North Korea Makes Fools of Engagement Proponents, Again
by Richardson ~ July 2nd, 2007. Filed under: Diplomacy, Engagement, Six-Party Talks. 
First North Korea demanded their $25 million in tainted funds frozen by U.S. treasury sanctions in Banco Delta Asia (BDA) be “unfrozen” before moving forward with the 13 February agreement. The U.S. agreed to this in a sidebar deal, though those funds are not included in the actual Six-Party agreements.
However, once the funds were actually unfrozen (around 10 April), they say in BDA and North Korea realized that no international bank wanted to touch their money. Realizing their mistake, and while the money just sat there, DPRK negotiations unilaterally altered the U.S.-DPRK sidebar deal from “unfrozen” to “received” by a bank in Pyongyang. This delay caused the 14 April deadline to be completely blown.
The 13 February deal also called for North Korea to receive 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, which South Korea delayed in delivering as North Korea refused to shutdown its reactor.
North Korea has said it wants to get promised shipments of oil before shutting down its Yongbyon nuclear reactor, delaying again a key obligation under a February nuclear agreement, U.S. officials said on Monday.
Administration critics of the agreement said the demand was further evidence of North Korean bad faith. . . But a supporter urged patience, saying the North Koreans just wanted assurances the fuel oil shipments would happen. “We are down to a couple of weeks” when the nuclear reactor will be shuttered, he said.
[. . .]
Under the February 13 deal North Korea is to receive another 950,000 tons of fuel oil or other aid of equivalent value when it completes steps to disable all its nuclear facilities.
Kim Kye-kwan must feel like a total arse when he meets the Six-Party counterparts to “negotiate.” Anyone who continues to call for engagement and insists that North Korea is an honest broker should feel the same. I’ll say it again; this deal will never be completed as North Korea will renege (again), over admitting the its HEU program, and ultimately over not giving its nuclear capabilities.
July 3rd, 2007 at 6:21 am
A Greed Framework.
July 3rd, 2007 at 6:33 am
Mark, if you ever leave the military you should look into being a headline/title author for The Economist.
July 3rd, 2007 at 7:51 am
[…] that the first 50,000-ton delivery comes after the shut-down. Now Richardson gives us a likely explanation for why that is: North Korea is now demanding the fuel oil first. Can we presume that South […]
July 3rd, 2007 at 10:40 am
Why are these developments a surprise? It’s a never ending game of cat and mouse.
July 3rd, 2007 at 11:07 am
What exactly does the agreement say about when North Korea is to recieve the 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil? My guess is that it is somewhat ambiguous, and the North is going to exploit every ambiguity in the agreement. When it comes down to HEU, the most critical ambiguity, I think the Noth will be successful in convincing Western media that their reneging over this point is really the U.S.’s fault, and thus this entire exercise is a complete waste, and a total embarrassment.
July 3rd, 2007 at 11:43 am
Jack;
Surprising? No, we can expect North Korea to delay at every possible turn, and to create new opportunities to do so. The level of arsewipperry is still amazing, though.
Stewart;
The 13 February deal (DOC) was specific on both when the Yongbyon nuclear reactor was to be shutdown by, and on the shipment of fuel oil:
Those items were to be completed in the first 60 days, or 14 April. South Korea was ready to ship the oil, but had to delay the shipment (and lost millions of dollars in the process) due to North Korea announcing it would not shutdown its reactor until it had the BDA funds (BDA funds are not in the 13 Feb agreement).
On the topic of HEU, if Hill doesn’t rollover, I think the U.S. might declassify some information to make its point, though I think the readily available information (including Kang Seok-ju’s admission) is damning enough.
July 3rd, 2007 at 6:06 pm
The best timing for the US to accuse and decisively show that NK is acting in bad faith for there to be maximum impact on the SK presidential election this December is going to be this fall. It will be much to the benefit of the international community and the US if the GNP holds the presidency in SK because they will be much less tolerant of KJI’s bad faith, and therefore more cooperative in taking “effective measures” against KJI.
July 3rd, 2007 at 8:02 pm
The main benefit for the US in having the 6 party talks should have been to lock China and South Korea into firm measures they would increasingly take as NK increasingly drug things out and played games - invite inspectors in then make more demands then have them sit on their thumbs and so on…
Without a set of clear penalties for typical non-complaince we have seen for ages, and without a will to use those penalties, the whole thing was done for North Korea’s benefit and we could have just gone in 1-on-1.
But, when you see the US won’t even stand firm and apply pressure itself - why should we kid ourselves about the US getting China and SK to do so?
And Japan stands alone….
July 3rd, 2007 at 9:38 pm
As I’ve said a few times, I’m reserving final judgment (yeah, I know how just much the admin cares, really I do) until after North Korea does something over the top to renege.
As Stewart points out, there is the chance that North Korea will convince Western (read: liberal in the leftist sense) media that the HEU debacle - and years of delay in denuclearization - was all Bush’s (or James Kelly’s) fault. Again, I think the admin might declassify enough info to prevent that from happening.
If, in the end, Hill et al do roll over and refuse to spring the trap, I’ll have to admit I was wrong about them giving Kim enough rope to pull a Saddam on himself, and that the admin failed on that count as well.
July 4th, 2007 at 2:25 am
Richardson, I think you misunderstand Kim Kye-kwan. He feels his role is to give nK as much as he can without any reciprocity, if he felt otherwise President Roh would not have appointed him.
July 6th, 2007 at 12:05 pm
I just read a news article saying what great news it is that North Korea might shut down its reactor “early,” that is before it recieves the entire 50,000 tons of fuel oil, and after it recieves an initial shipment of oil. As Richardson pointed out, the deal was that it would recieve the oil only AFTER it shut down the reactor. It is amazing how successful this completely distrustful regime is at spin, and how gladly the media sucks this b.s. in. With this negligent media coverage, it is goiong to be very difficult to convince the public that future renegging is actually the North’s fault.
[edit: link intserted into comment text to correct a formatting issue.]