A Mild Criticism of the U.S. Approach to Six-Party Talks
by Richardson ~ December 20th, 2006. Filed under: Six-Party Talks.Both the U.S. and North Korea have not changed positions much, if any, since September 2005; North Korea insisted on receiving the benefits of disarming before beginning that process, and the U.S. demanded nuclear disarmament and compliance with former agreements before any aid is given or sanctions lifted. The Banco Delta and nuclear test issues just compound the previous unworkable positions.
North Korea can indefinitely maintain the status quo by keeping the “you go first” request. They can claim – though fraudulently – that they are worried about a U.S. attack (although the U.S. didn’t attack them for decades before they tested a nuclear weapon on 8 October 2006 – North Korea’s artillery keeping Seoul hostage has been enough deterrent).
The obvious solution – one that the U.S. should be proposing – is to have some sort of simultaneous actions. For example, the day IAEA inspectors gain access to North Korean nuclear facilities, sanctions end, but with the condition that if said inspectors are impeded or ejected, sanctions return in full force plus, that very day. A series of conditional phases, again based in simultaneous actions conditional to progress, could be suggested. I suggested a somewhat similar approach last year.
Additional consequences for Pyongyang could be stipulated, so there would be no surprises (e.g., a repeat ejection of IAEA inspectors could result in a U.S. blockade, etc.). As barriers to inspectors decrease, so should sanctions, (monitored) aid, etc., but if North Korea were to impede inspectors, corresponding sanctions should automatically be enforced.
I do not expect Kim Jong-il to keep any nuclear related deal his government agrees to; the regime dynamics preclude genuine engagement. However, Kim Jong-il wont’ be around forever, and it is in the best interest of the U.S. to have some sort of deal in place, with some sort of lesser engagement in progress, when power changes hands in North Korea.
December 20th, 2006 at 7:06 pm
I agree to the extent that the overarching notion of having six parties involved was a great idea, acknowledging the fact that North Korea poses a wider regional problem.
However, the devil is in the details, and that is where these talks have failed in execution, amounting to nothing more than saber-rattling rhetoric and melodrama.
The talks do give the illusion of diplomacy, though, and superficial appearances are all that matter here on this peninsula.
December 20th, 2006 at 9:40 pm
“…the U.S. didn’t attack them for decades before they tested a nuclear weapon on 8 October 2006 – North Korea’s artillery keeping Seoul hostage has been enough deterrent”
The real reason why the US, and for that matter anyone else, has not attacked North Korea is that doing could not possibly result in any net benefit. Anyone attacking would face the prospect of very small benefits relative to the costs, even if KJI gave up immediately (he will not, but that would be his delusion in action). Only China (interested in a part of northern NK) and Russia (possibly interested in railroad connections) would stand to benefit in any way, and can do the math - they will not attack. The ROK might have some psychological/cultural benefit, and they can do (definitely have done) the math - they will not attack. Neither Japan or the US would stand to gain anything of significance and would pay in so much in so many ways that they do not have to do the math - they will not attack.
Even if KJI wanted to give North Korea to someone, under current conditions most likely he would have no takers.
The artillery, and everything else KJI has in the way of “defensive” capability is a gigantic waste of resources, useful at best for internal propaganda purposes even if it is dangerous to others. It is not a deterrent in a situation where he faces exactly no threat from anyone, contrary to his and his generals’ assertions to the contrary.
December 21st, 2006 at 4:57 am
The appearance of a viable threat is necessary to keep the US in South Korea.
Every time we think about leaving, the South and North Koreans hatch some collaborative plot to keep us here longer. DMZ ax murders, mortar rounds in the DMZ, new SP guns, subs on the coast, bombings, SOF infiltrations, Gwangju “massacre,” you name it…all part of the Corean machination.
Hell, they would have set the nuke off decades ago if Reagan hadn’t defeated Carter.
December 21st, 2006 at 7:23 am
North Korea is an enormous nuisance to the U.S., with the potential to be more than that through proliferation. A reunified Korea would, I think, eventually stay in the U.S. sphere of influence due to fears, unfounded or not, of becoming a semi-autonomous region of China. No, there could be much benefit from seeing North Korea fall.
The nuke and, to some extent, missile programs, yes. Artillery on the DMZ, no. The credible threat to Seoul from that artillery has indeed moderated responses to North Korea’s brinksmanship, and the North Korean leadership is well aware of that. Perhaps your not aware of how close things were in 1993 and 1994.
December 21st, 2006 at 7:34 am
That’s the other half of the engagement coin; North Korea can’t truly engage the international community since that would inevitably allow outside information into the country, which would in turn undermine the cult. Missile and nuclear antics ensures external pressure and the continued presence of USFK (although I see other reasons to stay after reunification), which is used to justify ‘sacrifices’ and ensure cohesiveness internally.
December 21st, 2006 at 10:58 pm
No doubt there would be much benefit to the KFR regime going out of business, but the US will not attack without huge provocation and neither will anyone else - most especially the ROK. The reverse is not true. If KJI really believed that he would come out the winner, he would have attacked long ago (followed dad’s example).
The US and/or ROK were on the verge of attacking North Korea in 93/94???? Big tough words from a guy with a lot of reason to try to divert attention from his personal problems notwithstanding, any actual attack was unlikely even if there were then and remain now reasons for trying to do something to speed up the departure of the KFR.
There exist/existed some kind of US military plans involving what some (KJI and his generals for example) like to characterize as offensive action???? There are few scenarios that have not been considered, with some kind of planning for almost all of them, including some with near zero probability of occurrence (such as an attack coming from Canada or Mexico on the US). However, that is not the same as planning for aggression and certainly not the same as threatening to attack without provocation.
The NK assets that are the basis of proliferation concerns are safe in the tunnels, out of reach of everything short of nuclear bunker busters capable of deep penetration. The North Koreans can be confident of that. All sides also know that the people the North Koreans fear have no clear idea where the key targets actually are, which would pretty well assure that anything but an all out attack using everything available (not going to happen) would be unsuccessful at removing the proliferation concerns.
The artillery pointed at Seoul is a different matter. In order to fire, all of those pieces have to be close to the surface in or near prepared positions and thus vulnerable to attack. If either the US or ROK intended to attack, the first thing to go would be that artillery, and it would be gone in minutes, which means it would not be available to return fire in defense or deter the attack through retaliation, all of which is pretty widely recognized, including no doubt by real thinkers in the KPA. The bottom line is that the main functions of that artillery are efforts at extortion, very limited effective use in the first hour or two of a North Korean attack, and internal NK propaganda, but not deterrence. Collectively, the North believes its own propaganda (no doubt there are individual exceptions), but there is no reason for anyone else to believe it. North Korea does not face any real threat of attack.
December 22nd, 2006 at 4:13 am
Yes, attack was extremely close before the 1994 Agreed Framework, and much of the artillery is set in hardened positions and so is much less vulnerable that you seem to be aware of. But these bits of information are both common knowledge, so I’m not going to debate it. Try a contemporary history (but not by Cumings, Feffer, Beal, or Harrison).
And off to the airport. . .