Update: Monitoring equipment saved for a rainy day:

“A delegation of the [IAEA] confirmed during its visit to North Korea’s nuclear facilities last week that the monitoring cameras, computers and many other devices used until its inspectors were expelled in 2002 had remained intact there, an IAEA official said Monday.

The equipment was covered with dust but many items appeared to be ready for use four and a half years after they were abandoned, though some of the devices will likely be replaced, the official said, calling the finding “surprising.”

Original post: North Korea and the IAEA have reportedly worked out an agreement that will allow the UN agency to install cameras to monitor and verify the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor:

A senior official of the International Atomic Energy Agency indicated Sunday that North Korea agreed to allow the IAEA to use monitoring cameras to verify the shutdown of the country’s key nuclear plant when he visited the country last week.

This actually exceeds requirements referenced in the 13 February agreement (though not he abandoned 1994 Agreed Framework), which mostly leaves details open ended or cites other agreements. The 13 February deal [all agreements can be found on the DPRK Documents Archive page] states:

…each party will take in the initial phase for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005.

[…]

5. Recalling Section 1 and 3 of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the Parties agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. In this regard, the Parties agreed to the provision of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK in the initial phase. The initial shipment of emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) will commence within next 60 days.

Relevant sections (item 1) of the 19 September agreement state:

The 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be observed and implemented.

The 1992 Joint declaration points to yet another process, the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission:

4. The South and the North, in order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, shall conduct inspection of the objects selected by the other side and agreed upon between the two sides, in accordance with procedures and methods to be determined by the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

This is one of the major weaknesses in dealing with North Korea on this issue – aside from that country being completely disingenuous when it comes to denuclearization – which is the mixing of North-South deals with UN, US-NK, and Six-Party agreements, making for a convoluted path to follow, and offering North Korea many junctures to call foul and stop the process. For what any deal is worth, it does suggest that the Six-Party framework is probably the best approach since it spreads responsibility and commitment, at least in theory.