For the Record: The 1994 Agreed Framework Prohibited North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Program

by Richardson ~ May 4th, 2008. Filed under: Diplomacy, Korean Politics, Nuclear Proliferation.

A few times I have come across the assertion that the 1994 Agreed Framework did not prohibit North Korea’s uranium enrichment program, and that document did not even include the word “uranium,” as an argument for why the U.S. was responsible for the disintegration of the Agreed Framework. However, that is a myth and such arguments are entirely specious; any sort of uranium enrichment program absolutely was prohibited under the 1994 Agreed Framework.

The 1994 Agreed Framework (PDF) Article III, section 2 states:

The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. (emphasis added)

So, the 1994 Agreed Framework references another agreement. The 1992 Joint Declaration (DOC) states in Article 3:

The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. (emphasis added)

Although it is not explicitly stated in the 1994 Agreed Framework, through referencing the 1992 Joint Declaration, uranium enrichment facilities – and therefore uranium enrichment – are implicitly prohibited by the 1994 Agreed Framework.

An example would be if one signed a contract and agreed to abide by certain regulations. Those regulations are not spelled out explicitly in the contract, but are implicitly included through the reference. Violation of those regulations would put one in violation of the contract, even if those regulations were not specifically spelled out in the contract.

I’m not sure, after reading these agreements, how someone could attempt to say a uranium enrichment program wasn’t forbidden by the 1994 Agreed Framework. But some still do, amazingly.

3 Responses to For the Record: The 1994 Agreed Framework Prohibited North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Program

  1. Leonid Petrov

    You are right. The 1994 Agreed Framework specifically prohibited the plutonium reprocessing program and implicitly all other nuclear programs (including uranium enrichment). However, when the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, James Kelly, was dispatched to Pyongyang in October 2002 to inform its leaders of Washington’s decision to scrap the 1994 Framework Agreement, strangely, the uranium enrichment program was chosen for incrimination. All attempts made by the North Koreans to defend their case were dismissed.

    Now read Siegfried S. Hecker’s recent “Report of Visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)”:

    “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials also stated that they view the uranium enrichment issue settled. They explained that the extraordinary access U.S. specialists were given to the aluminum tubes in question at a missile factory demonstrates that the DPRK has no such program. They dismissed allegations that they received centrifuges from Pakistan. They also denied nuclear cooperation with Syria and other countries. When pressed on this issue, they reiterated that they stand by their Oct. 3 commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology or know-how to other countries”. http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/08035Hecker.pdf

    Even though the uranium enrichment program was implicitly meant among other things prohibited by the 1992 Joint Declaration, the DPRK was not in material breach of 1994 Agreed Framework because of it. The main focus of AF was placed on 1) plutonium reprocessing program; 2) fuel oil delivery; 3) normalization of US-DPRK bilateral relations; and 4) LWR construction by 2003.

    We don’t know whether the North Koreans were secretly pursuing anything illegal or not. But we do know 100% that the promised LWR was not (and could not be) delivered by the set deadline (2003) and instead of normalization of bilateral relations North Korea was labeled “Evil”. Fuel oil deliveries were often irregular. In other words, the contract was breached by the US/KEDO side, causing a huge damage to DPRK economy.

    So, the alleged uranium enrichment program was randomly used by the State Department as a pretext to null the 1994 Framework Agreement. It could equally be something else.

    LP

  2. Richardson

    “. . . when the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, James Kelly, was dispatched to Pyongyang in October 2002 to inform its leaders of Washington’s decision to scrap the 1994 Framework Agreement. . .” (emphasis added)

    You’re stating something you cannot prove as fact; Kelly went there to confront the North Koreans, with evidence, about their illegal uranium enrichment program. Unless you have some convincing evidence to the contrary.

    The quote from Hecker’s report merely presents part of North Korea’s explanation, which is not credible, because;

    1. 1) North Korea has admitted to procuring tubes for the uranium program. (link1) (link2)
    2. 2) The tubes were suitable for centrifuges. (link)
    3. 3) Simple logic; that some tubes at a missile factory were examined certainly does not mean all of the tubes were accounted for, and so does not demonstrate what North Korea claims it does.
    4. 4) Most importantly, Pakistan and AQ Khan have admitted to supplying North Korea with centrifuges and technology. (link)

    North Korea, after all, has an established history of saying one thing, doing the other, and blaming [insert U.S. Imperialists/Japan/ROK/etc.] for their actions.

    Even though the uranium enrichment program was implicitly meant among other things prohibited by the 1992 Joint Declaration, the DPRK was not in material breach of 1994 Agreed Framework because of it. The main focus of AF was placed on 1) plutonium reprocessing program; 2) fuel oil delivery; 3) normalization of US-DPRK bilateral relations; and 4) LWR construction by 2003. (emphasis added)

    You’re arguing that because North Korea willfully violated a prohibition not centrally focused upon in negotiations, they didn’t really break the deal? Besides Pyongyang, I don’t know anyplace else where that sort of logic is valid. Also note that a uranium enrichment program was not “implicitly meant” to be prohibited; it in fact was prohibited. No - the breached the deal, and did so in the 90s.

    We don’t know whether the North Koreans were secretly pursuing anything illegal or not.

    That statement does not make sense;

    • 1) We know they were pursuing a uranium enrichment program.
    • 2) We know that violated the 1994 AF per the 1992 JD (i.e., illegal).
    • 3) We know they bought thousands of aluminum tubes from Russia for it.
    • 4) We know Pakistan provided them some centrifuges and the technology.
    • 5) We know they did it in secret.
    • 6) We know they lied about it for years after the private Oct 2002 admission.

    If you want to look at why the LWR were so far behind, look at how North Korea drug its feet to every round of negotiations related to it. Berlin negations didn’t start until March 1995. The type of LWR wasn’t agreed upon until June 1995. Discussions between North Korea and KEDO didn’t conclude until December 1996. On and on like that – due to North Korea delaying the process.

    Oil deliveries were irregular, at first and in part, due to the fact that a large shipment showed up to find no North Korean harbor capable of receiving it. It had to be ferried, that trip, and later delivered in smaller quantities than had originally been planned. That logistical issue is qualitatively different than North Korea pursing a secret uranium enrichment program that willfully and clearly put them in violation of the 1994 AF.

    North Korea chose to violate the 1994 Agreed Framework. They started that program in the mid-to-late 1990s, long before they had given the process a chance and years before the original LWR deadline. They denied ever having told Kelly about the program, then years later admitted to it (i.e., they lied). The claimed for years not to be developing a nuclear weapon, then Oct 2006 came (another lie).

    So, the alleged uranium enrichment program was randomly used by the State Department as a pretext to null the 1994 Framework Agreement.

    Even having procured the equipment violated the agreement, and none of that is “alleged,” even North Korea has now, finally and after years of being dishonest, admitted to this.

    North Korea has a clear and habitual track record of breaking deals and not telling the truth. If you want to believe their version of reality, then;

    • a) James Kelly lied
    • b) Pakistan and AQ Khan lied
    • c) Both U.S. and ROK intelligence are wrong (link)

    Or;

    • z) North Korea is for once telling the truth.

    Long odds, that bet.

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