Despite North Korea reneging on the 13 February deal (DOC), this is why I believe the Bush administration has not yet fallen back on sanctions and isolation for the Kim regime:

North Korea has a plausible excuse for missing the first deadline. As part of the Feb. 13th agreement, the Bush administration agreed to release $25 million of North Korean funds frozen in a Macau bank. According to the U.S. government, a legal snafu delayed release of the funds. North Korea refused to act until it sees the money. (emphasis added)

Two things to note. First, “As part of the Feb. 13th agreement, the Bush administration agreed to release $25 million…” That is just flat out wrong – there is no mention of the $25 million in that agreement, although it was agreed to in a sidebar deal between the U.S. and the DPRK. This type of factually incorrect and misleading assertion presented as fact, appearing first in the Boston Globe, and also in at least the International Herald Tribune, is what the administration in part has to fight against.

Second, “North Korea has a plausible excuse.” Banco Delta Asia (BDA) released, or unfroze, the $25 million no later than 10 April 2007. North Korea was to have shutdown its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon by 14 April. Once the funds were officially released, North Korea unilaterally altered its demand, and original sidebar deal with the U.S., from “unfrozen” to “transferred.” This was and is an attempt by North Korea to force the U.S. to let it use the internationally banking system, if the U.S. wants the privilege of continuing the Six-Party Talks. This background information, vital for understanding this issue, is of course not detailed in the article.

Calling that, “a plausible excuse” is a real stretch. To say that is it being incorrectly portrayed by some as a “plausible excuse” is the actual problem.

The author, however, does have a sufficient understanding of North Korea’s motives and direction, as well as what South Korea (under Roh) will do:

From Kim Jong Il’s perspective, with an arsenal of 10 bombs of plutonium and a nuclear weapons test, North Korea is a self-declared if yet-unrecognized nuclear weapons state. His goal is to keep these weapons, sell the aging Yongbyon reactor and reprocessing facility for the highest price. . .

Kim Jong Il’s experience with the other parties, especially President George W. Bush, gives him grounds for believing that he can have his cake and eat it: Sell his nuclear weapons production capability to the other states while keeping a minimum nuclear deterrent.

South Korea will be the first member of the coalition to defect.

This, however, assumes too much of Bush and, I think, is not supportable. The first part below is yet another major stretch, while the second is dead on:

Splitting the United States and China will be more difficult, but not impossible [for North Korea to accomplish].

[. . .]

For Beijing, the Bush administration’s primary objective of regime change is its own worst nightmare.

While China would like North Korea to be less belligerent, a sentiment that has been waxing there for several months, overall they are not opposed to a nuclear North Korea; a nuclear armed buffer zone. There is no need to drive a wedge into something already apart. But as noted above, China does not want to lose that buffer zone, either, which is why North Korea knows China will not cut off oil and trade to that point. China could still do more than it is doing, however.

Considerable uncertainty remains about how the Bush administration will play its hand.

True enough. I’m betting on a to a more aggression push for international sanctions and isolation for North Korea, pending the next reneging, which should be a clearer break and less easily clouded by the press, as pointed out above. Still, it will deal with declaring the highly enriched uranium (HEU) program, so there will be some doubt. Perhaps the cumulative effect of North Korea’s recent reneging will help in this respect.

The article ends with this:

My bet, therefore, is that Kim Jong Il will succeed: Selling his future nuclear weapons production capability at Yongbyon for a good price and China’s graces, while keeping a minimum nuclear deterrent.

If the U.S. does not aggressively isolate Pyongyang to the point of collapse, I fear he will be correct.