The misrepresentation of DeTrani’s remarks did not go unnoticed here, and Michael Green further clarifies (h/t reader):

Michael Green, an Asia expert on the National Security Council from 2001 to 2005, argued that congressional testimony from veteran intelligence official Joseph DeTrani given in February was misconstrued by the media as the administration backpedaling on North Korea’s uranium enrichment activities.

“I don’t think there is any evidence in anything said publicly to back that up,” Green said during a presentation at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. “I think it’s projecting the Iraq intelligence experience — as abysmal as it was — on North Korea inappropriately.”

In February, DeTrani, North Korea mission manager for the national intelligence director, spoke up from beside his boss to clarify a point before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Asked about confidence in the intelligence that led to the 2002 confrontation and North Korea’s subsequent abandonment of the Clinton-era agreement to contain plutonium-based nuclear activities, DeTrani said the intelligence community had once had “high confidence” that Pyongyang was acquiring materials for a “production-scale” uranium enrichment facility (see GSN, March 7).

Today U.S. intelligence officials still have confidence that such a program is in existence but at “the mid confidence level,” DeTrani said.

Observers would be mistaken, however, to consider his statement as a move to downgrade the intelligence community’s assessment of North Korea’s highly enriched uranium program, Green said.

With assistance from the South Koreans, U.S. officials had very detailed information about North Korea procurement activities based on plans acquired from the nuclear smuggling network once led by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, according to Green (see GSN, May 9).

“What the intelligence community did not know was where it was or how far along the North Koreans were in building this capability,” he said. “But there was no doubt and no dissent on the question of their procurement of everything needed to create a highly enriched uranium facility.”

Offering his own clarification of DeTrani’s much-reported statement, Green said DeTrani was indicating there was “high confidence” about North Korea’s procurement activities and “mid confidence” about the program itself.

That, he said, is “essentially the same assessment” the administration got in 2002. “I don’t think we know more about HEU, but I think it would be a mistake to conclude we know less,” Green said.

Green said there is no question North Korea has the intention to develop a HEU program, and the regime certainly purchased components through a black market network. What remains unclear, he said, is what Pyongyang has done with the material and how far along they may be.

Read the rest here.