Democrats Criticize Bush’s DPRK Policy
by Richardson ~ November 17th, 2006. Filed under: Diplomacy, Engagement, Fiskings, Six-Party Talks.At this point time – especially given Christopher Hill’s extraordinary efforts and the 19 September 2005 joint statement (DOC) – anyone calling for bilateral talks with North Korea, above and beyond what occurs on the sidelines of the Six-Party talks and at other international events, as a credible route to solving the nuclear issue is either ignorant, an ideologue, an idiot, or some combination thereof. With that said, this from the WaPo:
At a hearing yesterday on the administration’s preparation for the talks, Rep. Tom Lantos (D-Calif.) faulted the administration’s exclusive reliance on the six-nation negotiating framework, arguing that substantial bilateral contacts are necessary to reach any deal.
[. . .]
In the aftermath of the test, “it is now abundantly clear to the world that our current policies have failed,” said Lantos, who will wield the gavel when the new Congress convenes in January. “I look forward to leading the efforts in Congress to keep North Korea on the front burner and to pushing the administration to resolve the feuds within its own ranks which have hobbled North Korea policy.”
Lantos charged that Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill has been undercut in his diplomacy by “hard-liners lodged in the office of the Vice President and the Defense Department.” Hill had lobbied to travel to Pyongyang to meet with North Korean officials shortly after North Korea agreed in principle in September 2005 to dismantle its nuclear programs. But the trip never took place, and then the talks stalled over the Treasury Department action.
“Ambassador Hill must also make a stopover in Pyongyang on his way back from the six-party talks, not to negotiate a new and separate deal, but rather to demonstrate to Pyongyang our peaceful intent,” Lantos said. “The administration’s refusal to allow visits by American diplomats to North Korea must end, and it must end now.”
A correction for the Post - “Treasury Department action” did NOT kill the 19 September agreement, North Korea did in their statement the very next day (DOC). Hence no trip.
Lantos’ assertion that a U.S. policy – aside from bombing the DPRK into compliance with previous deals – could have stopped a North Korean nuclear test is laughable. North Korea has done what North Korea wants to do for decades, regardless of internationally imposed consequences (e.g., the Soviet-Korean and Sino-Korean disputes).
Charges of preventing Hill and other diplomats from dealing with North Korea borders on the delusional. I wonder if Lantos had read or is even aware of North Korea’s statement the day following the 19 September joint statement?
This is nothing more than the same tired ‘diplomacy-can-solve-everything’ spiel, with absolutely no lessons learned from North Korea’s past behavior. With ‘normal’ nations the reliance on diplomacy might tend to be correct, but the calculus of too many completely discount a) the cult aspect of the North Korean regime, and b) how North Korea is responding.
What does that leave for options? Not much. Realistically we can a) accept the status quo (which includes useless diplomatic talks), b) force the issue of regime collapse by strangulation, or, least likely of all, c) use military force.
Nothing new in these choices, either, no matter who is in office in Washington. The main difference is that the Democrats may go for the false positive of an ‘agreement’ and call it ‘progress.’ Which would accomplish nothing except to give Kim Jong-il more time.
Still, that’s not to say that I am particularly content with the Bush administration’s efforts; I think the U.S. should have applied much more pressure on the economies of China and South Korea, with the goal of collapsing North Korea. That is where I fault Bush.
November 17th, 2006 at 6:15 pm
I knew you’d enjoy this article!
As to your observations, spot on as usual, but I do have some questions about your conclusions.
You label diplomatic talks “useless” and seem to favor “regime change by strangulation”, leaving military force as a last and undesirable option. But at what point does NK lash out because of option B, forcing option C? And if we’re cognizant that this is would be the result, what’s the difference between poking Kim ’til he bites and coming right out and biting him first?
I would say diplomacy is useful with North Korea to the extent that it buys us more time and credit with the regional allies (and antagonists) who, jointly, can force Kim into compliance. Not to mention bilateral talks (or 3 party incl. ROK) with China to effect better treatment of NK refugees in that country.
November 17th, 2006 at 6:38 pm
Yep, I took your bait – thanks for sending that article my way.
I’ll clarify that I think talks are “useless” as far as solving the problem with an acceptable outcome; complete, verifiable, irreversible, denuclearization (CVID). I do agree that ‘diplomacy’ is good for buying time, but only if that time is actually spent strangling the regime. I guess that sounds cruel, but I’m far past the point where I see any viable outcome through talking to North Korea.
At what point Kim unilaterally selects option ‘C’ I’ve no idea, but I don’t think he’d do it unless he felt collapse was imminent. I do wonder if he’d try for exile in China or Indonesia first, or if he’d even have time to initiate war since collapse could take him by surprise.
Kind of moot right now, though, as ‘status quo’ is all our policies are apt to bring.
November 18th, 2006 at 2:40 am
“You label diplomatic talks “useless” and seem to favor “regime change by strangulation”, leaving military force as a last and undesirable option. But at what point does NK lash out because of option B, forcing option C? And if we’re cognizant that this is would be the result, what’s the difference between poking Kim ’til he bites and coming right out and biting him first?”
Choice.
Since it is easy to see how NK does things and how they have painted themselves into a corner with their xenophobia and phobia of the outside world, making it impossible (they believe) for them to do any of the significant measures they would have to implement in any real deal with the US, we can give fairly accurate predictions of how NK is most likely to act.
But, that does not mean we MAKE DECISIONS FOR THEM.
This is something that gets lost on the power makers and negociators too.
It ends up becoming appeasement if they follow through.
But more often than not, they do half-measures that simply kick the can further down the road.
Pyongyang has the power to make alternative choices than war.
It could open up more to the outside world. It could honor previous agreements. There is much Pyongyang could do to relieve some of the stress it has put its nation in.
The fact that they won’t and that they probably would lash out if sanctions pressed too far —- does not mean those sanctions “caused the war” if it comes.
A minority of people used that argument with Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor: the US cutting off oil in response to Japan’s invading China and other Asian nations was deemed to have “caused” the war.
When it comes down to it — historically speaking - and more - the US and other nations have the moral, ethical, and legal statutes behind the sanctions. North Korea is such a horrible state, the international community has the foundation, all the way around, to implement policies that cut off their interaction with such a nation - to strangle it - and force it to make a decision —— continue to be hell on earth and die or change.
But the choice is still Pyongyangs….