North Korea’s Nuclear Test - Why and What Can Be Done
by Richardson ~ October 9th, 2006. Filed under: Axis of Evil, China-Korea Relations, Engagement, Nuclear Proliferation, Six-Party Talks, WMD. 
Why North Korea tested nuclear device.. and why now? These questions of course assume that North Korea did in fact test a nuclear weapon and didn’t just detonate a large amount of conventional explosives in order to simulate a successful nuclear test. This could be the case considering the well publicized failure of the Taepodong ICBM on 4 July.
However, North Korea had a combination of reasons for testing a nuclear weapon; The timing of it, as author Chuck Downs has pointed out (by phone on an MSNBC broadcast, 0105-0115 am EST 9 Oct), has to do with South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon’s nominated at the new UN Secretary General – North Korea is trying to steal the spotlight and highlight it’s importance and technical acumen. As it is autumn, it is unlikely that fuel and food aid will be cut right before winter sets in. Japanese Prime Minister Abe has also just visited Beijing and arrived in Seoul, which was a bonus.
This is not the first time North Korea has done this. In a failed attempt to upstage the South, Pyongyang hosted an elaborate Arirang Festival over the summer of 2002 and made a point of opening it up to foreigners at the same time South Korea was jointly hosting the World Cup with Japan.
The obvious reason is for deterrence of an attack or invasion from a U.S. seeking regime change. However, military action by the U.S. was already extremely unlikely as any such action would put Seoul, South Korea’s capital, in danger of being hit by the thousands of artillery pieces just north of the border and well within range. That’s aside from the U.S. being overextending in Iraq. So a nuclear deterrent is only another level of deterrence.
The not so obvious reason is that North Korea has been implementing a strategy of disengagement since 4 October 2002, when then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in Pyongyang meeting North Korean Deputy Foreign Minster Kang Seok-Ju. When confronted with U.S. evidence, Kang admitted that North Korea had secretly continued a nuclear-weapons development program.
After that the words “complete, verifiable, and irreversible” became a part of the U.S. negotiating lexicon concerning denuclearization, which caused a shift in North Korean strategy from Regime survival by Extortion of Concessions to Regime survival by Strategic Disengagement.
North Korea cannot accept engagement for two primary reasons. First, invasive inspections would make the regime look weak internally and risk control of the military. Second, inspections on the scale that would be required for any new package deal would likely bring in an unprecedented influx of foreigners, something North Korea does not want.
This is because the legitimacy of the regime was built on a cult mythology that would be in jeopardy if outside information were to reach the isolated and misinformed North Korea population. The exposure of the North Korean people to reality vis-à-vis the cult is an enormous vulnerability for the regime.
What can be done about North Korea now? Excluding military intervention, there are still some options left for applying pressure on North Korea.
U.S.: First, the U.S. could make the world economy choose between itself and North Korea, effectively shutting down all international financial transactions for North Korea. China and South Korea would be most effected. Second, the U.S. could pressure regional powers to enforce the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) against North Korea. The PSI prevents proliferation of WMD-related goods and technologies. Third, if the U.S. chose to push for near-term regime change, China’s access to the U.S. marketplace could be threatened if China continues to support the regime. This might include a deal where U.S. forces in Korea remain in South Korean territory below the 38th parallel once Korea reunifies.
Japan: Remittances from Japan are estimated to be in the tens of millions; that’s probably going to stop, and it will hurt the North Korean elite.
South Korea: Condition free aid may come to an end, although it may wait until Roh is out of office.
China: The key is China; only China controls the fuels and aid that literally keeps the North Korean regime from falling. But China will only use this leverage if the U.S. uses its leverage to force China. So not likely that China will be the deciding factor here.
Is This a Failure for the Bush Administration? In a word, no. North Korea had no intention in making a realistic deal from the outset, and has broken every nuclear-related agreement is has made with both the U.S. and South Korea. North Korea has steadfastly refused to come back to the Six-Party Talks since September last year, literally throwing away aid packages that could have helped it’s starving population.
Aside from invading North Korea there is no realistic action any U.S. administration could have done that would have stopped North Korea from producing nuclear weapons. The notion that another deal like the 1994 Agreed Framework could have stopped this is deceptively attractive, but nonetheless incorrect.
The only deal North Korea would accept is one that did not include “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization,” in other words, another deal where North Korea reaps concessions for stopping nuclear activity, but actually continues such activity, as it did with the 1994 agreement. It’s also worth noting that North Korea likely had nuclear weapons before Bush 43 was even elected.
October 9th, 2006 at 7:03 pm
Articulate and thoughtful, as always.
But have you answered your own question: why did they do it? To say that they are implementing a strategy of disengagement does not explain the provocation. One can disengage without setting off bombs . . .
The speculation that this was an extremely small nuclear bomb (see the latest postings at the Belmont Club) suggests that Kim is letting it be known that he has devices suitable for terrorist use, or capable of delivery by Taepodong. Extortion seems a more plausible motive than disengagement for releasing that particular information…
October 9th, 2006 at 7:46 pm
You’re absolutely correct that the nuke is, to put it mildly, overkill. I think the Kim regime made a gross miscalculation.
The problem with the extortion theory is that the only realistic deal that will ever come from Washington must include CVID. That would mean engagement, and an influx of round eyes as well as ‘corrupt’ South Koreans, and much information coming into the closed society; something the cult aspect of the regime cannot tolerate. Hence disengagement.
Some have argued in the past that a Democratic president might not enforce CVID, and seek another 1994 Agreed Framework-like deal. The nuclear test precludes abandoning CVID. Finally, the Taepodong 2 has a long way to go before it can go very far, if you know what I mean.
October 9th, 2006 at 8:33 pm
This is a rather risky way to disengage, but perhaps the North is desperate and willing to go for broke.
Still … what can disengagement bring? Does Kim Jong-il simply intend to disengage and hope for the best, or does he have some plan beyond short-term survival?
And if he discovers that he’s not going to survive, will he decide to take others down with him … now that he has his nuclear toy?
As you say, things are about to get interesting.
Jeffery Hodges
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October 9th, 2006 at 8:48 pm
Wow, I hadn’t followed a link over to here before. Looks alot like the Korea Liberator.
I really do hope the U.S. pressures China (and SK) to get on board with the sanctions. Using access to the U.S. market would be a great way to accomplish this. An unitended benefit is it might even cause SK to see the benefits of FTA….
October 9th, 2006 at 8:57 pm
The test does may affect three other areas; 1.) The pending handover of wartime control and the likely USFK drawdown that would occur; 2.) The rearmament of Japan, and; 3.) ROK govt indifference to U.S.-ROK relations.
After the missiles tests in July, Rumsfeld said North Korea still wasn’t a threat to South Korea, which was taken as laying the grounds/justifying a USFK drawdown, or even a withdrawal. What’s Rumsfeld saying now?
With the Sunshine Policy in full swing, USFK dwindling and all but gone, and a Japan with article 9 still intact, where would that leave Kim’s ‘military first’ policy? Yes, the tight control on information would prevent those inside from seeing the truth of that, but the military might not.
At any rate, consider the landscape after the nuclear test; Sunshine is dead, Japan will only rearm faster, and we may see plans for drawing down USFK shelved (for awhile, anyway).
Kim has used the, ‘the-outside-world-is-out-to-get-us’ for decades – he’s just made it true, and given himself more reason to isolate and consolidate power. Threats from the outside bring them together; he’s counting on it.
October 9th, 2006 at 9:00 pm
Red,
Yes, it’s WordPress and the same person working the theme (me), although this is a different theme. Look for an announcement about this in a day or three at TKL.
I also hope the U.S. will put sufficient pressure on China. But am not sure we will.
October 9th, 2006 at 9:04 pm
But a policy of uniting because “the-outside-world-is-out-to-get-us” only works so long as the outside world isn’t really out to get you.
If he has now made it true that the outside world is out to get him, then he’s in deep trouble.
Jeffery Hodges
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October 9th, 2006 at 9:07 pm
What if he’s not fishing for a grand bargain which you say (and I have no reason to doubt your judgment) would have to include interventions that he cannot accept? He might have either more modest or more ambitious goals, ones that do not involve formal negotiations with the US.
For example, he might be trying to get the US to back off the financial noose-tightening which is perhaps starting to hurt. Or to induce the ROK to open the spigot of aid (public or clandestine) a little wider. Or even to elicit, by tacit intimidation, a meek response from the ROK while making the US want urgently to turn up the heat — thus perhaps bringing the alliance to a breaking point. I can only guess — and not particularly well-informed guesses, at that. Hints or demands from the DPRK in the near future may offer some clues as to the goal.
Or (more ambitiously) he may hope to persuade the ROK to accept an Anschluss if he can persuade them the alternative is a war that, even if he loses, will bring them catastrophe. If that is his aim then more, and increasingly threatening, military gestures will follow.
I really don’t know. But it seems to me an act of this nature signals pushing-against rather than pulling-away. It speaks aggression rather than disengagement — even if the aggression turns out to be a bluff.
It is a riveting story with high stakes for us all and I am grateful to you and your colleagues for providing excellent and timely insights as it unfolds.
October 9th, 2006 at 9:16 pm
Jeffery,
I agree that Kim made a monumental miscalculation; if I’m wrong and he does want to negotiate, he’ll have to accept the unacceptable as in CVID, but on the other hand if I’m correct and it’s part of an overall plan to ensure isolation (and, you know, to get the bomb too), then he could be in for a shock.
The major caveat I place with the ‘miscalculation’ statement is if China gets tough, finally. Without China I don’t think we can do much. Japan can cut off remittances, South Korea can stop the free love (including Kaesung/Kuemgangsan), etc.
October 9th, 2006 at 9:20 pm
Yes, China is the issue … unless Kim Jong-il can start playing the Russia card in the case that China cuts off aid.
In Realpolitik, such things can happen.
Jeffery Hodges
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October 9th, 2006 at 9:23 pm
Gray,
If Kim was shooting (pun intended) for the U.S. to back off sanctions or more aid from the south, then it was a definite misfire. He may have gotten the idea that it was possible – the aid and wedge you mention – after Roh’s response to the July missile tests (‘missile problem? what missile problem?’). Korean news (via my better half) has mentioned the possibility of ending Kaeseong and Kumgangsan ventures!
I don’t think North Korea would push to take over the south, however. Even if they were able to take it, the KPA would see how the other half has been living while their families literally starve to death in the north. I think mutiny would be fast in coming.
I’m waiting to see what happens just like the rest – heck, right now we don’t even know if it really was a nuke, or tons of conventional explosives!
October 9th, 2006 at 10:15 pm
Richardson,
Not trying to offend, I like the look of the site.
I still think KJI is hoping for a soft response from SK to further illustrate the differences between the U.S. and SK and finally kill the alliance, and he’s hoping China doesn’t play ball with sanctions (maybe they have a deal already).
One thing that I thought was interesting as I watched KBS yesterday, was that even after a suspected nuclear test, South Koreans still made the tourist trip to the NK mountain tourist site. The news was interviewing them about it asking if they were scared/worried as they departed for NK. Two older Koreans did decide to stay home…
October 9th, 2006 at 10:24 pm
Red,
No offense taken at all.
I think you’re right that there will be a softer response from SK than any of the other players and that China probalby won’t play hardball, at least willingly (i.e., w/o HARD U.S. pressure).
I think the two older Koreans should have stayed home - b/c going gives currency to Kim if for no other reason.
I’m still waiting to seek what the sniffer planes pick up…
October 9th, 2006 at 11:37 pm
Yeah, I was glad to see at least a couple Koreans not make the trip…but the bus was still pretty full of people who decided to go anyway…
October 10th, 2006 at 1:12 am
Ricardson,
I’ve got the creeping sensation that you guys are about to pull the plug on TKL. You and Joshua have been updating and improving your original blogs and it now seems turned off commenting over at TKL. What’s up and if I’m right, why?
October 10th, 2006 at 2:20 am
All your links (in the subsequent post) are belong to us! (They go nowhere. Do you need to include dd in yyyy/mm/dd/post-title/?
October 10th, 2006 at 5:36 am
Thanks Joel! A major oversight on my part ~ changing permalink structure to be compatible with TKL imports, but after I’d posted! Thanks again.
February 9th, 2007 at 12:35 am
[…] created a half dozen nuclear weapons he will be able to fully implement what fellow K-blogger Richardson at DPRK Studies calls Strategic Disengagement. Before strategically disengaging, if Kim can get the US to drop […]
June 15th, 2007 at 7:50 pm
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