Missing the Iraq-Korea Point

by Richardson ~ June 5th, 2007. Filed under: Axis of Evil, Iraq, U.S. Military, U.S.-Korea Relations.

While the comparison of Iraq now to Korea five decades ago is far from perfect, there are indeed several major points that make it an apt enough abstract example. For starters, after WWII until long after the Korean War, the accepted paradigm was that South Korea would remain a good, third-world, source of materials and/or labor for more developed nations like Japan, but that it would never amount to much itself (i.e., it was a “basketcase“).

Some of the reasons given were the influences of Confucianism and a general cultural backwardness that just wouldn’t seem to dissipate. If you’d told anyone in 1955 that five decades later South Korea would be a leader in high-tech industries, ship building, etc., you would have been considered an idiot. Everyone knew that Korea would never amount to much more that what it was right then.

I don’t see the U.S. doing for Iraq what it did for South Korea (for the first couple of decades after the Korean War, practically the entire ROK budget came from the U.S.), but it likely will take three, four, or even five decades for Iraq to firm up. U.S. troops may be in Iraq for that time, but not in the numbers they were in South Korea, guaranteed. Iraq has oil and can fund itself, of course, once some of the security issues have been resolved, as they should have been by now.

While South Korea did have North Korea as the primary security challenge, some seem to forget that there were a lot of homegrown communists raising hell in the south, aside from the provocations of the north. No, they did not rise to the level of sectarian violence in Iraq today, and yes the Koreas are homogeneous compared to Iraq, yet this is something often overlooked. The similarities here are; a) are fractured countries near rock bottom, b) have both internal and external security issues where the U.S. was/will be involved, and c) face a long-term (decades rather than years) recoveries but ultimately will prove pessimists wrong.

In this Time article by Bill Powell, he seems to go out of his way to miss the big picture implications of the Iraq-South Korea comparison to the point where it’s apparently more of a reaction against whatever Bush says than an actual analysis of the issue:

Now, in the midst of the administration’s surge strategy, comes the latest — and, alas, most preposterous — historical analogy: according to the New York Times, the Administration is now kicking around the idea of Iraq as Korea. White House spokesman Tony Snow made the comparison publicly last week as the Administration acknowledged that it was looking into keeping long-term bases in Iraq. The appeal of the comparison is obvious: the U.S. has had large numbers of troops in South Korea for more than half a century, without engaging in a major conflict once the Korean War ended.

As someone who has spent a lot of time over the years in South Korea, as well as some time in Iraq, let me try to explain why this analogy is so ludicrous.

[. . .]

Contrast this with Iraq, which is the opposite of simplicity itself. At minimum it’s the combat equivalent of three-dimensional chess.

[. . .]

If North Korea ever attacked a U.S. or South Korean base in the South, Pyongyang would be incinerated in response, and the reunification of the peninsula will have begun. Al-Qaeda, however, isn’t a country; it’s a global terrorist group

[. . .]

But even the notion that al-Qaeda will be our sole security risk in maintaining bases in Iraq is, to put it mildly, wishful thinking. What of Moqtada al Sadr and his Shi’ite radicals, who insist on the U.S. leaving lock, stock and barrel? And what of Iran, which apparently continues to aid and abet both Shi’ite and Sunni insurgent groups with IEDS and other weapons?

Iraq is not Japan or Germany; nor is it Vietnam (though, as hard as it is for Bush’s critics to swallow, the notion that a Saigon-like pull out from Iraq would embolden and empower al-Qaeda and its sympathizers worldwide is hardly idle.) It’s not even Malaya, where the British fought insurgents from 1948 to 1960 — a struggle that informs, to a degree, the current U.S. counterinsurgency strategy now being implemented by General David Petraeus. And it is most certainly not Korea.

Iraq is brutally tough, maybe too far gone, but worth the last shot Bush and Petraeus are now giving it. The Administration should stifle the impulse to compare Iraq to conflicts past. Everyone has analogy fatigue at this point. Just let the general get on with it.

The overall security relationship, assistance while rebuilding, and the time it likely will take is the abstract to take away from the comparison; if one were to apply the level of points in Powell’s article concerning Japan, Germany, Vietnam, etc., it would be next to impossible to make any comparison of such situations anywhere.

A lot of people have, “spent a lot of time over the years in South Korea,” but unless they study the history, they’re also going to miss the points that do match up in the comparison. It’s too bad that the White House hasn’t done a better job explaining it.

28 Responses to Missing the Iraq-Korea Point

  1. Sonagi

    I think you’re the one who’s missing the point. Most of your first paragraph deals with Korea’s miraculous economic growth in the face of low expectations. Those of us who reject the “Korea is successful, so Iraq will be successful” analogy aren’t even thinking about economics but simply stability and security. You write:

    “While South Korea did have North Korea as the primary security challenge, some seem to forget that there were a lot of homegrown communists raising hell in the south, aside from the provocations of the north.”

    That’s right. The civil war turned international conflict ended three years later in a stalemate, a nation divided. Iraq isn’t divided yet. We are still fighting multiple enemies who sometimes fight each other, and that is why you folks who support an extended war won’t suggest any timeframes.

    My understanding of modern Korean history is that Communists were most active in the South for a short period between the end of WWII and the beginning of the Korean War. The Rhee government, with assistance from the US, did an able job of snuffing out leftist movements. Post-armistice minor scuffles do not compare with the ongoing and rising death toil for military and civilians alike.

    You summarize the similaries as follows:

    “The similarities here are; a) are fractured countries near rock bottom, b) have both internal and external security issues where the U.S. was/will be involved, and c) face a long-term (decades rather than years) recoveries but ultimately will prove pessimists wrong. “

    a) Yes. b) Yes, but the issues/threats differ significantly; and c) Wishful thinking.

    You can logically argue for points a and b because they involve the past and the present. You cannot prove c because it is a future statement, and by your own admission, a distant future prediction.

    This whole Iraq=Korea, democracy-isn’t-built-in-a-day theme seems to a new message to counter growing public dissatisfaction with the ongoing conflict in Iraq. It’s not working, at least not for me. I don’t buy the Iraq=Korea analogy, and I don’t want a long-term troop presence in Iraq.

    Please tell your military buddies they need to go back to the drawing board and come up with a new marketing strategy for this war.

  2. Richardson

    And I believe you’re missing the point, as well!

    The first paragraph needs to be taken in context with the rest of the post, it’s not a stand alone statement.

    Yes, the homegrown commies I spoke of were the groups all over the country, especially in the south, that were not associated with Kim Il-sung (in fact he eliminated them later in the north, at least those that tried their luck there). There was also fighting on Cheju for a few years, all unrelated to the effort by Kim. I think you underestimate the problems they caused. Suh Dae-sook covers the background of all that well. At any rate, even after they were (mostly) snuffed out, the overwhelmingly prevailing opinion was that Korea would never amount to anything.

    Wishful thinking? You cannot disprove ‘c’ either! Enough in Iraq have a desire for democracy, the nation has economic resources, and for now the support of the U.S. How many have failed, over time, with that? The point still stands that the Korea comparison is an apt, abstract comparison. I’ve seen no argument to dissuade me from that.

    I don’t want troops in Iraq for 50 years either, at least not on great scale (advisors, trainers, and attaches-yes). But if the alternative is chaos and instability, we’ll probably be there.

    Marketing isn’t my department. If I was, we’d be hearing a lot more about a) the need to strangle the North Korean regime, and b) IRAN (Iran is going to bite us in the ass, bigtime).

  3. usinkorea

    I have to agree with DPRK Studies (which I’m sure will shock Sonagi)…not…but anyway…

    Your read on modern Korean history is a good bit off and should be rectified before we can even get into a serious discussion about where Iraq is close enough to be in the same ballpark as South Korea (please, don’t confine me to a limited “Iraq “=” Korea” box…)

    As Richardson pointed out, there were serious periods of unrest periodically in South Korea throughout the US “occupation” until the 1990s. If you look at 2000 and 2002, I’m not even sure you can rule out the 1990s and up…

    There were uprisings after the war. The Korean government fell in 1960. Park Chung Hee took over in a coup which was finalized in 1963. There was unrest in the late-1960s. The Yushin constitution in the early 1970s produced unrest. There was the Kwangju Massacre period of the 1980s and again in late 1980s.

    Were these upheavals the same as the military insurgency in Iraq? No.

    There were battles. There were acts of terrorism. The bulk was violent civil unrest….

    …and the point is that civil unrest, coupled with the low economic development and living standards, seen from afar, had many people predicting South Korea was hopeless and the US was wasting its time, energy, and risking too much blood by staying.

    The same is being said of Iraq.

    Iraq is in a better position than South Korea was. It has oil which can pump its economy. It is also not as alien to Western society and culture as Korea was at the time.

    Also, Iraq’s North Korea, Iran and those other nations funding the insurgents, are not as powerful as the Soviets and communist block that backed Pyongyang and thus insurgents in South Korea.

    South Korea will work as good as any model in our thinking on Iraq.

    If you can show me a nation coming out of oppression and dictatorship that created a firm national foundation and democracy within 4 years after a war, please do.

    Japan, maybe, under the US post WWII, but Japan was more isolated from those who wished to see the democratization fail.

  4. Richardson

    I’d thought of the Korea-Iraq example months before (2006?), but don’t recall blogging about it so didn’t bring it up. But so has someone else, and before Bush mentioned it;

    http://idiotscollective.blogspot.com/2007/04/to-iraq-love-korea.html

  5. usinkorea

    http://www.usinkorea.org/blog1/2007/04/10/the-first-vietnam-quagmire/

    http://www.usinkorea.org/blog1/2007/03/22/so-where-are-we-now-and-why-dont-we-leave/

    http://www.usinkorea.org/blog1/2007/03/20/iraq-4-years-later/

    http://www.usinkorea.org/blog1/2007/03/08/breen-goes-wrong/

    http://www.usinkorea.org/blog1/2007/02/17/iraq-broad-strokes/

    http://www.usinkorea.org/blog1/2007/01/04/south-korea-under-park-and-iraq/

    Ya gotta keep reading down to the 2nd half on that last one…

    http://www.usinkorea.org/blog1/2007/01/02/war-and-war/

    http://www.usinkorea.org/blog1/2006/11/12/risk-aversion/

    http://www.usinkorea.org/blog1/2006/07/02/4th-of-july-and-the-future/

  6. Tony

    Zionism.

  7. Richardson

    No Tony, going after (what we thought was) WMD, and terrorists in general, is not zionism.

    This appears to be your first comment here. Just to let you know, one word comments that don’t add anything to the conversation or are cryptic will be deleted in the future.

  8. Sonagi

    “I think you underestimate the problems they (post-war communists in the south) caused.”

    Can you provide some concrete data, events and casualty figures, for comparison with Iraq?

    No, but if the administration and the military wish to remain in Iraq, the burden is on them to convince the public that the mission will be successful.

    “But if the alternative is chaos and instability, we’ll probably be there.”

    But there is chaos and instability NOW.

  9. Richardson

    My information on this came primarily from books by Prof. Suh Dae-sook, (Documents of Korean communism, 1918-1948 – and – Korean Communism, 1945-1980), which I do not now have access to (and as they are no longer in print they cost ~$400 for the pair = I’m not going to be buying them any time soon). More info came from the book referred to a few comment up, Kim Il-sung: The North Korean leader, by the same author, and from discussions and correspondence with that author over a couple of years.

    Additional background came from Korea’s Place in the Sun, by Bruce Cumings, which I couldn’t throw (a book!) away, but have placed in storage. I think the first third or quarter of the book covers the issue of communist insurgents in the south. His two volumes on the Korean War may be in my basement, I’ll have to check.

    Those are the primary sources from what I recall, but as I’ve read a lot on it, there are probably a lot of obscure journal articles that contributed to my understanding of that era as well, and I won’t have those either.

    I understand that’s not an acceptable answer, but with the time/library resources I have, that’s about as good as it will get at this time for that specific topic.

  10. Sonagi

    A quote from Richardson got missed in my earlier post and my own reply was put in italics, so I’m making a correction below:

    Richardson wrote:

    “Wishful thinking? You cannot disprove ‘c’ either!”

    My response:

    No, but if the administration and the military wish to remain in Iraq, the burden is on them to convince the public that the mission is making satisfactory progress towards its goal of a stable and democratic Iraq.

  11. Richardson

    Sonagi,
    I agree that the admin needs to convince the public, which is why the last line of the post is;

    It’s too bad that the White House hasn’t done a better job explaining it.

    “It” meaning the Korea-Iraq point, which includes the long-term element. Again, not that “long-term” must mean as many troops/dollars as it did in Korea - I don’t know anyone who thinks that would fly.

  12. usinkorea

    “Can you provide some concrete data, events and casualty figures, for comparison with Iraq?”

    Right. It is about body counts…

    Which do you want?

    Do the 37,000 killed in the actual war count? Probably not, because if we did that, wouldn’t we have to be utterly tickled pink with how “small” the bloodletting has been in Iraq?…

  13. ghola

    best thing to do in iraq, is to let them have a civil war, which ever side is the victor, has the option of standing with us or against us. if the victors of iraqi civil war wants to turn towards modernization and democracy, we support them to the fullest of our ability. on the other hand, if they are against us, then, by all means, go in there and annihilate them….
    the funny thing about body counts is that to americans only the body vount of americans count..
    terrorists being blown aaway to hell by the millions won’t make me weep. no none at all.
    but how about all those women and children and regular folks trying to live out a meager existence in this glorious world ?
    in this world, are we that expandable as human beings..? still ? even if we are not all americans ?

    it’s too bad the situation as evolved to this point. but as americans we simply cannot walk away from this.

  14. lirelou

    Since the Armistice went into effect, some 90 US soldiers, 394 ROK soldiers, and 889 Nork soldiers have been killed (per USFK statistics). The most dangerous year for casualties was 1968, when a series of infiltrations added to the attack on the Blue House. The North believed, at the time, that the South was ripe for revolution and that these infiltrations of armed commandos and guerrilla groups would spart an uprising. After 1968, they scaled back their infiltrations and moved into terrorist style attacks both within and without Korea, and the occasional naval battle.

  15. usinkorea

    But — or and — as was noted above, there was major unrest in South Korea too. How many South Koreans that died under Rhee and Park and Chun go into the talley? How much of the blood shed in violent demostrations do we have to scrape off the street and put in a bucket to weigh against Iraq do we have to ad before the comparison becomes something more than a bushie would do?

    Some influencial elements of American society were calling for us to leave SK and marking it off as a lost cause in democracy and/or economics right up to the early 1990s when democracy finally fully flourished. Some have been calling for leaving SK due in part to its anti-US habit since at least the 1980s and continue up to day. (Me being one of them but also individuals in places of influence in think-tanks and media and gov.).

  16. lirelou

    usinkorea - a point you are aware of - but some drive-by might miss. The casualties listed in my #14 are CFC-DPRK clashes only and do not include civil disturbance operations, which are a unilateral ROK matter.

  17. kathreb

    I too can’t see much of worth in the analogy between Iraq and Korea.

    If I’m not mistaken the point you are trying to make is that South Korea was a poor country with a security problem (internally and externally) but it came good thanks to US involvement and long-term US troop presence (not sure if you are making this extra point on long-term troop presence). This seems a bit innocuous because I am sure that out of all the scenarios where US has been involved in poor country with a security problem, surely South Korea is a case of success out of a sample that would include other situations where success was not, or has not yet been, the outcome. If insecurity, poverty and US involvement are the criteria of comparison and basis of predicting a happy outcome it’s a bit of a weak argument.

    I am also not sure on your definition of success and to what degree the US involvement should be attributed to it vis-a-vis other factors. You seem to mark economic growth and democracy as the criteria of success, is that right?

    Before arguing the merits or demerits of an Iraq and Korea analogy further I would like to know why Korea was chosen. Is it because of the recent rumblings of a Korea style stay for US military in Iraq, or are we seriously trying to find a good case analogy to enhance our assessment of the situation in Iraq? If the second, I wonder where you locate the Iraq and Vietnam analogy. Do you see that as not valid, or only valid if US were to announce imminent withdrawal? Or what about comparing Iraq with another country where US military involvement has been large and conspicuous (as opposed to purely aid or peacekeeping involvement – I’m sure none of us see a useful analogy in such cases) but did not lead to success.

    I don’t mean this to sound like I’m asking you to go back and do more homework. I’m sure I could find this information myself if I had the time/energy/inclination. But I don’t. I would just like to raise these points as I think they need to be considered (if they haven’t already). That said feel free to answer as I am quite interested.

    PS: thanks for the b’day message.

  18. Richardson

    . . .I am sure that out of all the scenarios where US has been involved in poor country with a security problem, surely South Korea is a case of success out of a sample that would include other situations where success was not, or has not yet been, the outcome.

    Such as? And let’s keep the situation as similar as possible to Korea/Iraq, though of course no comparison can be exact.

    I am also not sure on your definition of success and to what degree the US involvement should be attributed to it vis-a-vis other factors. You seem to mark economic growth and democracy as the criteria of success, is that right?

    Democracy and economic success are the primary criteria of success, but regional stability is also a major factor. Do you mean to question to what degree the U.S. was responsible for South Korea’s success?

    Before arguing the merits or demerits of an Iraq and Korea analogy further I would like to know why Korea was chosen.

    I thought that was sufficiently addressed in the post and subsequent comments. Do you have any questions on more specific points? I’d rather not take stabs in the dark.

    I can see the Vietnam connection if we pull out of Iraq prematurely and let it descend into true chaos and civil war. I’d consider that a case of ending like Vietnam when it should have been Korea, minus the civil war of course.

  19. Sonagi

    “Before arguing the merits or demerits of an Iraq and Korea analogy further I would like to know why Korea was chosen. “

    The “Iraq is the new Korea” theme is being promoted by the Bush administration and the military for two reasons:

    1. Korea is an economically thriving democracy.

    2. US troops are still there 57 years after they arrived to fight in 1950.

    Three years after Bush landed a plane on the aircraft carrier and beamed “Mission accomplished” to a crowd of journalists, Americans are growing weary of daily reports of military casualties and suicide bombings. The pro-war folks are attempting to sell the American people on a long-term military presence in Iraq, a thought not uttered on the record when the Bush administration was laying out its case prior to the invasion.

    You know what they say about fooling all the people all the time.

  20. Richardson

    Alternatively, for the reasons cited above;

    The similarities here are; a) are fractured countries near rock bottom, b) have both internal and external security issues where the U.S. was/will be involved, and c) face a long-term (decades rather than years) recoveries but ultimately will prove pessimists wrong.

    Ah yes;

    Three years after Bush landed a plane on the aircraft carrier and beamed “Mission accomplished” …

    The mission completed was taking Iraq. The mission ongoing is not the same. Would you say the Korea War lasted until… 1968?

  21. usinkorea

    If insecurity, poverty and US involvement are the criteria of comparison and basis of predicting a happy outcome it’s a bit of a weak argument.

    I am also not sure on your definition of success and to what degree the US involvement should be attributed to it vis-a-vis other factors. You seem to mark economic growth and democracy as the criteria of success, is that right?

    My, that’s a pregnant ending…

    Are they your criteria for failure? Are you suggesting their is a better alternative? Or even another alternative that is in the same neighborhood?

    Care to share what it would be - and perhaps point out a few examples for us to understand by?

    Or, is the overall point here that everything is apples and oranges, including too oranges…?

    Why Korea and not Vietnam? Good point for discussion to thresh out why bringing up Korea is fine.

    Opponents of the war, like apparently you in this post, and like Sonagi, (and there is nothing wrong with being against the war….) seem to use as a means of attack on it the imposition of absolutes. Sonagi with “prove it is doable - and only reference Iraq right now” with a stress on absolute proof as if you were creating an equation that says 1 1 = 2.

    If insecurity, poverty and US involvement are the criteria of comparison and basis of predicting a happy outcome it’s a bit of a weak argument.

    Yes it is. Which is why I haven’t made it. Don’t read that Richardson is making it. And I doubt that is what the Bush team is saying with its Korea choice as well.

    How about this — does pointing to Vietnam and other failures mean that 1 1 = 2 - that US involvement in a poor country with difficulties necessarily ends in quagmire followed by eventual acceptance of defeat (and failure of imperialism, perhaps?)?

    What we are dealing with are chances of success.

    If someone can show me absolutes in the world, especially the world of geopolitical/geosocial relationships, please do. I’d like to think them over in relation to the mass of semi-anarchy I generally see through my glasses as I read about history and watch the world around me.

    What was the “primary” cause of South Korea’s eventual success?

    I’d say it was the people of that land. But, it is absolutely clear, or should be to any non-brain dead person, that the relationship with the US - especially what all the basing of US troops in that nation brought with it - was a key to its long term success.

    Iraq and Korea are not exactly the same. Gee. There goes my case……

    But, if the Iraqi people can - under the backdrop of the current US military committment - which includes direct fighting - reach a point they make that collective decision to fight the forces that are promoting chaos by using guerilla tactics to convince the US to leave and bring down the current Iraqi government, if the bulk of the Iraqi people agree they would prefer to give the new government and political process a go and turns the collective will of the nation against the insurgents, then having the US help and long term support could very well springboard that nation to economic development and democracy faster than we saw in South Korea.

    It became clear in Vietnam that the people of South Vietnam as a collective whole did not have it within them to stand up against the forces that were arrayed against the effort to make it a stable, hopefully democratic nation with a close relationship with the US. We shouldn’t have to go into great details about the Vietnam case for everybody to come close enough to accepting that as a truth.

    I do not view the situation in Iraq as a Vietnam. It might develop into one. But, from what I see today, it is not hopeless. And the costs-to-benefits ratio of trying to help the Iraqi people stabilize the nation and build from there is not too high, to me.

    [[Tangent thought I nevertheless wanted to type out — But, since we evidently still have to have a round of debate about whether or not democracy and economic growth are a good thing…..

    There probably is no point continuing to discuss any of this…

    (I have the memory of an intelligent grad student in the US saying, “Who are WE to say Juche doesn’t work” ringing in my ears more than anything said in this thread, and that is what is behind my last statement more than anything else…)]]

    Bringing in Vietnam is a natural thing to do in a discussion about what examples in the past can we look at to give us some idea or hope that Iraq can develop into a “success story”.

    Is Iraq more like Korea or more like Vietnam? Are there other examples that would fit better?

    We can also get into a discussion about what examples we might have out there where the US was a major hope for stabilization but pulled out and things went better than they were before?

    If Vietnam an example? What would we say about Vietnam since 1975?

  22. usinkorea

    You know what they say about fooling all the people all the time.

    Knee-jerk reaction…..”Yeah, Truman f—– us with that one too……Back then, they were saying we’d be home by Christmas. I guess the ass never told them he meant Christmas 2025.”

    Until reading your thoughts on Iraq War II, Sonagi, I never realized how much you were against the US occupation of South Korea and our continued presence there.

    Although we are coming at it from different angels, I am glad to find someone else in the K-blogsphere who wants US troops to leave South Korea as much as I do. (Though we might differ on whether Truman was really wrong to send them (back) into Korea in 1950?

    Or, am I extending your comments on Iraq too far?????

  23. usinkorea

    including too oranges…

    I have decided if I can’t stop making idiotic mistakes like this, I am never touching a computer again…..

  24. Sonagi

    “The mission completed was taking Iraq. The mission ongoing is not the same. Would you say the Korea War lasted until… 1968?”

    The armistice signed in 1953 ended major fighting and left the country divided in half. Iraq is still a battlefield. That’s why I reject any comparisons between Korea and Iraq. When Bush pulled his little publicity stunt, he wanted to communicate to the American people that the war was won. Clearly it is not.

    “Is Iraq more like Korea or more like Vietnam? “

    Iraq is like both and like neither. Yes, we can find similarities and differences, but in evaluating Iraq, we should consider Iraq, its history, its peoples, its present situation, and influences of foreign players. In other words, we should focus on Iraq itself, rather than trying to distract with a single comparison to one other war and post-war military alliance. If you want to make the case that Iraq will be successful, talk about what has happened and what is happening in Iraq.

  25. usinkorea

    Sonagi,

    If you are going to tell us we must limit any rationale thinking on whether to stay in Iraq or not must be limited to the box you are demanding, at least expand your thoughts on Iraq itself laying out for us some case. Your strongly implied conclusion, though never directly stated so far as I can remember, is that Iraq is undoable or too costly to attempt (not strictly a pacifist approach), but you never get into Iraq itself.

    Your commenting on Iraq is Derridian at its best —– “I don’t have to be constructive. My job is pointing out the cracks in everybody else’s thoughts”

    and just a vehicle for one-liners bashing Bush at its worst.

  26. usinkorea

    And whatever Bushie was doing on the deck of the carrier and now, I can jump out of that box, because I was making comparisons to Korea long before he brought it up, and since looking back at precedent is a natural thing to do when evaluating complex, international issues, I refuse to be limited to an (ill-defined) box.

  27. Sonagi

    I have already explained why Iraq is undoable - too many factions, some backed by various international players, fighting each other and us.

    I have already explained numerous times why the Iraq-Korea comparison is invalid: it ignores the fact that multiple threats continue to inflict daily military and civilian casualties three years after the regime fell and the US military supposedly took control of the country.

  28. usinkorea

    Factions back by international players.

    3 years of fighting.

    3,500 US casualties.

    A price too high….

    A situation too hopeless….

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