A scathing condemnation from the National Review, “we have already been bested,” while the Financial Times takes a more optimistic but still cautious wait-and-see approach, noting that the deal is, “still tentative and fragile.”

The Chosun Ilbo notes that this time around South Korea will bear much more of the financial burden, as Japan is out of the game until the abduction issue is solved, and the Joongang Ilbo laments that the, “nuclear weapons currently in the North’s possession were not even mentioned in the negotiations.”

Finally, the Korea Times editorial staff shows an uncharacteristic fundamental misunderstanding of the situation by praising the deal as,” an action program to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs,” and that, “Washington holds the key to dissolving tension caused by the Stalinist regime on the northern half of the Korean Peninsula.” In reality North Korea controls North Korea’s actions, not Washington – but I’ll stop editorializing.

National Review: Don’t Trust North Korea

North Korea’s chief arms negotiator, Kim Kye Gwan, is known as “the Smiling Assassin.” Do you suppose the North Koreans use similar grudgingly respectful terms to describe their American counterparts? Somehow I doubt it. Check out the terms of the latest agreement with North Korea.

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The terms sound suspiciously like the Clinton-era Agreed Framework… Proponents of the current approach observe that the 1994 agreement only sought to freeze North Korea’s nuclear program, not dismantle it.

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Simply making a deal with North Korea guarantees nothing. For example, the Agreed Framework provided the cover for North Korea to secretly begin to develop its nuclear capability. By 2002 it was clear that the DPRK was not adhering to the spirit of the bargain. Pyongyang took umbrage when Washington accused the regime of illegally processing uranium — while also saying they had a right to nuclear weapons and blaming us for forcing them to pursue the program. They pulled out of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and kicked out the verification teams.

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A deal was reportedly reached on September 19, 2005, in the joint statement ending the fourth round of talks. North Korea agreed to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

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A year later, on October 9, 2006, North Korea tested a nuclear weapon. This brought about diplomatic movement, but not the kind the DPRK wanted. Four days after the test the president signed the North Korea Nonproliferation Act, which allowed the U.S. to punish foreigners trading in nuclear and missile technology with North Korea. More significantly, on October 14 the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1718, which condemned the North Korean nuclear test in very strong language and imposed unprecedented financial sanctions. The resolution called on North Korea to abandon its nuclear and missile programs, and gave members states the authority to intercept suspected shipments of banned technology heading for the DPRK.

This was the high point in constructing the legal and diplomatic case for taking strong counter-proliferation actions against the regime. Even the EU signed on to the sanctions. One might have expected the United States to be stopping and searching North Korean and other ships suspected of carrying contraband, in order to ramp up pressure on the regime and demonstrate our resolve. We might also have used this leverage to force progress on other issues such as North Korea’s missile program, as well as complicity in narcotics trade, counterfeiting, money laundering, and the abduction of Japanese nationals.

But instead all we sought to do was “force North Korea back to the negotiating table.” This is ironic because that is exactly where they want to be. So long as they are negotiating they know they are safe. And they have long cultivated the notion among our diplomats that simply getting them to agree to talk represents a victory for our side; it must amuse them to see us high-fiving when they “give in.”

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It will be interesting to see if this deal lasts any longer than the 2005 agreement; or does as much damage as the 1994 framework. Regardless, we have already been bested. Our failure to follow up on the momentum we acquired in the wake of the North Korean nuclear test was a strategic blunder. We have lost sight of the fact that the only way substantive and permanent change will come to the Korean peninsula is with the end of Kim Jong Il’s regime. Any agreement we reach with Pyongyang only serves to push that date further into the future. The “Assassin” certainly has a lot to smile about.

Financial Times: From the axis of evil to a grand bargain

Sceptics – and there are plenty of those in the US and Japan – will point out that this is not the first time that North Korea has reached such an agreement.

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But everything changed last October after North Korea detonated its first nuclear device, giving a new urgency to the faltering talks.

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At the core of yesterday’s multilateral deal is a bilateral “grand bargain” between the US and North Korea, brokered by China. All those tonnes of heavy fuel oil are not half as important as talks between Washington and Pyongyang aimed at “moving towards full diplomatic relations”, US moves to stop designating North Korea as a “state sponsor of terrorism” and the intention to negotiate separately a permanent peace on the Korean peninsula

This encouraging deal – while still tentative and fragile – is constructed to maintain momentum, lock in multilateral pressure, and provide regular rewards for the progressive abandonment of each and every phase of North Korea’s nuclear programme.

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Some big questions remain. A key difference from the Agreed Framework negotiated by the Clinton administration in 1994 – so derided by the first-term Bush team – is that Pyongyang now has the bomb. From now on, each stage of negotiations is going to get even tougher. Second, if the US can treat with North Korea, which has the bomb, can it reach a grand bargain with Iran, which (so far) has not? Third, was it ultimately China that persuaded North Korea to strike a deal, and can Beijing therefore use its growing influence to resolve other international problems? Above all, does Kim Jong-il, the “Dear Leader”, really intend to implement the outline agreement that his representatives have accepted in Beijing? Only if he does will yesterday be remembered as a milestone in the struggle against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Chosun Ilbo: Same Old Deal, Higher Price

The United States is seeking a shut down of North Korea’s nuclear facilities, while the communist country merely wants to halt operations. But once North Korea makes up its mind, there is no way of stopping Pyongyang from restarting its nuclear facilities. Ultimately, should a final agreement be reached at the next round of six-party talks, it would be the same as the 1994 Geneva Agreement where North Korea freezes its nuclear program in exchange for alternative energy supplies from the international community.

The only difference this time is the fact that Korea should bear a much higher portion of the burden. The Geneva Agreement required Korea to supply 70 percent of the heavy oil and Japan 30 percent. But already during this round of talks, Tokyo has drawn a clear line, saying there will be no energy aid unless North Korea resolves the issue of abducted Japanese citizens.

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During six-party talks in September of 2005, South Korea had promised to supply 2 million kilowatts of electricity to the North. That’s why South Korea stands to bear almost the entire $150 million burden to supply North Korea with 500,000 tons of heavy oil each year, while other members of the dialogue simply sign the agreement and take a step back.

Closing down North Korea’s nuclear facilities fulfills Washington’s top priority of halting the spread of nuclear weapons. From South Korea’s perspective, in order to satisfy its top priority of keeping the Korean peninsula nuclear free, additional steps are needed to completely and irreversibly scrap both plutonium and uranium facilities and eliminate already produced nuclear weapons and all nuclear materials that could be used to make weapons. Ultimately, several more rounds of talks are needed and there is no way of telling how much more of a burden South Korea may have to shoulder.

Joongang Ilbo: Talks skirted existing arms

The agreement takes on added meaning because the North has 60 days to disable its nuclear facilities, and incentives will be given out on a piecemeal basis that coincides with the North’s level of compliance with the terms of the agreement.

This ensures that implementation will be more effective.

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Nevertheless, there are also some shortcomings. First, the basic framework for the current agreement repeats the framework of the 1994 agreement.
What is even more problematic is that nuclear weapons currently in the North’s possession were not even mentioned in the negotiations.

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If we continue to depend on negotiations that use incentives to the North as leverage for freezing future nuclear activities, there is a chance that the North will get away with the possession of nuclear weapons. The government needs to get tough on this issue, and in future negotiations needs to link the North’s current nuclear arsenal to future aid.

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Above all, the agreement of the Korean people must be obtained in coming up with the necessary financial means. We have to avoid arrogant suggestions, such as the one made by the former unification minister, who suggested providing millions of kilowatts of electricity to the North in exchange for getting a deal done.

Korea Times: Keep This Deal Alive

It’s a relief that the six countries have finally agreed on an action program to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs… It is important for all participants to keep the schedule and pose no new obstacles for its smooth implementation. Experiences show that diplomatic agreement is less than half of the successful solution.

The U.S. administration’s policy change was the decisive factor in turning what once appeared a hopeless confrontation into a diplomatic solution. This reconfirms what we have maintained all along - Washington holds the key to dissolving tension caused by the Stalinist regime on the northern half of the Korean Peninsula. The positive U.S. position shift should continue until Pyongyang shuts down and disables all its nuclear facilities. The two sides are on the threshold of that long and patient process.

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Hardliners could complain that the North’s resolve to dismantle nuclear weapons programs completely, verifiably and irrevocably appears weak compared with far clearer specification of rewards. It is true the North’s track records justify such skepticism. However, that should be no reason for the hawks to call for President Bush to veto this long-awaited deal.

The foreign ministers of the six countries should see to it there is no gap between words and deeds by any of the parties involved, especially Pyongyang. Then, working-group officials should follow up with the most detailed action-for-action schedule.

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Most important is North Korea’s determination to abide by the accord. The isolationist regime is in dire need of energy assistance to keep its impoverished economy afloat. Pyongyang should prove it is a reliable dialogue partner by faithfully adhering to every small detail. Only by doing so, can it move toward the next stage of seeking greater energy and economic assistance in return for abandoning all nuclear programs and existing atomic weapons if there are any.

How North Korea behaves in the wake of the deal will be critical in getting the U.S. security and diplomatic recognition Pyongyang has long sought. It is good to hear South Korea has played an important part in inducing the initialstage disarmament and rewards. We hope this would also serve to move the inter-Korean relationship from a unilateral one to a more reciprocal nature.