If the U.S. Nukes Dokdo, Will SK Fully Fund USFK?
by Richardson ~ December 7th, 2006. Filed under: Engagement, Korean Politics, U.S.-Korea Relations.While the U.S. struggles with getting South Korea to fund a more equitable share of USFK expenses, North Korea has apparently found the secret to increasing its aid package from the South; missile launches and nuclear tests. Inter-Korea projects, rejoice!:
The government is to spend more on financial support for North Korea next year than this year despite the North’s missile tests in July and nuclear test in October. The Unification Ministry’s plan for the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund obtained by the Chosun Ilbo says the government is to spend almost W1 trillion (US $1=W916) on some 30 inter-Korean projects in 2007. But the sum is in reality bigger than the W1.16 trillion budget this year, which included W200 billion that was to have gone into the aborted light-water reactor project for the North.
To many it might seem foolish to fund a regime that has broken every denuclearization agreement it has entered into, and done its damndest to destabilize regional security, but as South Korean President Roh says, they’re the “experts.”
Showing that an old dog can learn new trick, perhaps the USFK negotiating team should nuke Dokdo (threaten to turn it into a ‘Sea of Fire,’ literally), in an effort to get South Korea to pony up on funding?
December 7th, 2006 at 5:49 pm
We should threaten to leave Korea like LTG Trexler did to get them to fold on the bombing range issue.
December 8th, 2006 at 3:36 am
Or better yet, just leave, skip the threatening.
December 8th, 2006 at 11:32 pm
If US troops are nothing more than mercenaries, with the US attempting to get the ROK to “fund a more equitable share” of the cost of keeping them in the ROK, they have been there too long already. A big part of public attitude in the ROK appears to be that the US troops are mercenaries - needed to do the dirty dangerous work but otherwise unwelcome (not very different from the French Foreign Legion within France once you get beyond the hype).
Darin has it right.
Prior to saying anything about the possible benefits of a continued US military presence in the ROK, evryone who thinks that they are all that much should consider the benefits of the (lack of) continued US presence in the Phillipines and Thailand, which remain friendly but somehow manage to muddle through - as does the US - without much beyond the embassy guards and possibly sometimes some trainers from the US.
December 9th, 2006 at 6:31 pm
My position remains that the USFK is an invaluable part of regional security, and that USFJ alone would be woefully inadequate.
The Korean Peninsula is strategically more important than either Thailand or the PI, as well as having a much more powerful military and the technical expertise needed to design and field nuclear weapons.
December 9th, 2006 at 9:34 pm
While “The Korean Peninsula is strategically more important than either Thailand or the PI”, how does it compare to the strategic importance of Japan? Does the amount of strategic ground we gain by having having troops in S. Korea warrant those troops being “mercenaries” though?
I personally think Japan and Korea are so close to each other that there makes no real difference if we take our troops out of S. Korea if we increase our troops in Japan. Plus the majority of Japanese don’t have a problem with us being there, and even those that do are the people in Okinawa (because that’s where the majority of bases actually are), and they don’t want us out of Japan all together, they just want Japan as a nation to bear the burden of it’s defense and move the US bases out of Okinawa to other parts of Japan. It’s just a better environment all together in my opinion.
*However Japanese public opinions are sure to change if the bases move out of Okinawa and into their back yard instead.
December 9th, 2006 at 9:59 pm
If the reason for keeping USFK, as well as USFJ, in place is to keep the ROK/Japan/China, as well as NK or others, from doing something the US thinks is dumb, the US is keeping those troops in position to serve its own interests. In that case the US should not complain about paying the bill. If those forces are there as a kind of volunteer public service for the world, the US should continue to pay because it volunteered.
The fact that the ROK has a very powerful military and substantial technical expertise means that the ROK is, or should be, capable of dealing with NK by themselves. Probably, contingencies other than NK, such as a confrontation involving China or Japan will not be much affected by whether the USFK or USFJ is in place. All of the countries of interest will pursue their own interests, including an Asian arms race, and not be much bothered if what they want substantially conflicts with what the US wants.
The Japanese could do more technically and militarily than the ROK, it is just that they do not do so now as a matter of choice, knowing that the US will take care of them, and pay a big part of the cost for the honor of doing so.
What would the US do if either the ROK or Japan, or both, explicitly and publicly said that they wanted the US forces to leave? There is little question that the US could enforce its judgment that it should stay and be the cop on the beat, but the troops would be in an occupation situation on the territory of possibly very unreliable “friends” for US reasons.
With respect to stratigic value, technical expertise and nuclear weapons, Europe and the Middle East hold clues. The UK has more of all three. France has more of all three, with the additional factors of being contrary just because it can be and is in its own special way something of a troublemaker for the US. Israel has as much or more of all three, even if it will not admit to the nuclear. The US gets along OK without having troops in any of those three more or less friendly (France?) countries.
Germany has as much strategic value and technical expertise but not its own nuclear weapons.
All of those countries have, or could if they wanted to have, very powerful militaries. The US has a significant military presence only in Germany. If the US effort in Germany is for the purpose of preventing a repeat of the history of Europe of the 19th and 20th centuries, perhaps it has succeded but perhaps not - there is no way to tell for certain. WW-I was the “war to end all wars,” and resulted in a peace that lasted all of 20 years. All we know is that Europe has been mostly at peace for more than 60 years, not with any certainty that the continued US presence is why. The division between the East Block and the West, the main reason for US forces remaining in Europe for those 60 years did not involve possible conflict between, for example, Germany and France, two of the powers frequently in conflict in the past.
If the US can deal as well as it has with Europe and (obviously somewhat less well) the Middle East, why not Northeast Asia? Again, if the US is maintaining USFK and USFJ for its own purposes, it should continue to pay. The fact that others get a free ride regarding security should not affect US efforts to serve its own interests. If the other beneficiaries will pay, fine, but do not count on any help from them.
There is also the fact that continued US presence in the ROK and Japan encourages both to let Uncle Sugar take care of security for them. In effect that means an endless effort for the benefit of people who may not be very grateful for it, resent the implications, or think (correctly or not) the effort is not necessary. Check Iraq and Afganistan in about 40 years for the continuation.
December 9th, 2006 at 10:01 pm
More troops in Japan and little/none in Korea would do what exactly to moderate South Korea’s responses to regional issues, and do what to keep them from going nuclear? Nothing on both counts. More fully explained here;
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HI09Dg02.html
I’m taking the big picture approach, and in that view the opinions of South Koreans concerning USFK mattes very little. They are benefiting from our presence if the admit it or not, but our departure from South Korea would, IMO, very certainly have a destabilizing effect.
December 9th, 2006 at 10:24 pm
Whether South Koreans admit it or not, they are also greatly benefiting from the USFK presence, and in decades past there is no doubt that USFK deterred North Korea from again attacking the South. The mere presence of USFK also moderates China’s actions/responses to South Korea.
Obviously both sides benefit, and the ROK should indeed pay more to host USFK; it would cost them much, much more if they were to be involved in the regional arms race that would occur with a USFK withdrawal.
December 10th, 2006 at 1:05 pm
Absolutely right: removing USFK would do nothing to keep the ROK or Japan from building nuclear weapons (or starting a general arms race) and have exactly no moderating influence on either, or any of the neighbors.
Questions remain, however. What moderating influence does the US presence have now that can be conclusively demonstrated to exist and how is it manifested? Not that there is none, what it is and how it can be identified are not obvious. Mere assertions or assumptions that such influence exists are not satisfactory. If the moderating influence is to serve the US purpose of avoiding another war that it would for its own reasons feel obliged to enter when it started, providing that influence serves a US interest. Why should the US not fund the effort on its own? Everyone dislikes freeloaders, but why should the US allow the existence of freeloaders to influence its efforts to serve its own interests?
Neither the ROK nor Japan is likely to freely admit to the benefits of having the US take care of a lot of the security concerns in the region. The economies of both the ROK and Japan are as advanced as they are and the people as well off as they are in large part because neither was/is required to bear the full cost of its own defense. The free ride (from their perspective) that they continue to receive has been very valuable to them.
However, assuming (hateful word) that the US is/was acting rationally and has weighed the costs and benefits to itself of providing that moderating influence (if it exists) and regional security - finding the balance to be favorable to the US - the additional benefits to countries in the region were/are pure surplus. Apparently, the US believes that it has received and continues to receive benefits in excess of its costs, which is enough to encourage it to continue if, but only if, there is no higher valued use for the US resources involved. Unfortunately for the future of USFK and possibly USFJ, quite a few people think that there are many such higher valued uses and they want answers too. Someone will have the answer wrong, but who, and how can we know objectively?
The ROK, Japan and the US should have a clear understanding of the answer to the question that would be asked, at least implicitly, by a potential attacker, especially one with credible means of delivering on the implied promise - not threat. That question is “Are you (the US) willing to give up Anchorage/Seattle/Portland/San Francisco to keep or take revenge for Seoul/Tokyo?” If the answer is not an unequivocal yes (it definitely is not) there is no effective US “nuclear umbrella.” Does a Chinese “nuclear umbrella” exist for North Korea?
Realistically, the existing US forces in the area would have a very tough time with China on its own or neighboring territory. In North Korea US forces would be badly outnumbered by fanatics fighting for their lord and savior, so USFK may not be providing all that much deterrence. How do we know how much deterrence they are providing?
December 11th, 2006 at 10:09 am
Unfortunately the only way for that to be “conclusively demonstrated” would be to withdrawal troops and document the results. That is the weakness of social science, and sociology in this specific case. If it were as straight forward as chemistry of mathematics where a given formula under the same conditions will always yield the same results, political, social, and military policy would have little need for debate, at least for tactical issues.
I believe, however, that what we know (and think we know) of the current (possible/probable) goals of regional actors and their history of interaction, that my assessment of an arms race after a USFK withdrawal is highly probable, if not a certainty.
The statement in the second portion of the paragraph seems to answer your own question in the first of the same paragraph.
This assumes China (or whomever) would be irrational enough to attack the U.S., an assumption that I see little evidence for. As for the DPRK being shielded by a PRC umbrella, I doubt it; I don’t see the PRC sacrificing itself for North Korea. Having said that, I don’t see the U.S. using nukes in North Korea unless as a response to some security breach so grievous that there could be no credible objection from the PRC.
Realistically, North Korea would be flattened by air power before many U.S. ground troops ever went north of the 38th parallel. A major mission of USFK is to facilitate a buildup in the event of war. I don’t think there is any credible military analyst would want to be on record stating that USFK has not been a deterrent to a second DPRK invasion over the past few decades.