfer, 250)
1986	NK’s 5-MWe reactor becomes operational.	(Sigal, 21)
1987-02	The 200M building under construction in 1986-03 appears to be taking shape (long series of thick-walled cells are typical of such reprocessing plants) as a reprocessing plant for extracting nuclear grade weapons material. A short time later the building was roofed and the view lost.	(Oberdorfer, 251) (Yoo, 56)
1987-06	Near the end of the 18-month period that NK has to come to a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the IAEA discovers they have sent NK the wrong agreement document (single site). The IAEA sends the correct document (general inspection) and gives NK another 18-months.	(Oberdorfer, 254)
1988-06	NK construction of a much larger 50 MW reactor detected by US intelligence. The combination of this plant and the reprocessing plant was seen as near proof of a NK nuclear weapons program.	(Sigal, 22) (Oberdorfer, 251)
1988	The ’88 Olympic games are hosted in Seoul, South Korea. This is a major coup for South Korea, giving international legitimacy to its government.	
1988-10-31	US opens direct diplomatic dialogue with NK in Beijing. The nuclear issue was not discussed. Not much headway, but 18 meetings between 1988-1991.	(Sigal, 25)
1988-12	The 18-month period for NK and the IAEA to come to safeguards agreement passes without action. See 1987-06 and 1985-12-12.	(Oberdorfer, 254)
1989-01	President Jimmy Carter leave office as President George Bush Sr. is inaugurated. NK probably saw this as a definite downturn of events, while SK became surer of the US.	

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1989-02	US State Department begins to discuss the NK nuclear situation with Soviet and Chinese counterparts.	(Oberdorfer, 256-257)
1989-05	US State Dept. representatives travel to Seoul and Tokyo to discuss the NK nuclear situation. The US did not want SK to become insecure if they discovered that the US knew of a possible NK nuclear program and had not briefed them about it.	(Oberdorfer, 257)
1989	Yongbyon reactor shut down for 71 days. Possible reprocessing.	(Sigal, 22)
1990	Yongbyon reactor shut down for about 30 days. Possible reprocessing.	(Sigal, 22)
1990-09-30	SK establishes diplomatic ties with Russia. A coup for SK, this was a severe blow to NK security and the perception of its legitimacy.	(Sigal, 23)
1990-10	US Ambassador Donald Gregg notifies Assistant Sec. of State for East Asian and Pacific (EAP) Affairs Richard Solomon of agreement from US Forces Korea (USFK) commander General Robert RisCassi and SK National Security Advisor Kim Chong Whi for removal of US nukes in SK.	(Sigal, 28) (Oberdorfer, 258)
1991	Yongbyon reactor shut down for about 50 days.	(Sigal, 22)
1991-07-02	SK Pres. Roh resists the withdrawal of warheads he previously approved (for 1990-10). Roh insisted that SK, not the US, should play the leading role in dealing with NK on nuclear matters.	(Sigal, 28)
1991-08	A coup attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev fails. Boris Yeltsin begins to accumulate more power.	(Oberdorfer, 259)
1991-09	US begins to supply the IAEA with intelligence, including satellite photos.	(Oberdorfer, 268)
1991-09-17	SK secures separate seats for both Koreas over NK objections. Another major coup for SK over NK.	(Sigal, 23)
1991-09-27	Pres. Bush announces withdrawal of US nuclear weapons worldwide. A move meant to bring reciprocal steps from the Soviet Union.	(Sigal, 30) (Oberdorfer, 259)
1991-09-27	SK Defense Minister Lee Jong Koo suggests a commando raid against NK nuclear sites if inspections are not allowed.	(Sigal, 33)
1991-10-22	NK-SK make progress in a prime ministerial meeting in Pyongyang. From 10-22 to 10-25.	(Oberdorfer, 261)
<i>1991-10</i>	<i>A NK ship believed to have SCUD-C missiles and missile technology bound for Syria turns back after Israel threatens to intercept it.</i>	<i>(Sigal, 66)</i>
1991-10-30	SK Defense Ministry releases a white paper declaring that pressure on NK is the preferred strategy.	(Sigal, 31)
1991-11	Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen states, “We do not want to see the existence of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.”	(Sigal, 58)
1991-11-11	US Defense Secretary Cheney announces a delay in the withdrawal of 6,000 US troops from SK due to tensions with NK.	(Sigal, 31)

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1991-11-25	NK declares it will sign safeguards accord if US removes nuclear weapons from SK. Also see 1991-09-27 & 1991-12-18.	(Sigal, 31-32)
1991-12	US notifies NK that high-level talks can be arranged if NK agrees to meet its nuclear inspection obligations. Probably a strong motivator for NK to conclude agreements.	(Oberdorfer, 265)
1991-12-13	NK-SK conclude the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation.	(Sigal, 32) (Snyder, 163) (Oberdorfer, 262)
1991-12-16	SK Prime Minister (PM) Choe Ho Chung notes progress in NK-SK nuclear related talks.	(Sigal, 31)
1991-12-18	SK President Roh announces on TV that all nuclear weapons have been removed from SK	(Sigal, 30) (Oberdorfer, 262)
1991-12-24	In a meeting of the Central Committee of the North Korean Workers Party, Kim Il Sung praises the recent NK-SK agreement. At the same meeting, Kim Jong Il was named supreme commander of the NK armed forces. The plenum focused on inter-Korea issues, and did not criticize the US or SK.	(Oberdorfer, 262)
1991-12-26	NK-SK nuclear negotiations convene at Panmunjon. On the second day, NK representatives present a written proposal incorporating most on SK’s proposals and dropping some of NK’s. The negotiators appear to have been pre-authorized to make a deal.	(Oberdorfer, 263)
1991-12-31	NK-SK conclude the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Went beyond the NPT by agreeing not to “test, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons.”	(Sigal, 32) (Snyder, 163) (Oberdorfer, 264)
1992-01-06	Pres. Bush visits SK.	(Sigal, 31)
1992-01-07	SK Defense Ministry announces suspension of Team Spirit ‘93, but notes it can be resumed at any time.	(Sigal, 31)
1992-01-07	NK announces intention to sign IAEA safeguards agreement in the near future.	(Sigal, 32) (Snyder, 163)
1992-01-22	US-NK meeting between under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Arnold Kanter and Korean Workers Party (KWP) Secretary for International Affairs Kim Yong Sun. US emphasized that they were not a threat; all nukes had been removed from SK, and invited NK to inspect. NK replied by requesting cessation of US threats, and removal of nuclear weapons (which had actually already been removed).	(Sigal, 35) (Snyder, 164, says 01-20) (Oberdorfer, 266, says 01-21) (Downs, 218, says 01-21).
1992-01-30	NK signs IAEA safeguards agreement, in accordance with the 1985 NPT. From that time, NK “halted the reprocessing of spent fuel. It also delayed removing spent nuclear fuel from its reactor until May 1994.” IAEA inspections were also allowed for the next year and a half.	(Sigal, 32) (Oberdorfer, 267) (Downs, 219)
<i>1992-02</i>	<i>Israel alerts US intelligence that another NK missile shipment is headed to Syria and asks the US to intercept. The US Navy tracked the ship, but did not intercept it, and it reached its port.</i>	<i>(Sigal, 66)</i>

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1992-03-14	NK agrees, provisionally, to establish a Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) with SK to monitor the 1991 denuclearization accord.	(Sigal, 39)
1992-03-27	CIA director Robert Gates states that NK is very close to having nuclear weapons capability.	(Oberdorfer, 269)
1992-04-10	NK Supreme Peoples Assembly ratifies safeguard agreement with IAEA, understanding that inspections should follow.	(Sigal, 39) (Oberdorfer, 267, says 04-09) (Downs, 219, says 04-09)
1992-05-04	NK gives the IAEA a 150-page inventory of nuclear material and equipment. The information given was more detailed than required, and included information that a rouge state might want to hide (unless they did not understand the requirements fully). Disclosed that they had reprocessed 90 grams (about 3 ounces) of plutonium.	(Sigal, 39) (Oberdorfer, 269) (Downs, 219) (Kwan, 73)
1992-05-11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IAEA Director-General Hans Blix makes an unofficial trip to NK until 05-16, and inspects the Yongbyon facility. The facility is found to still be under construction and “far from fully equipped.” He was told the IAEA could visit any site, including those not declared. NK actually televised some of the inspections. • After this, NK “invited” the US to pay for more inspections. NK request Blix’s assistance in acquiring LWR and nuclear fuel in return for abandoning reprocessing. 	(Sigal, 39) (Oberdorfer, 269 & 290) (Downs, 219)
1992-06-01	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NK repeats request for LW reactors in a Beijing meeting with US diplomats. • US response was that only IAEA members in good standing are eligible for assistance, and NK still needed to allow more inspections. 	(Sigal, 39)
1992-07	Kim Dal Hyon, NK chairman of External Economic Affairs Committee, visits Seoul.	(Snyder, 164)
1992-07	The second IAEA ad hoc inspection reveals reprocessing on three different occasions; 1989, 1990, 1991. This analysis showed that NK lied about reprocessing, and left the possible amount of nuclear material gained up in the air. See possible innocent explanation in Sigal.	(Sigal, 43)
1992-08	US-SK joint military exercise “Focus Lens,” with more troops than Team Spirit would have had.	(Sigal, 44)
1992-08-24	SK establishes diplomatic ties with China. Another coup for SK.	(Sigal, 23)
1992-09	North-South subcommittee for Nuclear Matters break down; IAEA discovers discrepancies in NK records and push for “special inspections”; SK announces discovery of a NK spy ring; Kim Young Sam elected in SK, Bill Clinton in the US. These event occurred September-December 1992.	(Snyder, 164)

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1992-10-08	US-SK Security Consultative Meeting concerning Team Spirit. Team Spirit was a major concern; SK wanted it as leverage against NK, but the US was more cautious since the State Department Korea desk thought this was a (the?) major NK sore point. Eventually it was announced that Team Spirit would be held in March of 1993.	(Sigal, 46)
1992-10-22	During a NK-SK nuclear inspections meeting, NK demanded that Team Spirit be called off, or NK would cancel the talks.	(Sigal, 46)
1992-11-12	IAEA has “indisputable” evidence that NK created and concealed a trench between the Yongbyon reprocessing plant and an undeclared building believed to be a nuclear waste storage facility. In a face saving move, Blix decides to allow the change with little admission of NK fault. The NK representatives seemed amenable, but reversed their position the next day, perhaps after word from higher up; they then accused one of the IAEA inspectors of being a CIA agent.	(Oberdorfer, 275)
1992-11-13	NK chief delegate to the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) talks, Choe U Jin, gives the warning that IAEA inspections might be halted if Team Spirit were to be carried out.	(Sigal, 46)
1992-11-27	Choe U Jin again presses for the cancellation of Team Spirit at a commission meeting. “American officials were inclined to dismiss what Pyongyang said in public as propaganda...”	(Sigal, 47)
1992-12	IAEA requests “visits” to NK nuclear sites to clarify the nature of the sites and to perform some related tests.	(Oberdorfer, 276)
1993-01	NK responds to the IAEA request (1992-12) saying that “visits” shall not become “inspections,” and that non-nuclear military sites are off limits. The NK response made reference to the clause that allows nations to withdrawal from the NPT in regard to their “supreme national interests.”	(Oberdorfer, 276)
1993-01-25	NK brings the JNCC talks to a halt by refusing to deal. US-ROK were willing to offer the cancellation of Team Spirit ‘93 in return for inspections and continued talks; NK refused.	(Downs, 224)
1993-01	<i>Israel opens talks with NK in Pyongyang to establish diplomatic relations and provide \$1 billion in investment and technical assistance. This was a “different track” – in order to stop an Iranian bid to purchase 150 Nodong-1 missiles, which were under development by NK.</i>	(Sigal, 66)
1993-02-09	IAEA requests special inspections because NK had refused to give samples from two nuclear waste sites. NK rejected the request as an infringement on its sovereignty (perhaps this term is overused).	(Sigal, 49) (Downs, 225)
1993-02-22	NK protests the manner of IAEA inspections as invasive and hostile.	(Sigal, 49)
1993-02-22	At a closed session of the IAEA board, several US intelligence satellite photos showing NK nuclear installations and attempts at concealing them. NK representative Ho Jin Yun declared the photographs to be “fakery,” but the board was deeply impressed. A significant loss of face for NK.	(Oberdorfer, 277)

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1993-02-25	IAEA set a one-month deadline for NK to allow inspections of waste sites. They also warned of other measures by the UN Security Council.	(Sigal, 49) (Oberdorfer, 277)
1993-02-26	IAEA head Hans Blix sends a telex to the NK Foreign Ministry requesting that IAEA inspectors be allowed to inspect disputed sites on March 16. He also notified the UN Security Council, which had the responsibility of enforcing the request should NK decline.	(Oberdorfer, 279)
1993-02-28	IAEA adopts a 7-point resolution calling on NK to allow special inspections and abide by the safeguards accord.	(Chung, 73)
1993-03-08	Team Spirit begins.	(Sigal, 50) (Oberdorfer, 279, says 03-09)
1993-03-08	NK forces go on full alert, and nearly the entire nation was mobilized.	(Sigal, 50) (Oberdorfer, 279)
1993-03-12	NK gives 90-day notice of intent to withdrawal from NPT, effective 06-12. Reasons cited were Team Spirit, which NK said violated the NK-SK denuclearization accord, and the IAEA demand of special inspections.	(Sigal, 50) (Snyder, 164) (Oberdorfer, 279- 280) (Downs, 227)
1993-03-21	SK repatriates several NK soldier held since the Korean War, and President Clinton notes it’s not too late for NK to reverse its decision. The US and SK are now more cautious.	(Sigal, 50)
1993-03-29	SK Foreign Minister (FM) Han Sung Joo meets Secretary of State Christopher, Secretary of Defense Aspin and Secretary Adviser Lake in Washington to discuss “stick-and-carrot” approach. Discussed pressures plus face-saving routes – Han noted that pressure alone will not work.	(Sigal, 56)
1993-03-30	NK Minister of Atomic Energy rejects the IAEA demand for a special inspection, but invites consultations on “implementation of the safeguards agreement” inspections at other than nuclear waste sites.	(Sigal, 57)
1993-04-01	IAEA takes the unprecedented act of declaring NK in violation of its safeguards agreement. This was a vote, with 28 ayes (yes), and votes of no from China and Libya, while India, Pakistan, and Vietnam abstained.	(Sigal, 57)
1993-04-06	NK’s Foreign Minister issues a statement saying that officials of the IAEA are ignoring NK efforts for a settlement to the problem, and that the matter is between the US and NK, not NK and the IAEA. In fact, it was between the IAEA and NK, since the IAEA is the body in charge of nuclear issues. NK simply wanted to deal with the US.	(Sigal, 59)
1993-04	NK ambassador to the UN, Ho Jong, calls Kenneth Quinones of the State Dept. Korea desk. “Their conversation led to working-level talks in New York.”	(Sigal, 59) (Oberdorfer, 283)
1993-04-08	The UN Security Council president issues a statement urging further consultations between NK and the IAEA. The statement was issued instead of a vote in order to avoid a veto by China.	(Sigal, 57)

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1993-04-22	IAEA accepts a NK offer to allow inspectors to maintain cameras and other monitoring equipment. IAEA wanted more, but had to take what they could get in order to maintain the validity of safeguards information.	(Sigal, 61-62)
1993-04-22	SK FM Han meets with Chinese FM Qian Qichen in Bangkok and states the SK would drop its opposition to US-NK talks if China would agree not to veto a UN Security Council resolution for NK to comply with nuclear inspections rather than withdraw from the NPT. China did not agree immediately, but did not veto the resolution.	(Oberdorfer, 283) (Downs, 230)
1993-04-22	US agrees to reopen high-levels talks with no agreement for anything else, including suspension of Team Spirit.	(Sigal, 62)
1993-04-25	Choe Kwang, NK People’s Army Marshal, says that NK will take “effective countermeasures against any sanctions in self-defense.”	(Downs, 229)
1993-05-11	UN Security Council enacts a resolution calling on NK to reaffirm its commitment to the NPT and comply with its safeguards agreement. The vote was 13-0; China and Pakistan abstained.	(Sigal, 62) (Downs, 228-229)
1993-05-12	After two working-level meetings in Beijing, Robert Gallucci sees “some indications they are trying to resolve this.” Gallucci was head of the US delegation.	(Sigal, 62) (Downs, 228-229)
1993-05-17	US and NK representatives meet at the UN and agree to resume high-level talks on June 2. The move from working-level to high-level talks.	(Sigal, 62)
1993-05-26	Gallucci outlines the negotiating approach to the senate, several senators warn against rewarding NK’s non-compliance. Senators that Frank Murkowski (R-AK), and Richards Lugar (R-IN) are mentioned specifically.	(Sigal, 62)
1993-06-02	Negotiations between Gallucci and NK deputy FM Kang Sok Ju begin in New York.	(Oberdorfer, 284-285) (Downs, 230)
1993-06-07	Ken Quinones receives a call from NK representatives and goes to NY to meet with them informally (in a coffee shop) for the next three days.	(Oberdorfer, 285)
1993-06-10	In lengthy meeting Gallucci and Kang create a six paragraph joint statement (until 06-11).	(Oberdorfer, 285) (Downs, 230)
1993-06-11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NK unilaterally suspends its decision to withdrawal from the NPT for “as long as it considers necessary,” while talks continue. • The US responds that they will consider additional reprocessing, breaks in continuity of safeguards, or withdrawal from the NPT as harmful to resolve the issue via dialogue. <p>This implies that if the issue was not resolved by dialogue, force was an option. However some US right-wingers saw the continued dialogue as a victory for NK and proposed more US troops in Korea and more sanctions. Talks from 06-05 to 06-11.</p>	(Sigal, 64-65) (Snyder, 164) (Oberdorfer, 285-286) (Downs, 230-233)

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1993-06-14	<i>Israeli FM Shimon Peres meets with Sec. of State Warren Christopher and SK FM Han Sung Joo to discuss this upcoming visit to NK and objected to the path Israel had taken with NK. Israel provided some technical assistance, but suspended contacts at the request of the US. “Israel had acted on the assumption that North Korea, desperate for hard currency and oil, was selling missiles for purely commercial reason and could be bought off.” But, the US thought, “a rouge negotiation by a third country on missiles would not necessarily have helped solve the nuclear problem.”</i>	(Sigal, 66-67)
1993-07-14	High-levels talks resume. (07-14 to 07-19)	(Sigal, 67) (Downs, 233)
1993-07-17	NK proposes replacement of its gas-graphite reactors with two LW reactors. The US was not prepared for that offer and did not appear to know what to do with it, but later thought it was something they could work with. Talks from 07-11 to 07-18.	(Sigal, 68) (Snyder, 164)
1993-07-19	NK and the US separately issue identical statements in which the US agrees to explore the idea of providing LWRs. The agreement was joint, but it was issued separately because of SK (insecurities) objections of a joint statement.	(Sigal, 69) (Oberdorfer, 291)
1993-07-21	NK & SK announce that they will hold the 7 th meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control commission (JNCC). Despite US “pleas,” SK demands that NK scrap the reprocessing plant at Yongbyon, and insists on inspections. The talks go “nowhere fast.” This commission was created to implement the 1991 Denuclearization Accord.	(Sigal, 71-72)
1993-07-31	NK tells the IAEA that inspections will be limited to routine maintenance, such as replacing camera film and batteries. When the IAEA inspectors try to do more, they are physically intimidated. The IAEA say that they cannot do their jobs.	(Sigal, 72)
1993-08	IAEA inspectors are alarmed to find one seal to a “hot cell” broken and another with signs of tampering. The discoveries are taken as proof of reprocessing. Sigal notes, however, that a government expert said the seals could have been damaged during ongoing construction; NK did not use any of those possibilities as an excuse or explanation.	(Sigal, 72)
1993-08	US-NK talks resume unannounced in NY, with Ken Quinones and Gary Samore (Dir. of the Office of Asian Proliferation) as US representatives.	(Sigal, 77)
1993-09	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NK reps Kim Jong Su and Ho Jong ask Dep. Asst. Sec. of State Thomas Hubbard, US lead negotiator, to invite SK to Panmunjon for working-level contacts with the hope of leading to an exchange of special envoys. • The US then expresses a willingness to discuss the cancellation of Team Spirit with SK. • SK FM Han Sung Joo suggests abandoning the step-by-step approach, which required pre-conditions, and urges Gallucci to come up with a comprehensive package deal of quid pro quos. 	(Sigal, 77-78)

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1993-09-21	At a speech in Washington, Nat. Sec. Advisor Lake proclaims a new policy to expand the community of democratic, market-oriented nations and warns that nations like NK face isolation and unilateral aggressive actions. This demonstrates that US policy announcements are not always coordinated as well as they could be for the best effect, diplomatically.	(Sigal, 71)
1993-09-27	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At the IAEA General Conference, Blix says current access (camera maintenance) was not enough. • By a vote of 72-2 it was decided to urge NK to cooperate immediately. • NK then suspended consultations with the agency. 	(Sigal, 73)
1993-10-01	IAEA secretariat refers the NK inspection issue to the General Conference of IAEA members, which in turn passes a resolution calling on NK to comply with safeguards and allow regular inspections without delay.	(Bayer, 198)
1993-10-12	IAEA secretariat announces that it will no longer conduct “token” safeguard inspections.	(Bayer, 198)
1993-10	Def. Sec. Aspin convenes a meeting to consider a draft intelligence assessment that indicates that NK may have a “a bomb or two,” and that the construction of two gas-graphite reactors in NK is continuing, which would greatly increase the ability to produce nuclear-grade bomb-making materials. The group did not automatically accept all conclusions of the intel report, but decided to shift from trying to determine how many bombs may have been produced, to stopping further or future production, and therefore began to focus more clearly on how to halt the ongoing program.	(Sigal, 79)
1993-10	At a Deputy Committee meeting, Gallucci advocates the comprehensive approach and suggests canceling Team Spirit in return for NK cooperation with an IAEA inspection scheduled for August. Opposition comes from the Joint Staff, and no concrete decision was made at that time. Later it was decided to offer the cancellation of Team Spirit 1994 in return for NK coming back to NK-SK talks and allowing the August inspection. Gallucci (probably) had been aware of the new direction of thinking in the Pentagon concerning the need to stop the program first and determine the possible number of bombs later.	(Sigal, 80)
1993-10	<p>NK hosts US Rep. Gary Ackerman, who is accompanied by Quinones. NK reps had seen reports in the SK press about a comprehensive deal, and indicate that they are ready to propose a package deal. Quinones asks for it in writing, and the next morning receives a package that contained all the elements of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Ackerman succeeded Stephan Solarz as chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. This was a NK attempt to eliminate pre-conditions by laying out a “road map” of actions to be taken by each side at given times and simultaneously, getting past the “you go first” part of the process, while still retaining some leverage with unfulfilled promises.</p>	(Sigal, 78) (Oberdorfer, 293)

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1993-10-19	A meeting between Kim Yon Sun and Peter Hayes results in report emphasizing that if “the LWR issue were resolved successfully, then the DPRK would remain in the NPT.” This report was sent to Washington. Kim has been Kantor’s interlocutor in the 1992-01 high-level talk, and Hayes was from Nautilus Pacific Research. This was a major signal to Washington.	(Sigal, 79)
1993-10-23	Reporters in Seoul are told that SK was “attaching two conditions to any suspension of Team Spirit, that the North accept an exchange of presidential envoys with the South and that it allow ad hoc and routine inspections. “A week later Foreign Minister Han did not rule out improved ties between Washington and Pyongyang, but he insisted a third round of high-level talks, if held, should be limited to nuclear matters...”	(Sigal, 86)
1993-10-28	NK notified the IAEA it was willing to host a routine maintenance inspection for monitoring equipment, but that wider access would be restricted pending progress with NK-US talks.	(Sigal, 73)
1993-11-01	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IAEA head Hans Blix tells the UN General Assembly that the areas of non-compliance are becoming critical in NK. • By a vote of 140-1 the UN calls on NK to cooperate. Only NK voted no, but China abstained, which was critical in the US view. <p>The IAEA “bluff” was called, and they would either have to resume limited inspections, or NK would go completely into non-compliance, raising the stakes of the game.</p>	(Sigal, 73) (Bayer, 198)
1993-11-06	In a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, SK President Kim Young Sam secures a pledge that “Japan will not normalize relations with Pyongyang unless the nuclear issues are resolved.”	(Sigal, 86)
1993-11-07	Clinton said on <i>Meet the Press</i> that, “North Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb.” Perhaps he misspoke and should have said “nuclear program” rather than “nuclear bomb.”	(Sigal, 52)
1993-11-13	FM Han states that “It is not yet the stage to consider the package deal insisted [on] by” NK. “Instead of carrots [SK] began reaching for a stick.”	(Sigal, 86)
1993-11-11	NK negotiator Kang Sok Ju makes public the proposed package deal in Pyongyang.	(Oberdorfer, 295)
1993-11	SK Def. Min. Kwon Young-hae refuses to rule out a military attack on NK reactor sites. NK “promptly canceled talks with the South.”	(Sigal, 86)

Date	Event, Notes, & Observations	Sources
1993-11-15	Principals Committee of the National Security Council meeting convenes, and three options are considered. The 1 st is a combination of step-by-step and comprehensive approaches; the 2 nd is direct contact to avoid the “waste” of time in diplomatic channels; the 3 rd is a “fallback” position of freezing negotiations if the 2 nd option fails. The 3 rd option is killed. It was decided to prepare to options; step-by-step and a package deal. Option 2 was adopted, but still treated high-level US-NK talks as a reward. The administration was considerably concerned about the SK reaction, but pressed on. The SK view was that the NK objective was to “drive a wedge” between the US and SK, and that high-level US-NK talks was the worst path possible.	(Sigal, 82) (Oberdorfer, 295)
1993-11-16	Thomas Hubbard meets with NK officials in NY and they accept the idea of a package deal without specifying the contents. “The commitment came in a reply by Gallucci to a letter from Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju...”	(Sigal, 84-85)
1993-11-23	Presidents Clinton and Kim Young Sam meet in Washington, where Kim surprises everyone objecting “to the phrase ‘comprehensive approach’ and the offer to suspend Team Spirit.” He insisted tying the suspension of Team Spirit to high-level NK-SK talks (in Seoul), and an exchange of envoys. “The needed to show that they were in the front of the train, not in back... That was okay with us as long as they headed the train in the right direction,” said Gallucci. SK pressure caused the US to “renege” on earlier statements to NK, and attack the condition of NK envoys visiting Seoul before canceling Team Spirit, etc.	(Sigal, 87-88) (Oberdorfer, 296) (Snyder, 164, says 11-24).
1993-11	In a press conference after President Kim’s 11-23 announcements, SK FM Han states, “There are no packages.... As far as we are concerned – that means both the [ROK] and the [US] – these obligations are nonnegotiable and cannot be put into a package...” Still basing any deals on the completion of preconditions, which had a notoriously bad track record in actually resolving issues. Continued hard-line approach by SK, due to insecurities.	(Sigal, 88)
1993-11-29	NK FM states that US pressure will not work on NK, and that acceptance of the NK proposed package deal would solve all the ongoing issues quickly.	(Sigal, 89)
1993-12-02	Blix tells the IAEA board that inspectors cannot provide any assurance that NK is not producing new plutonium.	(Downs, 235)
1993-12	NK Workers Party Central Committee announces publicly at the end of a seven-year economic plan that the NK economy is in a “grave situation.” This was hard for NK to publicly admit, and should have been taken as a signal to US-SK that NK was looking for better international relations. Compared to the events of 11-29, this gives US-ROK negotiators a hint that they have some additional leverage.	(Oberdorfer, 297)
1993-12-29	US-NK reach an agreement that would allow IAEA inspections at all facilities except for two nuclear waste sites.	(Downs, 235)

Date	Event, Notes, & Observations	Sources
1994-01-25	SK Def. Ministry announces that Team Spirit will begin in mid-March 1994. Up to 120,000 troops including 50,00 US, and three B1 bombers.	(Sigal, 47) (Oberdorfer, 300)
1994-01-31	NK Foreign Ministry announces that SK is responsible for creating a condition of war on the peninsula, and threatens to stop talks and exit the NPT.	(Oberdorfer, 301)
1994-02-15	NK accepts minimum conditions for IAEA inspections to begin again, but then refuse to issue visas to inspectors unless some preconditions are met.	(Oberdorfer, 302) (Downs, 235-236)
1994-02-18	US-NK announce “Agreed Conclusion,” points designed to bring both sides back to talks and keep IAEA inspections on track.	(Snyder, 165)
1994-02-25	US-NK reach an agreement that will reopen NK-SK talks on 03-01 at Panmunjon; the US will cancel Team Spirit in 1994, and open high-level talks in Geneva on 03-21.	(Bayer, 199)
1994-03-01	A tem of six IAEA inspectors are allowed into NK.	(Bayer, 200)
1994-03-03	For the first time in four months, inter-Korea talks begin. Little is achieved, but they agree to meet again on 03-09 – but do not.	(Bayer, 200)
1994-03-04	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The US (suddenly) insists that the opening of high-level US-NK talks are conditional on actual exchanges of NK-SK nuclear envoys, rather than on talks to discuss such an exchange (SK pressure on the US?). • NK is outraged and immediately interferes with and prevents ongoing inspections. See agreement of 1994-02-25. “...Pyongyang seemed to be deliberately trying to increase the uncertainty surrounding its nuclear activities in retaliation for the change in Washington’s position.” 	(Bayer, 200)
1994-03	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US cancels US-NK talks scheduled for 03-21, and announces that Team Spirit will proceed. • NK walks out of NK-SK talks and threatens to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.” • US announces it will deploy Patriot missiles in SK and begins to pressure the UN Security Council for sanctions. • NK cancels inspections, says it will withdrawal from the NPT if Team Spirit proceeds, and will consider any sanctions an act of war. “Stalemate followed.” 	(Bayer, 200)
1994-03-21	IAEA again reports to the UN Security Council that it cannot verify that NK plutonium is or is not being diverted to a weapons program.	(Downs, 236)
1994-04-15	IAEA orders its inspectors to leave NK, since the agency could not verify that there had not been a diversion of nuclear materials for bomb making. The decision was made to turn the matter over to the UN Security Council.	(Oberdorfer, 303)

Date	Event, Notes, & Observations	Sources
1994-04-19	At the last NK-SK working level meeting at Panmunjon, tempers flare and NK negotiator Park Yong Su declares, “Seoul is not far from here. If a war breaks out, it will be a sear of fire. Mr. Song, it will probably be difficult for you to survive.” The NK team then left the meeting.	(Oberdorfer, 304)
1994-03/04	The Security Council issues a statement calling on NK to meet is safeguard obligations and allow in the IAEA to complete its March inspection. Due to Chinese pressure, a less statement was issued rather than a Security Council resolution.	(Bayer, 201)
1994-04	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NK ignores the Security Council statement and attempts by the IAEA to establish an inspection date in May. • US announces the delay of Team Spirit, meeting one of NK’s preconditions for reviving inspections. 	(Bayer, 202)
1994-04	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NK makes it clear that it will refuel the 5 MWe research reactor in early May (04-19). • US announces that an exchange of nuclear envoys by the two Korea is no longer a precondition to talks, further reducing barriers. <p>The reactor refuel was controversial because it would allow NK to reprocess the fuel rods to extract weapons grade material. The US removal of the envoy exchange as a precondition to talks left the completion of the March inspection as the only barrier to talks.</p>	(Bayer, 202-203) (Oberdorfer, 309)
1994-04	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IAEA announces that any unsupervised removal of fuel rods would be a “serious violation” and would be reported to the Security Council. • US says it will ask for sanctions unless NK allows the IAEA to monitor the removal and storage of fuel rods. <p>The US announcement mentioned only monitoring of the rod removal and storage, and specifically did not mention testing on the rods to determine the amount of previous processing.</p>	(Bayer, 203)
1994-05	US-NK reach yet another agreement; the US will cancel Team Spirit after NK allows the IAEA to finish its March inspection and to install inspectors to monitor the removal and storage of fuel rods.	(Bayer, 204)
1994-05-18	All top US military leaders, including every active four-star general and admiral in the US and several from across the world, meet at the Pentagon to discuss the war plan for the Korean Peninsula. This highlights the seriousness of the situation.	(Oberdorfer, 314-315)
1994-05-19	Defense Sec. William Perry, Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Gen. John Shalikashvili, and Gen. Gary Luck brief President Clinton on the situation.	(Oberdorfer, 315)
1994-05-20	US offers NK to convenes the postponed their round of high-level talks. This may have been due to the briefing Clinton received on 05-19, or the IAEA report of 05-20, or both.	(Oberdorfer, 315)

Date	Event, Notes, & Observations	Sources
1994-05-20	The IAEA announces that if finds no evidence that NK reprocessed plutonium in the period after 1993 February.	(Bayer, 204)
1994-05-24	NK opens direct negotiations with the IAEA on the disposal of spent fuel rods and warns that the final resolution of all inspection issues will await the conclusion of a “package deal” with the US. This appeared to confirm the notion that NK was using a “hard line” on IAEA inspections as leverage for concession with the US and not to protect an ongoing nuclear program.	(Bayer, 204) (Oberdorfer, 316, says 05-23)
1994-05-27	IAEA reports that NK is removing fuel rods “at a very fast pace,” which threatens to damage the value of the rods for testing purposes. IAEA wanted to test the rods for the core of the reactor for indications of how much plutonium had been processed in the past.	(Bayer, 205)
1994-05-28	IAEA head Hans Blix send a letter to UN Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali warning that NK is “within days” of obliterating all evidence that may show how much had been reprocessed in the past.	(Bayer, 205)
1994-05-29	Clinton announces that China will be granted most favored nation trading status without human rights pre-conditions, making it easier for China to cooperate with the US over NK nuclear issues.	(Oberdorfer, 320)
1994-05-30	UN Security Council holds an emergency meeting to hear an IAEA assessment that if the discharge of material at the 5 MWe reactor, all evidence will be lost in days.	(Downs, 237)
1994-05-31	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US threatens to cancel talks and to seek UN sanctions in NK destroys the evidence the IAEA needs; calls on NK to cease the removal of rods in a way that would hinder the IAEA inspections. • NK ignores the US request and removes the fuel rods in such a way as to make it impossible to the IAEA to get the required data. • The rods were dumped into cooling ponds, mixing them with other rods. 	(Bayer, 205)
1994-06-02	IAEA declares that its ability to verify the reactors past history has been lost due to the defueling carried out by NK.	(Oberdorfer, 316) (Downs, 237-238)
1994-06-02	US announces that it will seek UN sanctions against NK, and that talks will continue only after NK allows IAEA inspections to continue. The proposal receives opposition from inside and outside the administration. The sanctions drawn up by chief US negotiator Robert Gallucci include embargos on the sale or purchase of weapons from NK, on oil, and on all financial transactions, including the annual \$600 million – \$1.2 billion from Japan, as well as the suspension of NK membership in international organizations, etc.	(Bayer, 205) (Oberdorfer, 310-311)
1994-06-03	NK broadcasts that they are prepared to dismantle its reprocessing plant in exchange fore LWRs. A sign that NK is willing to deal.	(Oberdorfer, 321)
1994-06-05	Former president Jimmy Carter learns from Gallucci that there was no plan for direct contact with Kim Il Sung; Carter decides to go to Pyongyang.	(Oberdorfer, 317-318) (Downs, 241)

Date	Event, Notes, & Observations	Sources
1994-06-06	NK announces, “sanctions mean war, and there is no mercy in war.”	(Oberdorfer, 311)
1994-05&06	NK unloads fuel rods, causing talks to break off. For details, see Bayer above. Events occur in May and June, 1994.	(Snyder, 165)
1994-06-09	SK FM Han tells Chinese FM Qian Qichen that the only way for China to avoid confronting the UN Security Council on NK sanctions is to persuade NK to cooperate with the international community.	(Oberdorfer, 320)
1994-06-10	Chinese diplomats inform NK diplomats in Beijing and Pyongyang that China may not be able to veto a UN Security Council resolution due to overwhelming international pressure. China recommended that NK cooperate; NK was unhappy to say the least.	(Oberdorfer, 320-321)
1994-06-10	IAEA votes to cut off all technical aid to NK.	(Bayer, 207) (Downs, 238)
1994-06-13	NK announces immediate withdrawal from IAEA and expels to inspectors.	(Bayer, 207) (Downs, 238)
1994-06-13	Carter arrives in Seoul en route to Pyongyang.	(Oberdorfer, 322)
1994-06	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US announces that sanctions will be applied to NK upon security council approval. • China opposes sanctions. 	(Bayer, 207)
1994-06-15	Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter, and a small group of aids, arrive in Pyongyang, via the DMZ.	(Bayer, 207) (Oberdorfer, 326)
1994-06-16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Carter concludes an agreement with Kim Il Sung to keep spent fuel rods in storage and to resume US-NK negotiations if the US will supply two LWRs. • Although the Clinton administration is “annoyed” with Carter, they accept the proposal. 	(Snyder, 165) (Bayer, 207)
1994-06-16	US Senate passes a resolution (93-3) urging Clinton to prepare US troops “to deter and, if necessary, repel an attack from North Korea.”	(Downs, 240)
1994-06-17	Gen. Lake approaches Carter about additional conditions for NK, which go beyond anything agreed to so far. Carter objects for that reason. However, NK, eager to end the dangerous confrontation, formally accept the new conditions.	(Oberdorfer, 332)
1994-06-22	US receives written confirmation of the agreement from NK and immediately announces that high-level talks will be held in Geneva on July 08.	(Bayer, 208)
1994-07-08	Kim Il Sung dies at age 82 while the third round of negotiations open in Geneva. Negotiations are suspended the following day.	(Snyder, 165) (Oberdorfer, 339)
1994-08-05	Third round of NK-US talks resume. From 08-05 to 08-13.	(Snyder, 165)
1994-08-13	A US-NK accord is reached that will continue the June freeze, expanded to include the construction of its two new graphite reactors, while the US works to resolve details related to supplying LWRs.	(Bayer, 209)

Date	Event, Notes, & Observations	Sources
1994-08-15	Kim Young Sam announce SK willingness to provide NK with LWRs during a Liberation Day speech.	(Snyder, 165)
1994-09-16	US-NK talks continue in Berlin, led by Gary Samore, Dep. Asst. Sec. of State for Political/Military Affairs, and Kim Jong U, Chairman of the External Economy Commission. From 09-16 to 09-20. Talks continue intermittently until October.	(Snyder, 165)
1994-09-23	US-NK high-level talks begin in Geneva.	(Bayer, 210)
1994-09-23	State Dept. Korea expert Robert Carlin notices that from this date on, NK statements dropped the word “never” concerning special inspections – a subtle but significant indicator.	(Oberdorfer, 353)
1994-10	President Kim Young Sam “lash[es] out at the Unites States in early October for being naïve and overly flexible in negotiations with the North Koreans.” Kim said that the new NK regime was on the verge of collapse and that US concessions would only buoy it longer. This appears to be a reversal of SK policy.	(Bayer, 210)
1994-10-06	At US-NK negotiations, chief NK negotiator Kang proposes that the special inspections be delayed until 70-80% of the LWR components are delivered. See 09-23. A very significant development.	(Oberdorfer, 354)
1994-10-21	1994 Agreed Framework is announced. [Bayer, 210, notes 10-17 as the date. This may be the difference between agreeing and announcing publicly.]	(Snyder, 165) (Oberdorfer, 356-357) (Downs, 243)
1994-11/12	US sanctions on magnesite trade lifted, SK lifts certain North-South business contact restrictions, expert-level talks on safe storage of NK spent nuclear fuel open in Pyongyang, NK delegation visits Washing for the first round of negotiation over liaison offices. These events occur in November and December 1994.	(Snyder, 166)
1994-12-17	CWO Bobby Hall & CWO David Hileman’s helicopter is shot down after crossing into NK territory.	(Snyder, 166) (Oberdorfer, 359)
1994-12-22	Bill Richardson is dispatched to negotiate the release of Hall, but fails. He returns with the body of CWO David Hileman, who died in the incident.	(Oberdorfer, 359)
1994-12-28	After congressman Bill Richardson fails to negotiate Hall’s release, Deputy Asst. Sec. Thomas Hubbard flies to Pyongyang to negotiate Hall’s release.	(Snyder, 166) (Oberdorfer, 360)
1994-12-29	Hubbard receives final approval from Washington to make a statement about the US’s “regret” for the incident, which will accomplish Hall’s release.	(Oberdorfer, 360-361)
1994-12-30	Hall is released following the US announcement of “regret.”	(Snyder, 166)
1995-01-20	US State Dept. announces the easing of several economic sanctions against NK, as per the Agreed Framework.	(Oberdorfer, 364)

Date	Event, Notes, & Observations	Sources
1995-03	Berlin negotiations between Gary Samore and Kim Jong U break down over the type of reactor to be provided to NK under the Agreed Framework. These events occurs in March and April 1995.	(Snyder, 166)
1995-03	KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) is created by the US, SK, and Japan. Something of a face-saving measure, so that SK could play a larger role, through KEDO, without appearing to do so.	(Oberdorfer, 366)
1995-05	Negotiations over reactor type resume in Kuala Lumpur between Thomas Hubbard and NK Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Gye Gwan. These events occurs in May and June 1995.	(Snyder, 166) (Oberdorfer, 367)
1995-06-14	Agreement on LWR type is reached in Kuala Lumpur. The KEDO board meets in Seoul and designates the Korean Electric Power Company (KEPCO) as the prime LWR contractor.	(Snyder, 166)
1995-09-11	In Kuala Lumpur, KEDO executive director Stephen Bosworth and NK ambassador-at-large Ho-Jong begin negotiations over supply contract. 09-11 & 12.	(Snyder, 166)
1995-10-01	NK-KEDO supply contract negotiations continue in New York	(Snyder, 167)
1995-12-15	NK-KEDO supply contract negotiations are concluded.	(Snyder, 167)
1996-01	In Hawaii, NK Foreign Minister bureau chief Kim Byong Hong leads a delegation to the first round of talks on the MIA issue.	(Snyder, 167)
1996-05-26	Congressman Bill Richardson visits NK for talks on “pending issues,” including MIA remains. From 05-26 to 05-29.	(Snyder, 167)
1996-04	In Berlin, the first round of NK-US bilateral talks on NK development and export of missiles.	(Snyder, 167)
1996-04-16	Presidents Clinton and Kim Young Sam announce a Four Party Talks proposal during a bilateral summit held on Cheju.	(Snyder, 167)
1996-05	Second round of MIA remains talks held in NY.	(Snyder, 167)
1996-09-18	NK submarine discovered on SK’s East coast. Thousands of troops are mobilized for a month-long manhunt. Only one NK seaman is captured alive.	(Snyder, 167)
1996-10	In NY, US-NK hold twelve rounds of working-level negotiations on a NK statement of regret necessary to reactivate normalized KEDO operations. These events occurred from October to December 1996.	(Snyder, 167)
1996-11-25	In Pyongyang, US congressman Bill Richardson holds negotiations with Vice-Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju over the submarine incident and to secure release of Carl Hunziger, a US citizen held in NK for over two months on spying charges. From 11-25 to 11-27.	(Snyder, 168)
1996-12-29	NK issues a statement expressing “deep regret” for the submarine incursion.	(Snyder, 168)
1997-01	US-SK hold the first round of a “joint briefing” with NK on the Four Party Talks proposal.	(Snyder, 168)

Date	Event, Notes, & Observations	Sources
1997-05	US-SK hold the second round of a “joint briefing” with NK on the Four Party Talks proposal.	(Snyder, 168)
1997-09	US-SK hold the third round of a “joint briefing” with NK on the Four Party Talks proposal.	(Snyder, 168)
1997-12	In Geneva, the first round of the Four Party Talks take place.	(Snyder, 168)
See the bibliography of the main paper above for source information.		