Update: Although China has inspected some cargo going into North Korea, questions are being raised about how China and South Korea will interpret and implement enforcement of Saturday’s sanctions:

. . .the South Korean government said it would still pursue economic projects with North Korea, including an industrial zone and tourist resort in the North. Those projects are not explicitly covered by the Security Council resolution, but they are an important source of hard currency for the North.

China. . . said Saturday that it had no intention of stopping and inspecting cross-border shipments, as called for, but not specifically required, in the resolution. The Chinese government said nothing on Sunday about how it intended to carry out the sanctions, and American officials said they would be focused on whether the normal trade flow across the border was slowed.

Original post: While UN Security Council Resolution 1718 will indeed cause some, perhaps even major, discomfort for the North Korean elite, China has already laid the ground work for not enforcing 1718 to the letter by suggesting the PRC will not interdict North Korean vessels suspected of transporting banned cargoes.

South Korean officials have stated that, “South Korea’s engagement policy must continue despite Pyongyang’s purported nuclear test.” The administration is in complete denial – President Roh “said he cannot agree with the claim that Seoul’s over-generosity towards Pyongyang is a failure since ‘not a single grain of rice was given to it without preconditions.’” In reality, food aid is almost entirely unmonitored.

ROK officials have indicated that the Kaesong and Kumgangsan projects will continue because closing them would not hurt North Korea. However, North Korea receives billions of dollars from such ventures, and some of that money probably helped finance various WMD programs.

Reports of the death of the Sunshine Policy appear to be premature – at least until elections.

This is not the reality I want, but I will stick with my assessment that the nuclear test was a near total success for North Korea strategically, even if it was perhaps a dud and they will fact short to mid-term pain due to sanctions. In one fell swoop it has managed to ensure isolation (its primary method of regime survival since 2002), and changed the security landscape of NE Asia, ensuring a viable ‘threat’ to arm and rally its people against. Finally, North Korea knows that China (and South Korea to a lesser extent) can be counted on to fill the gap between pain and instability. And the U.S. likley will not take the actions that might prompt China to rid us of the Kim regime.