Two Words: Legacy Mode
by James Na ~ February 15th, 2007. Filed under: America, Engagement, Nuclear Proliferation, Six-Party Talks, U.S.-Korea Relations.It is said human beings are far more motivated by the fear of loss than by the prospect of gain. Indeed, some economists estimate human beings are three to four times more motivated by loss than by gain — which is to say human nature is generally risk-averse.
And that equation exposes what is fundamentally wrong with the latest “agreement” with North Korea. It is all carrots and no stick.
Leaders and elites in dictatorships are especially concerned with preservation of existing power. More goodies are always nice, but they can never compensate for increased danger to the preservation of the status quo, on which the very lives of such leaders and elites depend.
The current agreement between North Korea and the United States — and it is exactly that, the talk of multilateral diplomacy notwithstanding — is one that is entirely about gain. Sure, the gains are “back-loaded,” that is to say, the North will only derive substantial gains as it appears to abide by the terms. On that accord, the agreement is a marginal improvement on the 1994 Agreed Framework signed under President Clinton.
But because the agreement does not specify any loss from the status quo for North Korea, should it breach the terms, it is ultimately flawed. At any time, North Korea can try to “re-negotiate” or “re-interpret” the terms and haggle over the gains with absolutely no fear of a real, painful loss to itself.
In a “do-or-die” situation — and we are rapidly approaching that point with North Korea — any negotiated terms must present a stark choice between gain (significant or moderate, it matters little) or massive losses. The present agreement clearly does not meet that calculus.
Why then would the Bush 43 administration agree to such a thing after all the tough rhetoric, knowing full well that there would be a revolt from the Right? My own view is that the administration is subject to the same forces that led President Clinton to attempt to negotiate — until the very end of his presidency — “the” grand bargain with North Korea. That is, the administration is in full “legacy mode.”
By any objective measure, the president’s legacy is in tatters. “Compassionate” conservatism, whatever that meant, is but a faint memory. Evangelicals have grown disillusioned with any “faith-based initiatives.” The Arab-Israeli conflict is still stalemated with no end in sight. Tax cuts, including abolition of the death tax, will not be permanent. And Iraq is mired in sectarian violence. Aside from the appointments of two conservative judges, a legitimate success from my viewpoint as well as that from my fellow conservatives, the presidency has been a failure.
All these forces have put additional pressure on the administration to lower its expectations and, indeed, demands on North Korea to end its nuclear program. In a way, the administration has decided to cut its losses and make a deal while there is still “something to be salvaged” from the situation. It, too, is apparently subject to the same calculus of loss and gain.
Such desperate gambits rarely, if ever, pay off. Just as Clinton’s feverish “diplomacy” never paid off, but in fact backfired and led to the present predicament, I predict Bush 43’s deal with North Korea will also burden and constrain his successor similarly.
I warned the administration a year ago thusly:
Whether the administration is willing to engage in such a strategy or not, what it must strenuously avoid is a repeat of what the Clinton administration did — to pass down a major international threat that will be substantially more difficult to resolve for its successor.
Sadly, the administration has chosen the easy way out, the path of least resistance. And as with Clinton, someone else will pay the price later.
February 15th, 2007 at 4:31 pm
Oh, and one more thing: as others and I have predicted, CVID is dead.
February 15th, 2007 at 7:47 pm
[…] Two Words: Legacy Mode […]
February 15th, 2007 at 7:53 pm
As the de-arming portion of the deal hasn’t been negotiated yet, I think it’s premature to declare CVID dead.
References back to the 19 September agreement and the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization only reinforce the notion that CVID is in fact alive and well.
February 15th, 2007 at 9:09 pm
Legacy mode? Have you ever heard the saying, “You can’t polish a turd?” And this isn’t any substantial accomplishment to be proud of.
I think the Bush admin did this to put NK on the back burner in everyone’s mind so that it can deal with Iran right now, and follow up with NK later when it reneges. It will also make the US Democratically controlled congress approve the agreement because it is basically like Clintons agreement redeux. Are they going to vote against the agreement since Bush is wrong about everything and a wreckless war-mongering loose cannon? No. Voting against it or critisizing it is the same as criticizing Clintons (and their own) agreement.
Bush knows NK is going to renege. Who doesn’t?
When Iran gets whacked by either the USA or Israel (I’m very strongly guessing Israel, and probably within the next few months, if you use recent and ongoing deployments to the ME and increased rhetoric as a gauge) it may put an enormous amount of pressure on NK to comply with the agreement because backing out would naturally mean that they could be next. Thus enters “The Stick” portion to go with “The carrot,” albeit implied. It would make NK’s noncompliance much more blatant and conspicious, while compelling the other parties of the 6 party talks to more urgently and effectively confront NK this time. (though I doubt NK will comply) It would prove that Clintons’ solution was not a real solution at all, and thus, open the door to more “effective measures” that are currently unpopular and politically unfeasible.
I think NK could have a lot more to loose. The US, along with other countries, could do more than current sanctions are currently doing. I think the USA would wait until after the SK elections so the SK people could have a good chance to mull over the consequences of the Sunshine Policy and long alas the USA would have a friendly and pragmatic partner to work with. The GNP. Bush would have “won the blame game” at home and abroad.
The international community could reinstate sanctions in place now PLUS start intercepting NK ships and inspecting them for contra-band or even blockade the nation. This would be more politically feasible than air-strikes against NK’s nuke facilities. NK couldn’t do a whole lot short of starting a war. A war that they would be blamed for and quickly loose. Considering the lengths KJI is going to to keep himself in power right now, I doubt seriously he would give the USA an excuse to go to war and remove him. And what does Bush have to loose? The approval of the left? Of the world? I don’t think this would happen, but it’s very possible and KJI knows it.
February 15th, 2007 at 11:00 pm
Richardson:
Remember that actions speak louder than words. And the word around town is that the administration will not follow through on the tough rhetoric of the first term, especially since the “pro-stability” folks are back in.
CVID has been dead since the 2004 election. What we see now, I believe, is the crumbling of the shell.
Kevin:
Your theory is too clever by half. Occam’s Razor and all that. One thing one learns working in politics is that politicians rarely have principles. They act on those principles even more rarely.
As my boss often says, “Nothing moves in politics until pushed.” I have a nagging feeling that Bush 43 doesn’t feel all that pushed on the topic of North Korea.
You may be right about one thing. The administration may be “giving in” on North Korea, so it can save political capital for taking on Iran. The only problem with that is the North Korea deal sets up a bad precedent and expectations for Iran too, which might endanger any aggressive plan to deal with the latter.
February 16th, 2007 at 4:32 am
I think maybe I’m attached to my theory half as much as you think, but I do enjoy theorizing, and reading what others think, as well. It’s appropriate for a blog, I guess. I don’t mind being wrong. I’ll try to keep the quality good.
I do think Israel is going to be the one that conducts a massive, but short air-offensive to take out Irans nuke and missile facilities. The USA has too much heat on it right now, and Israel needs to earn it’s keep. It just acquired a bunch of bunker busting bombs from the US and $200MM worth of JP-8 jet fuel. Hell… the US may even publicly say something to the effect of “Israel over-reacted and we believe in diplomacy!” haha
I think this will still have a similar effect on NK as if the US did it since the USA will have coordinated on and postured for it.
The US will be in a better position to deal with NK later when the GNP is in power. In the mean time, it has to win the blame game when NK reneges.
February 16th, 2007 at 4:17 pm
It is and has always been my opinion that CVID would never happen. This isn’t to say that I am against holding talks to achieve that goal–we need to have something to talk about on at the table.
I think people in the US get really worked up over WMD so we forget about DPRK’s formidable conventional forces. KJI has never been interested in talking about reducing conventional military. If he can’t even talk about pulling back his artilleries, I can’t understand how we can expect him to shelve his nukes. Japan is willing to give a lot of money to North Korea if KJI would just give 4-5 Japanese nationals over to them. He won’t do even that—how can we expect him to give over the weapon which he has publically stated, gives him parity with United States? KJI has pretty much stated to his serfs that all the suffering and death that North Koreans endured was to “stand up” against the imperialists. To give up his nuke would anger the few crazy military first people. For KJI to give up the nuke would be tantamount to him telling his people that he has absolutely no reason to lead them–because so far, his justification for rule is to stand up against America.
I obsess over Daily NK. I think it’s easy to disregard what we read there because it’s run by defectors with political motives. But I believe them 100% when they say that the public sentiment in NK is changing. If DPRK’s most loyal soldiers are posted on the Chinese border, and they are all breaking smuggling rules, then we know KJI is in real trouble. KJI security officers all watch South Korean dramas. He is starting to crackdown on people holding guns. 2008 we are going to be seeing a lot of boisterous happy Chinese people—it will be inevitable that NK people will see this.
KJI’s greatest enemy isn’t USA, it’s his people from waking up from their slumber. Whether we give them a measly 50,000 tons of heavy oil or letting KJI buy some luxury items from his private bank in Macao won’t change the really important variables in the equations–>existence of South Korea and North Korea’s information blockade falling apart.
I’m not sure whether what W Bush is doing is right or wrong. But I can’t say it’s dumb, because anything that wastes time with KJI is in our favor. We need to yabber long enough that KJI thinks there is some hope. I don’t think we should even make it appear that we are trying to topple over KJI, because the relevant people will do that.
We just need to sit and wait and hope that hanryu power beats juche power.
February 16th, 2007 at 4:31 pm
one more thing, I am convinced that KJI is not interested in a “Grand Deal”. If we can’t agree on the small stuff, what makes anyone think we can agree on the big stuff? If we have full unfettered rights to inspect anywhere in NK (which is what CVID would entail) then we would also have a moral right to inspect death camps. This is a hopeless thing to dream.
February 16th, 2007 at 5:39 pm
I don’t think he can take the ‘grand’ deal;
http://www.dprkstudies.org/2006/07/06/north-koreas-strategic-disengagement-explained/
February 16th, 2007 at 7:13 pm
I agree. I think Kim Jong-il’s domestic constraints are such that he cannot, even if he were willing, make a genuine grand bargain.
I am afraid it’s regime change or the status quo. I find the status quo unacceptable, and so did the Bush administration rhetorically. Now we know it was just that — rhetoric — for the administration.
February 16th, 2007 at 7:43 pm
I think the Bush admin also knows Kim Jong-il will never take the larger deal (most in the center and right seem to), and are willing to see North Korea get the equivalent of 50k tons of fuel oil to prove it to critics.
The 950k will never happen - remember, the rest of the deal on which it (and everything else) is dependent hasn’t even been reached yet. All very premature be judging the agreement that isn’t, yet.
Kim Jong-il is going to hand the administration justification (for the doubters) for going for strangulation.
February 18th, 2007 at 9:55 am
I agree with those above who have said that Kim Jong Il is apparently limited in what he can take. There are certain to be factions in his government that do not want to see certain steps taken because they could threaten the long-term viability of the DPRK, moreso than Kim himself; most likely they are thinking beyond him.
I agree that the Bush admin is in ‘legacy mode’ and that this agreement appears to leave dealings with NK out of his legacy. It pushes the issue of Asian security back, though it’s no secret that Mr Abe in Japan intends to pursue closer security relations with the US. Perhaps there is a wait-and-see going on; a stronger Japan could push more regional strength on the DPRK, and we might see this in a few years, especially should Mr Abe be successful with his constitutional reforms.
February 18th, 2007 at 9:32 pm
When do you see this happen? The administration doesn’t have any spare time left. By the presidential compaign season (which is about six months from now), the administration will be completely lameduck.
Rats are abandoning ship. You can get a job with the administration for the asking nowadays (although — as one colleague pointed out to me — there are people who make a good career out of a series of such jobs).
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