The Council on Foreign Relations has a new online debate series on, “How to Control a Nuclear North Korea?” The first two posts were from Aaron L. Friedberg and David C. Kang on 4 December, with more to follow. From Friedberg’s portion:

The notion that Kim Jong-Il will agree to abandon his nuclear programs in exchange for written security guarantees or offers of economic assistance for his people is fanciful. To the contrary, he would likely regard moves to lessen tension and open North Korea to a flood of aid, trade, and outside influences as profoundly threatening. (emphasis added)

This post on ‘strategic disengagement’ explains the bolded text in more detail.

Fortunately there are other, more subtle ways of applying serious pressure, including the use of targeted financial sanctions. A full-scale crackdown on North Korea’s drug smuggling, arms dealing, and counterfeiting, and on the network of banks and front companies that it uses to funnel money back to Pyongyang, would put a crimp in Kim Jong-Il’s lavish lifestyle. More important, it could also threaten his grip on power. Without a steady influx of dollars to pay for foreign-made medicines, cars, watches, and other luxury goods, Kim will find it much harder to buy the continued loyalty of the inner circle of military officers, security personnel, and Communist Party officials on whom his safety depends.

Friedberg underscores the current basis of U.S. policy towards North Korea. In my opinion, Kang offers a rather unrealistic analysis, since North Korea has and will reject the sort of “transformations” he refers to:

Capitalism is a powerful force, and when it is unleashed, it is very difficult to turn it back. Give North Koreans a taste of economic freedoms and outside ideas and the next generation will view their own leadership and the world in different terms. Economic transformation is also the most likely strategy to help North Korean citizens: Our quarrel is not with the people of North Korea—they are the victims of a brutal and repressive regime.