Excerpts from the 17 October Department of State Daily Press Briefing on whether or not the U.S. is intentionally giving North Korea a pass on the possibly Syria nuclear facility question in order to keep the Six-Party Talks deal on track, U.S. inspectors in North Korea, and the establishment of a U.S. mission. Tom Casey, Deputy Spokesman is responding to questions:

QUESTION: . . . there have been suggestions from people whom some might describe as hardliners that the reason you’re not talking much about any North Korean help that Syria might have received is because you do not want this to derail the deal with North Korea. Is there any truth to that?

MR. CASEY: . . . I think the President made very clear, and you can go back and check the transcript, that nonproliferation issues have always been a part of the six-party talks; that the North Koreans have committed to us to both ceasing any support for proliferation activities as well as providing a declaration that covers the full range of their nuclear programs, including what proliferation activities they might have engaged in. And that is where we believe we will be able to find the best answers to what exactly is the full scope of their program, and that’s essential to being able to have confidence that as we move forward with the disablement and ultimately dismantling of the full range of their nuclear program that we have a complete understanding of what’s there.

[. . .]

QUESTION: So between now and [the 31 December 2007 deadline for implementation of the latest Six-Party Talks agreement], they’re free to export anything they like?

MR. CASEY: Nicholas, again, they’ve committed to ceasing those activities. I’m not going to try and parse it for you. They’ve made commitments; we expect them to live up to them.

[. . .]

QUESTION: I mean, despite Israel’s admission that they’ve had a strike on Syria, why is the Administration refusing to admit or deny that North Korean material has been — nuclear material had been found in Syria?

MR. CASEY: Look, I think the President refused to comment on this about five times less than an hour ago. I could probably go back and count the number of times I have simply said I don’t have anything for you on it, and you could ask again, Param, but it’s the same answer as before. Seriously, I just don’t have anything for you.

[. . .]

QUESTION: You said you expect them to abide by the commitments they’ve made. They actually haven’t — in these things they signed, they never said we’re not going to export material – [. . .] — to anybody else. They haven’t.

MR. CASEY: Nicholas, look, I think it’s abundantly clear that we expect a full declaration from the North Koreans about the extent of their nuclear program. It’s also abundantly clear — and you’ve heard it from the President, you’ve heard it from Chris, you’ve heard it from the Secretary, you’ve heard it from every official involved in this policy — that proliferation issues have been part of our discussion with the North Koreans since the beginning.

The United States is not going to pretend that North Korea has given us a declaration or pretend that they have ceased their activities. This is a serious process. It’s designed to get us to the point where the United States can be assured, the other members of the six-party can be assured and the world can be assured that North Korea is out of the nuclear business.

Are we there yet? Nope, we sure aren’t. There’s still a facility at Yongbyon. It’s been shut down, but it hasn’t been disabled. And ultimately, after it’s disabled, it’ll need to be dismantled.

They’ve promised to give us a declaration. Do we have it yet? No, but we’ve got a commitment to get one. Can I tell you right now what’s in that declaration or, you know, how it will look to us at the time? No, we’ll have to see. That’s why this whole process is based on good faith actions for good faith actions.

But I would note that we have now entered what is a really new phase in the ending of North Korea’s nuclear program. We have in the past gotten to the point of suspension of activities. That’s where the February 13th agreement brought us. This latest agreement takes us to actual dismantlement, to moving their facilities, the ones that are producing plutonium for nuclear bombs, out of business not just in terms of temporary shuttering, which they could restart and have back to full operations in a few weeks, but something where it’s going to take a year or more for them to do so. And I think that’s an important step and it’s one that hasn’t been achieved before. The declaration of their full length of their programs is also extremely significant because it’s something that we haven’t had. And once we have that, then we will be able to know and work specifically on eliminating any and all other nuclear programs or activities that may be out there.

But anyone asserting to you that the United States is turning a blind eye to proliferation activities, whether by North Korea or anyone else, simply isn’t speaking in a way that marries up with the facts on this issue.

[. . .]

QUESTION: Tom, just to follow up on the UN sanctions that was imposed after the nuclear weapons test, interdiction of vessels that leave North Korea – [. . .] What’s the latest on that? I mean, have – [. . .] These sanctions were imposed. Were there any cases of any movement of such vessels out of North Korea?

MR. CASEY: Well, certainly a lot of that would touch on intelligence-related issues and I don’t think I’d be in a position to talk about that. But the fact remains that those sanctions that were placed on North Korea remain in place. We fully expect that not only the United States but all member-states, as they are legally bound and required to do, will continue to implement them. And certainly, we are going to continue our own efforts bilaterally, multilaterally, through the Proliferation Security Initiative and other means to make sure that nuclear technology from any source is not subject to proliferation because that’s a fundamental U.S. security goal.

Let’s go back here.

QUESTION: Do you have any update on the team from — that’s in Pyongyang/Yongbyon?

MR. CASEY: . . . They have, as you know, been meeting with their counterparts. They were in Pyongyang initially. They did travel up to the Yongbyon facility for additional technical surveys. My understanding is that they are back in Pyongyang now and they will be this particular round or this particular team will be leaving on Thursday. The follow-on team which is expected to include approximately a dozen people is going to be arriving on Saturday.

[. . .]

QUESTION: And a follow-up on that. With such a flurry of U.S. officials going in and out, is there any sort of talk in the Department about establishing some kind of interest section or anything more permanent?

MR. CASEY: Not at this point, no.