A Return to the Principles of the Sunshine Policy
by Richardson ~ April 13th, 2008. Filed under: Diplomacy, Engagement, Six-Party Talks. 
South Korea’s new president, Lee Myung-bak (이명박), though not explicitly stating it, appears to be returning to the original principles of the Sunshine Policy. Lee has vowed to remain calm despite North Korea’s recent actions and increased rhetoric, and continues to call for constructive engagement in a manner that reminds me of former ROK President Kim Dae-jung (김대중, 1998-2003) in the late 1990s:
“North Korea should start dialogue with sincerity and change itself so that it can adapt to new international order,” he said. “The government is always ready to talk if it helps in resolving North Korea’s nuclear arms issue and the lives of North Koreans. The door is open.”
When former President Kim Dae-jung initiated his plan for unprecedented engagement with North Korea, the Sunshine Policy, in 1998, I thought it was an excellent plan. The three basic principles of the policy were:
- No armed provocation by the North will be tolerated.
- The South will not attempt to absorb the North in any way.
- The South actively seeks cooperation.
However, the price of dealing with North Korea soon became apparent; various sorts of compensation were required to persuade the DPRK to come to the negotiating table. Kim Dae-jung’s June 2000 summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il (김정일) is an unfortunate example, in which the ROK administration allowed up to half a billion dollars be transferred to North Korea. In return, Kim Jong-il agreed to meet with Kim Dae-jung, who later won a Nobel Peace Prize for his now tainted efforts to secure a lasting peace.
Under the administration of former ROK President Roh Moo-hung (노무현, 2003-2008), the first principle of the Sunshine Policy was eventually completely ignored while the last was pursued at any cost, ultimately resulting in a de facto policy of appeasement.
Lee’s pragmatic approach is exactly the right given current conditions, and, judging from his more hawkish background, it is highly unlikely that his approach will morph back into the all too familiar appeasement we’ve seen for nearly the past decade.
April 13th, 2008 at 8:57 pm
“judging from his more hawkish background, it is highly unlikely that his approach will morph back into the all too familiar appeasement”
You know, I feel that same sentence could have also described George W. Bush from 2001-2006.
The question, then, is what factors caused W to fall back into the appeasement cycle, and will similar factors ultimately work to suck LMB into this black hole as well?
April 13th, 2008 at 9:17 pm
Excellent observation, Janus. I do think the pendulum of public support for engagement with North Korea is still swinging away from Roh’s policies and that it won’t have time to swing back in Lee’s five years. Hopefully. We can only hope Lee has more backbone than Bush.
April 14th, 2008 at 12:00 am
Richardson:
Probably not. Until the regime collapses on itself, it will be the same game of cat and mouse played for decades.
April 14th, 2008 at 3:03 pm
Richardson: Please tell me if you mind me droping a comment or two sometimes on your blog.
Jack: Encouraging the collapse of the regime is in my opinion the only way beside war to put an end to the NK people misery. One of the way to do that is to go there exchange with as many people as possible.
April 14th, 2008 at 7:24 pm
Anyone can comment here as long as the guidelines on the About page are followed.
April 16th, 2008 at 2:09 am
Matthieu Thibault: Why would I encourage it when sooner or later will implode on its own? Historically, extreme regimes have a built in timebomb. The goals a lot of the time are too Utopian the masses in a trance.
With that said, I am all for regime change in North Korea but not forceful regime change from the outside if it can be avoided. Most likely, change will come from within. Please refer to Projecting Pyongyang for more information.
April 17th, 2008 at 2:56 pm
Janus,
As a card-carrying member of the American conservative movement, I have had more than my share of disappointment with the GWB administration.
All I can say about LMB is, he is not GWB. And even besides that point, ROK has a single-term presidency. There is a different lameduck dynamic with ROK.
Lastly, LMB doesn’t have an Iraq War to determine his “legacy.”
I still remain hopeful as does, apparently, Richardson.
April 17th, 2008 at 7:52 pm
I do remain hopeful of LMB, and I’ve totally had it with the Bush admin, as far as Korea policy goes.