North Korea Mounts Public Relations Blitz
by Richardson ~ June 28th, 2007. Filed under: Diplomacy, Engagement, Six-Party Talks.
Now that the $25 million of formerly frozen Banco Delta Asia (BDA) funds are safely in the coffers of Pyongyang, North Korea is moving very quickly in several areas, in addition to allowing the UN’s IAEA inspectors visit the Yongbyon nuclear reactor; a) pledging to, “cooperate with the international community in stopping narcotics trafficking” (ironic as the North Korean government is a drug trafficking entity), b) scaling back anti-U.S. rhetoric, c) pledging to use the tainted BDA funds, “to improve the livelihood of the people and other humanitarian purposes as agreed between the North and the United States” and, d) reportedly aggressively addressing Japanese concerns over abductions, “Kim Jong-il has ordered a thorough investigation into the issue … North Korea intends to resolve this issue.” (North Korea is of course still shooting off missiles and making vague threats to both South Korea and Japan, but they do have a reputation to live up to.)
Why all the “progress”?
Those who believe North Korea wants to engage and join the international community will interpret these moves as proof. However, the notion that Kim Jong-il wants to engage the international community has been discredited too many times to take such proponents seriously anymore (in fact, North Korea cannot engage without destroying itself from the inside).
Probably North Korea will soon shut down the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, as it was supposed to do by 14 April, and may even make some declarations concerning its plutonium program (then again, it may manufacture a reason to delay even this initial step, again – it should not be surprising if that happens). The next sticking point after the reactor shutdown for the 13 February deal (DOC) will most likely to be a declaration of its highly enriched uranium (HEU) program, which has consistently denied exist (after having admitted, almost bragged, to James Kelly in 2002 that it does exit)
As it has done in the past, I believe North Korea is now attempting to appear as cooperative as possible, as far as the agreement is concerned, adhering to the letter and intent of the agreement – up until the HEU admission becomes an issue, at which point they will claim they have and had no HEU program and again end progress on the 13 February agreement. This point likely will be used to prolong negotiations until the next U.S. president takes office, though could be solved sooner if the U.S. backs down as I am increasingly afraid it might.
Between now and the next reneging, it will receive heavy fuel oil from South Korea, aid from the international community, and depending on how far the “investigation” into Japanese abductions and related proclamations of apology, Japan may ease sanctions as well (allow remittances and the ferry to resume operation, etc.). Perhaps the regime will collect enough aid to make it through the winter more comfortable than they otherwise might have been.
The bottom line is that this is yet anther insincere flurry of North Korean activity that will soon be following by its reneging on the deal (again), but will still hopelessly raise the hopes and expectations of engagement-minded utopians and can’t seem to learn from the past.
If the break happens before South Korea’s next presidential elections in December, it could help ease Sunshine Policy proponents out of office, which is the bright side to the timing of these developments.
June 28th, 2007 at 11:47 pm
“b) scaling back anti-U.S. rhetoric, c) pledging to use the tainted BDA funds, “to improve the livelihood of the people and other humanitarian purposes as agreed between the North and the United States”
The DPRK is “tryin ta enjoy a special moment wit Homey” (Homey D. Clown - In Living Color), and this time Homey ain’t sayin “Homey don’t play dat.” In fact, Homey (the US) now does appear to “play dat.”
There is no agreement between the US and the DPRK regarding the use to which $25 million of the proceeds of continuing criminal activity are to be used. The US has exactly no interest in any such agreement.
What we have here is more evidence, as if any more might be needed, that the KFR will say and do anything to give the impression that it is the sole legitimate government of all Koreans (even those in Chinese-occupied territory) accepted by the other legitimate governments of the world, especially the US. One of the prime motivations for the KFR promoting the misimpression of its own legitimacy is to simultaneously promote the impression of illegitimacy of the ROK as the government of any part of Korea without regard to who is running it, right or left.
Every open bilateral contact between the US and the KFR/DPRK aids the KFR in its efforts and undermines the ROK. If the ROK is actually an ally of the US (yes - sometimes there is doubt), the US can at least insist that the ROK be party to any “negotiations” or “agreement” involving the US and DPRK. If the ROK is to be excluded, the US should insist that the real authority behind the DPRK, the party that keeps it alive, China, should negotiate on behalf of the communist/royalist (PRC/KFR) side and the KFR should be excluded.
June 29th, 2007 at 4:15 am
I’ve got goose bumps, it feels like 1994 all over again. Peace is breaking out everywhere…
June 29th, 2007 at 7:00 am
North Korea has undertaken a massive operation in South Korea to secretly replace all the Folgers crystals with Pyongyang Soju.
Ongrua;
I agree that all negotiations with North Korea are a complete waste of time with two conditional caveats; 1) that we may get some sort of deal in writing only to have Kim Jong-il kick the bucket, leaving the next regime perhaps able to deal with that, not having the cult baggage (assuming the next regime isn’t the military), and 2) the U.S. may use political capital, gained from dealing with Pyongyang and appeasing those in the U.S. calling for engagement, to pursue a policy of strangulation; now also a long shot as the Bush admin seems to have lost connection with reality somewhere along the way - to be known after the next reneging.
June 29th, 2007 at 11:33 pm
Richardson:
My problem with your #1 is that there does not appear to be much reason (not the same as no reason) to believe that the next regime would/will be any other than the military, or at least under the control of the military.
My problem with your #2 is that the “long shot” will be taken (if it is taken) way beyond the effective range of the weapon that is likely to exist at the next opportunity to fire and, thus, be unlikely to reach the target with enough remaining force to inflict the necessary fatal wound. That said, we can always hope. Perhaps we could also pray, but there are reasons why the DPRK (capitol - ex “Jerusalem of the East”) now is fairly characterized as “god-forsaken.”
WRT to KJI kicking the bucket, in the past few weeks there was a suggestion in some Korea-related posts that bacon be removed from the list of commodities deemed to be luxuries, so as to allow KJI to have his fill of it. Bacon does not seem very Korean. However, we do know that he likes pizza enough to have rounded up a foreign chef and sent people overseas to learn how to make it, has at least one respectable pizza oven, and was buying first-class pizza ingredients. Perhaps someone could prevail on the Sunshine folks to provide an endless (free) supply of cheeze (50% milkfat) and pepperoni (70% fat of one kind or another and a very respectable amount of sodium) in hopes of helping KJI to eat “heart-healthy.”
June 30th, 2007 at 8:18 am
For (1) there is some chance that the next regime will not be military. I think a more likely occurrence will be complete collapse or Chinese intervention.
On (2) there is actually much more we (U.S.) could do, if we actually wanted to cause or hasten collapse, starting with telling the international banking system to choose between the U.S. and any country that conducts any sort of banking with North Korea; let countries (e.g., China, South Korea) choose between trade with North Korea and trade with the U.S.; blockade, etc.
I don’t think it will happen that way, but those tools would do the job.
I do think it should happen that way, since the “soft landing” is a myth; it will take X dollars to rebuild/rehabilitate North Korea, but it will take many, many times more by giving North Korea funds to rebuild itself, as much would/does just (counterproductively) go to the military/elite, and the rest is lost in corruption/incompetence.
Sometimes it’s better to go down to the foundation to rebuild that to keep giving money to the drunk contractor hired to remodel.
But I’m sure we’ll wait around for China to step in. . .
July 1st, 2007 at 1:31 pm
Regarding 1, the assumption was that the next regime will be Korean, which may not be the case. If it is Korean, the only people in the DPRK that are nationally organized and have the means to make their wishes be commands are the military. They have a clear monopoly on the means of enforcement and enforcement will be necessary. If the next regime is installed by China, even if there are supposedly civilians running it, it will be under the control of the Chinese military either directly or, more likely for world public opinion reasons, indirectly though discretely through the DPRK military. Either way, for practical purposes, it would be a military government that the Chinese probably would not keep under any better (from the non-Chinese/non-DPRK point of view) control than they have the KFR. Sad to say, if current attitudes and actions are indicative (probably are), the ROK will likely do little worth mentioning to effectively assert control over a part of Korea that is constitutionally part of the ROK, though currently under the administration of the KFR.
On 2, could and will are definitely two different things. The US could do a lot of things that for a variety of reasons (frequently not good) that it does not do. Making people take a side and live with the consequences certainly appears to be effective in light of the pains so many non-US banks took to be sure that if they were associated with the effort to “return” the $25 million they would not suffer the fate of BDA.
Too many people in positions to decide what will be done are unwilling to exercise the power the US has to make things happen the way they should. They cannot believe, or act that way, that now the US is indeed the world’s sole super power both in terms of military ability and economic power. Those would also be the folks that always want to ask the Europeans what to do and demand some kind of agreement among countries that, allegations to the contrary aside, have very different agendas when it comes to dealing with problems such as despots.
China is a regional power well on its way to becoming a world power, partly with the help of people in the US who cannot abide the US actualy playing the roles that fell to it in large part as the result of WW-I and WW-II. Yes, “we’ll wait around for China to step in.” Then China will step in for its own good reasons (they will be good reasons) as most of the rest of the world whines that somebody, by which for practical purposes they will mean the US, should “do something” without saying what that “something” should be or how it should be done. Too late: nothing at all will be done then by anyone to change the course of events.
July 1st, 2007 at 4:25 pm
Ongrua (comment #6):
The assumption does not exclude the possibility of Chinese intervention, and in fact addresses just that. Re-read the first few lines of comment #5:
Yes, the difference between “could” and “will” is recognized and that is specifically why “could” was chosen. More on “could” from last year; Helping China Decide to Kill the Kim Regime.
I do worry about China in the short-term, but think there is a good chance that their many demographics issues will constrain them in the mid-to-long term (rapidly aging society with no support base due to the one-child policy, massive imbalance in male/female births, etc.).