Today is one month past the original 14 April 2007 deadline for North Korea to shutdown and secure the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, per the 13 February agreement (DOC). As that deadline loomed, it was clear it would not be met on time, even though BDA had released the funds in question as early as 10 April.

Now the U.S. government is bending rules beyond reason, even if for meeting “diplomatic” objectives. My original theory on the administration’s change of approach and adoption of “engagement” was an answer to:

…critics on the left [who have called for] dealing “diplomatically” with North Korea. Before they blamed Bush for killing the Agreed Framework (there was not “proof” – until Pakistan came forward). They blamed Bush for killing the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement due to the banking sanctions, etc. Always Bush’s fault.

When this deal is broken by North Korea, what will those critics say? They’ll have to blame Kim Jong-il rather than Bush. . . The result will be that the U.S. – the Bush administration probably, but perhaps whoever follows – will have vastly more political capital to use in a strangulation policy.

But, so far, rather than giving Kim Jong-il enough rope to hang himself, State has instead thrown down enough rope to create a safety net.

If the administration, once past the BDA issue, does not use North Korea’s next expected violation of the 13 February agreement (full disclosure of nuclear programs, including uranium enrichment), then I’ll have to admit I was wrong, and rather than having an actual plan, they are in fact clueless and have moved into “legacy mode.”

North Korea’s behavior, however, does tend to reaffirm Strategic Disengagement.