The short answer is ‘not much,’ except for the drama involved in guessing whether or not U.S. negotiators will make it home in time for Christmas (one has to wonder if the North Koreans timed the talks that way on purpose). The long answer is that it all comes down to this; a) what will be required of North Korea, b) what will be offered in return, and c) will that fit in with what North Korea wants and is willing to do? Both answers will get you to the same place, but we’ll take the scenic route.

First, any hypothetical deal would include the basic tenants of the 1994 Agreed Framework (PDF) as well as last years joint statement (DOC) – the same agreement that North Korea effectively shot down one day later (DOC).

At the top of the U.S. and Japanese required list is “complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization,” or CVID. As a part of the verification process,
Japan’s FM, Taro Aso, wants UN IAEA inspectors to resume monitoring North Korea’s nuclear sites sooner than later; “Without it, we cannot believe a story North Korea would tell us, that it stopped its nuclear facilities.” CVID is at the core of the reason for the Six-Party Talks and no deviation from seeking that outcome is to be anticipated.

The nature of CVID has changed since North Korea’s 9 October nuclear test; removing existing weapons must now be a part of any deal as well. What this means is invasive, nation-wide IAEA inspections, something North Korea likely will balk at. That North Korea putting up signs in Pyongyang celebrating de facto admission to the nuclear club, however does not bode well for the talks. An example: “Long live the celestial Gen. Kim Jong Il, who has established a world-class nuclear power!”

North Korea’s first priority seems to be getting financial restrictions – particularly those related to counterfeiting and money laundering – lifted rather than actually denuclearizing. Aside from that, North Korea’s primary demands are:

• Formal security assurances from the U.S.
• LWR reactors provided before NPT compliance
• Diplomatic relations with the U.S. and others
• Food and development aid, investment, etc.

Secondary demands may include:

• Trade normalization
• Fuel oil (perhaps)
• The U.S. military out of Korea
• Colonial reparations from Japan

Andrei Lankov’s latest article in the Asia Times makes a very valid point about economic changes that can be applied to many of the changes that would occur with CVID:

. . . why are the North Korean leaders so bent on re-Stalinizing their country, instead of emulating the Chinese reform policy that has been so tremendously successful?

[…]

If reforms undermine stability and produce a revolution, the current North Korean leaders will lose everything. Hence their best bet is to keep the situation under control and avoid all change.

[…]

No unauthorized contacts with the dangerous outside world would be permitted, and no unauthorized social or commercial activity would happen under such system. Neither Kim nor his close associates are fools; they know perfectly well that such a system is not efficient, but they also know that only under such system can their privileges and security be guaranteed. (emphasis added)

I’ve been arguing the same point about engagement in general and why North Korea continues to make choices that isolates itself (“Strategic Disengagement”); the exposure of the North Korean people to reality vis-à-vis the cult is an enormous vulnerability for the regime. CVID and actual engagement pose a more critical threat to the North Korean elite than isolation does.

Condoleezza Rice wants North Korea denuclearized within 24 months, which is how much longer she has as U.S. Secretary of State; optimistic despite Pyongyang’s “blasting” of Japan for allegedly attempting to “scuttle” the upcoming talks.

What the U.S. wants – CVID – is reasonable (depending on the timing), and what the U.S. is willing to give (security guarantee, diplomatic recognition, perhaps fuel oil and LWR, etc.) are ostensibly what North Korea wants. But can North Korea comply with CVID without endangering its political elite?

I’m in the camp that says no, which is why I think the talks will most likely result in nothing constructive. If some sort of deal similar to the 1994 Agreed Framework is reached, I do not believe the North Koreans will honestly implement their end of the bargain.

This won’t change until North Korea’s leadership does.