Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea. Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki. McGraw-Hill, 2003

In Crisis on the Korean Peninsula, O’Hanlon and Mochizuki layout a “grand deal” designed to diffuse not just the nuclear issue, but also the possibility of a conventional military confrontation and address human rights in North Korea. It does this in an unusual amount of detail over the 165 pages before the appendix and notes. Although I believe the overall concept is unrealistic at present, it may have an application in the future.

O’Hanlon and Mochizuki describe the 1994 Agreed Framework as limited and suggest that, ultimately, that is why it failed. Their comprehensive plan for a “grand deal” call for (2-3);

• Give up all nuclear activities and WMD capabilities
• Reduce conventional forces, including missiles
• Reform its economic system (open up)
• Address human rights issues, to include “gradual political liberalization” (21)

In return, the U.S., China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia would;

• Give massive amounts of aid to revamp the DPRK’s decrepit infrastructure
• Form diplomatic ties, and remove all existing sanctions and related restrictions
• Provide non-nuclear energy (not even Light Water Reactors (LWR) called for in the 1994 Agreed Framework)
• Provide non-aggression and security assurances

Reduce conventional forces in the southern half of the Korean Peninsula

A few other significant points:

• The plan calls for North Korea to make major changed before it receives the most substantial benefits (3)
• A fundamental assumption is that North Korea is willing to participate in genuine engagement for financial benefits
• It would offer two paths to North Korea; a) Engagement with eventual economic recovery, or b) isolation with further decline and likely collapse
• Notes that North Korea probably had one or two plutonium-based nuclear weapons before 1994 (8), and that the uranium
• enrichment program probably began around 1997 (31)
• Notes the possibility of a nuclear arms race in NE Asia, including South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, if North Korea goes nuclear (10)
• Assess that neither side broke the 1994 agreement until the DPRK uranium program (39)
• Chapter 3 goes into more detail on the “grand deal”
• Using various models, goes into detail on U.S., South Korean, and North Korean conventional military capabilities, and has detailed plans on exactly what elements (troops, tanks, planes, artillery, etc.) to reduce on each side (Chapters 2 and 4)
• Chapter 5 lays out what needs to be done to fix North Korea’s economy
• Chapter 6 discusses the role of USFK in a reunified peninsula, and touches on U.S. troops remaining to help prevent an arms race (152), but also discuses a draw down in the range of 10,000 to 30,000, depending on various land/air/sea configurations. (Note: when written, the U.S. had approximately 37,000 troops in Korea; currently there are about 29,000)

In a nutshell, the “grand deal” in the books is the 1994 Agreed Framework on steroids; it would do all that that failed plan would do, and much more, with the large exception of no LWR for North Korea. The book is critical of both the Clinton and Bush (W) administrations, but the authors did not lose focus by laying blame; they kept to the script of trying to formulate a comprehensive package deal.

The main flaw of the book is that it, in my opinion, does not take into consideration the cult of personality (24-25). The “grand deal” would clearly mean an unprecedented level of interaction and engagement for North Korea, and that means information flow. I think my position on that subject is clear. Aside from the cult, I also doubt that the Kim regime would seriously consider a package deal without LWR, or the type of conventional reductions detailed.

However, barring collapse, I believe that when Kim Jong-il is out of the picture, by whatever means, this plan could have an application with the new leader. For that reason alone it’s worth a read.

The book is an easy read with many of the facts essential for understanding North Korea. I recommend it to those new to Korean Studies, or those who would like a glimpse of what a “grand deal” could look like after Kim Jong-il.

From the Brookings Institution:

Mike M. Mochizuki, Ph.D., holds the Elliot School’s endowed chair in Japan-U.S. Relations at George Washington University and is one of the nation’s top authorities on northeast Asia. Dr. Mochizuki was formerly a senior fellow at Brookings as well as codirector of the Center for Asia-Pacific Policy at RAND.

Michael E. O’Hanlon is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, where he holds the Sydney Stein Jr. Chair. His recent books include The Future of Arms Control (Brookings, 2005; with Michael A. Levi), Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary (Brookings, 2004), and Crisis on the Korean Peninsula (McGraw Hill, 2003; with Mike Mochizuki).