The Latest DPRK Nuke Deal: So Far So Good
by Richardson ~ February 23rd, 2007. Filed under: Diplomacy, Engagement, Nuclear Proliferation, Six-Party Talks.When I suggest things are going well, I don’t mean I’m cautiously optimistic about resolving the nuclear problem through negotiations, but that the edges are already visibly fraying and that North Korea’s rejection – of what would clearly be a generous deal – will deliver some political capital to the Bush administration that can be used on a policy with a chance of success; strangulation.
I agree with Richard Holloran that North Korea has absolutely no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons, but disagree that Bush will possibly be labeled, “naïve or, worse, deceptive,” since the diplomacy-can-solve-everything crowd has been asking for the administration to, “open a dialogue with Pyongyang” and conclude a deal for years. This is their reality check; it’s North Korea’s fault after all. The unraveling will also, in my opinion, allay claims that the deal would amount to a betrayal of some sort.
A look at the disintegration;
North Korea is accusing the U.S. of lies:
North Korean U.N. Ambassador Pak Gil Yon also accused the United States of having “dirty” political motives and fabricating lies by suggesting Pyongyang might have misused funds from the U.N. Development Program for the development of nuclear weapons.
“The allegations of the United States are sheer fiction aimed at politicizing international aid to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” Pak said in the letter, which was also sent to the 15 U.N. Security Council members.
Cheney highlights that North Korea isn’t really to be trusted and has, “much to prove”:
Cheney echoed Bush in saying the North Korea deal was a step toward disarmament but he also raised concern about whether Pyongyang would follow through.
“We go into this deal with our eyes open. In light of North Korea’s missile test last July, it’s nuclear test in October and its record of proliferation and human rights abuses, the regime in Pyongyang has much to prove, yet this agreement represents the first hopeful step toward a better future for the North Korean people,” he said.
Some U.S. analysts have speculated that Cheney, known for his hawkish views, was a skeptic of the North Korea deal, but Friday’s speech was his first open acknowledgement of caution.
State is framing progress on the deal as being depending on “if” the 60 day timetable is kept. The “if not” path is implicit:
If all parties meet the 60-day timetable for their first round of agreements, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is likely to attend a six-nation ministerial meeting in Beijing in April to discuss the next phase of North Korea’s nuclear disarmament, Ambassador Christopher Hill said February 22 at the Brookings Institution, a policy research center in Washington. Hill is assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs.
Japan is not letting up on the abduction issue:
Japan will seek the arrests of two former North Korean agents in relation to the abduction of Japanese nationals in negotiations with Pyongyang in a working group to be launched by the end of March, Tokyo’s top government spokesman indicated Friday.
[. . .]
“To begin with, it was North Korea that carried out the abductions, so in order to find out the ultimate truth, obviously it is North Korea that has to come clear about what has happened,” Shiozaki told a morning news conference.
And is warning that more sanctions could follow:
Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso warned North Korea on Wednesday that Japan could impose additional unilateral sanctions on North Korea if the issue of Pyongyang’s abductions of Japanese nationals makes no headway during upcoming bilateral talks.
“It all depends on North Korea,” Aso said during a morning session of the House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee.
“It’s possible (that Japan may impose) further sanctions if North Korea does not show any sincerity at all” during the working group discussions, Aso said.
Meanwhile, South Korea’s intelligence service has finally declared that, yes, North Korea does have a HEU program:
South Korea’s intelligence agency said Tuesday it believes North Korea is running a clandestine uranium-enriching program, an allegation that has been surfacing as a key source of contention on a nuclear disarmament deal reached last week.
“We believe (the program) exists,” Kim Man-bok, head of the National Intelligence Service, told a parliamentary committee, according to lawmakers who participated in the closed-door meeting.
All the while North Korea has denied any uranium program.
The nice thing about the timeframes is that we’ll know fairly soon – in about seven weeks.
February 23rd, 2007 at 1:30 pm
[…] the horrors of Camp 22, which North Korea dares not open for inspection. Richard Halloran and Richardson do an excellent job of cataloguing North Korea’s statements that clarify just what this […]
February 23rd, 2007 at 6:35 pm
I think you underestimate the mendacity of political critics here in the US and probably abroad as well.
February 23rd, 2007 at 7:10 pm
Political critics (many of whom in my estimation vastly overestimate the ‘deal’ as a betrayal, something simply not supported by the actual agreement itself) are of much less importance than politicians themselves, particularly those in the majority. Cumings et al won’t stop being apologists ever, but if the administration follows its part to the letter until the DPRK reneges, they’ll reap some political capital.
February 24th, 2007 at 6:18 am
I guess I would have to start weighing how much support or not the claims that it was the US who caused the break down in the 1994 agreement in the mid-1990s members of the press gave???
I really don’t have any feel at all right now…I’ll have to think on it.
But, I seem to remember that — before 2002 and the North started acting up again — there was a signicant sized portion of the American media that gave a good bit of play to the idea it was the Newt Gingrich and Republican-controlled Congress that drug its feet on implementing the US steps in a good-faith manner and NK simply did the same.
I seem to remember that before the 2002 show down and what came in the years between then and now, a fair portion of the American press at least considered both governments to have broken the deal…
Not sure though….
This deal seems to have a much more defined and shorter schedule for certain steps to be met. That could make a difference in how much room elements in the press that hate Bush (in a religious fashion) will have to point fingers at his administration (as well as Pyongyang) for breaking the dal.
Time will tell…
February 24th, 2007 at 5:53 pm
Initially (1994-1995) North Korea complained that heavy fuel oil was not delivered on time, but the problem was that the first shipments arrived in large tankers and North Korea had no suitable harbor. Eventually a system of ferrying the oil was worked out, and I think later shipments came more frequently but in smaller amounts. (chronology for the dates above and below, PDF)
From ~1996-1998 there was grumbling from North Korea that the Clinton administration did not lift as many sanctions (did lift them on magnesite trade in Nov/Dec ’94, and a few others in Jan ‘95) as they expected, and neither side moved to normalize as called for in the 1994 agreement. Most of this foot dragging, however, can be attributed to North Korea dragging out (or canceling) related talks and negotiations (e.g., in Mar ’95 over the type of LWR).
North Korea also engaged in a string of provocations that violated the sentiment if not the letter of Section III, part 3 of the Agreed Framework, “The DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.” Some, but not all, include;
1) U.S. helicopter shot down in NK air space (Dec 1994)
2) NK sub found on SK’s East coast with a month-long man hunt (Sep 1996)
3) The 1998 Taepodong 1missile over Japan
4) Various naval skirmishes along the cost
From mid-1999 to 2002, however, the North was (outwardly) on relatively good behavior, with the missile testing moratorium, restructuring of food production and allowing small markets, steps to privatize housing (all since reversed), “working” with Japan on the abduction issue, etc. Things slowed but did not stop when Bush came into office. They even established diplomatic relations with several European nations up until late 2002.
If the U.S. hadn’t pressed on the uranium issue that October, North Korea might have even normalized relations with Japan and reaped the estimated US$10 billion in reparations and aid.
You’ll remember that I was paying very close attention to all this at the time.
February 24th, 2007 at 7:03 pm
What I was talking about was that members of the US press, and I believe members of the US Congress, as well as some think-tank people who aren’t at the Cumings’ level, have said since the late 1990s the US was to blame, or co-equal in blame, for the 1994 agreement not being lived up to before 2002 - before the offical complete break down of it was announced.
If the time-table for solid steps in this new deal has major steps specifically mapped out early and NK doesn’t go through, it might prevent the usual “blame America (the republicans)” habit by some in our society, but it will not give me a heart attack if a significant portion of the influencial press and politicians do blame the Bush administration if this latest deal does not come through.
February 24th, 2007 at 7:05 pm
The old claim was that it was the republican-led Congress who sabatoged Clinton’s deal.
February 24th, 2007 at 7:19 pm
I think it would be fairly easy to counter any argument that the Republican congress foiled implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework; the facts (i.e., North Korean behavior) just won’t bear it out. The exact same goes for the media and/or more obscure leftist think tank types who attempt to judge the actions of the U.S. and North Korea as being moral equivalents in the breakdown of the ‘94 deal.
Your observation about timed steps helping prevent the Bush administration taking the blame for when this deal collapses is exactly why I quickly changed my view of the deal as worthless to good for future political capital. Any future deal, if we get that far, should have similar provisions to insulate the administration from the blame when North Korea inevitably reneges.
February 26th, 2007 at 7:14 pm
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March 1st, 2007 at 9:02 am
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