Giving Kim Jong-il Enough Rope
by Richardson ~ February 15th, 2007. Filed under: Diplomacy, Engagement, Nuclear Proliferation, Six-Party Talks. 
At first I was also a bit angry about the deal, but after reading the fine print and some consideration, I think it could be an excellent move for the U.S., putting me at odds with Joshua and James on this issue. This deal doesn’t’ have the potential as a genuine “first step” to denuclearizing the peninsula through diplomacy that the administration touts, but neither is the betrayal or enabling mistake critics claim it is.
First keep in mind that this deal is not about achieving all our goals, it’s a step to that, so I don’t pin that larger responsibility on this deal. The deal has two stages; stage one is a small risk, and stage two will never happen, I’m betting. The agreement that delivers the goods, gets the nukes, and secures normalized realizations simply has not been negotiated or written yet, meaning that any comparisons to the 1994 Agreed Framework are premature.
For that reason I think criticizing this deal because it lacks a “stick” element should North Korea renege is also premature; the second stage of the deal may or may not contain that.
For shutting down Yongbyon, North Korea gets 50,000 tons of fuel oil. That’s a write off as they can easily restart the facility. And the U.S. will ease the banking sanctions - so what? Those can be back in force literally faster than Yongbyon can be restarted.
But to get the additional 950,000 tons of fuel oil, North Korea must make a full disclosure of all nuclear programs and materials; that means they have to come clean about the uranium program, something I don’t think they will do. I think that will be a breaking point, if something else doesn’t do it sooner.
What are North Korea’s reporting responsibilities? From the 13 February agreement (DOC), Part II, Section 2:
The DPRK will discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods, that would be abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement. (emphasis added)
A key phrase here is, “as described in the Joint Statement,” which refers to the 19 September 2005 agreement (DOC). While neither document mentions “uranium,” both refer to “nuclear programs,” plural. While not defined further, to everyone but North Korea that means the platinum program and the uranium program.
The North Koreans, however, could claim, for example, that it means their pre-1994 plutonium program and their post-2002 plutonium program – thus “programs” – and continue to deny the existence of a uranium program. Another way to pry into the uranium issues is this from Section 1 of the 19 September agreement:
The 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be observed and implemented.
The 1992 Joint Declaration (DOC) forbids all nuclear weapons, and Section 3 states:
The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.
The reference to uranium is, as with the 1994 Agreed Framework (PDF), implicit rather than explicit, but it is there.
In making this deal, the Bush administration has greatly eased up on North Korea, and to many that is a betrayal. In fact, he’s done what his critics on the left have asked for by dealing “diplomatically” with North Korea. Before they blamed Bush for killing the Agreed Framework (there was not “proof” – until Pakistan came forward). They blamed Bush for killing the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement due to the banking sanctions, etc. Always Bush’s fault.
When this deal is broken by North Korea, what will those critics say? They’ll have to blame Kim Jong-il rather than Bush. Any thinking person had of course already reached that conclusion, but this will also make those in La-La Land get it, at least some of it.
The result will be that the U.S. – the Bush administration probably, but perhaps whoever follows – will have vastly more political capital to use in a strangulation policy.
That’s why, after thinking on it, I think the Bush administration has not thrown the regime a lifeline, but given Kim Jong-il exactly enough rope to form the hangman’s noose and get it around his neck. We pull the lever after he reneges. Happ birthday indeed.
February 15th, 2007 at 8:24 pm
[…] A not quite as unhappy take in DPRK Studies. Filed under: North Korea | 7:17 […]
February 15th, 2007 at 8:54 pm
I think you’ve hit the nail on the head. As I looked over the statement, that clause about all nuclear programs (plural) stuck out as an irreconcilable point of contention. As long as the United States insists an HEU program exists and the North denies it, this deal cannot move forward. Of course whether the Pygmy’s failure to comply will give Bush any leverage over our regional ‘partners’ in the ROK and PRC is questionable. So far both have insisted the US provide ‘material’ evidence of the uranium program and have not accepted the A.Q. Khan/Pakistan admission as conclusive. North Korean intransigence will give the administration more domestic capital but without the cooperation of those two countries any further attempts to pressure NK will be difficult.
February 15th, 2007 at 9:19 pm
The other parties – China, South Korea, and Russia, since Japan is on board – would have to call Musharraf a liar if they decided that North Korea’s claims that Pakistan lied about the uranium program assistance are even semi-credible. I’m sure the U.S. can provide evidence that will satisfy the other participants of the Six-Party Talks.
I’m sure China will balk no matter what, but I think the pendulum of South Korean opinion is starting to come back from the far-left, finally.
Russia will of course oppose whatever the U.S. wants, but Russia isn’t really that relevant anymore since they don’t support the regime materially.
February 15th, 2007 at 9:22 pm
Unfortunately, the kind of DPRK apologist you sometimes debate and I like to fisk will never blame Kim Jong Il. Kim Jong Il could pitch babies into a wood chipper right before John Feffer’s beady eyes; Feffer would wipe off his coke-bottle glasses and go to work constructing some complex justification for Kim Jong Il defending his small nation’s sovereignty from neocon bullies (abetted, one supposes, by the babies). It will always be our fault, no matter how much we accomodate. We’ve pretty much exhausted the cosmetic value these talks might have had.
Frankly, I think James nailed it. Bush is trying to please people who can’t do anything but despise and undermine him.
February 15th, 2007 at 9:33 pm
Yes, Cumings, Feffer, Beal and the like will always be that way. But the left in congress will find much less wiggle room, I think.
At the cost of the Right? I doubt it. To be sure there is some element of, “see, we got a deal, too!” But, again, the actual deal has not been negotiated or agreed to yet.
That’s the beauty of it; North Korea can completely blow the deal without it ever having been actually made, and Bush will still get credit for having taken the “first step,” while gaining political capital to be spent on strangulation. After this almost-deal fails, isolating North Korea will, I hope, be revived.
February 15th, 2007 at 11:03 pm
I hope you’re right Richardson.
February 16th, 2007 at 1:41 am
[…] Richardson is far more reasonable in his appraisal. […]
February 18th, 2007 at 9:26 am
I came across several (well, if the shoe fits, then …) articles yesterday:
1. Hamas and North Korea: Administration has chosen to pretend that in failing it has succeeded
By Caroline B. Glick
2. Japan faces isolation over North Korea
February 19th, 2007 at 7:18 pm
This time is different. North Korea will disarm due to the fact that the US had the upper hand in the negotiations. We froze Kim Jong-il’s assets and embargoed his luxury items. Kim Jong-il is North Korea.
February 19th, 2007 at 7:50 pm
Thanks for the laugh.
February 20th, 2007 at 9:30 pm
[…] Comments • North Korea in the News 3 Gerry, Richardson, Antti • Giving Kim Jong-il Enough Rope 8 Richardson, Daily Jihadi, Michael Sheehan […] • Two Words: Legacy […]
February 21st, 2007 at 2:10 am
Relaxing money laundering sanctions even for a short period without addressing what those sanctions were specifically targeting (NK’s illegal activites abroad to generate hard currency) is something that should be avoided unless there is a darn good reason.
If there was real hope NK would follow through with disarming its nuke stuff, I could stomach a trade off, but it would need to be pretty much a sure thing that NK would follow through -
so, I can’t see anything in the deal that justifies easing these banking sanctions.
I can live with the small amount of fuel oil sent if it is not followed by more without compliance, and that is one of the problems with the deal:
I’ve been saying all along that the US should not sit down 1-on-1 with Korea in part because when you enter negociations - there is a drive to “get things done” - and the result can be crappy deals like this one and the 1994 deal. And this one could function like that deal - if the administration in the White House when it comes time to give further aid to NK decides it will do so “one last time” (again) to see if Pyongyang will comply.
And we have already seen before that pundits besides the likes of Cumings will point the finger at the US no matter what - because they believe “something can be done” and the US is more likely to bend than NK, so they put pressure on the US to “do something” by blaming the US for the failures - thus encouraging it to find the magical solution to the problem - which translates into “listening to” NK - which translates into giving into Pyongyang.
We have already seen hints of the momentum this deal is going to generate in North Korea’s favor:
South Korea’s progressives and others have viewed the “deal” as a justification for the Sunshine Policy and things like pushing for a 2nd summit.
Others will follow in the cutting of deals with NK here and there.
It took the US a long time to get China to squeeze NK with things like the banking sanctions, and now they will believe we have reversed course and they can freely help NK as they wish - or something close to that.
That was why one of the keys to me of any new deal we cut were clear cut guidlines about what China and South Korea and others would do if the deal fell through.
I haven’t read the deal, but I haven’t heard anything that makes me believe we have gotten such an assurance from the other nations involved.
I saw Tony Snow say that breaking this end-loaded deal would be upsetting to China (and SK), because the promise was to them as well.
I don’t buy it.
If there aren’t a series of penalities spelled out, China and South Korea (and any others) will find a way to say it isn’t clear who broke the deal or that the US broke the deal or that negociations simply need to be tried again —- and they will let NK off the hook –
because deal or no deal —- their primary motivation is, was, and will continue to be preventing a North Korean collapse.
The only thing I’ve heard that makes me feel remotely positive about this deal was Bill Kristol saying on Sunday that he could live with it if it turned out it was just a way to get North Korea off the agenda long enough to make some kind of big push (sanctions primarily) on Iran.
February 21st, 2007 at 2:22 am
Also, if this deal had been cut early last you, we might have been able to guess that the sanctions were really hurting the regime, and their coming to the table and signing a new deal (however bad) was a justification of the use of sanctions —– meaning it could convince important people that sanctions do work - so it would be easier to put them into effect next time.
However, the deal came after NK shot off an ICBM and tested a nuclear weapon, and I agree with Bolten and Newt Gingrich and others that the message being sent to Pyongyang and other nations is that if they hold out long enough, and put enough pressure on the US and global/regional community, they will be rewarded —- and with little requirements on their end.
February 21st, 2007 at 10:37 am
There is nothing in the deal that says the sanctions will be eased or lifted; only discussed – it’s all contingent on the progress of implementing 2005 Joint Agreement (see below).
I don’t think this deal is meant to influence those types; it will gain the president political capital with Congress, however. Particularly when North Korea does not comply. If on the off chance that North Korea *does* comply, IAEA inspectors will be all over the place, and NK will have to give up the HEU program. Yeah, they’re going to renege.
That’s only one side of the coin; yesterday Korea’s intel service announced that North Korea does, in their late estimation, have a HEU program. That is setting the stage for CVID, which will make North Korea renege on the deal.
That in turn will be a crushing – close to final – blow for the support base of Sunshine Policy fanatics. The fanatics themselves will never give it up, but their support will finally wither.
That stage of the deal hasn’t been negotiated yet, so too soon to criticize it.
Here are the main parts (via State);
So, in the first 60 days, talks will be initiated but that in no way means financial sanctions will be dropped or that anything else will be given to North Korea. In that same 60 days North Korea must shut down the Yongbyon reactor, disclose “all its nuclear programs,” and “invite” (but that does not say “let in”) IAEA inspectors.
North Korea may get 50k tons of fuel oil, but they aren’t going to get anything else for nothing.
If (when) they back out, Bush will get political capital to spend on strangulation, and Sunshine Policy proponents in the south will lose their support base, which has been steadily eroding since the July missile tests and October nuclear test.
Unless U.S. negotiations agree to something stupid in following talks, this is a win-win for the U.S.
February 21st, 2007 at 10:55 am
Good, informative follow up.
We’ll have to wait and see. I feel good that the bank accounts are not supposed to be unfrozen early on. We’ll see if it works out that way.
One key factor on what I wrote before is the 2 presidential elections coming up in the US and SK. The GNP victory which seems likely will alter how much play NK can get out of the deal. I am not completely convinced the GNP will in fact follow through with its anti-Sunshine mindset. I can remember back to 1997-98 when even conservatives were saying NK needed to be propped up because the collapse of the Asian Tiger Economies and exchange rate crisis made them re-think big time what unification after collapse might look like.
But, my bet is that the GNP will alter things a good bit. I just wonder what they will do if NK lurches toward collapse again?
The US election picture is even more up in the air. Rumsfeld is gone and the Bush team is lost at sea. Nobody can predict where US Korea policy is going to go - on either the North or South.
We also have no idea yet which party has the better chance of winning the White House. We don’t even have a solid idea of who will win the primaries. With the press stoking Obama as much as they possibly can, Hillary’s lock on the nomination is in doubt.
On the republican side, after hearing Gingrich is going to get in the race, and doing some quick googles on what he has said about Korea policy (both North and South), I think I might have a horse to root for. (I haven’t found what he thinks about the US-SK alliance yet, but I did put a query in at his website).
February 21st, 2007 at 11:14 am
In July, Gingrich suggested bombing the launch pad before North Korea could launch it’s missiles (as did William Perry, of the 1999 Perry Report). Great rhetoric, but it would have been incredibly stupid to actually do.
February 21st, 2007 at 11:44 am
Gingrich is a brilliant man. He was one of the earliest advocates of military transformation (not the technology kind, but the Martin van Creveld-ian doctrinal kind) among politicians. But he does not appear to know much about Korea.
And therein lies the perennial rub — East Asia is something of a backwater for political aspirants in the U.S. despite the importance of China and Japan.
There are few, if any, who speak Mandarin Chinese or Japanese, let alone Korean in the political class. There are some in the policy community, of course, but not nearly as many as European language speakers.
February 21st, 2007 at 2:47 pm
I always question when I hear people of that high a position or influence saying use military force on North Korea. I am a bit of a stone head when it comes to the idea Clinton was just about to pull the trigger back in 1993-94. I believe for the most part, it is a negociation strategy.
I thought the same thing when I heard Sen. Sam Nunn saying back just before Iraq War I that if Hussein used WMDs, all American options for response were on the table including tactical nukes. A good bit after the war (I think years), I happened to catch Nunn talking about those statements, and he said they were just bluster to bluff the regime into not using the WMDs.
I’m liking the idea of Gingrich running for a couple of reason. One of which is that he has the intelligence and personality to analyze things, formulate a plan, and go about seeking seriously to achieve it.
Whether he knows about Korea or not is a serious consideration, but if he turns his attention to it, I believe he would probably deal with it better than either Clinton or Bush.
I also want to see Gingrich get the rep nomination to force American society into a prolonged debate about the nature of what the US means to itself and to the future of not only our state but regions we are heavily invested in - like NE Asia and Europe and the Middle East.
If Gingrich and Hillary are the two rallying points, it will be very ugly to watch but I believe probably necessary. We need to have a big, public soul searching with both sides fully engaged in the debate if we are going to hammer out what the first 50 years of the 21st century are going to mean for the US.
The post-Cold War lethargy needs to be snuffed out now.
I can honestly take it either way….
If Gingrich’s side were to win, I could live with a more pro-active US taking on all contenders - both ally and enemy alike - striving to thwart both those who want to damage us physically as well as those who seek to undermine us rhetorically or ideologically or pseudo-ideologically.
If a Howard Dean type won, I’d wash my hands of the whole thing and concentrate on keeping my hard here in semi-rural Georgia green and my summer gardens producing some tasty produce tell people who might suddenly change course if something like another 9/11 happens that they can kiss my foot.
I can live with either an active or isolationist US.
February 21st, 2007 at 2:51 pm
keeping my hard = keeping my yard green
February 23rd, 2007 at 11:05 am
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September 16th, 2007 at 8:36 am
[…] has proliferated nuclear technology severe consequences should be enacted. Hasn’t the US given Kim Jong-il enough rope to hang himself with? If this doesn’t justify a naval blockade of North Korea and […]