27 Years ago today: Kwangju Sat’ae
by Richardson ~ May 18th, 2007. Filed under: Anti-Americanism, History, Korean Culture, Korean Politics.Once again time to remember what happened in Kwangju on 18 May 1980; the 광주 사태, or the “Kwangju Uprising” (literally, the “Kwangju Situation”). Revisionist may refer to it as the: Kwangju Democratization Movement (광주 민주화운동), and while such a movement was bolstered by what happened there, that day was not about a democracy movement.
The book recommendations from last year concerning this are still good, I think.
In an update to something mentioned in comments in last years post, I am currently going through Tim Shorrock’s paper so I can make a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for all the exact cables he referenced in his biased and slipshod paper on alleged U.S. complacency in events related to the Kwangju massacre. I once twice asked him via email for a bibliography or list of references; he refused and said they could be identified in the paper.
A search on the Kwangju Uprising yields this from the U.S. Embassy in Seoul (Korean) [corrected - thank you Sonagi]. The Google Translate feature is interesting, but of course has some issues; “개요” was translated as “dog bedspread” (summary, synopsis, or abstract is the actual meaning).
Update: From the Joongang Ilbo:
On the anniversary of the event, the Ministry of Administration and Home Affairs yesterday released for the first time comprehensive and detailed official data on the Gwangju uprising in 1980, the bloodiest chapter in the nation’s modern push for democracy.
The National Archives and Records Service, which is under the ministry, opened its database to the public to mark the 27th anniversary of the beginning of the uprising. The material was compiled in 70 volumes published by the city of Gwangju and includes official documents by the security forces then reporting the situation to their superiors.
May 18th, 2007 at 4:00 pm
“A search on the Kwangju Uprising yields this from the Korean Embassy in the U.S. (Korean). “
The two countries’ names are switched. The linked article is from the homepage of the US Embassy in Korea.
May 18th, 2007 at 4:20 pm
Doh! Thanks, corrected.
May 19th, 2007 at 3:11 pm
I challenge you to point out precisely where my ‘paper’ is ‘biased and slipshod.’ I reported as best as possible what was in the documents I obtained, and checked many of the facts with officials personally involved in the events, including the late US ambassador William Gleysteen and the former CIA station chief in Seoul, Donald Gregg. Second, its reprehensible for you to say I ‘refused’ to provide documentation. I have helped many many writers seeking access to the documents. I’m also a fulltime independent journalist and don’t always have time to answer requests (or probably in your case, demands) for backup documentation. So go ahead, let’s see your stuff, Mr ‘DPRK Studies.’
“In an update to something mentioned in comments in last years post, I am currently going through Tim Shorrock’s paper so I can make a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for all the exact cables he referenced in his biased and slipshod paper on alleged U.S. complacency in events related to the Kwangju massacre. I’d one asked him via email for a bibliography or list of references; he refused and said they could be identified in the paper.
May 19th, 2007 at 4:55 pm
You probably don’t remember me. I asked you two times via email for a bibliography or reference list to your paper, but was refused both times. So when you say:
I know better. In 2004 and 2005 I asked for such a list by email, specifically:
Your reply in 2005 was (direct quote from email):
Save the righteous indignation act for someone who doesn’t know better.
May 19th, 2007 at 10:14 pm
good luck, richardson, and I hope you do as much reporting as I did when you get them. Diplomatic and military cables only tell part of the story (Gleysteen unfortunatly is no longer with us but most of the other players are). You still owe it to the rest of us to point out the bias in my original reporting. Oh, and when you get all 3,000 documents, I expect you to answer each and every email asking you for the full documentation. You might find yourself dealing with a little reality when that happens.
FYI - I’ll be posting some recently obtained documentation as I get the time - hopefully by end of summer, when I finish a major project I’m working on. I’ve obtained 300-400 pages of declassified Kwangju-related documents from CIA and DIA (the most interesting) over the last two years, plus a few more State Dept documents. The newly released cables are quite interesting, and have changed some of my original conclusions. For example, I think Gleysteen and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher were far more concerned with the potential ramifications of what might happen when they gave the green light for military intervention than what was stated in the original documents (which were heavily redacted). Their concerns were reported in my original story, however (for the original JOC article, go http://www.timshorrock.com.) At the same time, the DIA docs show that that agency was far more knowledgeable than we knew before about what was happening inside the Korean military at the time. I’ve developed a real appreciation for the DIA analysts from my study of this period. They were much better informed than the State Dept.
You might be surprised - as cold war memories slip away we might agree on a few things, Richardson. I’m a journalist, I look for evidence, facts. If I find facts that make me rethink my conclusions, that’s what I do. I’m still unclear where you’re coming from in all of this. Certainly Gleysteen’s and Wickham’s books (and whatever I’ve posted) should give you enough material to at least give an inkling of your thinking on this critical period.
May 20th, 2007 at 2:04 am
I thought you gave plenty of rope to hang yourself in the article itself.
I would use “slight of hand” rather than just “slipshod”.
For one thing, you used the chic of “recently declassified documents” for a “cloak-n-dagger” effect, because using “secret” documents with hyperbolic claims against the government adds instant credibility in the minds of the average reader - even though there was basically nothing new about your claims or the evidence you presented. And like the other huge holes in your piece, you use this tool over-n-over-n-over again.
The whole article is full of “bait-n-switch” material. One quick example from the very start of the article (at least the version Kimsoft put up for you):
Later in the paper, you also happen to point out, besides being “trained to fight behind the lines” (ooooohhhhooooo) that the US Embassy and USFK leadership also noted the SF had been getting riot control training as trouble brewed across the nation.
Throughout the article, you rely HEAVILY on the idea that using military forces in riot control situation is in-and-of-itself a horribly gross infraction of civil society and civil rights. Probably a lot of readers are sucked in with the highly charged language you use, but if they would take a second to think about it, every nation that is considered a fine example of democracy and progressive society —- also calls in military units to handle situations that are beyond the scope of the powers of local, regional, and state police forces to handle.
If France, the UK, or Sweden had massive riots breaking out nation-wide after the president had been assassinated and the government was influx, you would see them call on military units to help. If you had a national disaster or even something like a highly popular sporting event, something like the National Guard being called in to help keep order would not be considered “highly unusual.”
So, trying to lay guilt for the bloodshed in Kwangju based on prior knowledge of the use of such forces does not hold together well at all.
Most of all, you just use yellow journalism —– using extrodinary langauge to hype up claims — that you fail to back up with evidence.
For example:
But after all the hype, when we get down to where the meat is supposed to meet bone —- which takes some time because you jump around to other items (with equally charged verbiage) before you make your case on this point, and what we get is:
And slightly later:
Gee golly!!! You’re right!! Look how those quotes from “the documents paint a devastating portrait” of the US in Korea at the time!!! — uh…wait a second…
“remind Chun…of the danger of escalation” — oh lordy, what bastards!!
“maintain law and order, if absolutely necessary, by reinforcing the police with the army” —– the horrors!!! the horrors!!! How has that Carter bastard escaped being put on trial in the Hague and hung for so long!!! Bastard bastard!!…
“probably targeted against unrest at Chonju and Kwangju Universities”
Oh my goodness!!! Smoking gun!! Smoking gun!!! Smoking gun!!!
I could go on and on.
The entire article is FULL of such things — again and again and again and again ——- dancing an incredible web of hyperbolic wording when making claims of what the cables show, jumping all to hell and back with the timeline of the events in Korea, when the timelines are absolutely crucial, then when you finally get to the point of quoting from the cables to back up the mammothly strong claims of blood on the American hands, —— the quoted material falls more flaccid than Hugh Hefner’s kochu pre-viagra….
The thing I am most amazed about is — you didn’t win a Pulitzer for it. I guess you wrote it a few years too early…..
Maybe next time….
May 20th, 2007 at 9:55 am
There are these wonderful invention called “footnotes” and “bibliographies.”
What’s really interesting is that you told me via email that, “Any cables can be identified by date and author.” Sorry, but there are no such 3,000 references in that document. So which is it; are you lying now, or were you lying then?
So first it was “reprehensible” that I said you refused to assist with your “documentation,” but when faced with your, shall we say, problem with being consistent, you fall back to the “reality” of being overwhelmed by providing that assistance. Again, which is it? No one here is going to let such logical inconsistencies to pass unnoticed.
Facts, eh? If you stuck to the facts and didn’t jump to absurd conclusions, this conversation would not be taking place. I agree with USinKOrea that “slipshod” is probably the wrong term; you’re meticulous, but
intellectuallydishonest and biased.May 20th, 2007 at 8:58 pm
That’s noble and good. I mean, it is good if you (anybody) can do that.
But, you are also stating that what you wrote in that article back then is “the truth” as best as you could tell it.
Maybe you see it differently now, but back when I first read the article in the late 1990s, after printing it out from Kimsoft, I found myself scribbling in the margins “leap” “stretch” and “no” time and time again - which is my habit when I come across a text where a writer is making clearly unsupported or questionable leaps in judgment about what the source material they are using means.
And the strange thing about what you are saying now is — you are using references to contact with Gleysteen and Wickham as a defense of what you wrote in that article —-
—- when both men have written books about the same events that are contrary to your interpretation. I can’t remember which one’s book it was, but he specifically stated he was writing the book in part to rebut erroneous claims made in the press about what the US in Korea was doing at the time, and I thought that was a direct reference to your article. (He might have even mentioned in at one point. It has been awhile since I read those two books).
Wickham’s book is available free online via Google Book Search. I think I might have to go back and read it….
May 20th, 2007 at 9:06 pm
Tim, as I read your account I found far too many leaps of logic that make sense in the US but not in Korea. As has been pointed out, the use of military units to assist in quelling civil disturbance is only taboo in the US and a few other nations. If you look carefully you will find National Police forces that carry automatic weapons as a matter of policy and have armored vehicles around the world, and not just the 2nd or 3rd world. The leap of logic that I believe shows your bias is linking the US approving military units be used to restore civil order with the massacre which apprears disorganized in the least and also appears to have escalated in time. A more logical conclusion is that although collusion is possible, the resulting loss of life is more due to badly trained aggressive troops, regional grudges, an escalation of violence by both sides and finally the very poor decision of the students to seize weapons and engage government forces.
May 20th, 2007 at 9:23 pm
[edited-link inserted] Here is the link to Wickham’s book at Google. It isn’t available for download like others there. You have to read it page by page online.
May 21st, 2007 at 1:03 am
There appears to be another misunderstanding as well, but one which may have effected some U.S. government policy makers. To be blunt, U.S. commanders had (and have) zero real command and control over Korea troops when the issue facing them is internal. The ROK military has full authority over any and all ROK troops, to include the vaunted KATUSAs. This means that while the ROK General Staff may have notified the Combined Forces Command of their desire to pull troops from under CFC command to send them into Kwangju, any CFC “aproval” would have merely signified: “OK, we can do without them.” The CFC has zero authority to countermand any orders given to ROK military formations by the ROK military command. The best any CFC commander could do was to voice the warning that doing so would “endanger the alliance”. The first duty of the ROK military is to the ROK, and not to their CFC allies. Anyone who had worked closely with ROK military units or commanders will confirm that.
May 21st, 2007 at 9:00 am
I believe Wickham stated in his book that the Special Forces units were not even under the CFC command. And either his or Gleysteen’s book talks about an earlier incident in which Chun took units off the DMZ line that were technically under USFK’s command structure even though the USFK command complained bitterly about the move. One of those authors asked a question I wish I could quote better - but it was basically, “Why should we believe stronger words or actions by the US in Korea would have stopped these people when they were not only willing to kill their fellow Korean officers and politicians in seeking power, but were willing to die themselves if stronger elements united against them?”
Here is one of the quotes from the article I particularly like;
Besides the note on riot control training (which I guess did not include how to bayonet students in the gut), you have the “chemical warfare” hyperbole…
You know, pepper spray could be considered a chemical warfare agent, if you used it in a war. It would work too. That stuff stings and keeps on stinging.
I understand South Korea used a strong version of tear gas in the past, but can anybody do a rundown for me on when and which countries banned CS gas as too dangerous? I tried doing a brief google on it a couple of years ago but gave up.
I wonder what the US was using in the late 1970s to early 1980s? From the 1950s through the end of the Vietnam Era, we had some pretty big riots and national unrest. During that time, did we consider CS gas something inhumane and possibly would break the Geneva Conventions if we used it in Vietnam?…………or…..are we talking from a 1990s perspective?
May 21st, 2007 at 9:05 pm
usinkorea. If memory serves, we were using CS gas for both riot control training and actual operations. Likewise, CS gas was used in training our own troops against gas warfare. If you went through a gas chamber exercise in the late 60s and early 70s, changes are you experienced CS gas. During the anti-Noriega riots in Panama in the late 80s, the Panamanian forces obtained a combination tear and vomiting gas from the Israelis. I remember entering my apartment building in Panama City and finding the elevator slimed with vomit from those who had been out protesting. Definitely worse than CS, though perhaps not as long-lasting. I’ve seen the quote you reference on a blog before, and recall that I asked for a list of countries who had banned it from the poster, with no result. I may have also pointed out the use of “considered by some military specialists” language as finely crafted psyops.
May 21st, 2007 at 9:51 pm
So you’re both saying Shorrock’s comments on CS are BS? Heh.
May 21st, 2007 at 11:47 pm
We still use CS for confidence training in the US military, or maybe when I blew snot in a continuous stream down to my boots for an hour in 1996 it was psychological. Believe it or not you can develop a tolerance for the stuff, but with any gas/material if there is not enough oxygen (enclosed spaces) you can have people suffocate which is why I believe many groups oppose CS. Oh well we can always go back to lethal force, since now even tasers are getting flak.
May 22nd, 2007 at 2:02 am
If Tim Shorrocks is the author of: “CS gas is a virulent form of tear gas banned in many countries and considered by some military specialists to be a form of chemical warfare”, then he is guilty of gross overstatement and misrepresentation. He could have verified the relative “virulence” of CS gas by checking with any E-6 CBR NCO of the period, or the U.S. Army Chemical Warfare School. And his qualification that it is “considered by some military specialists to be a form of chemical warfare” is sloppy to the extreme. Why can’t we get a cite to an internationally recognized specialist, or some recognized agency that supports such a view? That way, we could make an assessment of the validity of the allegations. This is akin to writing: “some military specialists consider torture to be an effective interrogation method”. Were I to infer such, I am sure he would immediately find the same faults with my reasoning and presentation of that alleged fact. Hell, some military “experts” thought we could do Iraq with small forces, relying upon “shock and awe”. But notice that in this latest example, once we start naming the gentlemen, their “military expertise” falls apart.
Now, before we start tearing Shorrocks up for something that he published years ago, let’s open the door to the possibility that he has learned a few things since then. And bear in mind tht some of his sources were personnel totally unfamiliar with the realities of service in Korea. I have no doubt that some government leaders back in Washington thought that they had far more leverage on the Korean military than those on the scene. They may have actually written memos using terms like “giving the green light”, without understanding that any Korean general worth his salt would have told him to shove that green light up his ass. Only those who have served in a combined force environment understand what that means. NATO earned experience was not readily interchangeable with CFC experience, but it was better than U.S. command-only experience. The best vignette I can think of is that these latter were comparable to the military retirees that occasionally show up at the PXes here expecting full access, only to be told that their purchases are limited to personal hygiene and necessity items only. They sputter, and cite their years of service, only to be told that: This is Korea, that’s Korean law, and under the SOFA, we are obliged to honor it. Where else will you see American service men standing to attention when the Korean National Anthem is played?
May 22nd, 2007 at 2:46 am
Touching on the above -
I believe I quoted the stuff from the 8th above and this was in mind when I blathered out “Smoking gun!! Smoking gun!!”…
May 22nd, 2007 at 5:40 am
If you guys have read Oberdorfer’s Two Koreas, would anyone agree with the interpretation of 5.18 in the book? Oberdorfer mentions Shorrocks report but Oberdorfer’s interviews with Wickham and Gleysteen do not support Shorrocks’ claims.
Additionally Army units do nearly yearly training in what we call a CS Chamber. The NBC guys set off CS gas in the building in order for soldiers to build confidence in their gas masks to show the soldiers that they work. After proving that the masks work everyone takes off their masks and does pushups and sings cadence among other things in the chamber in order to build tolerance. CS is far from being considered a dangerous chemical weapon.
May 22nd, 2007 at 6:43 am
Here is a quote from page 60 of Wickham’s book. It is in the description of the 12 Dec 1979 coup by Chun, but it relates to the Special Forces Unit.
The quote is a screen grab, so I am testing whether the img tag works in comments. If not, but follow the address:
May 22nd, 2007 at 7:07 am
When I went through basic training in 1991 we did the gas chamber thing. However, it was AF and we didn’t take off our masks, as I recall, as it was more to make sure the seal was correct, etc. It did irritate my neck where I’d shaved a couple hours prior.
May 22nd, 2007 at 1:15 pm
I think one of the things that really clouds the fact that the US did not have to “approve” release of ROK troops from the CFC is that US officials used the word “approve” publicly on several occasions. From the 1989 white paper:
In subsequent publications and interviews Ambassador Gleysteen has stated that the U.S. “approved” the movement of the 20th Division, and a U.S. Department of Defense spokesman on May 23, 1980 stated that the U.S. had “agreed” to release from OPCON of the troops sent to Kwangju. Irrespective of the terminology, under the rights of national sovereignty the ROKG had the authority to deploy the 20th Division as it saw fit, once it had OPCON, regardless of the views of the U.S. Government.
Other examples of this misunderstanding make you wonder about how widespread it was. In an NBC broadcast on May 22, 1980, it’s reported that the Pentagon said it had “given permission” to withdraw ROK troops, (It’s on youtube here). One book about the uprising (which has pretty clear biases) mentions that there is “an operations document dated May 16, 1980″ acknowledging an ROK request for operational control of the 20th Division, which the CFC commander replied to with “Your request is approved”. The writer accepts this as proof that the US government was lying
What’s interesting is that General Wickham was in the US from May 14-19 and would not have been the one who signed this document. A diagram I have displaying the CFC command structure shows that the deputy CinC would have been Korean; Wickham in his book names him as Baek Sok Chu. It would be rather ironic if this document ‘proving’ US culpability was in fact signed by a Korean. Does anyone know for certain if the Korean deputy CinC takes over in the absence of the American CinC?
May 22nd, 2007 at 3:01 pm
See. This is the problem I have with arguing about approval or non-approval and the jumbling of the timeline.
The use of military troops for riot control and/or in times of national emergency is NOT a horrible breach of civil society. It is something that even the most democratic of nations do when a situation even has the potential of becoming something too big for standard policing forces to handle. Even before terrorism became such a big concern after 9/11, if you had some major sporting event, like a World Cup, you would find some type of military unit being called upon to show a presence of force just in case…
So, what is the significance of whether or not the US Embassy or USFK HQ knew the Korean government was withdrawing troops from its normal basing area?
Why does being told military units were being used automatically equal the US in Korea knew a massacre was going to take place and approved of it? —-it doesn’t, but that is what these people rely on when they make this “approval” argument.
Also, the 18th and 19th were the two bloody days that are the main period of what we call the Kwangju Massacre - and was done by the Special Forces troops.
The US did acknowledge the use of the army unit on the 22nd, after news of the amount of bloodshed had partially made it out of the seige in Kwangju, and the US authorities argued that in part, it was a good idea to use the army unit rather than send the Special Forces troops back in.
More people did die on the 22nd, but this is where the discussion has to take into account who had gained the upper hand in the leadership of the protesters in Kwangju. Even the books that portray those leaders as heroic note that by this period, the moderates and those who were trying to negociate a deal with the authorities to return law and order to the city had been pushed out by more radical elements of students and others, and one of the main student leaders wanted a show down so that the world would focus on the brutality of the regime.
The students and others by this time were also armed with seized weapons and fought a battle against the army troops who moved in.
And what you find in the cables Shorrock quotes is time and time again, the US authorities in Korea telling the ROK government to use caution and resort to force as a last resort and understand that more violence could cause more unrest…..and so on and so on…..
All of the talk about whether this or that unit were under the USFK command structure and whatnot is just a smoke screen. It is a red herring argument by people who want desperately to blame the US for Kwangju.
If somebody can find a source that shows were Chun and crew told the US they were going to send down military units to send a message to other protesters around the nation by bayonetting students and blowing away a sizable portion of the protesters in the street so that the gutters would fill with blood and everybody would thus know who was in charge —-then we will have a smoking gun.
Until someone can establish the US had a good idea a massacre was going to take place and thought that was a peachy idea — I’ll continue to believe those who make the “America shares responsibility for the massacre” argument do so more out of bias than fact, logic, or common sense.
May 22nd, 2007 at 3:12 pm
I will add, the best argument for blaming the US for Kwangju is the “guilt by association after the fact” –
— that once the extent of the massacre became known and things had settled down in South Korea, the US did not fundamentally alter its relationship with South Korea and the South Koreans who were responsible for the bloodshed - or at minimum - who were in charge of the units that did the bulk of the killing on the 18th and 19th.
If we get into this discussion, I want the people calling for blood on the hands of the US in Korea to tell me what the US should have done.
For non-Koreans, that should be easy: they can say the US should refused to work with a Chun-led government and if Chun remained in power and against democracy, the US should have pulled out its troops and washed its hands of the ROK alliance.
Koreans can’t argue that, because they know Korean society at the time, whatever the reality of the massacre in Kwangju, would NOT have wanted US troops out.
It also seems to me the reason the bulk of the people who argue the US is co-guilty for Kwangju is simple guilt by association before the fact —– that we knew all along for decades the Korean government was dictatorial and we should have cut and run from them long, long before.
That might not even be a bad argument except for the fact that one reason Kwangju is remembered so much 27 years later is —
—- the amount of bloodshed and violence was shocking — was out of the norm — was not something people expected even the heavy handed rulers of South Korea would do….
May 22nd, 2007 at 3:18 pm
(And I’ll add a little more —- the idea the US caused the assassination of President Park Chung Hee by the Korean CIA chief rests much on the idea that President Carter’s effort to remove USFK from Korea, in large measure because of human rights violations, made people like the KCIA chief desperate and thus drove him to blow Park’s head off because Park would not give up power and that was causing problems with the US. I have always found it interesting that the same type of people who blame the US for Kwangju also blame the US for the Park murder. A clear “damned if you do/damned if you don’t” catch-22…)
May 22nd, 2007 at 6:55 pm
Actually, it was the 21st that was the worst day, followed by the 5 days of quiet (in the city) after the military withdrew and surrounded the city (though they killed at least 50 people on the outskirts). The final attack on the 27th (said to be 30 dead, though likely more) pales in comparison to the bloodshed on the 20th and 21st.
Also, the 20th division, which was sent down to end the uprising, had already been removed from the CFC on the 16th (after the large protest in Seoul but before the extension of martial law) - Chun didn’t need to alert the US to move the troops from Seoul to Kwangju, but may well have done so specifically in order to implicate the US (Ambassador Walker told LA Times reporter Sam Jameson this years later). Worth remembering is that the military said they would airdrop leaflets in Kwangju explaining the US position but never did; they also deliberately lied and told people in Kwangju that the US had approved the initial crackdown. Later, in July, Chun would almost ruin Wickham’s career when he named Wickham as having specifically said the US would support Chun (but removed the context of this statement). If anyone deserves the lion’s share of the blame for the anti-American feeling that developed later, it would be Chun, especially considering how his censorship of the papers controlled what Koreans read about the US.
Gleysteen wrote that they had prepared notes for the first white house visit by Chun having democracy and human rights as talking points, but Reagan ignored these and seemed to embrace Chun, which, he thought, ‘tarnished’ the US in the eyes of Koreans, who didn’t know that the visit was in return for the sparing of Kim Dae-jung’s life.
May 22nd, 2007 at 7:46 pm
In Michael Breen’s book he also confirms that the US had no control over the units that Chun used to smash the protesters. Breen explains that the perception of the Korean people was that the US could have played power politics to stop what happened. However, that is assuming the US could have predicted what was going to happen.
Oberdorfer also supports that Chun is the main person responsible for creating the perception that the US was behind the crackdown on the protesters. He intentionally launched a propanganda campaign of US support in order to give his crackdown legitimacy and then lied to the US on a number of occassions about his intentions.
It is important to remember that Chun served as the 9th White Horse Division commander during the Vietnam War. He wrote letters to Park Chung-hee about how Korea had to put down internal opposition because internal opposition in the south sponsored by the North Vietnamese was causing huge problems. With this context it really isn’t surprising that once he took over in a coup he immediately put down opposition to his rule from what were rightly or wrongly perceived to be communist sympathizers in Kwangju.
May 22nd, 2007 at 8:40 pm
“It is important to remember that Chun served as the 9th White Horse Division commander during the Vietnam War. He wrote letters to Park Chung-hee about how Korea had to put down internal opposition because internal opposition in the south sponsored by the North Vietnamese was causing huge problems.”
I believe “how Korea had to put down…” should read: “how South Vietnam had to put down…” I assume that he is referring to the Buddhist demonstrations in Danang and Hue. These took place before my arrival in early 1968, but my readings and impression is that foreign units merely protected their bases, while ARVN units conducted civil disturbance operations. In 1968, my neighbors in the White Horse division conducted combat and civic action missions only. Internal security missions were restricted to ARVN forces, to include the national police.
May 22nd, 2007 at 10:23 pm
I thought it was the 18th and 19th that were the primary days in which the Special Forces were reported to have been so brutal that led to the masses in the city coming out to support the students and other original protesters — but I am probably wrong. That was my memory from reading Kwangju Diary.
It gets difficult keeping the days straight given how charged the topic still is. For example, if the main days of bloodshed came after the initial couple of days where the Special Forces came in and got the whole city in an uproar —- you are also talking about the main days of bloodshed coming after the protesters had decided to fight fire with fire - meaning - you are talking about after they had armed themselves.
The discussion usually breaks down about here —- if you start to question the contemporary desire to view the protesters as nothing but peaceful and true advocates of democracy. —–meaning—if you try to think about what the situation was in reality at the time - you get bashed because there is no gray area - you must pick a side and only a %$#$% would be against the citizens who got slaughtered…..
…..but since peaceful large protests are rare these days in Korea……………..
Anyway, I seem to remember reading in an article once that Chun did have leaflets dropped in the troubled spots, but the leaflets said that the US was fully supporting what the government was doing — like the US was fine with the massacre.
One thing that is somewhat oddly missing often from these discussions is about what was going on elsewhere in the country.
There was unrest in a good number of places throughout the nation, but we remember Kwangju because it was the only place such a major loss of life occured.
I just read the Cumings Ohmy(gosh)news interview (didn’t know he was now the top Korea scholar in the US….)….and Cumings said he always thought the US had guilt to share for Kwangju because it knew the military was going to be used and the military had been rough in the past.
That is true, but why haven’t I run across articles and books detailing the unrest before the Kwangju Massacre to lay the foundation for the claim that Kwangju was predictable (and thus should have been prevented)?
May 23rd, 2007 at 6:01 am
GI Korea –
I hadn’t read about Chun’s views on Vietnam before. He mentioned to Wickham several times his fear of communist subversion in Korea. What may have been the catalyst for the crackdown on May 17 (which led to the closing of the National Assembly) was that the National Assembly was to open for the first time since Park’s assassination (and his coup). Several members of the assembly said they would try to pass a law to end martial law, which would have threatened Chun’s power.
Usinkorea –
A question I often ask is what was going on elsewhere in Korea. Was it really so quiet, or was it just overshadowed by Kwangju (and south Jeolla province)? It seems to have been quiet, but I’d like to know for sure about that myself. Of course, if Kwangju was the only place with demonstrations, his desire to crush the only thorn in his side would make sense.
As for the chronology of the violence, here’s the first 4 days in a nutshell (keeping in mind that three waves of paratroopers were sent to Kwangju, arriving early in the mornings of the 18th, 19th, and 20th):
May 18th – Troops secure universities; students demonstrate and move downtown, troops move downtown and attack protesters and bystanders. Anger over this leads to more protests the next day.
May 19 – More troops arrive, protests grow larger, several deaths occur.
May 20 – Even larger protests with many citizens taking part. In the evening the protest by taxi and bus drivers allow the citizens more control of the streets and puts troops on defensive. Shooting by soldiers at train station kills around 20.
May 21. Troops retreat to Provincial Hall. Citizens demonstrate in front of the troops there. Troops open fire there around 1:00 pm, around the universities, and later throughout the city as they retreated to the suburbs.
The demonstrators didn’t start grabbing guns from armories until after they were fired on, and it seems there wasn’t that much fighting between the citizen army and the paratroopers; the paratroopers retreated to the city outskirts by early evening on the 21st. The bulk of the deaths occurred on the 20th and 21st (the 18th and 19th were certainly brutal, and brought citizens into the streets, but were a prelude to even more violence) and they occurred before the demonstrators began arming themselves. During the 5 days when the army surrounded the city they killed some 50 people on the outskirts (including themselves – 2 units mistook each other for the enemy and fought for 30 minutes, leaving 9 soldiers dead). The retaking of the city on the 27th led to less casualties than during the 20th-21st by far.
One thing that’s never mentioned is that US officials managed to delay the final invasion by perhaps 2 days. During that time a lot of people calmed down, and the final group that held out to the end was far, far smaller than those who stood against the troops on the 21st. It’s quite likely that delay, brought about by the US, may have actually saved many lives.
May 23rd, 2007 at 6:57 am
lirelou,
You are correct I meant South Vietnam.
bulgasari,
Breen talks about Chun’s days as a division commander in Vietnam in his book. I think it is a safe bet to say that Chun saw what happened in South Vietnam and was not going to allow it to happen in South Korea.
May 23rd, 2007 at 9:22 am
From my vague memory of having read news article and articles and a couple of books, I don’t think we could say the rest of Korea was “quiet” before Kwangju. I’ve heard the immediate aftermath of Park’s assassination in Seoul referred to as remarkably calm, but by Kwangju, those months and weeks were not calm — from what I can remember reading here and there over the years.
I can’t recall any specifics right now, but Masan, Pusan, Seoul, and Wonju are all the names of cities that are ringing bells as to whether Kwangju was the only real show of demonstrations.
But, at least the US authorities in Korea at the time have argued over the years that although violent Korean-type demonstrations and suppression was going on in hot spots around the nation, and things were rough by our standards, there was nothing before Kwangju remotely on the same level as Kwangju —– thus arguing that they do not have blood on their hands by not moving to “stop Chun” from sending troops to Kwangju - as if they could anyway…
Also, “and they occurred before the demonstrators began arming themselves.”
I don’t have Kwangju Diary, and I don’t remember which blog this discussion came up on last year at this time, but in that book, there is a note from the 18th and 19th from one of the authors who was part of student demonstrations back then that a police station and officers had been “disarmed” already. This was before the the city rose up to support the students.
I have grown wary of discussions on Kwangju over the years after reading things about it and doing discussions in the internet and in person.
It is too much a hot button, emotional issue, because the blood is still fairly fresh historically speaking..
I avoided studies on contemporary or modern literature and later contemporary or 20th century East Asian history for that very reason.
You can find that today’s politics and pseudo-politics has influence on things like “early-modern” English literature - say - Shakespeare or John Donne —- so there is no place to really hide….
….but I would never go into academic studies on something like the Kwangju period, because it gets so jumbled quickly.
May 23rd, 2007 at 9:26 am
Trying to track down that quote again on disarmed, I saw that the discussion I had last year was with you (bulgasari).
As I remember it (I haven’t really started going over the thread again yet, I eventually did get back to the library and got the book again and eventually located that quote about “disarming”.
Do you remember the details better than me? Because right now, my brain isn’t pulling the specifics back up….
May 23rd, 2007 at 9:42 am
OK. Now I have a better handle on the memories, and also better on what we’ve said to each other about this last year…..I imagine we are both still in the same exact places this year.
Here is what I wrote several weeks after that thread at Marmot’s began when I got the chance to go through the book again:
You didn’t respond to this post last year, but it was the last note in the thread and again it came a couple of weeks later - you might never have seen it until now.
I am currently getting a monthly subscription to the NY Times archives, where I get 100 articles a month for $8, and I am searching around the times of big events in Korean history (going back to the late 1800s).
On my blog, I am posting clips from the articles as the current date comes up.
I am collecting sources for 1979-1980 (The Kwangju Period), but I don’t plan to offer them until next year, because there will be many articles from that time period, and I am already keeping a running series of posts on 1904, 1960, and 1950. That is plenty for a reader to keep up with.
However, as I run across stuff related to Kwangju that touches on any of the internet conversations we’ve had about that period, I’ll email the link to the jpg image of the screen grab I’m getting of sections of the articles.
I am assuming I’ll be able to find your email address on your blog….if not, just email it to me at usinkorea@hotmail.com
If any of you other readers are interested in getting stuff like that before May of next year, just email me your address and I’ll send them out together.
You can take a look at my blog to see how I am posting the articles for the years I am covering right now on it.
http://www.usinkorea.org/blog1
May 26th, 2007 at 11:50 pm
[...] in a new way to make a buck.- Korea’s troubled export: babies.- If you haven’t read Richardson’s post on the Gwangju Incident yet, you really should just for the fact he draws Tim Shorrock into the [...]
May 27th, 2007 at 2:50 am
After spending too much of my time reading writers of the ilk of Bruce Cumings, Seymour Hirsh, Noam Chomsky and Tim Shorrock, I have come to the conclusion that these people have a hidden agenda; i.e., an ‘ax to grind’.
The solution that works for me?
Since there is little reason to hope that these people will ever post a ‘truth in advertising’ label on any of their writings, I just don’t read these people anymore; they’re just wa-a-a-y too clever for me.
May 28th, 2007 at 12:02 am
well in jun 2007 the “May 18th” film will be released in Korea. Should make for some very interesting times here in Korea
June 3rd, 2007 at 4:09 am
[Comment removed for drive-by ad hominem.]
June 3rd, 2007 at 9:46 am
Thank you for engaging in a debate - by saying you refuse to debate. It helps everyone so much by such insightful input.
If we were sitting together in person, maybe you could put your fingers in your ears and go “na na na na na na na” too…
May 17th, 2008 at 7:48 pm
[...] post a more detailed response sometime next week, but in the mean time I highly recommend reading Richardson’s posting from last year and more importantly the comments that provides some great information and perspective about what [...]