Though the mechanics are obviously different than the Sino-Soviet Dispute, the outcome is similar enough to be compared; North Korea is in the middle of the re-emerging Chinese great power and the world’s only superpower (for a detailed explanation this, see Suh Dae-sook’s book). Bush’s change from a hard-line to La-La Land policy on North Korea has, in part, enabled this (the declaration will appear any day now, just ask Ambassador Hill).

In the 1960s, North Korea remained unaligned, accepting favors from both the Soviet Union and China. Now North Korea accepts aid from a China that prefers a buffer zone between it and USFK, as well as from the U.S., with a policy apparently bent on repeating history by trying to appease North Korea into denuclearizing.

At the same time, China is rising to eventually challenge America’s position in Asia by creating a blue water navy designed for exactly that task, particularly the relatively speedy production of SONG-class diesel submarines, and the new JIN-class SSBNs (nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles).

In 20 years China will likely have modernized much of its military, but will then face the double demographic problems of a society more aged that America’s and an enormous imbalance in the male to female ratio. At about the same time, petroleum will very scarce, or at least very expensive to extract, unless new reserves are unexpectedly found or science saves us. China might well be temped to expend excess males (and elderly!) in wars with Russia, former Soviet states, or the U.S. in search of energy or access to energy.

While the U.S. is distracted with the Middle East and a rising China, perhaps North Korea will continue to be just provocative enough to stave off being forced into true engagement, and the Kim regime will survive.

I think it more likely that the cracks initiated by the famine of the 1990s will eventually take its toll and outside information will eventually undermine the Kim cult, but never say never when it comes to North Korea.