Throwing Away another Negotiating Card

by Richardson ~ September 25th, 2007. Filed under: Diplomacy, Engagement, Nuclear Proliferation, Six-Party Talks.

Update: Jun Okumura of GloboTalk21 compares the 2005 and 2006 versions of the Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism and notes that:

What at the end of 2005 remained a contentious issue was [in 2006] merely a continuing demand from the Japanese government for a full accounting. All reference to other abductees, including South Koreans, had been removed. Moreover, there was no evident link between the Japanese demands and North Korean de-listing.

[. . .]

It had become something of a ritual, where Deputy Assistant Secretary Chris Hill would intimate de-listing without regard to the Japanese abductees, then the Japanese powers-that-be would claim that they had talked to President Bush, or Condoleezza Rice, and received reassurances that such was not the case. Now, the latest report from Washington says that Secretary Rice has also defected to the other side.

At this point I have to agree that the situation does indeed look that way.

Original post: On 17 September a Department of State official verified that North Korea would not be included on the 2008 list of drug trafficking nations that the U.S. maintains. It should be noted that this does not mean that North Korea isn’t involved in drug trafficking, only that North Korea’s drugs aren’t affecting the U.S.

Now it has been hinted that North Korea could be removed from the U.S. list of terrorist sponsoring nations – something that has long been a goal of the DPRK due to the automatic sanctions that are applied to those on the list – before denuclearizing and before settling the issue of Japanese citizens abducted (h/t DPRK Forum):

The top U.S. negotiator with North Korea [Christopher Hill] suggested recently that Pyongyang could come off the list before it abandons all nuclear programs as called for under a 2005 agreement…

Asked if Washington might also drop Pyongyang from the list before it provides a complete accounting for Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea, [U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza] Rice said the United States should not tie its hands in doling out such carrots to Pyongyang.

“I don’t think that we want to get into a situation in which we have locked all of the steps that we might take with the North Koreans and lock them into a certain sequence with other steps that we think need to be taken… We have to be able to use whatever incentives we have that are appropriate to the stage at which we are with the North Koreans,” [Rice told Reuters in an interview]. (emphasis added)

So Rice and Hill are hinting in diplo-speak that North Korea can achieve one of their two primary goals in negotiating with the U.S. – the other being a peace treaty – without denuclearizing or coming clean about its abductions of Japanese citizens, in effect snubbing our only true ally in East Asia and throwing away a valuable incentive to denuclearize.

While North Korea hasn’t engaged in any terrorist activity in several years, they are still harboring terrorists (Japanese Red Army members), and the abductions could be considered a form of terrorism. When North Korea reneges on the 13 February deal (again), as the regime ultimately will, how will the U.S. put them back on the list without admitting they were removed solely for political purposes?

7 Responses to Throwing Away another Negotiating Card

  1. Jack

    And to add insult to injury, there are hints of disengagement. [Gomer Pyle] Surprise, surprise, surprise! [/Gomer Pyle]

    http://voanews.com/english/2007-09-25-voa10.cfm

    and

    http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3453308,00.html

  2. Richardson

    As you hint, typical NK grandstanding. Could probably recycle the headlines next year. What I’m concerned about at this point is whether or not the U.S. will let North Korea get away with not fully declaring its HEU program and insisting on CVID before delisting/rewarding the DPRK.

  3. Jack

    I think so by default because of the nature of the politics surrounding it. I sure hope not mind you, and there is no confirmaiton yet, but it sure looks that way. I am not very happy about it, but when dealing with North Korea and the games they play, they will not hold their end of the bargain. They never do, and most likely never will.

  4. usinkorea

    If I were advising the Japanese government, I would tell them to pay particularly close attention to whichever candidates are the front runners during and immediately after the US presidential election, and I’d recommend spending a pretty penny —- I mean really putting some money behind the effort — to lobby those front runners and the next president.

    I’m not talking about anything illegal. I mean simply try to get in as close with the front runners, once they start moving ahead of the pack, so I’d be in a better position to have my intense lobbying work once they start getting ready to enter the White House if they win.

    I’d also try to gauge whether or not the party that wins the White House in 2008 will be the party in power the next 8 years, and I’d try my best decide on heavy lobbying that party’s top congressional people. The best result for Japan being that the Dems would win the White House and control Congress so they could have a clear party to grease.

    Because the US has gotten to the point that it shows clear disrespect for Japan as an ally and at minimum has shown we can’t be trusted - at least the Bush administration, and there is no clear reason to believe this is simply an anomaly. The trend is toward China due to business interest and toward NK due to fear and away from Japan - because Japan doesn’t kick back when we spite them…..kinda like how SK feels free to piss on us….

    Japan can hope to change this, but it is going to take a significant effort over a period of a decade or so, I’d say, because things have slipped too far.

    And I don’t know where they can turn if the US is determined to continue taking Japan for granted and harming it geopolitically when Japan has a good bit at stake…

    ….abductees or no abductees……Japan is more threatened by NK than the US. Japan is also pressured a good bit due to Korean and Chinese (and others) long-standing hatred of it. When the US makes moves like this that DPRK Studies mentions, they should feel it, and they should worry…..and they have enough reasons to do what they can to change it…

  5. Kevin

    I’m hoping that we are just calling KJI’s bluff and eliminating any excuse he will throw up to not get rid of his nukes and his programs.

    This also can bare fruit in the “hearts & minds” game by showing that America is making overt conciliatory steps with North Korea. The “hearts & minds” game will be extremely important once KJI reneges on the agreement because there must be enough political capital built up to push for full strangulation of that evil regime, and KJI needs to be seen by everyone as acting in bad faith and the sole blame for failure for this to succeed.

    The GNP returning to power in the SK elections this December is extremely important in gaining leverage, as the SK lefts’ sunshine policy would not allow full strangulation of KJI. I’m very curious what the inter-korean “publicity-stunt”…. I mean summit, will bring about. It’s timing to coincide with SK elections only shows a goal of inciting some October surprise that prevents the GNP from gaining the presidency.
    A great article on the SK political landscape is here:
    http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2068.cfm

    This USA can always put North Korea back on any trouble-makers list it wants, but once KJI’s nuke program is verifiably eliminated, he can not get it back. Even eliminating just part of it, like the yongbyon facility, would be worthy progress.

    America is just taking actions to call KJIs’ bluff, and gain hearts and minds. That’s my best guess.

  6. usinkorea

    My fear is that the US has read the tea leaves and believes NK is about the implode and decided that was the worst case that we must avoid - so we decided to create conditions (mainly in the news) that allow us and SK and China to pump in enough aid to stabilize the regime…

    I could easily be wrong on that, but that is my fear.

    I am more confident, however, that a GNP victory will not see an overall change in the South Korean aid. Roh and crew might actually believe the aid is making a difference in achieving peace and reconciliation. The GNP will simply believe it is keeping the North alive. But major aid will still flow no matter who wins…

    If the mountain tours come to an end and/or Kaesong, that will be a benchmark to watch — but I can’t remember anything out of the GNP or conservative leadership in SK that makes me think either of those primary cash cows are going away if they win…..

  7. Richardson

    My fear is that the Bush admin may be in legacy mode and is ignoring what actually should be done. It’s hard to gauge for sure until the HEU and CVID matters come up more substantially.

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