Nuke Tests, Korean Anti-Americanism and US-ROK Alliance
by James Na ~ October 19th, 2006. Filed under: Anti-Americanism, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Korean Culture, Korean Politics, U.S.-Korea Relations. 
Recently, my erstwhile colleague from The Korea Liberator, Joshua Stanton, testified in the Congress about anti-Americanism in the Republic of Korea. He detailed numerous and graphic instances of anti-Americanism in South Korea and gave a most bleak view of how the United States is seen there. Although Joshua did not explicitly state so, the obvious implications of the testimony were that the Korean public sentiment toward the U.S. was irretrievably “lost,” the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) should largely depart and the 50 plus-year alliance should be re-evaluated and possibly severed (Joshua is indeed fond of writing a series of posts titled “Death of an Alliance”).
If Joshua gave an accurate picture of the nature and power of anti-Americanism in South Korea, the reader/listener can only reach the same conclusion. The question, then, is: was Joshua’s testimony an accurate reflection of what is going on in South Korea? More over, does it serve as a reliable prediction of where South Korean socio-political trends, particularly as they related to Korea’s American policy, are headed?
In the first place, it should be notedly clearly that likely all instances of anti-American violence documented in Joshua’s testimony were factual. I personally believe all those cases of violence against my fellow Americans, particularly our military personnel, indeed took place. These are clearly reprehensible and should have been prosecuted vigorously by the local authorities. I am in full agreement with Joshua in this regard.
I also share Joshua’s view that the local authorities, indeed the central government in Seoul, utterly failed to enforce its own laws and endangered the US-ROK alliance by its willful neglect to prosecute the thugs who assaulted and even kidnapped Americans in ROK. My own view is that the current administration in Seoul tacitly tolerated and perhaps even encouraged such disturbances for its own political ends. Indeed, a former Korean ambassador to the U.S. during the current Roh Moo-Hyun administration stated rather remarkably at a public event in the U.S., “There is a domestic political component to anti-Americanism in the Republic of Korea.” That is about as graphic as a diplomat gets. Not surprisingly, this particular ambassador did not last.
But this is where I differ with Joshua. Whereas he continually referred to the Korean government’s failure to curb such violence, he never once in the testimony drew a distinction between the current Korean administration and the past governments in power, in regard to confronting or encouraging anti-Americanism. In reading or hearing the testimony, one gets the impression — an incorrect one — that Korea has always been an anti-American country that is becoming more so everyday.
As is obvious to even casual Korea-watchers, conservative and centrist governments in Seoul generally confronted and suppressed anti-Americanism whereas “progressive” ones (that is, the last two administrations) often encouraged it.
I know Joshua’s response to this would be to point out that anti-Americanism would not disappear even if a conservative government came to power in Seoul. But that is an extraordinarily high barrier he is erecting as a pre-condition for an alliance with any country, let alone South Korea. Indeed, no country could become an ally of the US with that kind of an absolutist condition.
It is not that a conservative government would make anti-Americanism disappear, but rather that such an administration would exercise the pervasive powers of incumbency to make anti-Americanism less palatable to the majority of the population. The central government in Seoul, in fact, exerts a considerable amount influence on the South Korean media and its coverage. Depending on who is in power, it is certainly within the government’s capacity to portray incidents involving Americans in Korea in either positive or negative light.
For example, should there be another unfortunate accident involving US military personnel and the indigenous civilians, a leftist Korean government would shape the media coverage in a such way as to maximize the suffering of the Korean victims while portraying Americans as unrepentant aggressors. The same scenario would receive an entirely different coverage with a conservative administration that would encourage the local media to show remorseful Americans who are emotionally distraught by the unfortunate circumstances. As Joshua himself pointed out, such displays, if shown by the local media, can be powerful in shaping the Korean public opinion.
True, committed anti-American radicals (say, 25-30 percent of the population) would not be swayed by such changes in media coverage, but the rest would be. More importantly, the overreaction of anti-American “activists” (such as violent outbursts against Americans) in such a context would sharply discredit them in the eyes of the majority, particularly given a conservative central government that emphasized the stability- and law-breaking nature of anti-Americanism.
Simply put, the return to power by conservatives in Korea may not eliminate anti-Americanism, but it has a strong potential to marginalize anti-American radicals and make them unappealing to average South Koreans.
There is plenty of evidence that South Korean public opinion sways rather wildly based on news coverage and episodic events. While reputedly 40 percent of Koreans surveyed blame the US for North Korea’s nuclear testing, the rest apparently does not. Indeed, in the aftermath of such an obvious and graphic demonstration of the “Sunshine” policy’s falilure, the public sentiment in South Korea seems to be swaying against “engagement” with North Korea and its chief sponsor China (already strained in some ways due to an ongoing historical Sino-Korean dispute) and toward the continuing alliance with the US.
Joshua also points to the pervasive anti-Americanism among South Korean youths. This is particularly true of university students. But my impression is that university students everywhere, including in our own country, often harbor anti-American views. Indeed, the opinion that the latest North Korean nuclear testing should be blamed on President Bush, rather than on Kim Jong-Il, is rather common, not just on Korean university campuses, but in the American academia as well.
In fact, as the young age, their views tend to become more conservative (faculty in general, however, is hopeless). This also the case in South Korea. As the younger segment of the population matures, it may not wholeheartedly embrace the US as all that is good and pure in the world, but it certainly appreciates the stability and prosperity America’s leadership brings to the world and specifically to South Korea.
Then there is a number of strategic concerns separate from the issue of anti-Americanism. The chief among these is the maintenance of balance of power in the Northeast Asia region that is undergoing some transformation due to the rise of Chinese economic and military power. There is no need to re-invent the wheel in discussing this subject, so I point the readers to Richardson’s piece, “The Coming East Asian Arms Race,” in particular his conclusion:
For Americans, the notions that a withdraw is a deserved payback for the rampant anti-Americanism in South Korea, or that the few billion we spend on defense there is a catastrophic waste, need to be discarded. The potential cost of a war would be far greater in both American lives and in dollars, the benefits of continued peace immeasurable.
Indeed, a well-known strategic thinker, by no means a dove, recently remarked to me, “It’s one thing to avoid countries with overwhelming and ingrained anti-Americanism. But it’s childish to leave every country with periodic surges of anti-Americanism. If we did that, we’d be back to Fortress America. Whether we like it or not, the Korean Peninsula is a strategic area, especially with China rising, and we need to stay there unless we know for sure that the South Koreans have turned forever against us.”
Indeed, in my view, the re-evaluation of the US-ROK alliance should be deferred until a conservative government comes to power, as appears likely next year, and provides some indication of whether or not the anti-American streak in South Korea is “seasonal” or permanent. If it turned out to be “seasonal,” we will have to learn to live with it while doing our best to work with the host government to marginalize it as a price for maintaining our pre-eminent strategic postition in this increasingly vital area. If it turned out to be permanent, we should indeed follow Joshua’s recommendation and end the alliance. But until that can be ascertained, we should not substitute an emotional response for sound strategic thinking.
As one of my previous bosses often said to me, “You can threaten to kill yourself many times, but you can only do it for real once.”
October 19th, 2006 at 7:16 pm
I’ve been coming to Korea since the mid-90’s, so I’ve only seen the Korea Joshua accurately portrayed (I’ve spent several non-consecutive years here). Whether or not a conservative government would be able to suppress the rising number of anti-American South Koreans remains to be seen. The possibility that a truly conservative government could be elected in South Korea is questionable, with the anti-American yourth starting to out number the aging, more rational voters.
However, the nature of the alliance does need to change. South Korea should rightly take on the major burden (both cost and personnel) of their own defense. We do need to dramatically reduce and restructure USFK, with less combat arms personnel on the ground.
Reducing and restructuring USFK to primarily provide support (intel, etc.) during peace time while retaining the capability to receive and integrate combat units during times of crisis is the way to go. This would dramatically change the demographic of USFK (more command sponsored billets (hopefully), longer tours, slightly older Soldiers), which would hopefully have a positive affect on community relations.
Those are our changes to make, and they are long overdue. Now, if the South Korean govt refuses to do their part and defend the alliance in public debate, then it’s time to pack our toys and leave. It is upsetting that it’s taken a decade for someone in the U.S. to realize/point out that successive South Korean govts, their media, and the vocal portion of their population have been using USFK and the US as their personnal penata. US Soldiers should not be treated the way we are here (spit on, discriminated against, swindled by authorities). We should not have to fear our “allies” who we have traveled across an ocean without our families to defend at their request.
October 19th, 2006 at 11:45 pm
I don’t doubt that at all. Your time in Korea coincides almost exclusively with the leftists’ tenure in the Blue House. Even with the relatively short history of the modern South Korea, I’d say 10 years don’t make up a big enough sampling. I think the currency speculation attacks (”IMF” episode) to the North Korean nuclear testing form two brackets of a certain period in South Korean history. It is certainly not long enough time to make definitive judgments about Korea or Koreans.
If by “truly conservative,” you mean in our, American, sense of “limited government, free enterprise, strong national defense and traditional (some say Christian) values,” I doubt that you’d see that very much anywhere else. It’s a struggle enough here.
By “conservative” in an international context, I mean generally anti-communist, pro-American, pro-business and socially traditional. It is certainly not impossible for ROK to have such a government again. To say that such a thing is impossible extrapolates too much from a limited period of Korean history. I have observed Korea well over 30 years now. I think I have longer time span and certainly more familiar and in-depth view of Korea than the vast majority of Americans, even “Korea hands.”
I wholeheartedly agree.
Again, that more accurately describes the past ten years, largely under leftists’ rule.
Of course, I agree fully. But this is not a problem unique to Korea. Many who served in Europe during the Sixties and Seventies (and in some instances during the Eighties) when student radicalism reached its peak can attest to egregious treatments of Americans by local populations.
Again, the issue, in strategic context, is, are these episodes politically seasonal or are they more permanent, enduring local socio-political phenomena? I argue that the judgment cannot be made in the case of Korea simply from the experience of the past ten years.
Leaving a geopolitical vacuum in the nexus among China, Russia and Japan based on that relatively short period of time is quite a bet.
October 20th, 2006 at 12:39 am
The election of conservatives to the Blue House will simply return the situation to what it has been since the mid-1980s and possibly longer:
It will return to a situation where Korean society as a whole enjoys whoring the US military out. And I believe describing as using a whore fits like a glove.
Korean society as a whole likes to entertain the ideas of the radicals but not to the point of making policy based on it.
The majority see the US as a necessary evil that is evil and necessary.
Korean society as a whole is anti-US in Korea. They have been since at least 1996 when I arrived, and they will continue to be so.
Respect for the alliance among the majority only rises in direct proportion to its fear: fear of NK, fear of losing USFK, fear of making US consumers angry, and fear of making Korea look bad in the international media.
Right now, they are afraid. In the mid-1990s, they were just comfortable with stoking Korean nationalism through anti-US fun. And I believe this habit has been around since the 1980s and that even Park Chung Hee used it from time to time as a negociating tool with the US.
The only generations that match your point are those who remember the Korean War and Japanese colonization, and they are dieing out and have lost the demographic power to make changes that should make the risks the US takes in South Korea worthwhile.
I personally hate the idea of whoring out our military for the sake of balance of power in North East Asia with South Korea as the focal point.
Japan will do well enough without putting so many American lives at stake for a nation that very much does like to feel better about it self by believing the US is a big if not the biggest problem in the society.
I really hate this old stand-by argument the US and South Korean government have been putting out for a long time: “It’s only a radical minority problem. Most South Koreans want US troops to say.”
I feel like beating my head against the wall every time I hear it.
It is such a lie with a tiny big of truth for the facade.
Yes - they want our troops to stay. Yes - the also want to base Korean nationalism in a large measure on disliking those same troops and the government that puts them in harm’s way.
It needs to end —— it needs to end before NK starts to implode and decides to take chunks of USFK with it.
October 20th, 2006 at 12:44 am
tiny bit of truth
October 20th, 2006 at 1:51 am
We are heavily committed n Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran could become a problem. Withdrawing U.S. troops from Korea is long overdue, and would give us more troops for duty elsewhere. Korea is either quite capable of defending itself now, or it was never worth defending in the first place.
October 20th, 2006 at 2:08 am
James,
I know that I’ve only experienced the “bad” period in Korea in terms of open, violent anti-Americanism, but I think that you might be expecting too much if you think a different government can quell it now.
When I used “truly conservative”, I meant that no politician in South Korea is conservative. For the most part, the spectrum seems to go something like this:
liberal–liberal, nationalist–ultra liberal–nK collaborator
I don’t think there is common ground to be found to use as the foundation for a future US/Korea alliance. Both sides have to see and acknowledge the benefits/reason the alliance exists.
October 20th, 2006 at 5:46 am
I only have time for a brief comment, but as I wrote in the post, The Coming East Asian Arms Race, and the longer version at ATol, South Korea Must Choose Sides, I believe it would be a monumental mistake for USFK to be either withdrawn or significantly reduced.
Now that North Korea has gone ‘nucular,’ this is truer than ever. Such an arms race could erase the relative regional stability that the U.S. presence has perpetuated for the past six decades, which is undeniably counter to U.S. interests. It could only be the result of shortsighted analysis on behalf of the DoD, and as I’ve worked in that environment I know how some of those folks wear blinders.
The arms race and regional instability would be the unintended consequences – but much easier to anticipate than, for example, the violence we now see in Iraq, also unintended consequences.
October 20th, 2006 at 6:40 am
James,
The current development of foreign policy ‘by the citizens in the street’ bodes ill for all.
I’m constantly reminded of the truism: ‘All political movements are eventually taken over by the radicals, who then proceed to eliminate all the moderate elements within the movement.’
In light of this, I’m convinced that all attempts to go with a policy that is ‘reasonable’ are, ultimately, futile.
I tend to side with Richardson’s thought processes, but argue that they depend on the widespread existence of a ‘well-thought-out and enlightened self-interest’ on the part of the major political parties in Korea. The pandering to the mobs by the last two administrations in the Blue House support the impression that Korea is still not ready for ‘prime time’. This was clearly exhibited by the purposeful and cynical mis-reporting of the tragedy of the ‘Crushing to Death of the Two Middle-School Girls’. The ludicrous farce known as the ‘USFK Han River Dumping Incident’ should not be forgotten … and don’t even get me started on President Roh’s malaise in ‘working with the US’ in Iraq.
To me, since the situation would ultimately get to the one suggested by Joshua, why don’t we just ‘cut to the chase’ and get that position ’staked out’ … as he did so well with his testimony before the House’s sub-committee.
October 20th, 2006 at 8:39 am
While I don’t have any evidence of this, yet, I tend to believe that the North Korean nuclear test may have started a major shift in the course of anti-Americanism in South Korea. Changes in public opinion don’t turn on a dime. . .
I also think the tendency of many (not all) South Koreans to overreact and not take a longer-term view plays directly into the arms race scenario; South Korea is practically guaranteed to start a massive build-up in the event of a USFK withdrawal. It’s easy to follow what likely would occur in the rest of the region.
As far as pulling out troops due to anti-Americanism (or even in some administrations), I see it as akin to cutting off ones nose to spite ones face (thanks for the correction, Mr. Sheehan); a potentially destabilized East Asia could hurt us more than staying in a country were many hate us.
And there will always be those in South Korea that hate us, even if popular opinion turns around. For those I suggest we take perverse pleasure while they stew in the futility of their efforts.
October 20th, 2006 at 5:22 pm
Perhaps I didn’t read Joshua’s presentation entirely but I don’t believe unpopularity is the main reason for pulling out of Korea. I can’t imagine a serious argument for the US to withdraw from any country based upon polls. Its the government that counts. Polls and the street are fickle and too easily contradictory.
Pulling out is a big deal with extraordinary reasons, such as
1.Fundamental disagreements on national security.
2.Betrayal of one party’s strategic interests.
3.Host country telling the US to go.
4.Dramatic change of geo-politics in the neighborhood that lessens or eliminates the alliances purpose.
Of these reasons, I see #1 applying as long as ROK sponsors the north with hundreds of millions of foreign exchange. Clearly the money used to develop nukes in the North didn’t come from Nork exports, innovation and normal commerce. The South, with its largess has aided northen nuclear development. I don’t think this was intentional, but I do think it was benighted.
So there are grounds developing for the US to withdraw, despite its own preferences. Should the ROK continue to financially support the north in definance of its alliance partner then number 2 comes into play and then the straws have accumulated to break the alliance’s back.
Personally I like what USFK does for the United States. But if ROK won’t play nice, then the US doesn’t have a choice.
October 20th, 2006 at 11:48 pm
I second changehappens’ thoughts above. I don’t think people who are seriously looking at the situation are for pulling out based on anti-US thought alone or as the most important primary factor. I know I don’t.
I look at the risks vs returns, and the returns have not been worth it since the end of the Cold War —- and the more NK stays a hair’s breathe from collapse, the more the risks have risen considerably.
It does not make sense to risk so much for so little.
And I’ll add again one of the items Richardson and I disagree on - with him being supported by more of the paid pundits and me more isolated:
The arms race argument just doesn’t work for me any more.
China is building up its military to be in the same ballpark as the US. That means they are going to build up and build up and build up no matter what.
North Korea is already armed to the teeth and can’t afford to boost it any more.
The US wants Japan to beef up.
So, what arm’s race are we preventing by keeping the US locked into fighting for South Korean society if war should break out again?
Preventing South Korea from a major build up is worth the risks involved in staying?
It just does not make any sense to me what so ever. I just don’t see some significantly more mammoth arms build up coming more than is already taking place just because we stay in South Korea.
October 21st, 2006 at 12:45 am
usainkorea:
And your proof for that is? Both you and Joshua have a rather limited view of South Korean political and social history, drawn from your personal observations from a very narrow range of time. Both of you were profoundly affected by a very specific period that may prove to have been an aberration. Again, 10 years — especially the only 10 years of leftist rule in South Korea — are not nearly enough time to pronounce such judgments that “Korean society as a whole is anti-US in Korea.”
You are saying that Koreans view the alliance with the US based on their perception of security and economic needs? You don’t say! You mean there are nations out there that ally with us for the love?
Er, the “good cop, bad cop” routine as a negotiating tool is very common in most, likely all, host countries.
No. You clearly did not understand me. Those older folks are what I call the “gratitude” people. They are indeed dying out. There will not be others like them, no matter who comes to power in Seoul. However, when “adults” are back in charge in the Blue House, the mature policy types will understand how precarious ROK’s position is in the new neighborhood. They are much more likely to “play ball” with the US (not like a grateful poor younger brother, but more like a real ally). And because actions of radical anti-American types can harm that relationship, they will use the considerable powers that central governments have in ROK (particularly in influencing media coverage) to make radical anti-American antics as unappealing to the majority as possible.
Been to a demonstration or two in Okinawa, have you?
Pooh. A big fat strawman. My view is not that simplistic. I always acknowledge that anti-Americanism in Korea is deep and pervasive. But the core of that anti-Americanism is present in perhaps 25-30 percent of the population. About an equal number is positive about the alliance with the US. The rest sway based on news coverage and episodic events, over which the government in Seoul has considerable leverage.
Feel free to do so, for the sound is only coming from your head, not mine.
As for the arms race argument, it’s not simply about preventing a South Korean military build-up. Should the US depart, and China continues to modernize its military, both South Korea and Japan will be forced to increased militarization substantially (and if you think the current, narrowly-focused modernizations in ROK and Japan are “build up,” you ain’t seen nothin’ yet).
And when that happens, the chance for conflict will be substantially greater (perhaps over Taiwan, perhaps over the remnant of North Korea, perhaps over a few worthless rocks claimed by both China and Japan). And, mark my words, WE will become involved in any fighting, one way or another.
October 21st, 2006 at 12:46 am
changehappens:
Should the right return to power in Seoul, I expect this policy to be terminated rather quickly.
October 21st, 2006 at 9:12 am
James J. Na
“Should the right return to power in Seoul, I expect this policy to be terminated rather quickly.”
Perhaps a few American policymakers have said that during the last decade, prior to Korean elections. So what should we do if the right doesn’t return to power in 2007? What if the right has a small majority and is weak? The US must deal with the here and now rather than governments and their policies yet to be elected.
October 21st, 2006 at 11:28 am
That is extraordinarily short-sighted. The election is next year! As for the following question:
Let me repeat what I wrote originally:
October 21st, 2006 at 12:58 pm
“strawman”
Funny, I was thinking the same thing with all those pot shots.
“Been to a demonstration or two in Okinawa, have you?”
So - Japan-Korea Same-Same, eh?
“And your proof for that is?”
Another pot shotter…
This isn’t a pot shot, but what is your experience in South Korean society? I don’t know, and it would help if I did.
I arrived in Korea before Kim Dae Jung was elected - so unless you put Kim Young Sam in the same boat in order to limit my understanding based solely on the years I was there - I don’t think you can say I focused on one or two trees and missed the forest.
I got the forest described to me by adult students ranging in age from 19 to mid-50s. The majority were not university students but those between the ages of 28-40. I heard what they had to say - again and again and again - month after month - for two years before I started teaching younger kids (and adults) in a different hakwon.
I also read the newspapers (English version) and paid attention.
I have also gone to graduate school on Korean Studies (in the US).
I’m not going to attempt to write a paper here, but there are plenty of examples and cultural artifacts (like polls) to support both Joshua ’s and my view.
You can slap the opinion away as naive and shallow if it makes you feel better (”You are saying that Koreans view the alliance with the US based on their perception of security and economic needs? You don’t say! You mean there are nations out there that ally with us for the love?”).
You kind of forgot the other side of this, no? as well as dumping another key consideration from what I said.
Coupled with the “no love” is active promotion of anti-US thought. We’ve seen it in the universities and elsewhere for a long time.
But you are correct, under Rhee, Park, Chun and Roh, the government did use its power to stifle anti-US promotion as best it could (but far from having complete success). But, I’ll give you some credit by stating I doubt you are telling us those methods of government “leadership” should return…
but this did make me wonder just a tiny bit: “they will use the considerable powers that central governments have in ROK (particularly in influencing media coverage) to make radical anti-American antics as unappealing to the majority as possible.”
You could say I misread your point again if you focus attention on “antics” of the radicals.
(But, hasn’t the media routinely bashed the radical groups for “antics”? MacArthur statue? base breakins? Embassy breakins????)
This might be a fruitful avenue to expand the conversation rather than repeating ourselves:
Do you think the media’s coverage that helps promote anti-US thought is controlled by the Roh government - or - is it more a product of what you get when the university system and other influencial elements within the society have been promoting an anti-US/Korean nationalism message for some time?
And this is at the heart of why I believe you are wrong.
Kim Dae Jung and Roh did not invent anti-Americanism. Kim Dae Jung didn’t really promote it much at all - that I remember - until recently and while out of office. He changed policy big time, but he did not play up to anti-US rhetoric or align himself with the types of groups and people Roh has. Or, if he did, they seem to have kept their mouths shut around reporters much better than Roh’s people.
The Koreans I talked to day to day in classes in 1996 and 1997 already had the view the US was a huge problem in Korean society - but it was a “cancer” they had no choice but to “endure.”
(You might take great comfort in the fact they still saw the “need” for USFK, I don’t —- because our need to be in Korea is so much less than it was before the 1990s…)
These adults, and what I saw from the newspapers and other things produced by Korean society/culture, did not come to these conclusions over night. They did not turn on the TV one day and get a news report that turned their attitude against the US in Korea. You don’t get what we are seeing now out of Korean society over night or in just a couple of years.
Korean society has been cultivating the anti-US culture for decades. Even right-wing ultra-nationalists have helped out from time to time during the Park Chung Hee era, but it minimum during the last few decades, perhaps well into the 1960s, both the pro-communist (leftists) underground and anti-South Korean dictator movements have had attached anti-US promotion that has had an important influence on Korean society as a whole. The reach of the anti-authoritarian rule line of thought was particularly deep.
What we have seen is that - as democracy grew in Korea - so did anti-US activity — and what is crucial - the thought became mainstream.
So what is a conservative government going to do? What kind of pressure do you have in mind on the media? What about education? Are we going to see censorship return? The recent movie that depicted a monster coming out of the Han because of the 2000 water dumping case would not have been allowed to be made? But it was made, and it was highly popular.
The Korean media does not sway those fence sitters because they are weightless, brainless leaves blown any which way in the wind.
Anti-US activity has become more pervasive on the surface under democracy - because it is what sells the best among the people. The Korean press today isn’t forced to print what the leftist Roh government wants. In fact, they beat the hell out of Roh and Uri and on positions that directly tie into key alliance areas - like war time control. The Korean press is basically free, and as such, it caters to its audience. Anti-US coverage and rampant nationalism comes out, because it is what people want to hear - at times.
I would even say we have seen less anti-US promotion in the press the last few years. Since 2003, when the US said it was going to take a major chunk of US troops out, and especially in 2005 and this year, the press has not taken up any of the rallying cries of the radical groups or promoted an issue that works against the US in Korea all out of proportion as it has routinely done in the past (since the dictorial governments have disappeared).
The last couple of years, you can see many more examples of how the press has tried to keep a lid on damage to the alliance by bashing Roh and by not jumping on GI crimes or going full tilt to back the rice farmers or bash the FTA. Roh and crew have found little support for their causes in the press.
So I don’t see how a conservative Blue House is going to reverse the trend in anti-US thought by leaning on the press.
But, all of this above is pointless if someone believes the need to be in Korea is too great to leave.
That is the real heart of the discussion.
I believe the need is not close to being what it was during the Cold War. As I stated earlier, I see no convincing reason to believe a much greater “arms race” is going to kick off that is already taking place if we leave Korea.
If we leave Japan, I can picture regional tension rising to the point all the major players would be involved to a point that economic interests would be hurt and possibly a regional war developing in the future.
If we don’t leave Japan, but we do leave Korea, I believe the chances any scenerio that dictates a need to remain in Korea would take place are small.
And they are not worth the risks we assume by keeping troops in Korea.
The need does not justify the potential costs.
This is with no consideration given to anti-US culture in South Korea whatsoever.
When you throw in anti-US culture, and how it has been growing for decades, and how it is NOT going to reverse itself, it makes even less sense to wait around for North Korea to collapse to see if it will lash out and drag the US into Korean War II.
October 21st, 2006 at 2:19 pm
James,
Based on your last comment, what do you imagine will happen once unification comes and it is on South Korean terms - which is the most likely outcome -
specifically - do you imagine the US military position in Korea will continue — that it will also continue in the strategic mission of preventing escalating tension and an arms race and other factors that are used to justify keeping troops in South Korea pre-unification?
I ask, because this has long been one of the areas that always left me scratching my head when I would hear the US and SK jointly say US troops would remain in Korea post-unification. I’ve always wanted to know what the US side had been smoking if they really believed that was how things are going to turn out.
Once the threat from NK is no more, South Korean society is going to act in a manner that will make what the French showed under De Gaulle look like they threw a love-fest for US troops when France pulled out of NATO.
And then what happens with to the arms race theory? What happens with that if Korea unifies and the Korean people tell the US military to get out?
(How many people familiar with South Korean society believe the society will not ask the US military to leave once the NK threat is completely removed?)
October 21st, 2006 at 3:05 pm
Actually, I think the testimony ought to pretty much speak for itself, and in it, I did not claim that anti-Americanism is irreversible or that the alliance could not be saved in some useful form. In fact, I suggested exactly the opposite in my conclusions, but the South Korean government will have to stop harming matters and start acting like an ally. I believe that as things are proceeding now, the alliance is dying (said so 56 times now, at last count). If the alliance is to be saved, the U.S. and Korean governments will have to fight lies by speaking the truth. Rather that restating myself, I simply invite readers to read the testimony and draw their own conclusions.
Anti-Americanism exists in other places, of course, but this is beside the point. I’ve also seen it in most of the two dozen-odd countries I’ve visited, but never so viscerally expressed by the elected government of a nation with which we have such an unbalanced security relationship. We would be deluding ourselves to believe that this can go on forever, no matter how much sense the alliance makes to intelligent and objective thinkers. Korea is a democracy, and as the bombing range controversy showed, political constraints can undermine military readiness, just as anti-Americanism undermines morale and public support among Americans.
While I agree that North Korea’s behavior of late is an opportunity for us to speak forthrightly to the South Korean people, it’s really the job of the Korean government to do that. Instead, it’s doing the opposite; hence, poll results showing 30-40% of South Koreans blame America for the tests. You may not think that these and other statistics I cite give an accurate picture. In that case, I’d simply invite you to cite other objective facts to refute my assertions.
I think that the long-term trends are unfavorable, and I don’t think that ignoring or downplaying the problem will solve it. We’re not government officials constrained by rules of diplomacy, so we can and should speak bluntly when given the extraordinary privilege of doing so.
Again, I don’t advocate a summary U.S. withdrawal from Korea, but I think we’re living in 1960 if we think the American people would be willing to throw American infantry into another Korean ground war. My take is that having a lot of ground troops in Korea is causing us most of the political cost we’re paying to be there, sets us up for military failure, and provides relatively little military benefit. That’s what Richard Nixon could see as far back as 1971.
October 21st, 2006 at 4:19 pm
James J. Na
“If it turned out to be permanent, we should indeed follow Joshua’s recommendation and end the alliance. But until that can be ascertained, we should not substitute an emotional response for sound strategic thinking.”
Seasonal or permanent Anti-Americanism is a condition not unique to Korea both for GI’s and expats. For instance in West Germany during the 70’s and 80’s, huge rallies against the US were orchestrated by Moscow(could some in ROK be directed from the North…absofu**knlutely). At least as high a percentage, maybe more, wanted the US out of Germany and other parts of Europe. We held our noses, kept the North Atlantic alliance and won a decisive victory over the USSR.
The US government should care some, but not much, about seasonal or permanent Anti-Americanism from the street or even in day to day life. What she should care about is the policies of host governments. If the government executes anti-American policies in ways that cross our vital interests or jeopardize our security then sound strategic thinking would compel alliance reassessment or termination.