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PAKISTAN'S PERILOUS SECURITY:
ETHNIC DIVERSITY, KASHMIR, & NUCLEAR ISSUES FROM A U.S. SECURITY PERSPECTIVE Within days of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, realizing what the “with us or against us” stance of the Bush administration meant for Pakistan, pledged to cooperate fully with the U.S. in its efforts to locate and apprehend those responsible for the attacks. (Pakistan vows 2001) Because of Pakistan’s shared border with Afghanistan and close ties to the Taliban [1] largely due to extensive Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) [2] operations in the region, Musharraf’s cooperation was viewed as critical for the success of U.S. efforts. Subsequently, Pakistan provided much valuable intelligence information on the Taliban during the U.S. led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Later, Musharraf ended Pakistan’s unofficial funding of radicals in Kashmir, [3] and took the opportunity to crackdown on extremist groups and consolidate his power base. The dramatic improvement in, or restoration of, U.S.-Pakistan relations indicates that Musharraf’s cooperation has begun to pay off diplomatically, and to some extent economically, with a reversal of the relative neglect of the 1990s. (Zhang 2003: 3) In the year and a half since September 11, the USAID program has been reestablished, the U.S. is providing assistance in the areas of health, education, cooperative law enforcement, and have begun restoring military ties (Rocca 2003), billions of dollars of Pakistani debt has been rescheduled, and sanctions that were put in place after nuclear tests in 1998 have been lifted. (U.S. inks 2002) However, while Pakistan improved relations with the U.S. and the international community, Musharraf met significant resistance domestically. Despite his decision to sever ties with the Taliban, there is evidence that some ISI officers continued to aid the Taliban for some time afterward, when the U.S. began bombing Afghanistan in October of 2001, there were large demonstrations where images of Bush and Musharraf were burned, and there was serious speculation of a coming civil war in Pakistan. (Jones 2002: 25 & 241) Although those dire predictions did not materialize, there was a car bomb assassination attempt on Musharraf last year. (Musharraf ‘plotters’ 2003) The internal security and stability of Pakistan can still be considered fragile at best. Pakistan continues to be a critical ally from a post-September 11 U.S. security perspective, but one with something of a double-edged quality that could be either helpful or devastating to U.S. interests in the region. On one hand, Pakistan is important due to its strategic location, regional influence, and significant intelligence gathering capabilities. On the other, it has the potential to be a nuclear technology proliferator and a flashpoint for a nuclear war with its neighbor and enemy since its creation five decades ago, India. The fact that such regional conflicts can quickly become world wars only serves to highlight the importance of the region to U.S. security interest. In order to better understand the seriousness of Pakistan’s less than enviable security situation and how it affects regional stability, this paper will introduce that nation’s various Muslim ethnic groups as well as its two primary security issues, Kashmir and nuclear weapons, and integrate that information into a security analysis. This will include discussion of elements that can be considered to be both threats and supports for Pakistani and regional security, and an assessment of Pakistan’s reliability as a partner in the war on terrorism. The focus will be more on how the various Muslim ethnic groups affect regional security, vis-à-vis internal security, rather than the overt military capabilities of Pakistan. Before Pakistan’s Muslim ethnic groups are introduced, a brief overview of early regional history, the introduction if Islam to the region, the formation of the Pakistani state, and where Pakistan is at currently in its evolution is useful for understanding the degree of ethnic diversity in Pakistan, and how it has been achieved. This is especially beneficial for understanding issues of ethnic versus state identities, (e.g. Baluchi versus Pakistani) separatism issues, and traditional kinship roles that will be discussed in following sections. Early Regional History A relatively advanced urban culture known as the Harappan culture, dating back to circa 2500 B.C.E, existed in the Indus River valley region in what are now Pakistan’s Sindh and Punjab provinces, where the ruins of several well-planned and constructed cities have been discovered. It was essentially a Bronze Age agricultural civilization that engaged in extensive commence. A wide variety of crops and domesticated animals were raised, cotton cloth was manufactured and dyed, and other elaborate wares were created. (Blood 1995) Successive waves of migrating Aryan and Indo-European tribes brought with them the religious and philosophical systems that later developed into Hinduism, as well as an early version of Sanskrit. Both the Persians and Buddhism arrived in the sixth century, and Alexander the Great defeated the Persians in 330 B.C.E. After the Greeks, several different groups successively ruled the region, including the Sakas, the Pahlavas, the Kushans, and the Huns, who were eventually overtaken by the Guptas, which marked the classical age of Hindu civilization from the fourth to the seventh centuries C.E. Although literature, medicine, and the sciences flourished during this era, the rigid social caste system also emerged, and Guptas influence waned in the seventh century, leaving a vacuum to be filled by Islam in the following century. (Blood 1995) The Arrival of Islam Islam arrived in 711 C.E. with an expedition to Balochistan and Sindh dispatched by the caliph in Damascus, and led by Muhammad bin Qasim. In the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries Muslim conquests displaced many of the regions Hindu rulers, although a large part of the conversions, especially among lower casts, can likely be attributed to the egalitarian element of Islam, which was probably quite attractive to them. The Mughal Empire, [4] (1526-1858) was established by Babur, who claimed to be a descendant of Genghis Khan. His empire ruled most of present-day Pakistan and South Asia, and marked the culmination of Muslim rule in the region. (Rauf 1975: 45; Blood 1995; Background Notes 2003) British Rule By the middle of the nineteenth century the expanding British Empire conquered most of the Indian subcontinent. Rule came in the form of the British East India Company, which governed Sindh, Punjab, and the Princely States of the British Indian Empire. The company expanded its territory by two methods: subsidiary agreements with local rulers, and direct military conquest or annexation. The first method transferred control of foreign and defense affairs to the company while allowing local rulers a large degree of control in other matter. “This development created what came to be called the Native States, or Princely India, that is, the world of the maharaja and his Muslim counterpart the nawab.” (Blood 1995) The second method, however, resulted in an even larger amount of Indian territory for the company. The British conducted significant irrigation projects in Punjab, and that province became a net exporter of grains. The British Indian Army later recruited large numbers of Muslims and Sikhs from Punjab and used them to putdown uprising in India that occurred in 1857-1858. Although the British maintained direct administrative rule in India, local customary law continued in the northwest frontier regions, which served as a buffer zone between British India and Russian expansion. (Blood 1995) Islamic modernization movements grew as a response to British rule, and although they differed, they saw reform of Islam, modernization, and education as key elements for future Muslim success. They also served as an early organization base for Muslims that later favored the creation of Pakistan. (Blood 1995; Background Notes 2003) The Formation of Pakistan During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the desire for independence grew among Muslims and Hindus alike, although some favored a gradual process of reform while others sought a fast end to foreign rule. The All-India Muslim League was formed in 1906 in order to protect Muslim rights and promote an Islamic homeland. The “Two Nations Theory,” which called for a separate state for Muslims, emerged in the late 1930s, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, known as the father of Pakistan, endorsed the “Lahore Resolution,” (also referred to as the “Pakistan Resolution”) which called for the end of British rule and the creation of an independent Muslim state. (Blood 1995; Background Notes 2003) The changing attitude towards colonialism in the West and the end of World War II caused the British to hasten their withdraw from India, and in 1947 it was announced that the states of India and Pakistan would be created. The various Princely States could choose between India, Pakistan, or to become independent, however the latter choice was strongly discouraged. (Blood 1995; Background Notes 2003) The process of division, and some of the issues that arose from it, is elaborated below in the section detailing the conflict in Kashmir. Two Muslim majority areas, separated by 1,600 kilometers, became Pakistan on August 14, 1947, and were referred to as West Pakistan (present-day Pakistan) and East Pakistan, which broke away to become independent as Bangladesh since 1971. Pakistan Today After just over five decades and the loss of East Pakistan, Pakistan has a population of about 148 million. Ninety-seven percent are Muslim (77 percent Sunni and 20 percent Shi’a), while the remaining three percent are Christian, Hindu, or other. The literacy rate is a mere 43 percent, and is perhaps the largest challenge facing the nations leaders as they seek to stabilize their nation and ensure peace and prosperity in the future. Pakistan remains a relatively underdeveloped and impoverished country, and while extensive natural gas reserves are present, there are few other significant natural resources. There are several environmental problems including industrial pollution, and agricultural runoff. [5] Since September 11, Pakistan has reduced overall debt by rescheduling loan payments, and has had some success in economic reform. However the nation is a net importer, including petroleum products. The clash with India over control of Kashmir is a defining struggle for Pakistan, and that competition led to the development and testing of nuclear weapons in 1998 (after India conducted its own tests). It is also a major drain on resources that are badly needed in almost all other sectors of the Pakistani economy. (Background Notes 2000) While most of these conditions have plagued Pakistan for its entire existence, the important difference now is that Pakistan is a nuclear power whose primary enemy is also a nuclear power. It is possible that either side could escalate tensions in Kashmir to create unity at home. The volatile security situation in Pakistan is an international concern now more than ever.  The five major ethnic groups [6] in Pakistan – Punjabis, Pashtuns, Sindhis, Muhajirs, and Baluchis – together constitute approximately 97 percent [7] of the population, and generally share some basic social mores, norms and values that may be overviewed before discussing specific groups individually. Remarkably similar to the family organizational models of Confucian nations in East Asia, Pakistanis derive their identity from the family, and social life revolves around and is defined by the family and kinship relationships, even among the Westernized elite. Sons are preferred to daughters, since sons will care for the parents in their old age, while daughters cost dowry and must be delivered chaste to their husband’s family. Individuals live with their parents or other relatives until they marry, even in the urban setting, and sons more often than not stay at home after marriage forming an extended family. Marriages are arranged and considered to be a joining of families, and cousins [8] are often married in order to keep assets within a family. As in East Asia, tensions between the mother-in-law and daughters-in-law are not uncommon. (Blood 1995) Most ethnic groups speak their own language in addition to one or more other languages, and often strongly associate language with a shared identity. There are more than twenty spoken languages in the country, and the primary languages belong to the Indo-Aryan or Dardic branches of the Indo-European language family. While Urdu is spoken as a native language by only about eight percent of the population (usually Muhajirs), it is the official administrative language and often spoke as a second or third language. About half of the population natively speaks Punjabi. Due to the long British colonization, English is also widely spoken, especially among the educated or elite classes, and has become a “de facto national language.” (Blood 1995) Punjabis (60-65 percent) The Punjabis are located primarily in the Punjab province of northern Pakistan (see maps 1 and 2), which is where the capital city of Islamabad is located. Many Punjabis are also found in western India near New Delhi. Most Punjabis trace their ancestry and heritage to pre-Islamic castes, or qaums [9], which are clan or tribal groups, while others trace theirs to Arabia, Persia, Balochistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir, making the Punjabis a group of very diverse origins. The traditional communal sharing of resources at the village level has resulted in kinship-based social networks that are geared towards group needs rather than individual desires. Much pressure is placed on individuals to pool and share resources, including income influence. (Blood 1995) The emphasis on equal access to resources may be viewed as family and village units, but it also creates an atmosphere that leads to less than optimal decision making processes and even corruption. Punjabis are Sunni Muslims and dominate public service positions, controlling about 75 percent of high level military and central government positions – they may be compared to the “WASP” (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) of the U.S. due to their over representation in leadership and power positions. Other ethnic groups, and the Sindhis have in particular, are sensitive to this, especially after the capital was moved to Islamabad in the Punjab province, from Karachi in the Sindh province. Former President Zia ul-Haq and Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif were Punjabis. (Blood 1995) Because Punjabis are largely in socially dominate positions, it stands to reason that they have the most to loose from instability. However, due to cultural aspects that put pressure on members to meet family or village level needs above all others, those in leadership positions responsible for larger areas may have conflicts of interest that create conflicts. Their domination of the government and military remains an area of contention among the other ethnic groups, and ensures that separatist movements will not die in the near future. Pashtuns (12-13 percent) The Pashtuns dominate the North-West Frontier Province, the northern portion of Balochistan, and also form a major group in southern Afghanistan (the Taliban were Pashtuns). Some have relocated to Sindh. The majority are pious Sunni Muslims, and often Wahabi. Strict adherence to the Pashtun code of conduct, or the pakhtunwali, is central and sustains a complex etiquette. Honor, revenge, and hospitality are three of the most important aspects of the code. Proper sexual conduct and chastity among female relative is tied to ones honor. Pashtun social organization is split into a complex array of groups with shifting alliances, and there is an egalitarian code among the men of a Pashtun clan. (Blood 1995) There are several issues that make the Pashtun perhaps the most volatile Muslim ethnic group in Pakistan, and the largest threat the internal stability and security, particularly their affinity to radical or Wahabi Islam. Because Pakistani and Afghani Pashtuns share a common code of conduct, the Afghani refugees have found the Pakistani border region to be particularly hospitable. This is not to say that there have been no tensions, but that possible problems were greatly reduced. More significant is the fact that Afghani Pashtuns have ties to “the most violent Sunni extremist groups in Pakistan, who wanted Pakistan declared a Sunni state and advocated the overthrow of the ruling elite through an Islamic revolution.” (Rashid 2000: 187) Light-arms proliferation, especially Kalashnikovs, is a problem in the Pashtun areas of Pakistan. (Blood 1995) Besides the problems associated with radical Islam and violence, wide scale smuggling threatens to destabilize Central Asia and Pakistan in particular: The smuggling trade to and from Afghanistan… represents a crippling revenues loss… local industry has been decimated by the smuggling of foreign domestic goods. What is euphemistically called the Afghan Transit Trade (ATT) has become the biggest smuggling racked in the world and has enmeshed the Taliban with Pakistani smugglers, transporters, drug barons, bureaucrats, politicians and police and army officers. This trade… undermined the economies of neighboring states. (Rashid 2000: 189) Sindhis (11-12 percent) The Sindhis are located in the Sindh province of southern Pakistan, with a coast on the Arabian Sea and an eastern border with India. Sindh was a relatively neglected and poor province during the time of British rule, with a feudal-like farming structure of tenant farmers and large landowners. After the creation of Pakistan, millions of well-educated Hindus and Sikhs left for India and about seven million Mohajirs and others immigrated to the region, taking their places in commerce. The Sindhis have been unhappy with Punjabi and Muhajir domination, the move of the capital from Karachi, as well as the fact that former President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (an ethnic Sindhi) was forcibly removed from office in 1977, and hanged in 1979. Due to the influx of other ethnic groups of higher social position and wealth, the Sindhis are concerned with cultural preservation, and preservation of economic resources for the Sindhi people. They view the Muhajir in particular as “self-important, land grabbing outsiders.” (Jones 2002: 115) There is an active separatist movement and a continuing problem with ethnic related violence. In the 1990s, “Sindh continued to be an ethnic battlefield within Pakistan. During the 1980s, there were repeated kidnappings in the province, some with political provocation.” (Blood 1995) The separatists movement and sectarian violence in Sindh, while a serous threat to Pakistan’s stability, is probably less apt to reduce Pakistan’s overall security situation than it is to make moving past the status quo, in that region at any rate, more difficult. The presence of the Muhajirs is the primary agitating factor for the Sindhis, and low levels of violence are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Muhajirs (7-8 percent) When Pakistan was created in 1947, approximately seven million Urdu speaking Indian Muslim refugees fled to Pakistan and settled primarily in southern cities of Karachi and Hyderabad in the Sindh province. Those immigrants are referred to as “Muhajirs,” or “Mohajirs,” although the term is less an ethnic group than an identifier for those migrating for Islamic purposes: The word ‘Mohajir’ is derived from the Arabic ‘Hijra,’ which was used to describe the flight of Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) and his followers from Mecca to Madina to avoid persecution by the enemies of Islam. Its later usage has carried the connotation of a migration in the cause of Islam. It was applied… to the nearly seven million Indian Muslims who crossed the border into (West) Pakistan… About 70 per cent of these refugees were Punjabis… [and] owing to a shared language and culture these Punjabi immigrants assimilate rather quickly… and ceased to identify themselves as Mohajirs. (Ahmed 1998: 91)Although many Muhajir claim Arabic, Persian, or other Central Asian ancestry, “it is apparent that… they basically belong to the same stock as the neighbouring Hindus from amongst who they were converted to Islam.” (Ahmed 1998: 93) Thus the term “Muhajir” is used more in a political context than an ethnic or racial identifier. Having said that, they are still an important group that remains distinct from the Sindhis they live with. One of the reasons for their migration was the fact that the Pakistani government had proclaimed that members of the British-run Indian civil service would be given similar employment if they relocated to Pakistan. The Muhajirs came, many taking over the homes and business of the Hindus who had hastily fled for India (Jones 2002: 113-114) They were more educated and urbanized than the native Sindhis, and quickly dominated the business and political spheres of Sindh, to the great and continuing displeasure of the Sindhis. “The situation was hardly helped by the fact that many Mohajirs viewed the Sindhis as medieval peasants who needed to be dragged into the twentieth century.” (Jones 2002: 115) For their part, the Muhajirs viewed Pakistan as something of a promised land where an Islamic nation was to be constructed, and they have been sorely disappointed with the outcome to date. They also have a slightly fundamentalist and conservative approach to Islam, which conflicts with the Sufi-influenced Sindhis. (Ahmed 1998: 101) The separatist movement has gained credence with many Muhajirs, who quietly call for an area to call their own. Former President Bhutto’s blatant and biased support for ethnic Sindhis greatly contributed to Muhajir perceptions of vulnerability, as did the lack of Pakistani support for Indian Muslim immigrants in Bangladesh after East Pakistan broke away in 1971. (Jones 2002: 117 & 119) These issues continue to degrade the overall state of Pakistani stability and security. Baluchis (4-5 percent) That Baluchis occupy the very sparsely populated and extremely inhospitable Baloch province of southwestern Pakistan (about 43 percent of Pakistan’s land area), which has been compared to the Mars landscape. The tribal population also stretches beyond Pakistan into southern Iran, and to some extent, Afghanistan. The Baluchis are composed of four major subgroups: Marris, Bugtis, Bizonjos, and Mongals. (Upreti 2001: 95) They arrived in present day Baluchistan sometime in the first millennium, and were originally from tribes that migrated from Syria before the Christian era. Sheep and goat herding is the mainstay of Baluchi life, although a small amount of land is irrigated if an oasis is available. (Blood 1995) The vast majority are Hanafi Sunnis, although there is a community of the Zikris sect (who believe that the teaching of Messiah Nur Pak supercede those of the prophet) numbering about 500,000-700,000 in the coastal area (and in Karachi). By law, the Zikris are not considered to be true Muslims. Strong kinship ties are especially important in dealing with the harsh physical environment. However, in contrast to other regions, lineages play a much less important role. Baluchi society has been characterized as “feudal militarism,” and they have a similar code of conduct as the Pashtuns (honor, revenge, hospitality), except that the egalitarian element (among men) is missing from the clan. (Blood 1995) Having said that, there are some similarities between the Baluchi and Pashtun code of conduct, especially in the areas of crime, punishment, and revenge. (Baloch Traditions 2003) A strong national and cultural identity (Baluchi rather than Pakistani), which has sustained a sporadic yet long-lived separatist movement and poor relations with the central government, including military conflict. “I have been a Baloch for several centuries. I have been a Muslim for 1,400 years. I have been a Pakistani for just over fifty,” stated a Baluchi tribal chief with little use for the Pakistani government. (Jones 2002: 109) Low development and relative backwardness only enhances separatism. Like the Sindhis, the Baluchi separatism is less of a threat to long-term stability than it is a roadblock to a stronger national unity. The Baluchis would be considered a minor ethnic group if they did not control such a large portion of Pakistan’s land area. There are several other minority ethnic groups in Pakistan comprising of approximately three percent of the overall population, or about four and a half million. However, none of these minority Muslim ethnic groups are significant in numbers or influence, and the only separatist movement among them is relatively unorganized and ineffectual. The Pakistani controlled portion of Kashmir, located in the Northern Areas of the, adjacent to the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), is home to four minority groups: the Kashmiris, Uighurs (near the Chinese border), Gilgitis, and the Baltistanis. (Agha 2003) The number of Uighurs has increased by several thousand since 9/11 as they have fled the Chinese crackdown on “terrorists” Uighur groups. “Efforts to deport Uighur refugees from Pakistan have been stepped up, with Pakistani authorities arresting and torturing refugees before returning them to China… [and some] were reportedly executed soon after being driven across the Chinese border.” (Refugees 2002) Interestingly, it is reported that nearly two-thirds of the Northern Light Infantrymen (NLI) that formed the Kargil invasion force in 1998 and 1999 were Kashmiri “Gilgitis… and Baltistanis whose second and third cousins are still in the Ladakh ranges. They have all been tactically motivated, being told that they are on a mission to reclaim their 'homeland' from Indian occupation.” (Prasannan 1999) In southern Punjab, Seraiki speaking groups are to be found, and they are the only minor ethnic group that has a serous, although ineffective, separatist movement. They have a fairly recent separatist movement based on language and feeling of oppression from the Punjabi majority. The dominant Punjabis, however, reject Seraiki claims of cultural differentiation, and consider the Seraiki language to be a dialect of Punjabi. (Jones 2002: 140) Pakistan currently faces a wide array of current and potential threats to its future, including separatism, sectarianism, radical Islam, small arms proliferation, inadequate education, corruption, debt, the problem of Kashmir, and the dangers associated with possessing nuclear weapons. While all of these issues are important, below I cover what I believe are the four most pressing for Pakistan at the moment in terms of stability and security: separatism, radical Islam, Kashmir, and nuclear weapons. Separatist Movements Of Pakistan’s five major ethnic groups, four have separatist movements that are organized or active to various degrees, including the Pashtuns, Baluchis, Sindhis, and Muhajirs. The Pashtun and Baluchi movements are the oldest, as both of those groups opted for independence in 1947 but were forced to become a part of Pakistan. The Baluchis resisted the strongest, and took up arms against the Pakistani government. They are still concerned about preserving their ethnic identity under Punjabi domination, but there is relatively little violence at present. Pakistan will not set a precedent by allowing provinces to gain independence, and Baluchistan in particular due to its coastal access and because it is an effective buffer zone with Iran. Pashtun separatism picked up in the 1950s, and while government programs to include Pashtuns and extend economic opportunities has weakened that movement (Upreti 2001: 94-95), it is still a very potential problem to current and future administrations. Sindhi and Muhajir separatism are linked to one another, and to a large extent fueled by each other. Sindhi separatism began in 1977 when President Bhutto, an ethnic Sindhi, was removed from office and the gains Sindhis had made under Bhutto’s rather blatant favoritism began to disappear. It was also a reaction to both Muhajir and Punjabi domination – Sindhis felt like second-class citizens in their own province. Muhajirs, on the other hand, felt threatened by Sindhis nationalism, and from the early 1980s have sought a homeland to call their own. The result in the Sindh province has been thinly veiled tensions that boil over into bouts of intense violence from time to time, making the entire southeastern region rather unstable. (Upreti 2001: 95-99) As in the case of Baluchistan, it is absurd for either the Sindhis or the Muhajirs to expect independence due to the strategic nature of the Sindh border with India. These movements are a testament of the Pakistani governments failure, at least to this point, of creating a national identity that all can comfortably adopt. None of them currently pose a plausible threat to the central government, but they do pose general stability issues that detract from the overall ability of the government to act in a unified manner. The implications of this will be further discussed below. Radical Islam From the moment Pakistan was created an internal debate has been raging over what the nature of the state should be: a state for Muslims, or an Islamic state, i.e., a secular (or semi-secular) state that would respect Muslim values, or a state under traditional Sharia law. That struggle pits a moderate majority against a radical minority, and is Pakistan’s number one internal security problem. The founder of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, was a Western educated modernist and secularist whose speeches and writings strongly endorsed a state for Muslims, including specific comments that Sharia law should not be considered, and that Pakistan should not be controlled by ulema, or religious leaders. However, “any fair-minded assessment of Jinnah would have to recognize that he did make some comments about the all-encompassing nature of the Quran.” (Jones 2002: 12) Those comparatively rare comments have been taken out of context and used by traditionalists as justification for transforming Pakistan into an Islamic state. “The Quran and Sunnah, they maintained, lay down all the rules necessary for life and there was no need for mere men to create political institutions that could only distort Allah’s word.” (Jones 2002: 13) Those espousing radical Islamic ideals were mostly held in check until 1977, when General Zia-ul-Haq came into power and began an Islamization process in Pakistan. He began a broad program that created Sharia courts and brought ulema into the government decision-making process, and it was during his rule that many of the harsher laws and punishments associated with radical Islam were implemented in Pakistan. (Faruki 1987: 58) It retrospect, one can see that Zia-ul-Haq’s regime has left a lasting legacy of instability problems for Pakistan, from the separatist movements of the Sindhis and Muhajirs, to enabling the amazing growth of the madrassas throughout the country. Pakistan’s many ultra-conservative madrassas cannot be overlooked. Approximately 80 percent of Pakistanis are Sunni Muslims, and Sunnis may be divided into two camps: Barelvis and Deobandis. The majority describe themselves as following the moderate Barelvis tradition, which adheres to a more tolerant interpretation of Islam, and has some Sufi-like practices. The Deobandis, located mostly in the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) (Malik 1996: 251), on the other hand, favor a literal interpretation of the Quran, shun all things modern as un-Islamic, and it is they who run the many madrassas in Pakistan that enabled the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. (Jones 2002: 9-10) Those madrassas have been and are the main delivery system for radical Islam throughout Pakistan: At the time of Pakistan’s independence there were an estimated 250 madrassas in the country. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan transformed the situation. The madrassas won a well-deserved reputation for producing highly motivated anti-Soviet fighters. As a result, foreign funds, chiefly from the US and Saudi Arabia, flowed into the madrassas system. By 1987 there were 2,862 madrassas producing around 30,000 graduates each year... in 1995... there were 7,000 or 8,000 madrassas in Pakistan, and between 600,000 and 700,000 students attending them. (Jones 2002: 32)Students graduating from madrassas, which are predominately of the Deobandis school (Malik 1996:251), are ill prepared for employment in the modern economic system, and have few prospects for earning a living, and many opt for militant groups, many of which have ties to terrorist organizations. Creating socio-economic options for these youth may be just as important as changing the madrassas system. (Mahmood 1995: 262-263) President Musharraf attempted to limit the madrassas before September 11, but to little avail. After September 11, however, Musharraf made sweeping changes meant to reform the madrassas and bring them more inline with mainstream education. (Jones 2002: 32-33) Musharraf’s actions deserve praise, but his reforms may have little effect for years, or even decades to come: what took decades to build cannot be wiped away overnight, especially with radicals resisting his efforts. A case in point is the May 2, 2003 “capture of an alleged al Qaeda cell in Karachi, Pakistan, including the man [10] believed to have masterminded the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole.” (Plot 2003) That Pakistan’s ISI has been cooperating with and helping U.S. counterterrorism efforts is tempered by fact that al Qaeda members have a credible support network entrenched in Pakistan. The Conflict in Kashmir Pakistan’s number one external security concern, Kashmir, is also one of the four [11] areas in the world with the greatest potential for being a flashpoint for a regional or world war. Both India and Pakistan have been galvanized by over five decades of non-stop conflict in Kashmir, ensuring that there is no easy diplomatic solution. Pakistan pursues Kashmir with the zealousness of one who is convinced they are in the right according to the spirit of the Lahore Resolution of 1940, while India rejects calls for a new partition or popular vote due to stability concerns and worries that other areas will experience separatist uprisings. Presently, neither side can back down without committing political suicide domestically: The Kashmir dispute embodies Indo-Pakistani antagonism. The positions are clear-cut: India insists on maintaining the status quo, while Pakistan refuses to accept Indian jurisdiction and control. New Delhi regards Kashmir as an integral part of India while Islamabad insists that the dispute should be settled according to the terms of the [UN] resolution. Both countries reject total independence for Kashmir. (Kashmir 2002)Kashmir referred to several smaller states that had been combined by over time by the Singh family, and included Jammu (Hindu majority), “Ladakh (Buddhist majority), Baltistan (Muslim majority) and the Kashmir Valley (Muslim majority).” (Jones 2002: 57) Sir Hari Singh was the autocratic ruler of Kashmir, or the “maharaja,” in August 1947. Kashmir was one of the more than 550 “Princely States” that made up the Indian subcontinent under British rule. The maharaja had three choices: to become an independent state, or join either India or Pakistan. Technically, Kashmir was never under British rule but did pay tribute to the British crown with an annual tribute of “a horse, twelve goats and six of Kashmir’s famous shawls or pashminas.” (Jones 2002: 56) All of the rulers of the Princely States faced the same decision, but practicality decided the manner in many cases, and those clearly within the bounds of India or Pakistan, or when congruous with the border, joined those nations respectively. Kashmir posed a diplomatic problem from the beginning for two reasons. First, it was strategically located near both the Soviet Union and China. Second, it was one of the few cases in which the religion of the majority of the population and that of the ruler were different – nearly 80 percent of the population was Muslim, while the maharaja was Hindu. Additionally, Kashmir was congruous with Pakistan. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, believed that Kashmir was clearly a state that would go to Pakistan due to the Muslim population and the proximity. He is credited with the historically ironic quote, “Kashmir will fall into our lap like a ripe fruit.” (Jones 2002: 56-57) Muslims in Kashmir also led a harsh existence as second-class citizens, mostly employed as serfs, and one might expect that they would grasp at the chance to become a part of Pakistan. The ruler maharaja of Kashmir would have preferred to become an independent state, but faced opposition from both the Pakistani and Indian sides, as well as the British. The British Viceroy of India, Lord Louis Mountbatten, was tasked to oversee the division of the subcontinent, and it was he who convinced the rulers of the Princely States to choose between India and Pakistan, rather than opting to become independent. He made a special effort in the case of Kashmir. (Jones 2002: 58) Mountbatten’s role in the decision of Singh to make Kashmir a part of India has caused much controversy, and even conspiracy theory, in Pakistan. Historians in Pakistan content that Mountbatten influenced not only Singh, but also the Boundary Commission, “which was responsible for implementing the partition of the subcontinent by demarcating the new international borders that would run through Punjab.” (Jones 2002: 59) Not surprisingly, many in India have taken the opposite view, contending that Mountbatten advised Singh that India would not be offended in Kashmir went to Pakistan, and that he endorsed a direct vote by the population to determine the outcome. The controversy was due in part to the conflicting means of deciding the future of Princely States. On one hand, the rulers were to choose for themselves, yet on the other the Boundary Commission had instructions that demarcation should have been accomplished by “ascertaining the contiguous majority area of Muslims and non-Muslims,” and was meant to be an objective process. (Jones 2002: 59) The commission was carried out by a respected lawyer, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, who was selected in part because he had never been to India and it was thought that that fact would prevent any appearance of being subjective. However, because it later became apparent that Mountbatten persuaded Radcliffe to award the Muslim majority area of Ferozepur to India when it had been earmarked for Pakistan, the potential for controversy was realized. Ferozepur, although otherwise insignificant, had the only arsenal that might logically fall within Pakistani territory, and Radcliffe had marked it on a map as going to Pakistan. When Mountbatten discovered this, he arranged a meeting that resulted in this change, as even Indian historians now generally concede. (Jones 2002: 59-60) Although there is no evidence that Mountbatten influenced Singh on the decision to join India, he certainly created the conditions that made it a viable option when he suggested that Gurdaspur, a Muslim majority area that provided the only practical land link from India to Kashmir, could be awarded to India. India recognized this and began plans for bringing Kashmir into its domain. This has caused endless accusations from Pakistanis, who charge that Mountbatten was far from neutral. However, Mountbatten did also publicly take the position that if Singh opted for India that the decision should be temporary and should be decided by a referendum. (Jones 2002: 60-61) The case of Junagadh also set a precedent for Pakistan obtaining Kashmir. Junagadh was a state with an 80 percent Hindu population and a Muslim leader. Although not contiguous with Pakistan, it was located in Western India and had the possibility of a sea link to Pakistan. When the Muslim leader decided to accede to Pakistan, India invaded, held a popular vote, and Junagadh became part of India. (Jones 2002: 69) However, this was not to be the case for Kashmir. Mountbatten had opened up the possibility of Kashmir going to India, and India lobbied to Kashmir’s Hindu leader longer and harder than Pakistan did. In fact, because Pakistan thought that Kashmir would “fall into [the] lap” of Pakistan like a ripe fruit, they did not exert any pressure on Singh until far too late. Other factors also began to shape the Singh’s decision. After the British withdrew from Kashmir and the rest of India, order began to erode and violence was common in many areas. The oppressed Muslims in parts of Kashmir aimed their violence toward the maharaja, Singh, who then had them disarmed. The Kashmir Muslims rearmed with help from militants in Pakistan, and a chain of events was set in place that led to several thousand Pakistanis crossing into Kashmir in October of 1947. The object was to take Kashmir, allow a vote, and bring it into Pakistan. The unorganized militants, however, took the opportunity to plunder, and turned the local population against them. To make matters worse, Singh felt that he needed assistance from the Indian military – assistance that would not come unless he acceded to India, which he then did. The events surrounding the signing of that document are the topic of yet another controversy, but suffice it to say that Kashmir went to India, and the referendum never took place. (Jones 2002: 63-65) The fighting escalated and continued until a UN ceasefire took effect in 1949. In 1965 India and Pakistan fought another war [12] to decide the fate of Kashmir, but in the end the ceasefire line remained in exactly the same position. It is not particularly relevant to this study aside from the fact that is served to further galvanize both sides. Pakistan provided funds to insurgents and militant separatist groups in Kashmir until after September 11, 2001, when President Musharraf ended funding in order to minimize the perception of Pakistan aiding terrorists. The latest large-scale conflict over Kashmir occurred in the spring of 1999 when Pakistani troops in the guise of militants and took nearly 140 mountains positions over approximately 40 square miles. The posts were abandoned by Indian troops during the harsh winters and reoccupied each spring. Pakistani planners took advantage of the Indian absence to occupy the posts and take the strategic high ground. Besides the goal of obtaining more territory, Pakistan wanted to raise international awareness of the conflict with the hope that concern of the possibility of a nuclear exchange would put pressure on India to allow a referendum in Kashmir. (Jones 2002: 91-95) That plan, however, backfired miserably: Pakistan appeared to be a reckless aggressor and the international community favored keeping the ceasefire line rather than a vote. (Jones 2002: 105) The most significant revelation resulting from the conflict is the likelihood that then Pakistani President “Nawaz Sharif had not been told about Kargil in advance.” (Jones 2002: 101) He made that claim during his trial after he was ousted by the military, and it was substantiated by conversations secretly taped by an unknown intelligence organization and released by India. Nuclear Concerns The Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs present a classic arms race scenario in that they are both a response to the continuing struggle to control Kashmir, and to each other’s programs. Unfortunately, although not unpredictably, rather than enhancing their security they have degraded the stability and security of the entire region, and created a situation more dangerous than at almost anytime during the Cold War. On May 11 and 13, 1998, India exploded five nuclear weapons while conducting underground tests in the desert at Rajasthan. Pakistan followed suit with their own underground nuclear tests on May 28 and May 30, (Jones 2002: 187-189) making India and Pakistan numbers seven and eight, respectively, in the club of known [13] nuclear powers. Even before Pakistan had carried out its first test, nuclear tensions were high on the subcontinent. On the evening of May 27, 1998, the night before Pakistan planned its first nuclear test, Pakistani intelligence reported that Israeli jet fighters were thought to be on the way to Pakistan. They feared that the Israeli intelligence network had learned of the Pakistani program, on were planning to preemptively strike before Pakistan could carry out the explosions. The Pakistani military then armed some newly tested intermediate range missiles with untested nuclear warheads – India soon learned of this and responded in kind. (Jones 2002: 187-188) Fortunately, the Israeli aircraft thought to be on the way turned out to be an intelligence mistake: if Pakistan had been attacked at that critical moment, there is almost no chance that there would not have been a nuclear war on May 28, 1998. The apparent willingness of Pakistan to take an aggressive nuclear posture has continued until very recently. In December of 2002 President Musharraf admitted that he had been prepared to use nuclear weapons if India had moved “a single step across the... Line of Control, they should not expect a conventional war from Pakistan.” (Khan 2002) Tensions had escalated after a group of Pakistani militants killed 14 when they bombed the Indian Parliament earlier that month. India accused Pakistan of sponsoring the terrorists while Pakistan denied the charges. In October of 2002, just a few days after North Korea admitted to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly that North Korea has secretly continued a nuclear-weapons development program, (McGeary 2002) the U.S. announced it had intelligence reports indicating that Pakistan was a supplier of nuclear technology and equipment to North Korea. It was thought that Pakistan traded its nuclear technology for North Korea’s missile expertise sometime in 1997, two years before Musharraf took power, but evidence indicated that the relationship continued after than, even after September 11. (Sanger & Dao 2002) Although Pakistan has denied the charges, it was an embarrassing situation for the U.S.: America’s new partner in the war against terrorism found to be supplying North Korea with nuclear capabilities. In late March 2003 the Bush administration announced that sanctions had been imposed against Pakistan’s primary nuclear laboratory for proliferating nuclear technology to a nation in breach of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NTP). The administration also “publicly acknowledged for the first time that Pakistan was the critical supplier of the technology that enabled North Korea to develop a clandestine project to build weapons from highly enriched uranium.” (Sanger 2003) Unfortunately, there are few institutions in Pakistan that offer possible supports to stability and security, but one area that does offer hope is that of the current leadership: modernist President Perez Musharraf. Recognizing what America’s post-September 11 meant for Pakistan, Musharraf began mobilizing support [14] among the population by making a lengthy televised address in the days following the terrorist attack. In something of a fireside chat, he explained to his countrymen that he had agreed to assist the U.S. because Osama bin Laden was, at least partially, responsible for the attacks, that such cooperation could increase Pakistani influence in the region, and that if Pakistan did not cooperate, India could possibly take advantage of the situation. "On the one hand, if we make any mistake, it could culminate in very bad ends... If we make the right decisions, it could be very fruitful for us.” (Musharraf makes 2001) Like each Pakistani leader before him, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s term did not end with a peaceful or legal transfer of power: in ended in a coup d'etat on October 12,1999, when Chief of the Army General Perez Musharraf seized executive responsibility. (Jones 2002: 34-35) As the international community looked on the coup with general condemnation, Pakistanis rejoiced. Sharif had come into power with majority support, but he had then censored the media, and “emasculated” the parliament and Supreme Court. (Jones 2002: 35 & 55) Many of the officers of the other remaining powerful Pakistani institution, the army, viewed Sharif as “an incapable, power-crazed paranoiac who was failing to produce the economic growth that Pakistan so badly needed.” (Jones 2002: 37) He was viewed as being especially incompetent because he had withdrawn troops from Kargil a few months earlier without any concessions from the Indian side, although he was in position to seek them. The army, including Musharraf, viewed this as a betrayal to those that died in the conflict. His move to reduce the military’s influence was his last, and led to the October coup. (Jones 2002: 35) Musharraf may be described as a modernist, but not a secularist, the difference being that the modernists are “relatively liberal Pakistanis [who] believe that Islam should inform public policies in the country... [and] that Islamic principles can make a positive contribution to contemporary democratic theory and practice.” (Jones 2002: 8) Unlike the radicals, they believe that Islam can comfortably exist with new technologies. The conflict over implementation of the zakat [15] tax offers a typical example of the gulf between the two ideologies: (one of the Five Pillars [...classical zakat is levied on camels and horses among other items. Modernists, regarding this as a tax on means of transportation, held the view that zakat is equally applied to lorries, buses, cars, and taxis. Traditionalist strongly objected on the grounds that if the principle of new interpretation was accepted with regard to zakatarkan] of the Faith) it might be used as a precedent to change the rules regard other arkan such as prayer, fasting, or the pilgrimage. (Faruki 1987: 56)Although the zakat example is from 1951, it is still relevant today as Pakistan’s tax revenues are approximately half the worldwide average, (Jones 2002: 286) and it is one of the reforms Musharraf is interested in. As a modernist who abhors radical Islam, Musharraf has consistently tried to reduce the influence of radical groups by increasing education and democracy. In 2000 he unveiled a plan to increase Pakistan’s tax base and revenues, reduce government spending by reducing the bureaucracy, and agreed to hand over power to a democratically elected government by 2003, as directed by the Pakistani Supreme Court. (Musharraf promises 2000) This resulted an April 2002 referendum that, although criticized as being unconstitutional, gave him another five years in office. Musharraf was (again) accused of being a dictator a few months later in August for granting himself the powers to dissolve parliament, but he then allowed general elections in October 2002 and February 2003. (Timeline 2003) At the time of the February elections, Musharraf stated that Pakistan’s transition into a democracy had been completed. Although some claimed he was merely a dictator, perhaps his style of democracy can be forgiven considering the difficult and unpopular decisions that he had to make in order to address some of Pakistan’s other internal stability problems. For example, in January of 2002 he took steps against radical groups and banned to militant Islamic groups Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. (Timeline 2003) Before September 11, Musharraf also set out to reform the madrassas, specifically requiring that they give the government detailed syllabi and reveal sources of funding. After September 11 he had more room to maneuver: Clerics running the schools were told they had to turn away and foreign student who did not have a letter of approval from their own governments and to start teaching science, English and Pakistan studies alongside religious subjects. Musharraf also ordered the creation of a registration system for all those attending the madrassas. The U.S. provided U.S. $10 million dollars to purchase the necessary computer equipment. (Jones 2002: 33)In doing so, Musharraf addressed some of the major inadequacies of the madrassas education system, which had been apparent for decades. (Rauf 1975: 110-111) Musharraf’s immediate pledge of cooperation with the U.S. after 9/11 (Pakistan leaders 2001) has also strengthened Pakistan and given him some much needed leverage in implementing his modernist policies. While cooperating with the U.S. brought domestic tensions for Musharraf, the immediate tangible benefits were undeniable and in the form of debt relieve and other aid that relieved some of the pressure on the Pakistani economy. (Jones 2002: 3) As the example of the Taliban illustrates, a relatively small group of well-funded radical militants can threaten the stability and security of an entire region, Central Asia in their case. The problem with radical madrassas of the Deobandis tradition (the very ones that educated Taliban fighters) located throughout the country has also been noted, and one might draw the conclusion that Pakistan is in very serous trouble. The answer in this case is that it depends. The Taliban had massive amounts of funding, especially from Wahabi elements in Saudi Arabia and from the U.S., and the full cooperation and assistance of Pakistan’s ISI, which is not the case for the radical groups now operating in Pakistan. The threat is still there and cannot be underestimated, as the March 2003 capture of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, an al Qaeda planner, (Musharraf hails 2003) and the recent capture of an al Qaeda cell in Karachi (Plot 2003) demonstrates. However, the mere fact that Musharraf’s administration is proactively addressing the problem is a positive. Pakistan clearly faces several fundamental internal and external security dilemmas, often inter-related, that hinder its ability to affect a stable internal environment and move beyond the status quo of a third-world existence. It is equally clear, from a post-September 11 U.S. security perspective, that these issues cannot be ignored as they have been in the past, and the U.S. cannot disengage from the region once the immediate Taliban related objectives are met. Some of the problems posed by Pakistan’s situation, particularly those related to separatism and ethnic conflict, must be addressed by Pakistan alone. Others, however, will require continuing input and support from the U.S. and the international community, including India and other regional powers. Below are the four primary conclusions of this study. 1.) Pakistan Has Failed to Create a National Identity That Can Compete With Ethnic Ones The dream of Jinnah and many Muslims in 1947 has not been realized, and the state that was meant to be a haven for Muslims has been effectively paralyzed by separatism, ethnic and sectarian conflict, corruption, and a general lack of coherent leadership. For Pakistan to grow out of its third-world status, a national identity must be attainable for all ethnic groups. There are several contributing factors. First, government policies that are unfair or give one ethnic group advantage over another, or are perceived to do so, have created nothing but animosity and reinforced existing identities. The example of the Sindh province illustrates this in painful detail. Bhutto’s policies of blatantly favoring the minority created or amplified far more problems than they solved. Rather than resorting to favoritism, an educational campaign would have yielded better results, and still might, by lessening the gaps between those in leadership positions, and those that are excluded due to a lack of qualifications. Second, radical forms of Islam, including many madrassas, are extremely damaging. Not only do they lead to sectarian conflict, but in many cases those trapped in the world of extremism are ill-equipped to be a productive member of society and must instead turn to smuggling, militant groups, poppy production, or other socially disruptive activities in order to survive. The example of Taliban smuggling demonstrates that one small group with funding (U.S. and Saudi Arabia) and extensive organizational support (ISI) can destabilize an entire region, Central Asia in this case. It is rather ironic that Pakistan, or elements thereof, continued to assist the Taliban, a group that fomented separatism among Pakistani Pushtuns, and generally wreaked havoc on the Pakistani economy due to elaborate smuggling operations that robbed the government of much needed revenues. While separatism has an obvious link to an ethnic versus national identity, smuggling also effect this by siphoning off badly needed resources that could be used in the final area, education. The literacy rate in Pakistan is an abysmal 43 percent, and since the foundation of any modern or successful society is an educational one, this is one area that must be addressed. A better education, especially for non-Punjabi ethnicities, would help eliminate some of the differences that have continued to differentiate groups and reinforce ethnic identities. Education, of course, is a long-term investment, and it will take time to reduce the influences of separatism, radical interpretations of Islam, etc., yet this is clearly something that Pakistan must invest in if it is to have a future with any level of security and stability. The darker side of these problems is that, if they persist or increase, radical groups in Pakistan may become direct targets of U.S. intervention in the future. 2.) Kashmir Must Become a Part of Pakistan While it may seem absurd to suggest at this point in time, this issue must be resolved for the region to have any level of genuine security in the future, not unlike the Israeli-Palestinian situation. Not any outcome is acceptable; it must be a fair and logical decision, preferably based upon the guidelines of the Boundary Commission, the spirit of the Lahore Resolution, and under the authority of the UN. An objective survey of the governing agreements and known facts will lead one to the conclusion that Kashmir should have either been awarded to Pakistan outright due to the congruous border and Muslim majority population, or a referendum should have been held to determine the fate of the Princely State. Indeed, both Pakistan and the UN called (and still do) for a vote after the first conflict over the region, while India refuses. India will, in all likelihood, continue to refuse as long as it views such a loss as an instigator of other attempts at separating. The option of an independent Kashmir is not viable, since both Pakistan and India would be tempted to occupy the territory, likely sparking yet another war, and now that the opponents are nuclear, this must be prevented. It is rather ironic that the conflict over Kashmir is one of the few issues that seems to be able to draw Pakistan’s ethnic groups together in agreement, while threatening the stability and security of the entire region. Again, at this point in time the suggestion that Pakistan should gain Kashmir seems rather absurd, yet eventually a decision must be made and implemented if any lasting peace is to be had between India and Pakistan. Non-decision will merely perpetuate the tense and dangerous status quo, while an international endorsement of Indian control would likely cause an immediate war between nuclear-armed rivals. 3.) Both Pakistan and India Should De-Nuclearize The position that both Pakistan and India should become non-nuclear powers is of course a U.S. perspective, yet is also a global issue that concerns much more than just the local participants. However, and surprisingly, Pakistan has taken the lead in initiating mutual denuclearization: Pakistan upped the stakes in peace overtures with India on Monday, saying it would scrap its nuclear arsenal if its South Asian rival does the same... ‘As far as Pakistan is concerned, if India is ready to denuclearize, we would be happy to denuclearize,’ Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman Aziz Ahmed Khan said. ‘But it will have to be mutual.’” (Graham, 2003)This is quite astonishing since the logic of such conflicts would dictate that a smaller nation with less resources and a smaller military would be loathe to give up its hard won nuclear arsenal. Indeed, Pakistanis takes an unusual pride in their nuclear capability, and even have monuments to the achievement in the major cities. (Keller, 2003) President Musharraf is clearly taking a chance, politically, in his own country for making such an offer, however, he may have internal reasons besides the obvious India aspect, such as a general lack of tight control over those assets and related technology. There are several examples that demonstrate that the executive branch is not always completely aware or in control of key actions. Then general, now President, Musharraf himself probably initiated the 1998 Kargil campaign without the express consent of then President Sharif. (Jones, 2002: 34-35) The implications of such an action are significant, more so for a nation with nuclear weapons and considering the possible consequences. After September 11 Musharraf severed all ties with the Taliban, yet some ISI officers may still be aiding former Taliban. (Gall, 2003) More significantly, there is evidence that Pakistan continued a relationship with North Korea after September 11, likely without the knowledge of Musharraf. (Keller, 2003) The U.S. and the UN should take advantage of Pakistan’s offer and exert all possible influence to achieve the nuclear disarmament of Pakistan and India. 4.) The U.S. Cannot Disengage From the Region Finally, the U.S. cannot disengage from Pakistan or the region after the immediate objectives related to the Taliban are met. Following the Soviet-Afghan conflict, the U.S. abandoned the region, including the Taliban, which it had effectively helped to create. The reckless lack of oversight of such operations could and should be considered to be “blowback.” [16] Likewise, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. generally relaxed both militarily and diplomatically, drawing down troops, recalling diplomats, and reducing espionage efforts. As a result, the U.S. has been somewhat unprepared for detecting attacks such as September 11, or meeting general intelligence gathering and analysis demands in the aftermath. The trend now is towards rebuilding and improving those capabilities, and Pakistan can be a key partner – if it able to overcome its many internal and external security issues. Continuing U.S. engagement, among other factors, has greatly contributed to peace and stability in East Asia, and may help in the case of Pakistan and Central Asia. This does not necessarily mean troop deployment, but should include economic aid and ties, and continuing intelligence cooperation. To achieve satisfactory results, the U.S. needs to be aware of and work with Pakistan to address those internal problems, most of which, as we have seen, are inter-related on many levels. [2]
During the Soviet-Afghan conflict the CIA worked closely with the ISI
to aid
the Afghani freedom fighters, the Mujahideen, including the Taliban.
(Jones, 2002: 27)
[3]
The U.S. exerted considerable pressure on Pakistan to cease Pakistani
funding of radicals in Kashmir.
[6] Note that
ethnic group names may use different spellings in
sources cited due to varying Romanizations systems.
[8] A close
Pakistani
friend currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Korea is a case in point. Before
going
abroad to study, he lived at home with his parents.
While he has been in Korea, his parents have arranged a marriage for
him, and they will reside with his parents upon his return to Pakistan.
[9]
Muslims use the term “qaum”
rather than “caste,”
which infers Hindu connotations of reincarnation and
karma.
[10]
“One of those, Whalid ba Attash, is believed to have masterminded the
attack on the USS Cole in Yemen, and to have played a role in the 1998
bombing
of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya and the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks.” (Plot, 2003)
[13] The
other known, or strongly suspected,
nuclear-armed nations are the U.S, UK, France, Russia, China, and
Israel.
[14]
Robert C. Tucker’s “Politics as Leadership,” 1981, describes the
political leadership process as a) diagnosis of the problem(s); b)
prognosis, and; c) mobilization of support.
[16]
A
term commonly used in the intelligence community that refers in a
project
that comes back to haunt or damage the sponsoring organization. After
September 11 many pundits blamed U.S. policy for the Taliban’s attacks
on the U.S. I conclude that they were right that it was “blowback,” but
for the neglect of a dangerous tool, the Taliban, created and
abandoned, not for direct
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