Israeli Intel on Syria, North Korea Sparks Bush Admin Debate
by Richardson ~ October 10th, 2007. Filed under: Diplomacy, Nuclear Proliferation, Syria, Terrorism. What Israel hit in Syria, and more importantly the silence from both Israel and Syria, has caused rampant speculation on what the target was. Aside from the prospect of North Korea aiding a nascent Syrian nuclear program – with initial reports indicating Israeli commandos seized nuclear material – some reports indicate the target was a shipment of missiles from North Korea, while there are rumors it could have been Iraqi WMD hidden in Syria before the war.
Another explanation for Syria’s silence is that Israel soundly defeated their shiny new nation-wide antiaircraft system purchased from the Russians, stunning the Syrians. It’s also possible that North Korea and Syria were collaborating on chemical or biological weapons, though that is also pure speculation, based on North Korea’s expertise in those areas.
According to the New York Times, alleged Israeli intelligence indicating nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Syria – actually nuclear proliferation by North Korea – has divided the Bush administration. Reportedly, on one side are those who want to suspend dealing with North Korea per the Israeli intel, on the other are those who don’t consider the intel significant enough to suspend talks and deals:
The debate has fractured along now-familiar fault lines, with Vice President Dick Cheney and conservative hawks in the administration portraying the Israeli intelligence as credible and arguing that it should cause the United States to reconsider its diplomatic overtures to Syria and North Korea.
By contrast, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her allies within the administration have said they do not believe that the intelligence presented so far merits any change in the American diplomatic approach.
[. . .]
Besides Ms. Rice, officials said that Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates was cautious about fully endorsing Israeli warnings that Syria was on a path that could lead to a nuclear weapon. Others in the Bush administration remain unconvinced that a nascent Syrian nuclear program could pose an immediate threat.
It has long been known that North Korean scientists have aided Damascus in developing sophisticated ballistic missile technology, and there appears to be little debate that North Koreans frequently visited a site in the Syrian desert that Israeli jets attacked Sept. 6. Where officials disagree is whether the accumulated evidence points to a Syrian nuclear program that poses a significant threat to the Middle East.
[Comment: The paragraph above suggests the existence of a Syrian nuclear program is being taken for granted. In realty , where officials disagree is whether or not there is a Syrian nuclear program, if North Korea was assisting them (if there was such a program), and if Israeli intelligence can be trusted.]
Mr. Cheney and his allies have expressed unease at the decision last week by President Bush and Ms. Rice to proceed with an agreement to supply North Korea with economic aid in return for the North’s disabling its nuclear reactor. Those officials argued that the Israeli intelligence demonstrates that North Korea cannot be trusted. They also argue that the United States should be prepared to scuttle the agreement unless North Korea admits to its dealing with the Syrians.
During a breakfast meeting on Oct. 2 at the White House, Ms. Rice and her chief North Korea negotiator, Christopher R. Hill, made the case to President Bush that the United States faced a choice: to continue with the nuclear pact with North Korea as a way to bring the secretive country back into the diplomatic fold and give it the incentive to stop proliferating nuclear material; or to return to the administration’s previous strategy of isolation, which detractors say left North Korea to its own devices and led it to test a nuclear device last October.
[. . .]
The current and former American officials said Israel presented the United States with intelligence over the summer about what it described as nuclear activity in Syria. Officials have said Israel told the White House shortly in advance of the September raid that it was prepared to carry it out, but it is not clear whether the White House took a position then about whether the attack was justified.
One former top Bush administration official said Israeli officials were so concerned about the threat posed by a potential Syrian nuclear program that they told the White House they could not wait past the end of the summer to strike the facility.
Last week, Turkish officials traveled to Damascus to present the Syrian government with the Israeli dossier on what was believed to be a Syrian nuclear program, according to a Middle East security analyst in Washington. The analyst said that Syrian officials vigorously denied the intelligence and said that what the Israelis hit was a storage depot for strategic missiles.
[. . .]
Publicly, Syrian officials have said Israeli jets hit an empty warehouse.
Bruce Riedel, a veteran of the C.I.A. and the National Security Council and now a Middle East expert at the Brookings Institution, said that American intelligence agencies remained cautious in drawing hard conclusions about the significance of the suspicious activity at the Syrian site.
Still, Mr. Riedel said Israel would not have launched the strike in Syria if it believed Damascus was merely developing more sophisticated ballistic missiles or chemical weapons.
“Those red lines were crossed 20 years ago,” he said. “You don’t risk general war in the Middle East over an extra 100 kilometers’ range on a missile system.”
Another former intelligence official said Syria was attempting to develop so-called airburst capability for its ballistic missiles. Such technology would allow Syria to detonate warheads in the air to disperse the warhead’s material more widely. (emphasis added)
The last two paragraphs offer two explanations; one bolstering the nuclear scenario, the other giving credence to advanced missiles as the target.
While both are plausible (as is the weaponizing of chemical or biological agents with North Korean help), I tend to find the nuclear explanation less probably for a few reasons. First, it is an obvious red line I don’t see the North Korean’s crossing in an area being watched as closely as Syria is, despite the U.S. being stretched thin in Iraq. Second, North Korea needs to play nice a little longer to reap the benefits of the latest Six-Party Talks agreement. After that all bets are off. Finally, it would justify the previous U.S. approach and perhaps prevent China from being able to effective block U.S. backed UN sanctions.
So until more data is made public, I see the most probable explanation as advanced missile technology cooperation between North Korea and Syria. Of course that opinion is subject to change with the availability of new facts.



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