Dr. Andrei Lankov’s latest article in the Asia Times, “North Korea needs a dose of soft power,” which suggests the most practical way of changing North Korea is to do so by engaging, particularly via exchanges of people as we did with the Soviets. While he notes that North Korea likely will remain nuclear (I agree - at least in the short-to-mid term), that they have no attraction to reform that could collapse them (again, I agree), and that the North Korean government would be careful to guard against the possible ideological contamination, he seems to believe such an approach might still bear fruit. There I do not agree completely, and even though cracks are appearing and widening in the regime control, I don’t think the North Korean regime would willingly go down this path of death via engagement.

I also don’t completely agree that we can’t do much in the shorter term with sanctions and pressure on China and South Korea - the key is to force them to fall in line. The totality of sanctions (including those from Japan), denying access to the international money transfer system, and drying up sources of money like the UNDP have had a noticeable effect on the regime, and we could do more, even if not as drastic as I suggest in this post. When the elite feel the pinch, the regime is in danger. An excerpt from Lankov’s article:

It is clear that the current Western approach to dealing with North Korea is not working. Some people in Washington obviously still believe that financial or other sanctions will push the North Korean regime to the corner and press Pyongyang into relinquishing its nuclear program. But this is very unlikely.

First, neither China nor Russia is willing to participate in the sanctions regime wholeheartedly. Neither country is happy about a nuclear North Korea, but they see its collapse as an even greater evil. However, without their participation, no sanctions regime can succeed. More important, South Korea, still technically an ally of the United States, is even less willing to drive Pyongyang to the corner. And finally, even if sanctions have some effect, the only palpable results will be more dead farmers. The regime survived far greater challenges a decade ago when it had no backers whatsoever.

So what can be done? In the short run, not much. Like it or not, Pyongyang will remain nuclear. There might be some compromises, such as freezing existing nuclear facilities, but in general there is no way to press North Korean leaders into abandoning their nuclear weapons.

This is not good news, since it means that the threat will remain. Earlier experience has clearly demonstrated that every time North Korean leaders run into trouble, they use blackmail tactics, and they usually work. In all probability, there will be more provocations in the future. Since Pyongyang’s leaders believe (perhaps with good reason) that Chinese-style economic reforms might bring about the collapse of their regime, they have not the slightest inclination to start reforming themselves.

This leaves them with few options other a policy aimed at extracting aid from the outside world, and regular blackmail is one of the usual tools of this approach. Thus the threat persists unless the regime or, at least, its nature is changed, but how can this goal be achieved if pressure from outside is so patently inefficient? The answer is pressure from within, by nurturing pro-democracy and pro-reform forces within North Korean society (and also pro-reform thoughts within the brains of individuals).

[…]

Their claim to legitimacy is based on their alleged ability to deliver better lives to Koreans here and now, and Pyongyang’s rulers have failed in this regard in the most spectacular way. The existence of another Korea makes the use of nationalistic slogans somewhat problematic as well.

North Korea’s leaders cannot really say, “We have to be poor to protect our independence from those encroaching foreigners,” since the existence of the dirty-rich South vividly demonstrates that under a reasonably rational government, Koreans can be both rich and independent (and also free).

This leaves Pyongyang with no choice but to seal the borders as tight as no other communist regime has ever done before, on assumption that the common folk should not know that they live a complete lie. This self-imposed information isolation is the major condition for the regime’s survival, and breaking such a wall of ignorance should be seen as the major target for any long-term efforts directed at bringing change to North Korea.

The power of soft measures is often underestimated, not least because such policies are cheap, slow and not as spectacular as commando raids or even economic embargoes. However, their efficiency is remarkable.

[. . .]

North Korea’s leaders are no fools. They understand that such exchanges are dangerous, and they do not want future Korean Yakovlevs and Kalugins to emerge. Back in 1959-60 they even decided to recall their students from the Soviet Union and other countries of the Communist Bloc and did not send their young people to study anywhere but in Mao Zedong’s China until the late 1970s. In other words, for two decades Pyongyang’s leaders believed that those countries were way too liberal as an environment for their students.

However, they also understand that without exchanges they cannot survive in the longer run. Even now, Pyongyang is doing its best to increase exchanges with China, sending numerous students there.

Read the rest here.

Actually, North Korea is sending many fewer students to China, not that many were ever sent, now than in the past, but some are being educated in other countries.

On a side note, I’ve attended lectures by and met Oleg Kalugin, a KBG general who defected to the U.S. in 1995. From what he as said, it is certainly true that his time in the U.S. changed his view, but I have doubts that North Koreans would ever allow anywhere near a similar degree of independence for official visitors to the U.S.