North Korea Reneges, Again: Broken Window Theory Revisited
by Richardson ~ February 18th, 2008. Filed under: Axis of Evil, Diplomacy, Economics, Engagement, Human Rights, Nuclear Proliferation.If ever there was a time to drop the hammer on North Korea for habitually reneging on nuclear deals, now would be the time:
Speaking to reporters in Beijing Saturday, [Sigfried Hecker] said North Korean officials have told him they will not provide a full declaration of the country’s nuclear programs until other countries provide fuel oil and other aid.
Hecker says Pyongyang also wants to be removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terror.
“They said until that is done, they will not be able to produce what Ambassador Hill calls a complete and correct declaration,” he said.
North Korea has been insisting that it already submitted the declaration as required under the 13 February agreement (DOC), but now says they need to receive more aid and be taken off the U.S. list of terrorist sponsoring nations before will submit a full declaration. Perhaps they don’t see the problem with that position.
North Korea missed the first deadline of the agreement as well, back in April 2007. The top U.S. negotiator for the issue, Christopher Hill, has been adamant that North Korea must admit to and fully delcare its HEU program, and that they stick to deadlines. But there have been no consequences for breaking deadlines and attempting to retool deals as they see fit, as in the current case.
Perhaps Hill is just trying to keep North Korea talking while the U.S. is engaged in Central Asia and Iraq, but whatever he is doing, solving the issue is not it. In the process he is not following his own advice. John Bolton said this in May 2007 (Hill quote included):
First, the timetable of the Feb. 13 agreement is already shredded. President Bush said at the time of the deal: “Those who say that the North Koreans have got to prove themselves by actually following through on the deal are right, and I’m one.” Assistant Secretary of State Chris Hill, the deal’s U.S. architect and chief negotiator, said: “We need to avoid above all missing deadlines. It’s like a broken-window theory: one window is unrepaired, and before you know it you’ll have a lot of broken windows and nobody cares.”
Those statements were correct when made, and they are correct today. Sadly, however, they no longer seem to be “operative.”
History is not likely to be kind to most of those involved in the North Korean nuclear negotiating fiasco.
February 19th, 2008 at 3:01 am
very well stated ~ very disappointing and frustrating..
February 21st, 2008 at 2:18 am
I’ve never met one myself…..but more and more…..North Korea is sounding like a juicy girl……and the end version of the Bush White House……one of those typical brain-dead GIs who steel their roommates Visa card to buy her whatever she demands next……
…..(except….in this version…..we are the ones taking it up the……..)
February 27th, 2008 at 6:28 pm
At the risk of getting in over my head, I would like to see the U.S. and South Korea pursue a fairly comprehensive peace treaty to end the Korean War, in parallel with the Six-Party Talks and their sequential, “action-for-action” format. It seems inconceivable to me that the KPA will “declare” all their nuclear items while they are “at war” with the world’s only superpower, even if the civilian leaders of the DPRK have already said they would do it by Dec 31. (What kind of military would they be if they were so willing to roll over and play dead?)
I don’t see the downside of ending the Korean War with a peace treaty, signed by all 4 parties involved (China, North Korea, South Korea, and the U.S. on behalf of the U.N.) Don’t we all want a peace treaty? Certainly all Koreans would like to see their country “at peace”. Why are we using a peace treaty as a bargaining chip to get the North Koreans to declare their nuclear materials? Isn’t this the cart before the horse? Wouldn’t a peace treaty be a big step forward in “confidence building measures”?
I am afraid that the arms-control/non-proliferation advisers have gotten ahead of themselves on this one. We are “at war” with North Korea. We were not at war with Russia, or China or Libya, or other emerging or emerged nuclear powers. I am afraid that nobody shifted gears slightly for this situation to put the peace treaty horse before the arms-control/non-proliferation cart. We may now miss this window of opportunity to make some diplomatic progress with the North Koreans because we now have only 10 months to go before the Bush administration will be leaving office.
May I also say that even if a peace treaty does not result in a complete declaration, we will have put the ball firmly in the KPA’s court. They will from then on have to explain to the North Korean people why, when they are no longer at war, they need a songun/military first policy, a million man army, nuclear weapons, etc. If we accomplish nothing else this year but a peace treaty, I believe that would be an accomplishment that would work to our benefit as North Korean society digests that new paradigm, even if it take a new U.S. administration 1-2 years to re-engage with the North. It may take the KPA that long to adjust to the “new realities” in northeast Asia.
February 27th, 2008 at 7:18 pm
This comment seems to show a fundamental misunderstanding of North Korea’s power structure. The KPA does not decide to declare or not to declare nuclear programs, Kim Jong-il does. The “civilian leaders” don’t decide, Kim Jong-il does. Songbun does not equate to the military getting such veto powers.
China was not officially part of the Korean War (PLA were “volunteers,” so that is not possible. South Korea refused to participate in the armistice, so that is unlikely as well.
An obvious downside is that it would take the Trading with the Enemy Act off the table, which would in reality then allow the Kim regime to strengthen itself and thereby lessen pressures to denuclearize. If you ignore the concentration camps and nukes, that’s a good thing, otherwise it’s not a good thing at all.
Red herring. Technical state of war, de facto state of tense peace w/armistice. Whatever else Kim Jong-il is, he’s apparently not an idiot and knows the U.S. is not going to attack them if they give up nukes. Remember, North Korea already holds Seoul hostage with conventional artillery.
Uh, the ball has been in their court since October 1994 (i.e., the Agreed Framework). Lately it is still in their court; they are now just about two months late with the declaration; everyone is waiting on North Korea.
The approach you suggest has been tried, and tried – and it failed, and failed. If North Korea cannot keep some of the simpler portions of this agreement (like a declaration), what can it be expected to keep?
Continuing such a path is to refuse to learn from already repeated mistakes.
February 27th, 2008 at 10:30 pm
Richarson, I appreciate your thoughts on this topic. You are the first person I have discussed this with who has responded with reasonable objections.
I accept your point that KJI if fact trumps the KPA. I still find it hard to believe, however, that the KPA (or KJI) would just declare all their nuclear weapons without some resistance and/or pretty clear signs that they will be getting at least a fair amount of what they want. Is it not possible that the incomplete declaration, now two months “late” is at least a partial reflection of resistance on the part of the KPA leadership, which KJI is part of, to in fact “come clean”? Wouldn’t it make sense for them to drag their feet as long as we, the other 5 parties to the Six-Party Talks, are behind in our commitments for HFO and/or other exchanges? They don’t have to refuse a direct order to reveal their nuclear program(s), just drag it out as long as we, the other 5 parties, give them an excuse to do so? Would you expect our military, which I might also point out is under the control of a civilian commander-in-chief, to immediately acquiesce to a policy directive (not a direct order) when they think it is not in the best interests of national defense? Wouldn’t they try to hem and haw also, particularly if the “other side” was in arrears in their obligations? (I should also mention that I did my time as a Signal Corps officer, had a father who retired from the Army reserves as a LTC, a brother who retired from the Army reserves as an LTC, and a West Point brother who was killed in Vietnam, so I am also not unfamiliar with the military.)
Isn’t part of the problem here that the North Koreans (read KJI) can agree to something and can in fact then do it, whereas our system has a much bigger problem “jumping” without a lot of advance planning and passing of appropriation bills, etc.? And when you add 4 other countries to the mix, this seems to me that there will be a pretty good likelihood that “our” side won’t be able to live up to its side of the bargain in a timely and qualitatively significant manner such that the North can always weasle out of any deal they get themselves into?
As to whether KJI has the absolute say over a policy that might, in the eyes of the KPA, lead to their defeat or subjugation by the U.S. or ROK, I think the jury is still out on that. KJI is not KIS. The North Koreans are still human and will react under extreme stress in ways that we cannot predict.
Re the Korean War peace treaty, I agree that the Chinese were officially “volunteers”. I do not know what China’s position on a peace treaty is at this point or how or whether they will want to be a party to the treaty. I will try to learn more about this question. I have been pleasantly surprised in my visits to China last year (I have been visiting China since 1975) to hear Chinese say, “of course North Korea started the Korean War.” I am confident we wouldn’t have heard this opinion 10-20 years ago. The War Memorial Museum in Dandong doesn’t seem to have caught up with this change of view as it still refers to the “UN aggressors” (which at least is better than the North Koreans continually ranting about the “US aggressors”.) You stated that the Chinese participating in a peace treats “is not possible”. I would think that it is only “not possible” if the other parties to a treaty refuse to allow them to participate, which may very well be the case. I doubt if it can be ruled out, out of hand.
Regarding South Korean participation, I am surprised to hear you dismiss their potential participation in a peace treaty. Are you suggesting that the South Koreans don’t want a peace treaty? How could we have a peace treaty without both major parties, North and South Korea, involved?
According to our history of the war, which I have no reason to disbelieve, the North Koreans attacked South Korea. They did not attack the U.S.(who they understood to think had no interest in the Korean peninsula). They may have attacked U.S. forces but there was and is a South Korean government that they wanted (and most likely still want to) remove. The fact that the South Koreans did not participate in the Armistice, as I understand it, was not because they had no legitimate place there, but rather because they wanted to conquer North Korea and didn’t want to give up the fight. Thus they are still at war with North Korea (although they signed some general document several years ago, but not a peace treaty).
To my knowledge the U.S. is not and was not actually “at war” with North Korea. It is the U.N. that was fighting the North Koreans (and the Chinese “volunteers” and the Russian pilots, etc.) How could the U.N. represented by the U.S. sign a peace treaty with the DPRK and not have South Korea sign also? The only conceivable scenario I can imagine that would explain that is if the ROK is in fact a puppet of the U.S. and not a sovereign country. I doubt if the South Koreans, or our government would subscribe to that view.
Re your concern about losing the Trading w/ the Enemy Act, allowing the DPRK to ignore pressure to denuclearize, I don’t see Pakistan or India denuclearizing and we are at peace with them. Wouldn’t the best encouragement for a country to denuclearize be to see that it was not threatened (real or imaginary) by a larger, nuclear foe? Instead of pushing for something that isn’t likely to happen anytime soon, namely denuclearization of the DPRK, shouldn’t we be working on more confidence building measures to reassure them we are not going to attack (I don’t think we have the moral right to attack the DPRK and expose the ROK to DPRK retribution, without the explicit consent of the ROK).
We have been trying the pressure tactics for over 50 years now to no avail. What is the time line for them to be successful? And if they are someday (after I am long gone) successful, won’t a peace treaty be an appropriate document to have? Why not lay the groundwork now?
I don’t think a peace treaty is a red herring. It is a legal document. Part of a system of laws that we ourselves aspire to and would like the North to conform to as well. It is clear that the “complete declaration” is not working. We need to move forward. Just sitting here and having each side accuse the other of not fulfilling their end of the deal is just like a couple of school-yard boys having a spat that will not be resolved.
You say that KJI knows we won’t attack the DPRK “if they give up nukes”. Would we seriously contemplate attacking if they don’t? What gives us the right to attack them, without ROK agreement, unless they are in fact clearly selling the technology and/or materials to others? I would make the case that as long as they don’t proliferate, we can, and in fact will, live with them having some nuclear capability.
Having been a swimmer I don’t want to get too involved in who has the ball, but speaking of red herrings, it is obvious that the declaration is not “the simpler portion of the agreement”.
I would be happy to hear of the at least two failed attempts at a peace treaty that you allude to.
(Sorry it is getting late and I have to do a little work before hitting the sack so pardon me if I sort of trail off here.)
February 27th, 2008 at 11:08 pm
I genuinely do not have time to reply to all of that, but will make a few brief comments.
That depends on how you define what North Korea wants. I believe that the preponderance of evidence suggests nuclear weapons are what North Korea wants. Along with being recognized as a nuclear power, normalized relations (and the aid that would bring), etc. That’s the problem. There is no credible reason to believe the U.S. would renege on a deal with North Korea, and so far it’s never been tested since North Korea always wins that race.
It’s a reflection of what Kim wants; to keep the nukes.
We are not behind in our commitments – North Korea has halted the process with the declaration issue. “Action-for-action,” remember? By all accounts, they have reneged on this agreement.
Those who resist get excommunicated or executed. I think you vastly overestimate KPA influence.
What South Korea wants is not the issue; North Korea will not deal with them on the issue, unless they’ve changed their position very lately.
The USFK commander is also the CFC commander. Regardless, North Korea wants a treaty with the U.S., not South Korea.
Apples/oranges.
That’s not a reason to stop doing the right thing in favor of the wrong thing.
Not what I responded to – saying that a treaty must/should come before denuclearizing is a red herring.
You are misquoting me – if you’re going to use quotation marks, use me exact words. I said, “some of the simpler portions of this agreement (like a declaration).” Compared to the rest of the agreement (DOC), it most definitely is.
I don’t allude to any failed attempts at peace treaties, just the unbroken string of nuclear agreements broken by North Korea.
February 29th, 2008 at 5:00 am
Interesting debate, and I would like to address some points if you do not mind. I am pretty new to the whole Korean and International community debacle and this by any measure is not going to be solved overnight. With that said, the political wrangling can go on for days, and in the meantime, when and how will it be solved?
In my opinion, North Korea will most likely balk until the country is sold to the highest bidder or the regime implodes on itself. I am going to bet on the latter. Specifics aside, one has to look at the bigger picture of the negotiations process and understand Kim Jong Il’s ultimate goal is regime survival; nothing more. If it means starving his people, having conventional weapons along the DMZ, indoctrination, re-education, public executions, making exceptions in his so-called Juche idea to line his pockets, or use the deteriorating Yongbyon complex as an ace for unchecked aid, he will do it (among other things).
Kim Jong Il has the last say. He controls everything and there is no room for dissent in any measure. The KPA, the Supreme Peoples Assembly and everything else in between all answer to Kim Jong Il. End of story.
So, the question is, how does the international community finally agree on something to have Kim give the declaration, normalize relations and finally thaw the ice that has been firmly in place for over half a century? The answer may be easier than it seems. My guess is the lack of funds. The economy is dead and Kim Jong Il needs those funds to keep his government going by a thread, and has been dependent on outside aid and illicit trade for a very long time. Loans are in default, trade is limited not only because of sanctions but also for the lack of raw materials, energy and spare parts. The black market is thriving, people are risking life and limb to vote with their feet and engaging in black market activities because the state is failing to deliver. From what I can tell, the elites and policy elites are accepting bribes and despite the crackdown on corruption, there is little the government can do once it is widespread (I believe it is getting worse). All of these things are problems for Kim Jong Il, and I am sure he knows the problems facing his grip on power. Therefore, I have noticed some changes inside his Utopia because his choices are starting to dwindle.
With that said, since these choices are getting smaller, his choices on who he can run to in his time of need come with a heavy price tag. His weapons programs are (in my estimation) the only ace he has at his disposal to show he is in control of the talks and he figures the international community will bend over backwards for him to dismantle and finally give an account for other programs as well. He makes promises, spins, and drags his feet in the hopes somebody will make the first move and give more aid without having to give up the ace. The carrot approach so far has been for naught. They have tried to show the carrot in the hope he will come out of his cave, but in esscence grabs the carrot and runs right back in. To conclude, the only way things are going to finally come to a successful conclusion is when the regime is gone once and for all, and I believe quite strongly it will happen without a single shot fired. The real problems will most likely come in a post-Kim era.