Victor Cha and Giving Kim Enough Rope
by Richardson ~ May 2nd, 2007. Filed under: Diplomacy, Engagement, Washington Views.The 13 February deal (DOC) brought much criticism from both the center and the right for giving North Korea another chance. Many in fact took the agreement out of the proper context and criticized it for things not even in it but reserved for deals to be struck in later stages of negotiations.
For the first day or so I was also not impressed with the agreement, but then considered the possibility that the Bush administration was perhaps planning on building political capital by doing what many Democrats have called for; “engaging” North Korea with “diplomacy.” Then, when the deal inevitably unraveled with North Korea reneging, that capital could be used to press harder for strangulation. In effect, giving Kim Jong-il enough rope to hang himself.
While all of that hasn’t been verified, the memo Victor Cha’s office drafted on the topic of dealing with North Korea does give credence to the notion that the administration is capable of more subtlety than given credit for:
Victor D. Cha, a Georgetown University international relations professor, started his job as an Asia specialist at the White House’s National Security Council during Christmas week in 2004.
[…]
Cha, 45, will return to Georgetown this week, but his government service has had unusual impact, especially for an ivory-tower academic with no experience in policymaking.
He arrived at the White House with a reputation as an advocate for a tough approach to negotiations with North Korea — what he called “hawk engagement” — but in the end he drafted the crucial memo that helped persuade President Bush earlier this year to allow U.S. negotiators to meet for bilateral talks with their North Korean counterparts in Berlin.
The approach all but shattered the taboo on substantive bilateral negotiations that Bush had imposed since the crisis over North Korea’s nuclear ambitions erupted nearly five years ago. North Korea requested the meeting after refusing substantive talks at six-nation negotiations in December. (Pyongyang proposed Geneva as a venue, but that is where a Clinton-era agreement scorned by Bush was negotiated, so Berlin was chosen.)
Cha caught Bush’s eye by arguing in his memo that it is time to test North Korea’s intentions — seeking an agreement with specific actions and a limited time frame. North Korea ultimately agreed to shut down its nuclear reactor in 60 days if the United States ended a banking inquiry, but North Korea has now missed the deadline by more than two weeks.
Cha declined to discuss the memo.
[…]
“People were trying to interpret what the administration’s policy was,” he said. “It was largely a black interpretation, that they were trying to scuttle everything that the previous administration was doing. I thought that wasn’t right, and that it was a much more subtle policy.”
[…]
Last month, Cha became the first U.S. official to visit Pyongyang in almost five years when he was assigned to accompany New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson (D) on a trip to recover the remains of U.S. soldiers. It was Cha’s first visit to the country he had studied for so long. (emphasis added)
How much more we don’t know? (h/t Marmot’s Hole)
May 2nd, 2007 at 3:47 pm
It would be nice if the US side knew that the banking sanctions were hurting as much as they clearly seem to be and that they were confident NK would balk at fullfilling the deal based on those sanctions. But, I don’t have that much faith in us.
The banking sanctions would/should be something that the US could stick to the moral high ground on or protect from appeasement policy pushers — it is kinda hard to make excuses for ending sanctions for something like money laundering meth distribution proceeds just so Kim Jong Il can have enough Hennesey to pass around to the elite. It’s kinda hard to excuse Kim Jong Il’s non-compliance over something like that. So, if they did know NK would continue to demand more than just the release of the $20-whatever million, they were smart in the new deal.
May 2nd, 2007 at 5:54 pm
I’m fairly certain that at least parts of the government are well aware of that.
And remember, the financial sanctions are something that can easily be put back into practice.
May 2nd, 2007 at 9:41 pm
It was a pretty safe bet, based on a 100 percent negative track record, that North Korea would violate its agreement. I worry whether the Bush administration has the energy and attention spam to follow through.
May 2nd, 2007 at 11:14 pm
The timing of the violation is what is a suprise to me - just like how quickly after the ICBM test they fired off a nuke.
Given how quickly NK has refused to implement this deal - and the fact that they keep harping on being allowed to use the international banking system, and looking back at how quickly the nuke test came, I feel better about my view that the regime is getting desperate because it sees a run toward collapse as something that is going to happen in the near future.
May 3rd, 2007 at 2:15 am
‘The Only Fat Man in North Korea’ (Reg TM) continues to eat well.
As long as this continues to be the case, clever policies of ‘giving Kim enough rope’ will do little more than allow that rope to be used to hang yet more innocents at Yodok.
We had the little bastard (not a registered trademark) ‘on the ropes’ at the end of last year.
What in hell happened that allowed the turnabout? Was John Bolton the ONLY person having the testicular audacity necessary to maintain the pressure?
With only a trace of sarcasm do I assert that the most plausible explanation (at least to me) for this debacle is that the fat man has some ‘doggie pictures’ in his files that he is threatening to post onto the Internet.
May 3rd, 2007 at 12:19 pm
I definitely agree it was a safe bet. Unfortunately that BDA fiasco may have left the impression with many that the U.S. has some responsibility for the delays, thus lessening the perception of blame attributed to North Korea. We need a more dramatic reneging by North Korea.
I also worry about the Bush admin following through. I’m not sure what really prompted Cha to leave now, but it doesn’t read like a good thing.