I think some will make more of this than it is; reference to nuclear weapons and uranium is implicit (reference to the 2005 Joint Statement (DOC)), but it is still there. That is what will be dealt with in the second stage of negotiations that must be accomplished for North Korea to obtain the 950k tons of fuel oil. From Kyodo:

North Korea’s abandonment of nuclear weapons was stated in a first draft of an agreement document for the six-party talks held earlier this month, but was dropped in a second draft drawn up by the United States after the North Korean side rejected it, negotiation sources said Sunday.

Given that North Korea giving up nuclear development with highly enriched uranium was also reportedly removed from the document, experts said the focus of the six-party talks has apparently shifted from denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula to nonproliferation of nuclear materials led by those based on plutonium.

[…]

Against this backdrop, North Korea’s abandonment of nuclear weapons was conditionally dropped in a second draft drawn up with the lead of the United States.

[…]

The sources said Japan strongly insisted on keeping the weapons abandonment in the document but its voice “was limited” in influencing the talks because of its hard-line position over the issue of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea in the past.
Japan maintained it would not join energy aid unless progress is made in resolving the abduction issue.

In the end, the final document referred to North Korea’s nuclear weapons just indirectly by stating the six parties “reiterated that they would earnestly fulfill their commitments in the joint statement” they adopted in September 2005.

The joint statement commits Pyongyang to abandoning all its existing nuclear weapons and programs in exchange for economic and diplomatic benefits and security assurances.

Update: See Joshua’s post on the above information.

I don’t think it’s accurate to say the U.S. gave up anything; explicit language was not used for the uranium program or denuclearization but implicit language was. It still points to the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement which references further documents and does call for complete denuclearization, period. As the Kyodo article notes; “The joint statement commits Pyongyang to abandoning all its existing nuclear weapons and programs. . .”

Remember, the 13 February deal is two parts, the first being relatively minor. Anything given, except for the 50k tons of heavy fuel oil, can be taken back before Yongbyon gets fully fired up again.

I don’t think anyone on the U.S. side actually believes North Korea will fulfill its side of this deal – and if it didn’t have a chance to succeed, one must ask what would then be the purpose for such a deal – but it’s still important for the U.S. to make a good faith effort to fulfill its part of the bargain so as not to give North Korea the excuse for what it will do anyway.

It’s important because it will give the administration some badly needed political capital to refocus efforts on strangulation. After North Korea reneges there will still be a sizeable group of apologists and congressional useful idiots calling for engagement, but I think they will be a small enough minority so as not to impede a wider strategy of slow strangulation.

We’ll see in a few weeks.