North Korea-Syria: Should be Oct 2002 Deja Vu, But Isn’t
by Richardson ~ April 26th, 2008. Filed under: Diplomacy, Engagement, Nuclear Proliferation, Six-Party Talks, Syria.During a meeting in P’yŏngyang on 04 October 2002, North Korean Deputy Foreign Minster Kang Seok-Ju admitted to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly that North Korea had a uranium enrichment program. That was the public beginning of the end of the 1994 Agreed Framework.
Now the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) has revealed that North Korea was assisting Syria in a program to obtain Plutonium at the Al-Kibar facilty. Even though any assistance for any nuclear-related project is another clear violation of UNSCR 1718, the Bush administration is unlikely to halt agreements related to the Six-Party Talks as it is in full Legacy Mode.
The following is a clip of CIA video (11 min 38 sec) presented to congress on Friday (via Arms Control Wonk):
Online Videos by Veoh.com
A nuclear power plant is not a nuclear weapons program. However, several details indicate the Syrian plant was in fact meant for a plutonium based nuclear weapons program:
- The reactor design was nearly identical to the antiquated graphite-moderated reactor located at Yongbyon in North Korea, and North Korean scientists and technicians were known to have been involved in the Syrian project. As the video states, only North Korea has constructed this type of reactor in the past 35 years.
- The reactor would have produced Plutonium 239 (Pu-239), which is used in the production of implosion nuclear weapons (e.g. the “Fat Man” atom bomb dropped on Nagasaki, 09 August 1945).
- The reactor was not configured to deliver electric to the Syrian electrical grid.
- The reactor was built in secret, in violation of agreements with the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
- Note that no Plutonium reprocessing facilities were yet constructed. This is not surprising since the reactor was not yet producing Plutonium to reprocess.
David Albright, of Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), has downplayed IC claims that the facility in Al-Kibar was related to a nuclear weapons program because, “The United States and Israel have not identified any Syrian plutonium separation facilities or nuclear weaponization facilities.” This, despite the secrecy of the program (and in violation of the Nonproliferation Treaty), the fact that the reactor was not configured for electricity production or deliver to the Syrian electric grid, and the fact that reprocessing and weaponization would come only after the plant was successful. Once again Albright plays apologist to a regime bent on obtaining nuclear weapons.
Syria was foolish for thinking it could hide such a facility under the gaze of Israel. North Korea was foolish for thinking it could conceal its involvement in nuclear proliferating. But perhaps both will have the last laugh as the Bush administration is so focused on obtaining a pseudo denuclearization agreement from North Korea that it will let this slide. If so, this Bush administration will have done much more damage to our security than even the Clinton administrations ignoring the problem in the late 1990s.
See related posts at OneFreeKorea and ROK Drop.
April 27th, 2008 at 6:41 pm
I have to say the Bush administration has done something pretty hard to do —- made it’s North Korea policy look much worse than that of Clinton…
At least when Clinton cut the first deal giving into North Korean blackmail without getting rid of the root cause, there was a whole lot of talk of war about to break out.
I never bought that line. I always believed, and still believe, the talk of striking at North Korea’s nuclear facilities was posturing by the US to put pressure on Pyongyang.
But, I am in the minority with that opinion and all the talk at the time was about how close we were to using force and possible war.
Bush can’t even point to that and say he had to make this deal to prevent such bloodshed…
April 27th, 2008 at 9:08 pm
Yes, at this point Bush’s policy is even worse than Clinton’s. That’s hard to type.
However, from what I’ve read, we actually were close to hitting North Korea’s known nuke facilities prior to July 1994 - it really was close.
I think if Bush had stayed on course with NK the legacy would have been genuine. At it is, it’ll be as fake as Clinton’s. Pathetic.
April 29th, 2008 at 2:30 am
The Al Kibar scandal is a clear attempt of the White House (R.Cheney) group to undermine the negotiating efforts of the State Department (C.Rice) group, and to preclude any chance of removing NK from the list of terrorism-supporting states tomorrow - 30th April.
The “intelligence” (very unconvincing) was leaked deliberately to the media one week before the 30 April. Chris Hill and Sung Kim were sacrificed in the process. Also, the White House pursued some murky plans in the Middle East.
I don’t believe that Pyongyang might have provided its own snaps (the Syrian photographs) for Washington, as a quid for the desired quo (removal from the list of the terror supporting states). It’s too complex and unnecessary. If the US wanted to cut the deal with NK, they would have done so many years ago.
The 6PT might sustain this blow (as Hill and Kim Sook have suggested today) but it once again shows the rise of factional struggle in Washington, and once again (as it was in September 2005) leaves the US-DPRK normalization process in jeopardy.
LP
April 29th, 2008 at 7:50 am
Hello Leonid Petrov,
I am no expert on Middle Eastern affairs (or DPRK for that matter), but the intelligence that was leaked seemed pretty convincing to me. If I may ask, what makes you believe it is unconvincing? Help a fellow newbie out.
April 29th, 2008 at 4:02 pm
Dr. Petrov,
I’ll have to echo Jack and ask why you think the presented evidence is “very unconvincing”?
From what’s in the press, it does in fact seem likely that North Korea was assisting Syria with the construction of a graphite moderated reactor, which was secret and apparently not configured to be connected to the power grid. Considering the actors, the most likely explanation was a nuclear program.
I do have a few questions, including why or how either Syria or North Korea thought they could conceal the site. But I suppose we’re not talking about the sharpest tools in the shed.
I agree that the timing is suspect, and that Bush’s explanation (that a display of what we know might convince North Korea to present a “complete disclosure”) has a few logic issues.
But I’m afraid that – unless the Bush administration accepts an obviously disingenuous declaration from North Korea – the Six Party Talks are hopeless. It’s been just over a year since the first deadline (from the 13 February 2007 deal), and four months past the already delayed 31 December 2007 deadline for the declaration. (See Hill’s statements on “broken windows”)
If North Korea wanted a deal, they would have complied with the one already in place. But that has not happened. I don’t see a realistic chance for this while Kim Jong-il is in power.
April 29th, 2008 at 5:29 pm
The major thing that has me wondering Richardson is the fact North Korea does not want a deal despite the very serious situation regarding the lack of food for the very people that is keeping the regime together. With elites, KPA and others not getting rations and other perks, that could be a direct threat to Kim’s power. So the question is, why would Kim shoot himself in the foot? Perhaps it is fear an enriched uranium program is found? Also, another thing about the difference between a declaration and inspectors going to see what is there. If North Korea does finally declare all of its programs and past dealings, does that mean inspectors have to go and see it? What is making me wonder that is the DPRK is one of the most sealed places in the world. Also, I have not seen anything regarding biological or chemical weapons.
Forget concentration camps…
April 29th, 2008 at 7:38 pm
I have to agree with the pathetic nature of the Bush Adminstration on this issue. It’s indefensible.
April 29th, 2008 at 8:03 pm
Jack,
Although China has at times expressed frustration with North Korea, I think KJI is counting on China tiding them over. The regime doesn’t care if a few million peasants starve, as long as the elite and military have enough to function (and not even all the military). So Kim is giving South Korea the finger and asking China for help. China will give it.
I don’t think North Korea - under KJI - will provide a declaration that is accurate, or allow the sort of rigorous inspections required to vet such a list.
James,
It makes me worry about the next POTUS…
April 30th, 2008 at 1:33 pm
Why the “evidence” was unconvincing? The presentation of “intelligence” was designed for jounos - not for specialists - and the way it was done backfired as much on the US and Israel as it damaged NK’s interests. See the pertinent posting in my blog http://leonidpetrov.wordpress.com/2008/04/29/the-al-kibar-scandal-why-now/ and follow the links.
As far as I know, KJI has tabled the nuclear declaration last November. What happens with the Terrorism List, by the way?
LP
April 30th, 2008 at 2:46 pm
Dr. Petrov,
1. What is a jounos?
2. Also, I followed the links and maybe I am missing something. I am very sorry for my ignorance on this. Maybe there is no other way to make it clearer for a NK idiot as myself, but I am still not understanding how it was presented would backfire. The only thing I can think of was the evidence manufactured or exaggerated?
Something else?
I’ll re-read it and try to understand better.
Man, I feel dumb right now.
April 30th, 2008 at 2:58 pm
Dr. Petrov,
Re-reading it made more sense. I see where you are coming from now.
Sorry for the dumb questions.
April 30th, 2008 at 5:07 pm
The timing is suspect, the presentation not to the liking of some; but neither of those things has anything to do with whether or not the evidence was convincing.
As for backfiring, I think it’s safe to say that whatever evidence the U.S. presents will be suspect by some, which was the case before 2003 and more so afterwards. But that goes more to discounting the evidence b/c of preconceived notions rather than looking at the facts.
Yes, North Korea submitted an incomplete declaration late last year. That the Bush administration didn’t accept it and pressed for a full one shows that they are (foolishly, IMO) bending over backwards to achieve another nuclear deal with North Korea - but North Korea continues to refuse to deal.
Referring to item #3 of the 13 Feb deal;
It seems pretty clear that North Korea is holding all of this up. They have not met the deadlines, and, as evidenced by the incomplete declaration, have not dealt honestly.
May 1st, 2008 at 1:27 am
1. Syria-DPRK nuclear cooperation “evidence” is backfiring on the US and Israel:
a) Israel suspected that Syria was illegally developing a nuclear facility and NOT informed the IAEA, but instead attacked Syria without proclaiming a war and destroyed a suspected target.
b) The US did not blame Israel for this but, instead, sided with the aggressor.
c) The US apparently had the “intelligence” on the suspected nuclear facility in Syria but did not share it with the IAEA until eight months later.
d) The White House decided to reveal the “evidence” in the middle of highly successful negotiations with North Korea and one week before the update on the Terrorism-supporting Nations List: both actions undermining the negotiations efforts of the State Department. Does this improve the international standing of the US?
2. Any North Korean nuclear declaration can be labeled “incomplete” unless the US arbitrarily decides to accept it:
a) Nobody (except for KJI) really knows 100% truth about the NK nuclear program and it is impossible to verify anything or otherwise.
b) Neo-cons in the White House are NOT interested in concluding a deal with KJI because any deal with him would remind them of the 1994 Framework Agreement, which they singlehandedly dismantled in 2002.
c) By insisting that North Korean nuclear declaration is “incomplete” the US has a comfortable excuse NOT to implement #3 of the 13 Feb 2007 deal, which North Korea desperately needs to be accomplished to be removed from the Terrorism List and Trading with the Enemy Act.
3. Syria-DPRK link was engineered by the White House to destroy any NK’s expectations that it would be cleared of terrorism-supporting charges.
a) The 2007 report on terrorism did not bring any surprises. The report is online if you haven’t read it yet - you’ll note that the paragraph on NK is almost all verbatim to last year, and what was changed was minimal.
b) Don’t forget that there is NOT only a NK angle, but a Middle East angle in this story. This puts many analysts at a weakness, because there are few people well versed in both regions of the world (actually, I used to be fluent in Farsi and Arabic before learning Korean).
c) The common factor is that the Neo-cons who want to see negotiations with NK sank, want the same for Syrian/Israeli talks. Hard line all around…
LP
May 1st, 2008 at 4:55 pm
The items listed under number “1” above are reasons why you may believe this situation should backfire on the U.S. and Israel (and which are highly debatable in that regard), but none of them are examples of an actual backfire, i.e. no consequences or repercussions.
Concerning item “2” above. North Korea’s responsibility under the 13 February 2007 deal (DOC) is this:
The “Joint Statement” refers to the 19 September 2005 agreement (DOC), which in return references the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (DOC) – all three of which North Korea are in explicit violation of.
While no one but KJI may know “100” percent about the truth of the matter, the U.S. obviously knows enough to tell that North Korea is once again not being honest with the declaration it provided. There is nothing arbitrary about that; the U.S. had been very consistent in requiring a full declaration, including uranium (see comment by Bruce Klingner on this), until the wheels apparently fell off that wagon recently.
North Korea destroyed the 1994 Agreed Framework very handily by engaging in a uranium enrichment program, in implicit yet clear violation of that agreement. This has been independently verified by Pakistan. Unless the “Neo-cons” had something to do with AQ Khan transferring equipment and know-how to North Korea, they were not involved in the destruction of the 1994 Agreed Framework.
North Korea has done nothing to be taken off the list of terrorist sponsoring nations, and once again violated the very deal that could get them off that list. Clearly the U.S. is not responsible for North Korea’s indefensible behavior.
The claim that the Syria-North Korea story was fabricated by the U.S. dips into conspiracy theory which seems to be on a rather precarious foundation considering the fairly convincing evidence. Except with conspiracy theories no evidence is good enough. Was AQ Khan’s proliferation of uranium enrichment technology to North Korea also a fabrication?
May 2nd, 2008 at 12:26 pm
1. The items listed under number “1” above explain how the Syria-DPRK scandal backfires on US image and reputation worldwide. But you are quite right - the current administration does not fear immediate consequences or repercussions, thus the sense of impunity.
2. Item “2” claims that any North Korean nuclear declaration can be labeled “incomplete” unless the US arbitrarily decides to accept it. The Financial Times reported today that a key congressional committee has approved legislation that could complicate US efforts to reach a denuclearisation deal with the DPRK. The House foreign affairs committee unanimously approved a bill that would place conditions on any move by the Bush administration to remove the DPRK from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. If approved by Congress, this measure would require the White House to certify that the DPRK has provided a “complete and correct declaration” of all its nuclear programmes before lifting sanctions. (Demetri Sevastopulo and Daniel Dombey, “HOUSE DRAWS LINE ON NORTH KOREA”, Washington, 2008/05/01). Stay assured that all NK declarations are now going to be “incomplete” and “incorrect”.
3. NK is in breach of the “Joint Statement” because it feels threatened by the US (which concentrates its offensive force in the region and is capable of destroying NK within minutes). Still, it’s in Washington’s power to assure Pyongyang of its peaceful intentions. The tentative agreement was reached last week in Pyongyang between Kim Kye-gwan and Sung Kim. But hours later the Syria-DPRK scandal broke out in Washington putting a big question mark on this positive development.
4. North Korea did not violate the 1994 Agreed Framework by engaging in a uranium enrichment program, simply because “uranium enrichment program” was never mentioned in that agreement.
5. The Agreed Framework was scrapped by the US administration which realised that it could not deliver the promised LWR by 2003. Things got even more complicated because of the US reluctance to deal with NK bilaterally that delayed progress in 6PT until January-February 2007.
6. The Syria-DPRK cooperation (nuclear and/or conventional) probably existed since long time ago. But the “intelligence” offered by the US last week was dwelling on purely circumstantial evidence (some undated images, some assumptions and fears) which all together cannot stand a serious trial.
LP
May 2nd, 2008 at 4:03 pm
1.) I guess we’ll have to disagree; those are still reasons for what you believe should happen, not actual consequences or repercussions.
2.) This continues to ignore the fact that the U.S. knows North Korea has more than they admitted to. Again, refer to the admission of AQ Khan. Chris Hill has clearly been bending over backwards this past year, and more so since North Korea missed the (extended) December deadline. That the House (but not the Senate, yet, which is important to note) is getting involved now is a consequence of North Korea taking too long, as well as its nuclear proliferation activities.
3.) First, unless you mean nuclear weapons (which would be absurd), your military assessment is incorrect (e.g., that the U.S., “is capable of destroying NK within minutes”). North Korea, however, could do a lot of damage with ~11,000 artillery tubes aimed at Seoul. At present I will not respond the apology for North Korea reneging on agreements.
4.) Absolutely incorrect. I’ve run into that argument a few times. Please read the agreement again. Uranium enrichment, or even a facility to do such, is implicitly yet clearly prohibited by the 1994 Agreed Framework (PDF). Article III, section 2 of the 1994 Agreed Framework states, “The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The 1992 Joint Declaration (DOC) states in Article 1, “The South and the North shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons,” and in Article 3, “The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” I’m not sure how someone could attempt to say a uranium enrichment program isn’t forbidden by the 1994 Agreed Framework.
5.) See #4 above; North Korea was in material breach.
6.) I cannot comprehend that you admit North Korea may have been envolved in nuclear proliferation to Syria for some time, yet blame the U.S. for the process falling apart. I cannot argue against such positions effectively, since facts and logic seem to have no bearing in the assessment.
May 3rd, 2008 at 12:52 pm
1. I disagree.
2. The US always knows more than anyone and has a long past record of manipulation of intelligence. It is strange though that two months before the present revelations the most authoritative analysis of the evidence (by Seymour Hersh in the February 2008 issue of New Yorker) concluded that there had been “no signals intelligence, no human intelligence, no satellite intelligence,” to establish that the “box in the desert” bombed by Israel was a nuclear facility.
Also, the credibility of AQ Khan’s “admissions” are questionable. Just imagine a few rogue scientists and security personnel, on their own and for personal gain, steel the nuclear know-how and technology and sell it to the underworld… And no government or official was involved at any stage? Finally, the doubts about traces of uranium on the centrifuges supplied for US inspection late in 2007 made the whole story even shakier.
3. Why absurd? Thanks to the Sunshine Policy, people in Seoul stopped worrying about the 11,000 artillery tubes, but living in Pyongyang under the constant threat of a single B-52 on a “training” sortie is VERY unpleasant. The balance of terror, which is being maintained on the peninsula since 1953, forced NK to upgrade its deterrence capability (which is in breach of Armistice Agreement, but so is the US). Please don’t forget that the DPRK has been inviting the US to sign a peace treaty since 1975.
4-5. I disagree. The very term “uranium enrichment program” was not even once mentioned in the 1994 Agreed Framework and there is no compelling record that it was pursued by NK between 1994 and 2002. As for the LWR, the date of its delivery was specifically set but virtually nothing was done to deliver on this promise.
6. Syria and NK both rejected the US claims. The US, while accusing NK of breach of IAEA rules, was protecting an Israel that refused even to join the IAEA, maintained its own nuclear arsenal, and had repeatedly shown its readiness to attack any country it considered to be challenging its Middle Eastern nuclear monopoly. Syria is a party to the NPT and had had a legitimate nuclear program, under IAEA supervision, and cooperation with NK nuclear experts was not necessarily in itself suspicious.
LP
May 3rd, 2008 at 5:58 pm
1-3 & 6 we’ll just have to agree to disagree as to some extent opinion comes to play. I’ll let it go. Perhaps with 5 as well; I disagree with you, but recognize certain limitations in this case.
For 4, however, I presented quotes from the agreements (yes, plural) that are relevant and you still came back with, “The very term ‘uranium enrichment program’ was not even once mentioned in the 1994 Agreed Framework .” Did you read all of what I wrote? Read the agreements?
I must conclude that you do not understand how implicit requirements work in such agreements. The 1994 AF does not mention uranium - instead it includes requirements from an agreement that in fact does spell it all out. It’s not explicit, yet the 1994 AF clearly prohibits uranium enrichment facilities.
An example would be if you signed a contract and agreed to abide by certain regulations. Those regulations are not spelled out explicitly in the contract, but are implicitly included through the reference. Violation of those regulations would put one in violation of the contract, even if those regulations were not specifically spelled out in the contract.
Exact same situation with the 1994 AF. Explicit vs implicit. Important.
To state that the 1994 AF did not prohibit uranium enrichment facilities is factually wrong. The agreements clearly refute such a position. No guessing or legal interpretation is required; it’s very plain.
All agreements relevant to this discussion can be found at;
http://www.dprkstudies.org/documents-archive/
May 5th, 2008 at 12:05 pm
1-3 & 5-6. No problem. I agree to disagree.
4. You are right. The 1994 Agreed Framework specifically prohibited the plutonium reprocessing program and implicitly all other nuclear programs (including uranium enrichment). However, when the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, James Kelly, was dispatched to Pyongyang in October 2002 to inform its leaders of Washington’s decision to scrap the 1994 Framework Agreement, strangely, the uranium enrichment program was chosen for incrimination. All attempts made by the North Koreans to defend their case were dismissed.
Now read Siegfried S. Hecker’s recent “Report of Visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)”:
“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials also stated that they view the uranium enrichment issue settled. They explained that the extraordinary access U.S. specialists were given to the aluminum tubes in question at a missile factory demonstrates that the DPRK has no such program. They dismissed allegations that they received centrifuges from Pakistan. They also denied nuclear cooperation with Syria and other countries. When pressed on this issue, they reiterated that they stand by their Oct. 3 commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology or know-how to other countries”. http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/08035Hecker.pdf
Even though the uranium enrichment program was implicitly meant among other things prohibited by the 1992 Joint Declaration, the DPRK was not in material breach of 1994 Agreed Framework because of it. The main focus of AF was placed on 1) plutonium reprocessing program; 2) fuel oil delivery; 3) normalization of US-DPRK bilateral relations; and 4) LWR construction by 2003.
We don’t know whether the North Koreans were secretly pursuing anything illegal or not. But we do know 100% that the promised LWR was not (and could not be) delivered by the set deadline (2003) and instead of normalization of bilateral relations North Korea was labeled “Evil”. Fuel oil deliveries were often irregular. In other words, the contract was breached by the US/KEDO side, causing a huge damage to DPRK economy.
So, the alleged uranium enrichment program was randomly used by the State Department as a pretext to null the 1994 Framework Agreement. It could equally be something else.
LP
May 5th, 2008 at 3:50 pm
See my reply here.