Why North Korea Conducted a Second Nuclear Test
by Richardson ~ May 25th, 2009. Filed under: Axis of Evil, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Kim Jong-il, North Korea, Nuclear Proliferation, Six-Party Talks, UN, WMD.The title assumes North Korea did test a nuclear device, which I think likely, and not an equivalent amount of TNT, initially thought a possibility in 2006 until radioactive isotopes of krypton and xenon were detected.
There are several reasons for a North Korea to conduct a nuclear test and it’s difficult if not impossible to rank them by importance as Kim Jong-il might. The lines also blur for some stated here, and no doubt some could be broken down further.
Proof of concept: Perhaps the simplest reason, and in light of the failure of the 2006 nuclear test – to prove to themselves (regime elite) and the rest of the world they in fact do have a no kidding nuclear weapons capability. Since this is something North Korea intends to keep, it’s important to know the design functions as intended. Look for another Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) to prove a delivery capability.
Domestic audiences: Two sides to this one; the population as a whole, the regime elite. Whatever the outcome of the test, all would be told it was a spectacular success that boosted the prestige and security of the regime, etc. But elites would find out sooner in and greater detail of any failure. In the case of elites, especially the military, a success gives them a bit of confidence in being able to maintain the status quo and their positions of power.
Succession – North Korea after the Dear Leader: There have been several adjustments to North Korea’s political system since Kim Jong-il’s stroke last August, for example changes to the National Defense Commission and many other changes of personnel in regime leadership. These changes appear to be geared towards leaving whomever succeeds Kim Jong-il (my pick is still Kim Jong-un) in a better position, both domestically and when it comes to dealing with outside powers. For more see, “What if Kim Jong-il Died… Today? (Part 1),” and “What if Kim Jong-il Died… Today? (Part 2).”
Setting the stage for negotiations: Whenever returns to the negotiating table, be it Six-Party Talks or some other forum, they want to there as a nuclear power. Perhaps with Kim Jong-il heading the regime, or his successor (assuming the regime survives Kim’s death). The first test was a failure and Washington could easily ignore that status for Pyongyang, but with a likely successful test North Korea is moving towards de facto nuclear power status. Just getting the U.S. to admit North Korea is a nuclear state would be seen as a wild victory in Pyongyang, and would also feed domestic propaganda.
Wheeling and dealing, someday: Not right away, but eventually (the test was not about near-term concessions). At some point someone in Washington may make North Korea another offer they can’t refuse (to renege on) in exchange for selling off or allowing the monitoring of some part of their nuclear program. But North Korea won’t give up its nuclear program as long as it a sovereign country.
No good reason not to: The U.S. and UN have demonstrated to North Korea that neither has the current capacity or willpower to respond in a way North Korea finds unacceptable. The 2006 missile and nuke tests, the April TD-2 test, and now this; the U.S. talked big but in reality there are no consequences for North Korea, and Kim Jong-il knows it. What could/should be done? See OFK’s “Plan B” (no, it’s not a pill).
What it’s not about: Finally, Pyongyang did not conduct this second nuclear test because it felt ignored or wanted more attention from the Obama administration. It’s a reason that gets attached to many North Korean actions as sometimes North Korean acts of brinkmanship are indeed meant to get America’s attention, but not this time I think. After the April TD-2 test, North Korea threatened to escalate – what we’re seeing now – if the UN even discussed the TD-2 issue. A ridiculous and absurd demand, since the UN Security Council was practically guaranteed to make some sort of watered down statement. North Korea likely had a nuclear test planned before April and only the most unrealistic of responses from the U.S. would have prevented it.
Probably I missed something obvious, but those are the main reasons as I see them.
Not sure if this effect was intentional or not, but there seems to be markedly less interest in this likely successful nuclear test than there was for the unsuccessful one in 2006. Perhaps this is due to it following the TD-2 test so closely and getting sort of numbed to North Korean antics – how many times can we go to the brink of brinkmanship? – but I detect a “so what” factor. There is indeed a reason to care about this, but that’s the topic for another post…
May 25th, 2009 at 7:28 pm
You missed the most important reason. They are dicks.
May 25th, 2009 at 7:33 pm
Doh!
May 26th, 2009 at 12:56 am
What kind of device?
Hypothesis A - the most frightening: a ready to launch warhead, a device small enough to be carried by a missile like Tae-pong-do’s. They have to test it before mounting the load, logically. But this is teling us another thing, that they have completed the other tests for the load like gravity and speed/velocity and temperature tolerance. This can be a nasty surprise indeed.
Hypothesis B – an older type of uranium ammo, like the nuke bombs that they had in the eighties, after Ceausescu’s visit to NK this one too in a speech told us that Romania was able to build nukes but being so peace loving Romania will not start such a process. Probably his ambitions as a local leader were bolstered by the North Koreans showing him a nuke designed and build by their own scientist. This is not so frightening because it shows that the NK was trying to get rid of the old ammo and in the same time to tell the world that they are serious and determinate to continue the improvement of their nukes.
May 26th, 2009 at 9:48 am
I wonder if the Kim regime’s concerns about developments in the ROK possibly have more to do with the timing of this test than some of the other reasons advanced?
Is there the possibility that the Norks need more food, and other aid, than previously? Surely the decline in oil prices have helped ease economic concerns for the regime a bit…but I wonder.
This is just thinking aloud, but would be curious for some opinions re the current state of what the Norks call an economy.
May 26th, 2009 at 6:11 pm
Andrei; While a likely successful nuclear test is worrisome, North Korea probably can’t delivery by ICBM - yet. North Korea probably has plutonium based nuclear weapons. But since we don’t know the true extent of their HEU program, it is possible they have uranium based ones instead of - or in addition to - plutonium based devices.
El Jefe; A nuke test isn’t likely to gain North Korea food aid anytime soon, and probably the opposite. They surely do need more food than they have, but the regime isn’t worried about loosing some of the non-elite. Instead I think it’s likely they are more concerned with the core issues outlined above, but may bargain away bits of their program in the future for food (and some will be foolish enough to bargain with them, again).
May 27th, 2009 at 12:04 pm
Has anyone else been listening to the English language shortwave broadcasts from NK since the tests? I missed the broadcast immediately after the test, but both yesterday’s (the 26th) and today’s (the 27th) were revealing.
Yesterday’s made no mention of the test whatsoever. Today’s “news” segment started with accounts foreign press coverage of the “Great Leader” conducting a routine military inspection (this is atypical, normally the news segment ends with foreign press accounts), then broke the test story obliquely by covering a mass meeting (in approval of the test, naturally) about it in Pyongyang yesterday.
This all is consistent with theories that internal, and not external, considerations are primarily behind the decision to conduct the test. If it were external, their foreign broadcast service would have made the test (and the reason for conducting it) the centerpiece of their programming. Instead, they come across as being uncertain and confused as to how to break the story.
NK is an alternate reality zone. (If you doubt this, get a shortwave radio and compare their shortwave broadcasts to those of, say, Cuba.)
To expect the inhabitants of such a zone to make decisions based on criteria those of us outside of it would is unrealistic. Such speculation can be useful in the case of unfree societies that are less absolutely totalitarian than NK (and thus not in a completely alternate reality zone). Not all dictatorships are created equal.
May 28th, 2009 at 9:36 am
Hello there Richardson. Long time, no post or comment my dear friend.
I have been away a while, and holy moly, a lot of things have happened. With that said, I have to say Kim has tested the US administration like he does every other administration to adjust the game plan to get max results. This is the standard stuff, but something different is happening.
I am not an expert on this subject, but one thing is for certain that the DPRK cannot continue on its current course, economically alone, and survive as a regime. Yes, people have been proven wrong before (like 1994), but something feels different here. However, feelings and reality are different things.
As for the nuke, it is a propaganda extravaganza. I have a feeling Kim needs to cement his legacy. As you know, legitimacy is everything to pave the path to succession (as you say if it lasts that long), but I have been debating with some pretty smart folks regarding this very issue.
It is very difficult if not impossible to know Kim’s true intentions, but if his plan is regime survival (and movements seem to point to that desire), there has been some debate about legacy:
1. Does Kim want to go out with a “bang” and not give two centavos about the regime’s future, therefore, go ahead with some strike?
2. Does Kim want to keep the apes in line by showing he is an invincible, capable leader who saw the best interests for the happiness and prosperity of the Korean people?
I would say it is the latter, but I will not commit to anything lest I be proven wrong along the way.
Ahhh, and more goodies too. Missiles, the algore girls going on trial, and of course, the leaping death of Roh. It’s been a busy time in Korea my friend.
May 29th, 2009 at 12:21 am
[...] did North Korea test a nuke? Richardson made an excellent post about this very issue, and it is well worth a look. While I am not an expert on nuclear devices or [...]
May 30th, 2009 at 11:38 am
An excellent article that puts things in an easy to understand perspective. Iran is another rogue state that is a nuclear wannabe. Neither Iran nor North Korea have any real interest or concern for regional stability. And both wouldn’t hesitate to sell or give nuclear technology to anyone willing to buy or advance their agendas. There’s no doubt the two remaining states of the axis of evil are spinning out of control.
June 3rd, 2009 at 2:45 pm
And of course, if you can make more than one you can sell them like hot-cakes (or- if your people are hungry - for hot cakes).
Forget the aid concessions - change the world! Give the tool to some angry people elsewhere on the planet and let them use it.
June 3rd, 2009 at 2:47 pm
Ooops - Did I say “give the tool”. I should have said “sell the tool”.