Clinton’s North Korea Legacy is Now

by Richardson ~ February 13th, 2007. Filed under: Diplomacy, History, Nuclear Proliferation, Six-Party Talks, WMD.

Digg this postBill Clinton was president in 1994 when the Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North Korea (PDF) was concluded. It was in all likelihood the best deal Clinton (actually Carter) or anyone else could get at the time, and I do not fault him for it. It probably averted a second Korean War.

No, Clinton’s unforgivable transgression with North Korea was ignoring repeated warnings from the intelligence community in 1997, 1998, and a formal warning in March 1999, that North Korea likely was pursing a secret – and illegal per the 1994 agreement – uranium program with help from Pakistan. This is no longer a question; Pakistan formally admitted that its top nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, did indeed supply both information and materials for North Korea’s uranium program.

Neither Clinton nor Bush could control how North Korea would react to confrontation. The key difference is that Bush did confront North Korea, in October 2002. At the time North Korea had concluded diplomatic relations with several nations, and was well on the way to doing so with the U.S., Japan, and South Korea – all based on the false presumption that the 1994 Agreed Framework being upheld in good faith by North Korea.

However, if Clinton had done his job as Commander in Chief and confronted North Korea in 1999 – when he was again warned by the IC – it is highly unlikely that a) the June 2000 summit between Kim Jong-il and Kim Dae-jung would ever have taken place, b) that the Sunshine Policy would have survived, c) that popular opinion in South Korea would have turned so anti-American or pro-North Korea, or d) that Roh Moo-hyun would have been elected to continue to undermine U.S. regional policy, put regional stability at risk, and fan anti-Americanism.

While the current deal is nothing to be proud of (see updates at OFK, this at the Nomad’s, and this at ROK Drop), it is directly related to Clinton’s inaction in the late 1990s.

All of that is Bill Clinton’s North Korea legacy. Oh, and this, too;

19 Responses to Clinton’s North Korea Legacy is Now

  1. iheartblueballs

    Classic. I can understand laying the 94 abortion on Bill’s plate. He deserves it. But to say that this complete pile of shit deal is ALSO Clinton’s fault…dear God man, you’ve got the worst case of Clinton-derangement syndrome I’ve seen in years. Is Christopher Hill going to pull off a mask to reveal Slick Willy? Hilarious man. Funnier than anything you’ve ever written.

    So if this deal succeeds, are you going to post how Clinton should get all the credit?

    Seriously. Bone up and lay some responsibility on Bush’s doorstep for once. He’s the decider, you know. He decided to endorse this horseshit, not Clinton or Richardson or Albright. They’re not in the loop in case you haven’t checked up on the makeup of our current government. I realize it’ll be a shock to the system to acknowledge Bush may have [edit], but it’ll help you sleep at night.

    [edit] You on the other hand, can’t stop blaming Clinton for everything from your stubbed toe to Iraq. Wake up mate, you’re embarrassing.

  2. Richardson

    So if this deal succeeds, are you going to post how Clinton should get all the credit?

    Yeah, sorry, it’s too late for that; Clinton gets credit for the freeze from 1994 to (maybe) 1997. After that he gets his due for the hole he dug, the one we’re in right now. Acting even as late as 2000 would have made a huge difference in the regional strategic landscape. Inaction, and the consequences, is his legacy.

    Seriously. Bone up and lay some responsibility on Bush’s doorstep for once. He’s the decider, you know.

    I’ve been critical of many of Bush’s policies, concerning North Korea, Iraq, etc. I’ve already said that this one is worthless, as is any deal while Kim Jong-il is in power ultimately is. If you’re not aware of that, read up and cure your ignorance before you speak up. Thanks, and good luck with that.

  3. Christian A. Beltram

    Has Clinton commented on his failure to top the NrthKoreans from develoin nuclear weapons? I would like to know because he must feel that the North Koreas took him or a rie when they promised not to develop those weapons in 1994.

  4. Richardson

    Clinton is extremely defensive about his record. In a Fox News interview with Chris Wallace about his administration’s failure to apprehend Bin Laden, Clinton sort of went off the deep end and responded like an upset adolescent to legitimate questions. I’ve not seen any direct questions put to him on the specific failures I note above, but would expect a similar knee-jerk denial of any responsibility.

    Again, I don’t fault him from 1994 to about 1997, but after that he allowed this situation to fester, knowing that someone else would have to deal with it or not.

  5. virtual wonderer

    You seriously cannot blame Bill Clinton for not having the “wisdom” to see that Sunshine policy meant a surge in anti-american sentiment in South Korea. Back during Kim Dae Jung administration, I heard exactly zero voices from anyone saying that Bill Clinton needs a firmer stance on DPRK, because sunshine policy would lead to anti-american sentiment in South Korea. That’s like saying that Americans should have forseen that Antonio Ohno’s victory would lead to anti-american sentiment even before the race begun. There was also no way in heck we could have forseen that a traffic accident can grow to become a political farce.

    When it comes to DPRK, I can’t really blame either Clinton or Bush simply because they have one of the most difficult decision a human must make. It’s a decision where the only options are always bad, and the trully bad decision leads to nuclear holocaust.

    Honestly, Bill Clinton really don’t have much legacy far as South Korean policy is concerned. 1994 agreement doesn’t really leave a lot of “legacy” when that policy was reversed in 2000. We will soon forget what Clinton did in the far east. In fact, I forgot it already.

  6. Richardson

    You seriously cannot blame Bill Clinton for not having the “wisdom” to see that Sunshine policy meant a surge in anti-american sentiment in South Korea.

    I don’t think there’s anything in what I wrote to suggest that. But I’m - rightfully – blaming him for not acting when he should have.

    It was going to be ugly facing North Korea’s transgression no matter who did it. But Clinton ignored it while Bush did not.

    And yes, Clinton’s failure to act in or before 1999 really did lead to the historic turn in South Korean public opinion. That may not be a popular notion to some, but it’s still there. But then again, I haven’t forgotten what Clinton did in Asia, or more importantly, what he failed to do.

  7. OneFreeKorea » Bush’s Korea Sellout Rolls On

    [...] every bit as bad as the Agreed Framework.  Indeed, as Richardson notes, the Clinton Administration could be forgiven for not knowing what pathological liars the North Koreans were in 1994 (but not by 1997).  Bush [...]

  8. virtual wonderer

    hmm. I don’t think you are necessarily wrong. I just am not convince you are right. I mean, Clinton might have wasted a lot of money on nothing. Might even have financed crazy sh17 KJI was up to. But I am still not convinced what he did was wrong.

    I have to consider that during Clinton administration, he effectively slowed down NK’s plutonium weapons research—which was why KJI continued on with his uranium research. The story that was generated by the media after KJI popped the bomb seems that the bomb was a plutonium bomb. I don’t know if this is true or not, but if it is true, the case for Clinton’s policy is a lot stronger. I think once KJI croaks, whatever “legacy” Clinton or Bush leaves behind will hinge on whether that bomb was plutonium based. Regardless of whether it was plutonium based or uranium based, the political party who “guessed” wrong will be remain no doubt adamantly self-righteous that they made the “correct” decision with the given data at the time.

    I can understand why the right wingers get emotional about rewarding KJI, but I am not convinced that what Clinton did was stupid. I am looking at the picture of Albright holding hands with KJI. I remember seeing pictures of republican dignitaries shaking hands with terror sponsors. I just don’t think we have much choice in a lot of these matters whether it’s republican lead or democrat lead.

  9. Richardson

    The problem with suggesting that Clinton’s deal kept all plutonium under control is that it didn’t; North Korea sabotaged the facilities making it impossible for IAEA scientists to determine how much plutonium had been reprocessed. It still isn’t known how much they had before 1994. Old intel estimates (pre-Bush) guessed that North Korea had 1-2 nukes in 1998. So the plutonium bomb test (it was) does not mean that the plutonium was processed from the stockpiles raided after 2002. Meaning that a plutonium bomb test does nothing to bolster Clinton’s position.

    Uranium was also a natural choice for North Korea, although technically much more difficult to enrich – enter Pakistan. Plus, it is much easier to hide uranium enrichment as compared to plutonium enrichment. See;

    http://www.dprkstudies.org/2006/02/15/dprk-nuclear-background/

    The problem with Albright in the DPRK in 2000 is that the IC had warned Clinton of the illegal nuke program just the year before.

    Again, my problem with Clinton isn’t the 1994 deal, but ignoring the uranium problem afterwards. If Bush had done the same thing and we had a uranium bomb test, I’d lay that with both, but more with Bush. But that’s not what happened.

  10. OneFreeKorea » Escape from Munich

    [...] regard:  this deal is every bit as bad as the Agreed Framework.  Yes, the Clinton Administration could be forgiven for not knowing what pathological liars the North Koreans were in 1994 (but not by 1997).  Bush [...]

  11. virtual wonderer

    “The problem with suggesting that Clinton’s deal kept all plutonium under control is that it didn’t; North Korea sabotaged the facilities making it impossible for IAEA scientists to determine how much plutonium had been reprocessed.”

    This is interesting. Something to look into. Kudos for expanding my mind.

  12. Two Words: Legacy Mode at DPRK Studies

    [...] Comments • Clinton’s North Korea Legacy is Now  9 virtual wonderer, Richardson, virtual wonderer [...] • Pyongyang [...]

  13. Richardson

    More on that;

    The operational history of the reactor between 1986 and 1994 (and hence how much plutonium was produced) is shrouded in mystery. In 1992, when IAEA inspectors were first allowed access to the reactor, Pyongyang claimed that the reactor had experienced serious start-up and control difficulties, which prevented full-power operations and resulted in frequent shut downs during the first several years of operations. According to the North Koreans, reactor operation caused distortions in the neutron flux (the total number and speed of neutrons within a specific volume), which caused fuel in some parts of the core to overheat and to fail. In April–May 1989, the reactor was reportedly shut in order to remove a few hundred damaged fuel rods, after which North Korea claimed that it was able to operate more regularly at 20MW(th) – close to full power. At the time of the initial IAEA inspections in April 1992, North Korea claimed that about 17kg of plutonium had been produced in the reactor fuel. By the time the reactor was completely de­fuelled in June 1994, the spent fuel probably contained about 25–30kg of plutonium.

    The accuracy of North Korea’s operating record prior to 1992 has never been verified, and independent evidence is mixed. Through satellite reconnaissance, the US detected the construction of the 5MW(e) reactor at an early stage, and was able to confirm initial operation of the reactor in 1986 by noting the emission of steam plumes from its cooling tower, which indicated the reactor was venting excess heat. However, satellite monitoring of the facility was not frequent enough during the 1980s to compile a complete record of operations and cloud cover sometimes prevented plumes from being detected. In any event, ‘plumology’ is an inexact science. If operated at low power levels or under certain climatic conditions, the reactor might not produce a clearly visible steam plume. Nonetheless, US observation of the reactor over the years did reveal some discrepancies in North Korea’s declared operating history, suggesting that the reactor may have functioned more frequently than Pyongyang had claimed

    The IAEA was also never able to complete its investigations into the reactor’s operating history. Some of the evidence collected by the Agency supported North Korea’s assertions, while some of it did not. Furthermore, Pyongyang obstructed the IAEA‘s efforts to take further measurements that might have provided answers to these questions. In fact, North Korea deliberately destroyed evidence which would have been helpful in reconstructing and verifying the reactor’s operating history. In June 1994, when North Korea completely de-fuelled the reactor, it refused to allow the IAEA to record the exact location of each of the 8,000 fuel rods in the core. Armed with this information, and subsequent measurements of the radioactivity level of each rod, the IAEA had hoped to ‘map’ the reactor’s operational history, especially to determine how long the fuel was in the reactor. To foil this effort, North Korea not only prevented the IAEA measurements, but also mixed the rods together in different storage baskets in the cooling pond so that the evidence was destroyed.

  14. virtual wonderer

    Hmm. Interesting. So we have no idea how much nukes KJI is really capable of building.

    My question is, was Bill Clinton’s policy at least successful in preventing DPRK from producing additional weaponizable plutonium?

  15. Richardson

    My question is, was Bill Clinton’s policy at least successful in preventing DPRK from producing additional weaponizable plutonium?

    If you mean in reactors, then yes. The reactors were down, so not producing.

    If you mean reprocessing fuel rods to extract more plutonium, then probably, but not 100 percent sure. Why? North Korea could have some some remote, deep reprocessing plant. Odds are against this since a chemical signature would be present, but it’s remotely possible.

    To put it all in context; Yes, Clinton’s 1994 Agreed Framework did prevent North Korea from producing plutonium in reactors, and very likely from reprocessing at another location, but only by not confronting the regime about it’s secret and illegal uranium program.

  16. NPR and Accuracy in Reporting at DPRK Studies

    [...] and things fell apart.” I guess that’s Daniel Schorr’s influence, but there’s nothing like actual context. Share and Enjoy: These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and [...]

  17. Dag, Boo

    [edit - violation of comment policy]

  18. Richardson

    Dag, Boo;
    If you wish to attempt to argue with specific items in the post, you may. If you have an argument to make, make it and I’ll point out your mistakes.

    But you may not make drive-by ad hominem attacks. Keep the pathetic one-liners to yourself.

  19. DPRK Studies

    John McCain’s North Korea Policy…

    Today my North Korea news aggregator picked up a piece by the Democratic National Committee (DNC) on John McCain’s North Korea policy, per his comments in the Asia Wall Street Journal. The article had a spiffy title, “Today’s McCain Myth: Joh…

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