Goodbye Vulcans, Hello 41 Liegemen
by Richardson ~ November 9th, 2006. Filed under: America, Diplomacy, Engagement, Geopolitics, Human Rights, Washington Views.SecDef Rumsfeld is out, leaving only VP Cheney as the last “Vulcan.” Baker, Gates and other “loyal liegemen of Bush 41″ are back in (h/t RCP).
What will this mean for our East Asia policy? My predictions follow:
1. Less Japan, more China. Bush 41 and his liegemen are advocates of engaging (read appeasing) China, and some even have personally close relationships in China. Bush 43’s administration previously took a tilt toward a China-friendly policy with the appointment of John Snow as the Treasury Secretary (”all business, all the time, at all costs”). The return of the 41 people likely signals the complete triumph of the China business lobby in the administration.
And goodbye, Taiwan.
2. No more human rights. Corollary to the triumph of the business lobby is the end of pushing for human rights and spreading representative forms of government in troubled regions. Back in will be a policy of cozying up to dictators, provided they can keep their rabble in line. Never mind that precisely that kind of “pragmatism” led to our Saudi “allies” squashing internal dissent and re-directing anger against their oligarchy from the people toward the United States, contributing to 9/11.
Remember that we have given billions to Egypt and 99% of Egyptians hate us whereas we have criticized the mullahs in Iran for their oppression, and a substantial majority of Iranians think well of the United States.
3. Korean Peninsula the Nexus. This is where things get murky. 41 loyalists are, above all, pro-stability people (instability — even one toward more freedom — is considered bad for business, at least in the short term). They will seek to preserve and contain North Korea in order to stabilize the region. That’s bad news for those of us who seek to destroy North Korea’s regime.
The good news is that the 41 folks get along with conservatives in South Korea. Should the conservatives return to power in Korea next year, the US-South Korean relationship and cooperation, badly strained under the leftist, anti-American Roh administration, will improve substantially (there is always silver lining even in the darkest of clouds).
4. Yeah on allies, nay on lean, agile military. 41 people like the concept of auxiliae and foederati (we call that Nixon Doctrine in English; some call it Vietnamization).
Many parts of the military were very unhappy with Rumsfeld’s “transformation” to make the military capable of deploying rapildy and being able to deal with a wide spectrum of security threats. Military brass wants to build empires of their own, with more money, bigger armies and more shiny, gold-plated hardware. I expect transformation to decelerate.
In Asia, this means the US will “hunker down” more in allied countries and will slow down or reverse the process of withdrawing forces back to CONUS and US-controlled rocks.
Lastly, the return of the 41 people will mean pre-9/11 thinking. Oh, yeah, remember that event?
We are already very deficient in public diplomacy. Even during the heydays of the Vulcans at the White House, the administration had a disturbing tendency to concentrate on personalities (Putin comes to mind) and ignore appealing in a serious manner to the ordinary people in other countries with the message of freedom and representative government. Now, with the “pragmatists” conclusively back, what little vestige of public diplomacy efforts that have remained will disappear completely.
November 9th, 2006 at 1:47 pm
This from The Belmont Club:
Rumsfeld resigns
Before the Democratic Party enunciates or even considers a policy on Iraq. The argument that this is a necessary mea culpa, a necessary retreat comes up against the question: retreat to what? Every rearguard action has a fallback line of defense prepared. Since the Democrats have not indicated where they want the retreat to stop, and there is no indication that the President has prepared a fallback position the appropriate term isn’t a rearguard action. Retreats without an endpoint have another name. They are called a rout.
There is no sense getting excited about Rumsfeld’s resignation. It is but the first step on a long road to … has anyone decided yet? Therefore the only rational thing to do is relax. Take a loaf of French bread and cut off two slices with a utility saw and make another mayo and peanut butter sandwich. Sooner or later the enemy is going to realize what the Guderian knew in 1940. That it doesn’t matter how many men, tanks or forts are serried before you. If there is no mind in opposition, and no awareness of the need to set a mind in opposition, then the road to Paris is open. The bread is theirs. The saw is ours. And the sandwich is good.
http://fallbackbelmont.blogspot.com/2006/11/rumsfeld-resigns.html
November 9th, 2006 at 2:59 pm
“the [sic] Guderian”?
I know Heinz Guderian is held in high esteem by armored warfare doctrine aficionados, but does he now deserve “the”?
In any case, the analogy is not perfect. There WAS “mind in opposition” in the French high command. It’s just that the Germans operated at a much higher tempo, had greater internal agility (faster cycling through OODA) and achieved a near complete psychological dislocation of their opponents, as the decision cycles of the latter began to unravel.
Of course, v. Manstein’s genius of planning the attack through the Ardenne forest (supposedly uncrossable for a large mechanized/motorized force), the one undefended spot between the Maginot fortresses and the mobile part of the Allied army advancing through the Low Countries was key too.
It wasn’t simply that the Germans fought an enemy who had already given up (on the contrary, the best parts of the Allied army bravely sallied forth into the Low Countries in anticipation of this flanking maneuver). They had to get a lot of ducks lined up just right and had a pinch of luck, too.
November 10th, 2006 at 4:11 pm
I expect the next 20 years to be a continual repeat of the 1990s - lack of vision and a squandering of opportunity since the Cold War came to an end. I invented a title for it which the Europeans can use, “The Withering Hegemon.”
I don’t believe the American people have what it takes to do something important in Iraq (and if not in Iraq - certainly not in Afghanistan). I believe the lack of vision and fortitude will also translate into us standing by and watching France and Germany and Russia along with China (to name the big players) establish the “multi-poles” they have been evangelicizing the world about as the only hope for the global future. And as far as South Korea is concerned, I believe they will also be firmly committed to the “multi-polar” world order - as well as demand the US leave its military in Korea - and the US will agree to go along whoring its soldiers out.
I don’t know much about the specific people like James does, but from what he wrote, I am guessing these were the same people who thought it was a swell idea to leave Hussien in power and “maintain the coalition” by not pushing the Gulf War further into Iraq with the purpose of removing the regime from power. I like Colin Powell, but it is still irritating to me that he still sticks to the idea they were right to end the Gulf War when they did. And I am assuming these other Bush 41 people would agree….???….
Nope. I have no hopes for the future.
In 1989, when the Cold War was coming to a speedy end, I had truly high hopes. By the late 1990s, I concluded we had missed the window of opportunity and we were content to fumble on into the future. Now, I am even more convinced that is the heart of the United States today, and it will be for the next couple of decades barring an unforeseen rise of a major threat.
Because it is obvious the threat from Islamic fundamentalist terrorism has not given us what we need to succeed.
November 14th, 2006 at 1:46 pm
We always have hope for the future. We are, after all, Americans.