The Trouble with North Korea
by James Na ~ December 9th, 2008. Filed under: Activism, China-Korea Relations, Defectors & Refugees, Human Rights, Hunger & Famine, Korean Politics, North Korea, Nuclear Proliferation, Reunification, South Korea, U.S.-Korea Relations.The trouble with North Korea is that nobody wants it — except the current ruling elite of North Korea itself.
In a previous post, I rather immodestly predicted that, should the Kim regime collapse in North Korea, a military junta backed by China would emerge, resulting in a Burma-ization of North Korea. I further speculated that in an increasingly Sinicized North Korea, the lot of ordinary North Koreans would be bleak.
I have given some further consideration to this topic and present additional thoughts below for a discussion.
Let’s examine the position and motivation of each external actor involved in “the North Korean problem.” First, the United States. By now, it is clear that neither the outgoing Republican administration nor the incoming Democratic one is serious about North Korea. With Iraq, Afghanistan, other aspects of the War on Terror and the latest economic malaise occupying the attention, North Korea would not even register as a serious policy issue but for its nuclear arsenal. Because of this, I suspect that Washington would not object to Chinese domination of North Korea provided the Chinese disarmed the North Korean nuclear arsenal in return.
It would not be too far-fetched to assume that many in Washington want the North Korean problem to simply go away and will make extraordinary concessions (to principle, mostly) to make this happen.
Ah, but what about the small, but vocal and occasionally effective (but generally ineffectual) human rights lobby in Washington? More on that below.
Second, China. Of all the external players, China desires control of North Korea the most. This stems from China’s desire to maintain friendly governments along its entire border as well as its sensitivity to an American outpost and ally on its border in mainland Asia.
Nonetheless, China does not “want” North Korea or its problems. As fierce a critic of Red China as I am, I must acknowledge that a direct rule of North Korea by China would probably be a material improvement for ordinary North Koreans compared to the native rule, whether the Kim regime or a military junta.
But a direct control of North Korea entails enormous headaches to Beijing, including a likely conflict with South Korea — which is why Beijing would “contract out” the administration of North Korea to a pliable North Korean military junta. In China’s view, economic exploitation of North Korea’s resources and its workers would be more than enough as long as its client government remains exactly that.
Third, South Korea. For a long time, it was given that South Koreans desired reunification with their Northern brethren. That assumption can longer be accepted at face value. It is clear that many, perhaps most, South Koreans care more about their standard of living than saving their Northern kin with their kindness and purse. This is particularly so in light of the potential world-wide recession.
Not only have the South Koreans been scared away from reunification by their study of the cost of the German unification, their growing contacts with the often malajusted and violent North Koreans have increased their disdain for and fear of the latter. Many South Koreans do not believe that most North Koreans can be rehabilitated and integrated into their capitalist society, nor are they willing to try.
Many South Koreans, too, want the North Korean problem to simply go away. The more pragmatic among them would like to assist North Korea and “coax” it into Chinese-style economic reform so as to lower future costs of reunification and certainly to reduce the number of refugees who would flood South Korea.
Indeed, it appears only the fringe elements of both the Korean right and the left still desire unification on the grounds of either ethnic solidarity or principle.
Japan and Russia are peripheral to the issue at the moment and are likely to remain so. The European Union is a non-player.
Among the external actors, only the Western — that is, largely American — human rights lobby wants North Korea’s regime to disintegrate today, followed swiftly by South Korean annexation (for the record, although I am no longer an active member of this coalition, I am sympathetic to its views and goals). Those in the human rights lobby tend to view any “unreciprocated” economic assistance to North Korea with great hostility. They correctly believe that such an assistance would sustain a monstrous regime that deserves a quick death. Thus they frequently describe those elements in South Korea and America that advocate economic assistance to North Korea as useful idiots and fellow travelers of Kim Jong-Il.
But therein lies a moral dilemma. Clearly, substantial economic aids to North Korea would improve the lot of North Koreans, however marginally. They might even save some lives.
Of course, the human right lobby would argue that the assistance would delay the death of the regime and prolong oppression and misery. But this assumes that there is a light at the end of the tunnel, i.e., that reunification with the South would occur eventually.
But what if that were not the case? What if the current trajectory continued and the South Korean alienation with North Koreans increased and the desire of the former for reunification declined still?
Considering that no external government wants the administration of North Korea, except perhaps the most unpalatable one (i.e. China), at what point does humanitarian economic aid to North Korea become a necessary evil to improve the lot of North Koreans, in the potential absence of realistic and better alternatives?
I am beginning to grapple internally with the possibility that the position of the human rights lobby might ultimately be wrong for the right reasons while the useful idiots might be right for the wrong reasons.
I am no longer certain what the right answer is, and I invite comments and discussions from the readers.
December 9th, 2008 at 6:33 pm
The easy answer is, there is no easy answer. Never has been the case. I think you know this deep in your heart, and the most plausible answer is the least palatable.
Most likely, with the secretive nature of the regime, the out of sight out of mind crowds, all of it it will all come to a head when least expected. With that said, nobody will have the plan in place to handle the situation, and like most things, action is taken in crisis mode.
It is a very sad picture. While I cannot begin to speculate what is going on with Kim, and as much as I want to believe he is ill beyond repute, I think something else is going on. Some things are simply not fitting to suggest something serious happened to Kim unless the policy elites are keeping it secret. That could be it too.
Whatever the case may be, North Korea is a thorn on everybody’s side and nobody wants to deal with it. Once everything is said and done, the ones that get hurt the most are you guessed it; the ones people are claiming to help.
Unfortunately, the most I see is lip service and not real work.
December 10th, 2008 at 12:49 am
It is very unfortunate for the Korean people on the both side of The Korean Peninsula. Korea happened to be sandwitched between 4 major powers: Russsia, China, Japan, and the USA. And those four major powers have their own national interests.
I really think those 4 major powers are responsible for the Korean division which is the last cold war frontier on earth.
December 10th, 2008 at 3:55 am
Completely agree with your analysis of the powers’ attitude to the NK issue. Provided a link in my Russian blog.
December 10th, 2008 at 8:09 am
Penetrating insights, all. I have a different take as a Soldier and a veteran of two regime change operations.
1. Kicking the can down the road is never the answer. It will still ultimately result in a Sino-Korean confrontation with a high likelihood of armed conflict. The war-is-the-last-resort and an unacceptable-course-of-action contingents are not aligning themselves with historic evidences.
2. The inevitability of the collapse of the DPRK seems like a given, whether forced or unforced. A negotiated UN-backed plan to occupy nK with sK and UN troops is the best possible scenario. In such a scenario, China would agree to certain pro-PRC concessions that fall short of a Chinese occupation of the former DPRK.
3. Attainment of such a scenario would involve credible sticks as well as carrots. A strategic military alliance between the US, Japan, ROK and Australian forces along with the option to limit/levy Chinese imports with tariffs/duties might persuade the Sino-Russo alliance that a free unified Korea on its border (and potential trade partner) might not be the end of the world if the nK infiltration is halted and the massive trade advantage with the US is sustained.
4. South Korea must emerge as a real regional military power. We are on this trajectory now but some in the ROK have terrifying memories of Chinese and Japanese suzerainty and are getting cold feet. Turn over of operational control of USFK to South Korea is conditional: the ROK must flex its muscle as a regional power, damn the torpedoes. With a stable economic, political, and military alliance with the US, Japan, and Australia, the ROK has the backing it needs to reclaim nK even if such action is viewed as provocative towards the PRC. There is no way a free people can remain free with the sacrifices required of freedom and liberty: the blood (or willingness to shed it in the cause of liberty) of patriots.
The PRC did not emerge a winner in the Korean War. The Juche revolution is rotted and decayed. The threat of confrontation with the PRC is ominous and most undesirable, but it is not the worst case scenario. The alliance between the ROK/US/Japan/Australia has far more strategic military advantages over almost any possible Sino-Russo alliance.
As long as the ROK is reluctant to take a leadership role as a regional power, the bellicose threats of the DPRK and the silent Confucian expectation of the PRC for the ROK to be quiet and submit will determine the future of a booming ROK that is near critical mass in terms of its long term future prospects.
There are very good reasons for avoiding another military confrontation on the Korean peninsula. Yet pragmatism based on a safety-at-all costs mentality caused the continental Europeans to kow tow to Hitler and the war they sought to avoid came anyway and with horrific human costs. Never, ever let the enemy determine the time, place or conditions under which you fight. The do-anything-to-avoid-war mentality is the pimp selling freedom and independence to predatorial parasites and sap-suckers. Decadence and social decay are the usual fruits of policy made under such motivations.
The cause is just, morally right and historically grounded. Sooner or later the injustice of the enslavement and torture of the Korean brethren to the north must be answered in the national conscience of the people of the ROK.
December 10th, 2008 at 8:13 am
The above post should read,
“There is no way a free people can remain free withOUT the sacrifices required of freedom and liberty: the blood (or willingness to shed it in the cause of liberty) of patriots.”
December 10th, 2008 at 11:49 pm
James, your analysis overall as usual is good, but I have a few thoughts.
1) I don’t buy the premise that refugees would flood South Korea in a collapse. Assuming you get food & other basic services (something approaching law & order) in there right after the collapse, most NKs want to stay where they grew up. (I can go into more detail at a future time if you’re interested.) Also, in the short run, unless it’s by boat, no NKs would be able to cross the DMZ anyway, they’d be going north, likely where they’d meet the Red Army.
2) “only the Western — that is, largely American — human rights lobby wants North Korea’s regime to disintegrate today, *followed swiftly by South Korean annexation*”
“…a light at the end of the tunnel, i.e., that reunification with the South would occur eventually.”
–> this connection in the minds of South Koreans and even others that freedom for NKs is one in the same with reunification must be gotten rid of once and for all.
The goal needs to be the freedom (self-rule) of the NK people, not reunification. I’m not anti-reunification in and of itself, but for all the reasons South Koreans fear reunification, it will be a mess, well, a nightmare. The two sides obviously are not ready, so why rush things!?!
And the real kicker is, those who start with the premise of “reunification (step 2) or nothing” are, whether intentionally or not, sacrificing the freedom of the North Korean people (step 1). Again, you don’t have to have reunification to have NK freedom.
Now, I will for the most part leave the heavy-lifting geopolitical analysis to you and others, definitely not my specialty. I will only offer an idea. I realize the following may not be as likely, but if it is preferable, it at least needs to be discussed, if not promoted.
SK moves in with troops (OR, better, as KCJ says in his #2 point above, the UN & SK troops) to ensure law in order immediately following the death of KJI, but this wouldn’t have to mean reunification. It could be providing law & order for a few (well, likely several) years until civil & govt institutions could get up off the ground. then pull out. then 20-30-40 years down the road, the NK people have a referendum and the SK people have their own referendum on reunification. If both sides vote yes with supermajorities, THEN you reunify.
Freedom first, then, if mutually desired later by SK & NK, reunification. When talking with South Koreans (and, apparently, some of the NKHR activists?) this must be repeated until blue in the face. I admit, this hasn’t yielded great results yet in my experience, but if you mention China controlling NK for the next 50-100 yrs as the only other forseeable option, they at least start listening. (though, on balance, i admit i remain pessimistic because one weakness of democracies seems to be they don’t plan for teh future well, they just react to the latest crises, so China it is…)
One final note, your post has me also thinking about that last bit, China taking over. Yeah, as much as it’s hard to admit it, that is preferable to a permanent continuation of the present situation. Much preferable.
December 11th, 2008 at 1:32 am
DanB:
Excellent point, and you are right, it is very easily overlooked as a [possible] intermediate step between the way it is now and the eventual reunification. I think the assumption most of us have is that a regime collapse is tantamount to reunification - and perhaps that it is too simplistic.
The goal of a free NK is a worthy one - and not neccessarily a compromise. Hard to see that happening under a PRC protectorate - at least proportionate to the level of personal liberty enjoyed in SK.
At some point I hope the patriotic nationalism of the ROK supersedes the cautious pragmatism of no-war-no-matter-what. My bottom line is freedom of religion in NK, regardless of the political alignment. Once that is achieved, the real engine of cultural and political change in SK can unleash it’s tour de force: SK’s zealous missionaries and evengelists.
December 11th, 2008 at 2:24 pm
Dr. Lankov,
My thanks as before. I was embarrassed to note that I was unaware of your blog. Could you provide a link for it?
KCJ,
While deferring decision is not a sound response, that is what will happen. Remember that we operate in the world of “what is,” not “what should.”
As for the ROK military, I think it IS on its way to becoming a serious regional military power if not quite there yet. I think a good model might be the Singaporean military (only with more manpower and greater capabilities).
But therein lies the precise problem. Should the ROK military become such a power, PRC is ever more unlikely to allow it to enter North Korea.
danb,
Although North Korean independence, rather than reunification with the South, is a worthy goal, it is a path that leads to Chinese domination. It is also highly unlikely that South Korea can occupy it and then simply withdraw (in which case, North Korea will, again, be at the mercy of China).
Thank you all for the discussion.
December 12th, 2008 at 7:46 pm
Dear Mr.Na,
My blog is tttkkk.livejournal.com (it’s very popular and widely read, but it is written in a rather exotic language, Russian).
AL
December 12th, 2008 at 7:52 pm
Dr Lankov,
It is so nice to see your comment on this blog.
Richardson,
You should be honor to have someone like Dr. Lankov reading and commenting on your blog.
December 12th, 2008 at 8:15 pm
Re unification. The major potential pro-unification force is the NK common people, those proverbial “masses”. The huge gap in living standards between two Koreas, some 1:20 to 1:40, will make South very attractive to the 95% of the Northerners, once they get some graphic ideas about its prosperity. Truly, the land of milk and honey. This, combined with lifelong exposure to the ‘unification-is-our-only-desire’ type propaganda, is bound to create a powerful grassroots pro-unification movement in the North. Once northern can express themselves (not freely, but to some extent), they will demand immediate unification with the South, assuming (wrongly) that it will mean a nearly automatic increase of their living standards up to the SK level. This is illusion, I know, but this will be a mighty powerful illusion. I cannot imagine how any reform-minded North Korean government will be able to persuade the North Koreans to keep their state. I also cannot imagine how South Korean public, also taught by both Left and Right that ‘unification-is-our-only-desire’ will say NO! to the crowds of the compatriots, rushing to the ROK borders, and waving taegugki on the Pyongyang streets.
To make things clear: although I believe that this scenarios is good to both the continuation of status quo and Chinese take-over, I do not want such a scenario, I am in favor of gradual, step-by-step unification. Nonetheless, I cannot see how unification can be prevented if North Koreans will get the level of freedom comparable with, say, that of modern Communist China (let alone something more close to a democracy). Most which can be done is to slow down the process, winning a year or two, or (if politicians in charge will be especially clever and cunning) five years’ delay.
December 12th, 2008 at 9:06 pm
Dear MAJ K
Thank you. But personality cult NEVER ends well. IMHO, Kim Il Sung of 1945 was really decent person. a true hero, actually. It did not prevent him from becoming the worst tyrant in Korean history who killed more Koreans than any foreign invader. Fortunately, I have no chances to become a tyrant (may be, to a couple of post-graduates), but still…
December 12th, 2008 at 9:16 pm
Andrei Lankov , I really, really liked your book by the way. Just thought I’s toss that out there.
December 12th, 2008 at 9:41 pm
Dr. Lankov,
Thank you very much for sharing your brilliant insights and analysis with us. I am thrilled that you decided to join our colloquy and dignify us ‘laymen’.
I especially affirm the role of Juche in driving home reunification as “sacred struggle” (almost jihad) in the minds of NKs. The problem will be that once Oz is discovered to be a bald fiction and the people learn that Kim Il Sung is no more of a god than his lifeless ubiquitous statues, it is difficult to assess what portions of the Juche narrative will remain. I would think that reunification is a theme so basic to the identity of the Koreans that it would survive the ideological and religious meltdown that is coming.
The role of the SK Christian missionaries and evangelists cannot be underestimated in either a soft leanding/gradual reform or regime collapse scenario. They will surge into NK at the slightest opening with or without their government’s permission. They will immediately link up with the underground NK Churches and there you have an unbreakable bond between the two Koreas that may form the backbone of permanent reuinification. The spiritual vacuum created by the exposure of the Juche ideal as bald propaganda will be filled by the Christian Gospel proclaimed by the savvy SK evangelists offering hope, healing and a hand up.
It is very important also to factor in the cultural annexing of Mt. Baektu (mythical birthplace of Tan Gun and the Korean nation) by the Chinese as Mt. Xaibeng (sp?). The PRC is building an airport near Xaibeng and is investing heavily in it as a tourist location and (Chinese) cultural site. These ancient claims can be powerful motivators in a nationalistic narrative that may pit the Koreans against the Chinese on a deeper level than anything political or military. The spread of Christianity into North Korea will no doubt fuel Korean nationalism as it did under Japanese occupation 1910-1945.
So, a showdown with the PRC may be looming no matter what. The smart money is on preparing for it circumspectly. A reunified Korea will be a regional power once NK is successfully absorbed into the South under a unified democratic government.
Just my $.02. Once again, thanks Richardson for hosting this excellent blog, and thanks to Dr. Lankov and all for the spirited colloquy.
December 12th, 2008 at 10:00 pm
Maj K & KCJ; Note, this post was by James Na, a good friend of mine an guest blogger here for some time. Of course knowing that Dr. Lankov reads this blog from time to time is very good to know.
Dr. Lankov; I agree that KIS of 1945 was an actual hero. Suh Dae-sook convincingly tells his tale. But as Dr. Suh notes on that point, power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
December 13th, 2008 at 5:34 am
Yeah, from what I read in his book, KIS had more then enough legit deeds that were impressive on its own merits. The problem was, his sycophants tended to add a few details here and there to build him up just a tad…
December 13th, 2008 at 6:47 am
I’d like to address another issue, regional trade and the forming of an East Asian trading bloc as opposed to simply being dependent on exporting to the USA. The USA’s economy is due to crash soon very badly. From what I see, with all the problems in the USA, it will take the USA 5-10 to recover. Whereas, an East Asian trading bloc with Japan and China as the main economic engines could possibly recover much quicker.
It’s been addressed for years, but not taken too seriously by most. But look at the statistics. There are 1.5 billion people in China, Japan and S. Korea alone. With that population, they could start internal consumption and regional trade much easier than wait for the USA to recover. Especially, if the trans-Siberian railway is completed and runs thru NK. Russia started repairing NK railway lines to the tune of $200 million dollars.
A railroad running from Pusan (with a very close port proximity to Japan) thru Asia to Europe could be what the region needs to jump start internal trade. Russia has natural resources; China, Korea and Japan have a large population and manufacturing capability. The railway trade with Europe and the rest of Russia could bring a huge trade boom. NK could even make money on a toll for each railway car going thru their borders.
Just what anyone else thought of this situation and how it could affect the region in the next decade or so.
December 13th, 2008 at 8:08 am
Richardson:
My apologies to James Na. His entry is superb and his analysis very palatable. Due to his blog entry all the above discussion has been generated. Sorry to fawn over Dr. Lankov.
BTW, I’m no one important, just an ordinary Soldier serving his second tour in Korea.
KCJ
December 31st, 2008 at 1:16 am
To paint a picture even more darkly, one has to consider that there simply isn’t enough arable land in North Korea to sustain its population, especially under the inefficiencies of a Stalinist system. I’m sure Kim and his cronies realize this. Rather than constantly trying to bully his way into getting more and more food aid every year, I believe that there is a deliberate government policy to starve a certain segment and percentage of the population to make the country more sustainable.
If one looks at a map of where the most acute apparent food shortages are, one will find that the area just north of the DMZ in the mountainous and marginal east seem to be the areas hardest hit. Everyone but the elite suffers, of course, but it appears that this area is headed for an apocalyptic famine and presumed depopulation. International food agencies have paid critical attention to just this area in the past.
As expected, NK is more than happy to accept food aid on its terms–but its terms only. In other words, it will be appropriated for military rations, and to a lesser extent perhaps to marginally supplement those areas of the country already relatively well off–e.g., Pyongyang and environs–where those perceived to be most loyal to the regime live.
In other words, there really is no way to prevent Kim from his depopulation efforts, nor to help the most needy. A certain segment of the population is already targeted for starvation. All the food aid in the world will merely play into Kim’s hands by strengthening his regime and rewarding that segment of the population which already represents the biggest threat and menace to international stability.
The only food aid that could possibly lessen the suffering and starvation of vast segments of the NK population would have to come from apolitical or politically neutral aid agencies who would be allowed to monitor distribution. Don’t expect the NK government to ever approve this. Any other food aid–however well intentioned–heartbreakingly rewards the worst segments of NK society and prolongs the current situation and all its threats. NK falls only when Pyongyang gets incredibly hungry.