Post-Kim Dynasty Korean Peninsula and Beyond
by James Na ~ September 11th, 2008. Filed under: Axis of Evil, China-Korea Relations, DPRK Military, Geopolitics, Japan-Korea Relations, Korean Politics, North Korea, Nuclear Proliferation, ROK Miltary, South Korea, U.S. Military, U.S.-Korea Relations.Predicting the future is a chancy business at best and rarely rewards either the prognosticator or the consumers of the fortunetelling. Nonetheless, I offer the following thoughts as a conversation-starter.
With the recent speculation of Kim Jong-Il’s ill health, incapacitation and perhaps death, it might be useful to conceptualize the political shape of the Korean Peninsula and its strategic implications. In order to deal with this question intelligently, the first order of business is to envisage the post-Kim Dynasty North Korean regime.
Most North Korean civil institutions have withered away badly since the 1990’s (and perhaps even before that), and the military is the only organized and functioning institution capable of holding the country together. Thus, the most likely scenario is that a military junta, perhaps something akin to the ruling regime of Burma, will rise to replace the Cult of Kim family.
There might be a primus inter pares in this junta, but no single figure will be able to dominate the regime as the two Kims have. As such, there would be constant internal jockeying for power, a situation ripe for foreign interventions. Among outside powers, the best placed to exert significant influence is obviously the People’s Republic of China. What is less obvious is that within both the North Korean and Chinese ruling circles, the strongest ties are among hardline, possibly the most anti-American, military leaders of each country.
Chinese leaders clearly abhor the idea of an American ally (or perhaps even American troops) on its eastern border and will, thus, wield its influence to sustain North Korea as a separate entity from South Korea. Beyond this, however, Chinese leaders will have to come to a decision about North Korea’s role in China’s regional and global strategy. Chinese military hardliners would likely argue for using North Korea as a foil to exert pressure on the United States. Economic reformists and the more diplomatically-oriented Chinese leaders, however, might be able to obtain a key concession from hardliners to reach a policy consensus — robust support for a hardline North Korean junta and guarantee for its survival in return for denuclearization of North Korea.
The latter action will — regrettably from my point of view — satisfy either the McCain or Obama administration in the United States and will lead to tacit and perhaps even explicit American recognition of North Korea as a region within Chinese sphere of influence. In turn, North Korea might promptly fade away from American military security consciousness with all the attendant consequences for future American presence in the Korean Peninsula.
Even more regrettably, denuclearization will also satisfy South Korean government despite its continuing rhetoric regarding reunification. It is no longer a secret that the South Korean government, whether in conservative or leftist hands, dreads reunification with the completely disfunctional North on economic and social grounds. Most South Koreans see little to gain from such reunification and much to lose. For that matter, even if there were political will, there is not much Seoul can do against further Sinicization of North Korea, notwithstanding the nationalist outrage (Chinese government would be wise to acknowledge Goguryeo as a Korean historical entity while pursuing this strategy).
Confounded with domestic political struggle, the Japanese government will likely take a wait-and-see strategy, which basically amounts to tacit acceptance of North Korea’s transition to a Chinese protectorate, especially if North Korea stops testing ballistic missiles into Japanese airspace and confines its anti-Japanese activities to rhetorical excesses. The abductee issue, however, will not resolve and will likely freeze North Korea-Japan relationship for some time. Indeed, North Korea-Japan relationship is likely to be captive to China-Japan relationship. Although China will not use its North Korean protectorate to pick fights with the United States, it will likely exploit North Korea’s proximity and substantial ethnic North Korean population in Japan to serve Chinese interests in any disputes with Japan.
In the long term, China will continue gradual Sinicization of North Korea, including economic exploitation. Instead of prickly Vietnam, much of Chinese foreign direct investment may head to North Korean factories and farms. Although there will be increased contacts between North Korea and South Korea, the latter will be unable to exert any serious influence in North Korea. Nonetheless, increasing Sinicization of North Korea (and sympathetic South Korean media exposé of North Korean suffering “under Chinese overlordship”) will breed significant resentment in South Korea and may result in clandestine conflict between China and South Korea over North Korea, a contest South Korea would likely lose without substantial American assistance. Unfortunately for South Korea, such assistance is unlikely to come unless there is increased tension between China and the United States over other issues such as Taiwan.
The prospect for North Korean people is thus bleak. Should there be overt hostilities over North Korean territory (low probability), they would suffer greatly — on top of what they have suffered already for the past decades. The best foreseeable scenario is continuing repression under a military junta Burma-style minus, of course, the Kim family cult. Still, with the disappearance of the cult and the attendant social control, there may be popular sparks that lead to internal disturbances. How outside powers would respond to such unrest remains too difficult to even speculate. The most that can be said is that the prospect for liberation of North Korea and its reunification with the South will remain a dim, distant dream.
September 11th, 2008 at 10:50 pm
Very interesting! Why not to publish it somewhere (say, in Asia Times)?
September 12th, 2008 at 6:39 am
“…there may be popular sparks that lead to internal disturbances.”
I have heard and read this in numerous places for years and years. In your opinion, what are the chances of serious internal unrest? Are we looking at a Zimbabwe situation? i.e., a beaten down population, disarmed and thoroughly demoralized.
Another quick question for you: What are the chances that the military (rank and file) would react to such disturbances should they occur? Does the military, for example, regularly post soldiers far away from home regions, etc?
Thanks
P.S. Love the official DPRK news site (www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm). They could re-forest the north with all the “Large Floral Baskets” that Kim seems to recieve on a daily basis.
September 12th, 2008 at 2:06 pm
Dr. Lankov,
Thank you for the kind remark. I thought I would jot down some obvious thoughts on the future of North Korea and related regional consequences as a conversation-starter. I do not think it is rigorous enough to be submitted somewhere formally.
James,
There have been a number of riots in North Korea, reported with varying degrees of reliability, over the years. Whatever the case may be, these disturbances, if any, were all put down with considerable brutality by the North Korean authorities.
I believe most, perhaps, all of these riots have been food-related, rather than political in nature.
And it is my contention that the Kim family cult and the related social control system have prevented these incidents from growing into something more significant. Once the cult is demolished (or simply fades away after Kim Jong-Il’s death), however, some of the cultish social control will also lessen.
When this trend is combined with prospective Chinese “overlordship,” I think the chance of serious disturbances in the post-Kim North Korea increases. This is, of course, not something easy or even possible to predict given the fickle nature of mass psychology. Quite often, popular revolts occur after a “random” fuse is lit — for example, the first Palestinian Intifada (which was spontaneous unlike the cynically induced second Intifada) began because of a traffic accident — which was incorrectly deemed or rumored among the Palestinian public to have been deliberate killings.
As for your second question, I do not have an intelligent guess on the subject. It has been a while since I looked at North Korean military recruitment and organizational structure. I do not know if it now follows a regional-regimental model (e.g. British) of recruitment or a centralized depot system (e.g. the U.S.). But I would be surprised if North Korea used the former.
This brings up another possibility I did not forecast in the entry — civil war in North Korea waged by competing generals or factions of generals, with various military units obeying their commanders rather than the central government.
In my view, this scenario will also lead to a vigorous Chinese intervention to stabilize the situation and similar consequences as I laid out — although in such a case, there would be greater possibility of South Korean intervention assisted by the United States.
September 15th, 2008 at 10:43 pm
Esteemed Gentlemen:
Fantastic discussion and powerful lead editorial by James Na. Really opens up the regional considerations for the pen.
One factor that not too many analysts are discussing is the impact the sKorean Christian Church will have on a post-KJI nK. As of now, nK is the most hostile regime on earth to Christianity. sKorea sends more missionaries than any nation save the US (and should surpass the US if the current trend sustains).
sKorean evangelists armed with substantial humanitarian aid will surge over the 38th parallel if even a crack of daylight permits movement. They will establish link up nodes with the burgeoning underground Church in nK (some estimate 100,000+ clandestine Christians) as soon as conditions permit. In the absence of the Kim Cult and the Juche religion, nK people will be seeking some kind of spiritual/moral meaning - and the Christian message could take hold quickly and influence currents in Pyongyang.
The Church connection will also open up pipelines of social and economic exchange between nK and sK bodies completely independent of policies established between the two governments. The Church could end up influencing many activities in a post KJI regime without being directly observed.
The hatred with which the Kim cult demonized Christianity should not be underestimated. The military junta will seek to crush any above ground Christian activity if it esteems the church’s influence a threat - which is the most likely scenario. If the Church gains a foothold and the military junta(s) cannot effectively muzzle the union between the sK churches and the nK underground church and the spiritually starving masses that may seek her comfort, a completely unanticipated social scene could emerge.
Add to this mix the uncountable sK Christian families with kin in the north. Pyongyang was once the Asian capital of Christianity with a prewar population in excess of 250,000.
The Juche regime has plowed most of the nK people’s ancestral graveyards in search of arable land. To do that it was necessary first to relocate entire villages and cities. The nK people are in complete disarray as to their genealogies - which will be a factor in the post-Juche society that will be seeking to recover its ethnic and spiritual identity. Families are intact in sK and may be able to assist in recovering some relational ties.
China’s loosening towards Christianity is also a factor. Beijing will have a tough time repressing Christianity in nK as a protectorate if it currently doesn’t prosecute it’s own antiChristian policy with much vigor in the PRC. That is not to say that China tolerates Christianity - I don’t believe that is the case - but even today there are nodes of nK Christian activity around the border between nK and the PRC.
Without committing to a prediction, I believe the influence of Christianity in the post KJI nK state will be substantial and dynamic. Much of its activity will proceed undetected by analysts looking at the more conventional indicators of change on the peninsula. The zeal of the Church in sK was vividly displayed when sK missionaries entered Afghanistan in 2007 and were captured by the Taliban. That same zeal for humanitarian and spiritual aid in Muslim Afghanistan is 100 times hotter for the salvation and healing of nK.
September 18th, 2008 at 4:41 am
Hi, I found your blog on this new directory of WordPress Blogs at blackhatbootcamp.com/listofwordpressblogs. I dont know how your blog came up, must have been a typo, i duno. Anyways, I just clicked it and here I am. Your blog looks good. Have a nice day. James.
September 18th, 2008 at 11:25 am
KCJ,
I have high hopes for the spread of Christianity in North Korea (and China as well). In the likely ideological vacuum of post-Kim Dynasty North Korea, the spiritual ground may be indeed fertile for Christianity, the larger impact of which can only be positive.
Nonetheless, it is exceedingly difficult to predict what short-term effect the spread of Christianity would have on North Korea. It is, unfortunately, not something on which one can base policy decisions regarding North Korea at this point (I am not suggesting that is what you meant, of course).
This, I believe, belongs in the domain of faith. Although the current situation is bleak with little prospect of improvement for North Korea, I have faith that one day North Korea will be liberated and reunified with the South. May that day come soon.
September 21st, 2008 at 2:09 pm
[...] a post-Kim Jong-il regime in North [...]
September 24th, 2008 at 5:37 am
James Na,
Penetrating insights, and I mostly agree with your analysis. The one thing I take a different position on is the role of policy with regard to predictive analysis of cultural impacts. I served in the invasion force that took down Baghdad in 2003. Our most costly mistake was not factoring in the role that Islam would play in a post-Baathist Iraq.
In North Korea (as in Baghdad), a post KJI regime (pKJIr) will have two characteristics that compare to post-Saddam Iraq:
1. Virulent distrust of government, especially national government;
2. A formidable and palpable spiritual vacuum that will be filled by something other than the idolatry of Juche.
These two factors could be indicators of favorable conditions for the spread of Christianity.
As the people will refuse to place any trust in government in the aftermath of the collapse of Pyongyang and the uncovering of the fallacies of Juche, local quorums of leaders will form the loci of democracy’s embryonic budding. The only non-governmental structures that are extant in nK are the black market and the underground church. The underground Church could gain much momentum in the pKJIr as it will possess the only grass roots infrastructure capable of providing democratic leadership and consensus opinions with popular support. The sK missionaries have mature plans in place to surge over the MDL with humanitarian assistance and evangelists as soon as conditions permit.
[A similar (though not completely relevant) comparison is the way the Catholic Church rose from the ashes of the collapsed Roman empire to prominence. The Church, itself illegal until the Edict of Milan in 313 AD, kept low and clandestine until conditions favored political tolerance. When the empire collapsed, the Church emerged with a mature infrastructure that kept many Roman subsocieties from being absorbed by the Germanic invaders (forgive me if my European history is rusty). That mature infrastructure was largely invisible to the Empire before Constantine's executive order to give Christianity political tolerance.]
Also, the greater crisis may be the spiritual one. Juche is the only permitted religion in nK. Shamanism is making a dramatic comeback as people are reaching for anything they can practice above ground that will provide some kind of hope or comfort. The linkage between the zealous sK missionaries and the underground nK Church may be the pipeline of a nascent democratic movement in nK. The Korean Christians are credited with being the real purveyors of Korean nationalism during the Japanese occupation as they refused to subscribe to the coerced Shintoist emperor worship. The same currents could stir a revival of Christianity in nK. The added benefits of a robust humanitarian operations network largely unregulated by the sK government will make the Church that much more attractive. The groupthink and role of ‘han’ that was played to bizarre levels in the Juche regime may provide conformist incentive to the masses.
Lastly, Christianity was brutally oppressed in the USSR. Yet today, 96% of Russians believe in God. That is a telling statistic seeing every vestige of Christianity was systematically rooted out by the politbureau and the KGB. The USSR collapsed less than 20 years ago and religion is resurgent in Russia today.
Finally, while policy may be a difficult place to factor in religious influence, strategy is not. And any strategy that underestimates the pKJIr’s distrust of government and spiritual vacuum will create more problems than it solves, at least in the immediate aftermath of a regime collapse.
KCJ
December 12th, 2008 at 12:22 pm
[...] 12, 2008 DPRK Studies a un excellent post sur l’avenir probable de la Corée du Nord.Il ne serait pas surprenant [...]