Lankov on Korean Reunification
by Richardson ~ November 16th, 2007. Filed under: Defectors & Refugees, Economics, Engagement, Geopolitics, Korean Politics, Reunification.Dr. Andrei Lankov’s latest article on reunification is out and is as usual a must read. Some of the points he covers are:
- While both Koreas say they want reunification, in reality neither is prepared for the costs to their side; loss of power for the elites in North Korea, and severe financial hardship in South Korea that would make the late 1990s woes look comparatively prosperous.
- Due to the income and infrastructure differences, the German model is not really applicable to the Koreas anymore.
- North Korea cannot reform substantially – to the level that could realistically be expected to reduce the gap with South Korea – Without undermining the leadership cult. Thus the North Korean elite shun genuine engagement and reform.
- Despite resistance to reform, crack in the regimes social control of the population [that began during the famine of the mid-1990s] have spread knowledge of the outside world and sewn the seeds of, “slow-motion disintegration,” or collapse from within.
- While Seoul may have secret contingency plans for a North Korea collapse scenario, there is not longer-term plan for integration. [Roh unilaterally shot down joint work on CONPLAN 5029, which would deal with a combined approach to the shorter-term issue associated with a collapse and chaos in North Korea.]
- North Koreans are literate and educated, but no where near the level of their southern counterparts, making economic integrating more difficult. The North Korean “middle classes” would need some type of reeducation to be productive.
- Lankov suggests, “a provisional confederation, whose sole and clearly stated task would be to lay the foundations for a truly unified state and to cushion the more disastrous effects of North Korea’s transformation.”
- He also suggests a “general amnesty,” though with some exceptions, because “the sheer scale of the crimes committed makes any serious and fair investigation impossible.”
There are a few areas where I have additional comments or gently disagree:
- While I agree that neither Korea wants reunification at this time (neither does China, Japan, or Russia), I think the article doesn’t fully explain the extent of the Kim cult, which may not be obvious to non-Korea watchers.
- Surprisingly, the importance of nuclear and conventional WMD proliferation was not really covered, nor was the likelihood of an East Asian arms race stemming from a nearly (or literally) bankrupt “Korea” (with South Korean leadership) worried about Chinese territorial designs, and still paranoid about Japan. For such a Korea, nuclear weapons would be a cheap and perhaps irresistible enticing option.
- Because the North Korean elite resists even basic reforms, I don’t think “provisional confederation” is very realistic (Lankov does note this could happen only with dramatic change from leadership).
- Besides being absolutely unpalatable, an amnesty in Korea would, if South Korea’s history is any indication, solve nothing; a recent example being the ROK government’s recent decision to confiscate the land of the descendents of suspected collaborators with the Japanese during the colonial period, 1910-1945. Will economic woes pressing, former North Korean elites would make both welcomed and deserving targets.
My assessment is that North Korea will continue to resist reform until Kim Jong-il dies, then, after the elite struggle to choose a new leader and maintain their status, chaos will slowly take over. Whether or not that chaos will result in war or not I don’t know and don’t think anyone does, at this point. But a soft landing for North Korea is not realistic; it will be either a hard landing or a harder one.
November 16th, 2007 at 1:31 pm
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November 16th, 2007 at 1:34 pm
Good stuff Richardson.
November 16th, 2007 at 2:29 pm
…which is why I think the US policy should be one of encouraging revolt from within/speeding the collapse along.
We can have no faith that any deal with NK will do anything to avoid a hard landing.
The best bet is something politically impossible —- taking over the Soviet role of keeping NK reasonably healthy with massive material and finacial infusions on a continual basis. But, even there, if we could somehow stomach doing that (which we can’t), to avoid the chance of NK lashing out as it collapses in the future, we still could not be assured collapse would not come due to the leadership situation. —
Nobody has been groomed to take over command of a system that must be commanded from a lone despot. It took Kim Jong Il many years to solidify his position, and I would say the next person in line (whoever that is at the moment) is not only going to come into power with little groundwork laid, he will be coming into a much worse situation than when Kim Jong Il started taking the reins of power into his own hands fully.
So, even if we become NK’s best friend and sponsor, we still couldn’t put ourselves in a position where the power vaccum that will be left when Kim dies does not defeat our “soft-landing” hopes….
…so even pipe-dreams are not without major problems…..
The best thing the US can do is prepare for the collapse.
We probably have to do that on our own for the most part. Even if the next South Korean government is GNP and US-friendly, we can’t count on Korean politics and culture not to produce another Roh-type 5 or 10 years from now.
We could work with Japan to lay down ideas for the minimal reconstruction and stabilization of North Korea after various collapse scenerios, but if such information leaked, it would cause a lot of medieum term problems, and I don’t know if the value of such planning would offset the chance of such an East Asian backlash….???…
But, our best bet is still to make what plans we can for collapse and at the same time work diligently to make that collapse happen sooner rather than later.
Once the collapse starts, my guess is that pretty much everybody will have to come along with us anyway ——- in fact —- that they will be demanding we take the lead and carry the bulk of the weight —- with the exception of China (and maybe even China).
Nobody will want to pay to stabilize North Korea.
Nobody has the machinery on hand to deal with the mess that will be left. China just can’t march troops in and believe it will all settle down eventually. They will have to put together a package to deal with the mess I doubt they have the stomach or familiarity/know how to do. The US has at least been playing at nation building for some time…I could be wrong, because I’m not much up on China these days, but I doubt they are ready to handle a NK collapse or would be even if they focused much attention on it in the medieum term (say decade to two decades).
Japan has money it could bring to bear that would help a lot, but the historical memories and hatred of Japan means it will be far off the sidelines when the collapse comes (unless NK attacks it directly).
So that leaves the US.
We’ll have to lead the way — even if China initially marches troops in. We’ll have to listen to all the sides voicing their concerns, but due to the fact we’ll be asked to lead the effort, like in bringing the EU into the picture economically, we’ll have the bulk of the burden, but we’ll also be able to bend more to our ideas (will) than we probably currently believe is possible. -Meaning, when we are actually stuck in the crisis, we will face much weaker opposition than we currently would guess…
So the better prepared we are, the better it will be for everybody, and the best way to prepare is to try to bring about the end (the landing) of the North Korean regimes on terms we are preparing for……which would include working to condition the collapse from within and preparing the regional and global financial and other institutions to step in once the regime is finished.
November 18th, 2007 at 6:40 pm
Being the only nation with no possible territorial ambition is part of that as well. China’s Koguryo claims will make the Koreans wary, and Russia is really a non-player at this point.
At this point I don’t think the ROK or U.S. are anywhere near ready, not even in planning.
Who will take the blame?