The Chosun Ilbo cautions South Korean President Roh on areas that should not be tinkered with, such as the Northern Limit Line (border) and the annual Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) U.S.-ROK joint military exercise, and notes that it’s “pathetic” that the ROK commander-in-chief will be in the DPRK during the exercise. Two from the Dong-a Ilbo; the first cautions against altering UFL and calls into question the North’s objections to the exercise, noting that, “[a]s it has already been conducted 32 times, the North is also well aware of the fact that it is not a pre-emptive strike exercise.” The second warns that agreeing to more economic aid for the North without addressing the nuclear issue will only bolster Kim’s “military first” policy. A skeptical editorial from the Joongang Ilbo notes that the timing is inappropriate, that North Korea has reneged on its promise of a summit in the South, and that it is likely an election year ploy by North Korea and aided by Roh. The Hankyoreh puts its usual overly optimistic spin on the event, claiming it will, “transcending ideology and political factions.” The Korea Times warns of undermining the U.S.-ROK alliance, while a guest writer at the Korea Herald notes that the public is not giddy for this summit with reasons (many listed), and asks, “[w]hat, really, is the point?”

Chosun Ilbo: Issues the Inter-Korean Summit Shouldn’t Touch

Preparations for the inter-Korean summit have begun, but some unnerving stories circulate about the summit. They involve rumors that President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il may redraw the Northern Limit Line, the de-facto sea border between the two Koreas, discuss scrapping the National Security Law and halting joint military exercises with U.S. troops. North Korea has been insisting on all three of them, and there are concerns that Roh may give in to all three of those demands amid suspicions that North Korea took the initiative in realizing the summit.

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North Korea publicly executes its citizens for watching South Korean videos. It is ludicrous for a country like that to demand the scrapping of South Korea’s National Security Law. Even until just recently, North Korean spies were arrested in South Korea. That is the reality facing us. If North Korea changes its own version of the National Security Law, then after discussions in this country we can think about altering or abolishing our own. But we can’t abolish the law at this point simply because North Korea demands it.

The inter-Korean summit coincides with the Ulchi Focus Lens joint military exercise between South Korean and U.S. troops. There is a good chance that North Korea chose that timing on purpose. North Korea may be scheming to bring Roh to Pyongyang and scold him for allowing the U.S. to play war games in his own country at such a time.

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It is pathetic to think that the people who pushed for the summit allowed South Korea’s commander-in-chief to be on the other side of the border when a military exercise aimed at thwarting a possible threat from North Korea is under way.

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If North Korea’s military threat diminishes, then the need for joint military exercises between South Korea and the U.S. diminishes. But if we fall into the trap of weakening the justification for the joint military drills while North Korea’s threat remains the same, then the South Korean people will be the ones paying the price.

These crucial issues are not something a president with just three months left in office should handle. It would be wrong for these matters to be included on the agenda of the inter-Korean summit.

Donga Ilbo: Summit and Joint Military Drill

The possibility of downsizing or postponing the Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL), an annual exercise between South Korean and U.S. forces, is looming because the dates of the inter-Korean summit coincides with the joint drill. Although presidential spokesman Cheon Ho-seon denied the possibility, saying, “So far, no such change has been deliberated,” we cannot be optimistic about its outlook. Even Cheon admitted, “We cannot rule out the possibility that this problem arises (in the process of negotiating the inter-Korean summit).” Since the 33rd UFL is scheduled to take place between August 20 and 31, precisely overlapping with the summit, which will be held between August 28 and 30, there is a very slim chance that the North will let it slide without making a fuss.

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The UFL is a defense exercise against a North Korean invasion that has been annually held since 1975. As it has already been conducted 32 times, the North is also well aware of the fact that it is not a pre-emptive strike exercise. Therefore, its demand to suspend the UFL can be only viewed as an attempt to weaken the military alliance between South Korea and the U.S.

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If the North persistently demands to stop the UFL, the South Korean government, which has put forth enormous amount of effort to create the opportunity, will be tempted to make a concession. However, it will likely deal a heavy blow to the ROK and the U.S. military alliance. Preceding a joint exercise without any delay is a matter of showing a faith to an ally. The government must not change the plan for the UFL which involves more than 10,000 troops, including the Korean Army, U.S. forces in Korea and U.S. reinforcement troops stationed outside Korea.

If the government changes the plans for the UFL because of pressure from the North, it will not only hamper the military alliance with the U.S. but will also cause a crisis in national security.

Donga Ilbo: Strategies for Inter-Korean Summit

Speculation has been rife that an epoch-defining investment in North Korea will be one of the key agendas in the Inter-Korean summit, scheduled to be held in Pyongyang.

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However, the issue of financial resources and public consensus must be addressed… Although this can be seen as a preliminary investment for unification in the long run, the huge costs incurred with the move will eventually become a burden to the public and the next administration. Unless it is pushed through after the majority of the public approves of it, the Roh administration will not be able to avoid criticism since it will be regarded as a continuation of the lavish and one-sided economic support that the previous administration provided.

The government has allocated 65 trillion won to inter-Korean cooperation in the ten years from 2006 to 2015, according to a report that the Korea Development Bank produced in early 2006, upon the request of the Ministry of Finance and Economy. This is about 1.3 million won or 1,400 dollars per citizen.

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Since such projects involve a great deal of taxpayers’ money, the government must carefully review whether its investment and assistance will bear fruit.

The Korean government and non-government organizations spent 6.59 trillion won to provide assistance, including rice, to North Korea between 2000 and 2006. However, despite the sumptuous spending, it has failed to produce any significant change to the attitude of the Stalinist regime or the lives of the North Korean people. Tensions have rather mounted between the two Koreas, and in the neighboring countries surrounding the Korean Peninsula, due to the North’s launching of missiles and development of nuclear weapons.

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An agreement that adds only burden to the public must be avoided at the summit. Instead, President Roh must induce an agreement that clamps down on issues such as denuclearization, the repatriation of prisoners from the Korean War or civilians abducted by the North, and the reunion of separated families. If the South concentrates only on economic cooperation, without addressing thorny issues such as the North’s nuclear program, it will only add wings to the North’s military-first politics.

Joongang Ilbo: Summit of folly

The government had denied any possibility of a summit meeting with North Korea but this has now been revealed as a lie.

[. . .]

A summit meeting between South and North Korea can play a crucial role in easing tension, but such a meeting must be planned in a prudent way. In this sense, this summit meeting inspires anxieties rather than expectations.

First of all, the timing for the meeting seems inappropriate. At the 2000 summit meeting, North Korea promised that Kim Jong Il would visit South Korea in return, but he has not kept the promise. But North Korea has now agreed to hold a summit meeting on its turf with a South Korean presidential election just a few months away. It seems that North Korea is playing this card to influence South Korea’s election.

President Roh Moo-hyun has not been eager to have a summit meeting with North Korea since he entered office. He believed that North Korea’s nuclear crisis must be resolved first. Even two months ago, he emphasized that nothing good can come from a summit meeting while the North Korean nuclear issue is unresolved. But he has now changed his stance abruptly, even though North Korea has only shut down one reactor — a baby step toward the resolution of the nuclear issue. One suspects that the South and the North Korea have agreed to hold a summit because the presidents of both countries have the December presidential election on their minds.

Hankyoreh: Put differences aside for successful summit

Some people in some quarters are trying to minimize the significance and value of the inter-Korean summit taking place at the end of this month. This surely is because they are more worried about how the event might affect the presidential election than they are about having a successful summit. This is an attitude that judges the issues before the nation along partisan lines and must not negatively influence the summit.

In politics, it is only the Grand National Party that is having a sensitive reaction… By the looks of things it is judging everything based on its relationship to the election… [and] fueling suggestions that there was some secret deal behind the agreement with Pyongyang to have a summit, without any evidence. It is also out of touch with the recent atmosphere in the GNP, which recently produced a profoundly changed position on North Korea, titled “Peace Vision for the Korean Peninsula.”

The Korean public is not as careless as politicians think in the judgments it makes regarding major issues facing the country. According to a Gallup Korea poll commissioned by The Chosun Ilbo, 75.6 percent of the country is favor of having this summit but only 35.5 percent think it will accomplish anything. In other words, there is a big gap between the perceived need for a summit and the expectations for its outcome.

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We endorse the U.S. government’s request that abolition of North Korea’s nuclear program be a main topic on the agenda at the summit. But the United States must also be aware of the fact that North and South Korea have other important issues to discuss between themselves.

The results of the summit will be of help to the whole of the South Korean people and the Korean peninsula, transcending ideology and political factions. This is why everyone should cooperate where possible for the better good, despite political differences, instead of taking a cautious approach. In addition, the government should of course work to collect a wide range of views ahead of time, so as to make sure the summit does not fuel discord within South Korea.

Korea Times: Summit & ROK-US Alliance

South Korean officials racked their brains Sunday to brace for the Aug. 28-30 inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang in North Korea.

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There is speculation that the South Korean government has been preparing a package of gifts including economic assistance to the North to ensure the success of the second inter-Korean summit. Some express concern over possible “backroom dealings” while others cite North Korea’s possible raising the issue of the Korea-U.S. Ulji Focus Lens joint military exercise, which will be held during the summit.

Lawmakers belonging to the National Assembly’s Unification and Foreign Affairs Committee are engaged in hot debate over the possible inappropriate deal with some alleging the South will provide the North with $20 billion worth assistance for construction of infrastructure facilities in the impoverished North. If this allegation is true, Cheong Wa Dae needs to get approval from the National Assembly as such assistance would be a huge burden on taxpayers.

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Roh needs to be reminded that the United States is apprehensive about the possible large-size economic program which would have the effect of weakening the U.S.-initiated economic sanctions against the reclusive nation. So he needs to persuade Kim on the need to act reciprocally to get such financial assistance by faithfully abiding by the North’s promise to dismantle its nuclear facilities. With this, Roh will be able to avoid possible conflict with the United States.

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Concerning the military exercise, South Korea needs to closely consult with the United States based on mutual confidence in order not to undermine the ROK-U.S. alliance. The United States, for its part, is asked to fully consider the South’s position to help ensure a successful summit outcome.

Korea Herald: The risky road to Pyongyang

South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun has his summit with Kim Jong-il, but what will he do with it?

Seven years ago, when President Kim Dae-jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il held their groundbreaking summit talks in Pyongyang, the North Korean dictator ended his handshakes by declaring that he would be in Seoul for the second round of summit talks.

It never happened. And the fact that he reneged on that promise may explain the glaring absence of excitement over the announcement that a second summit, this time between Kim and South Korea’s President Roh Moo-hyun, will be held this month in Pyongyang.

For Roh, it is a chance for a dramatic swan song as he nears the end of his term. He will step down early next year because the constitution forbids a second term in office. Following the presidential election in December, a different administration will look after North Korean policy for five years.

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It’s too early to see if this gambit will work. The official announcement of the second summit has not ushered in a mood of celebration. Unlike in June 2000, the reaction this time is muted, hardly jubilant… The main reason seems to be the hope that it will boost the electoral chance of the severely divided liberals in December.

Although a large segment of voters is disenchanted by the North’s nuclear ambitions and remains critical of Seoul’s policy of largesse and reconciliation, they still crave for reduced tension between the two sides.

But the summit, slated for Aug.

28 to 30, appears hobbled by a number of factors. The first is the secrecy surrounding negotiations for the summit, with Seoul’s top intelligence chief having made two unpublicized trips to the North as Roh’s emissary. That underscores the point that the government may have bowed too much to Pyongyang, allowing it to dictate the terms of the talks.

Another point of contention is the lack of agreement on an agenda.

What, really, is the point?

More aid for North Korea? More legitimacy to the North’s demand for the removal of U.S. troops in the South? Is the North attempting to drive a wedge into the U.S.- Korean alliance by agreeing to summit talks separate from the six-party denuclearization process now underway?

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Suspicions over a backroom deal also abound. Former president Kim Dae-jung was severely criticized for making an unpublicized, unauthorized “gift” of $450 million in cash “aid” to the North just before his landmark summit, prompting accusations that he practically “bought” his face-time with Kim. This time, even before the summit talks begin, opposition critics are wondering exactly how much has been offered or will be paid for the talks.

Whatever the agenda, prospects for substantial agreements appear dim.

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The North, while it badly needs more of the food, fertilizers and fuel it is already getting in exchange for shutting down the main nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, still has a hawkish military that pursues the contentious goal of redrawing the border in the Yellow Sea which demarcates the two sides, even at the risk of more clashes with the South. Is Kim pushing for a South Korean concession on this issue at the summit? Is he eyeing a compromise reunification formula? perhaps a confederated system, an idea that has been raised cautiously by Roh’s liberal supporters?