Some Shocking Gossip Talk about U.S., Korea and China
by Richardson ~ September 18th, 2006. Filed under: America, China, China-Korea Relations, Engagement, Geopolitics, U.S.-Korea Relations, Washington Views.First, a BIG caveat emptor: the following is my speculation based on completely unverified rumors, gossip and other usual D.C. chatter, so take it for what it’s worth (that’s what the blogosphere is for, right?).
There are apparently increasing concerns that the Bush (43) administration’s second term is taking a radical departure from the policies, but not the rhetoric, of the first term, especially in foreign affairs. There is persistent gossip that the foreign policy/national security hawks who support confrontation against Iran and North Korea (and in the long-term, China) are losing influence while advisers and loyalists of the elder Bush (41) are being brought in quietly to change the direction.
Reputedly, the latter group favors a policy of retrenchment and negotiation — through which a substantial portion of U.S. forces will withdraw from Iraq, and concessions provided to both Iran and North Korea in exchange for a respite. These are to provide a legacy of “stability” and “security” — or peace, simply put — for the succeeding administration in what would be a distinctly Clintonian move (there are also those who suggest some intra-family motives within the Bush clan).
Furthermore, this group of influential advisers supposedly favors a long-term “engagement” with the People’s Republic of China, whereby, in return of American recognition of Chinese sphere of influence — including, crucially for this blog, the Korean Peninsula — the U.S. and China will continue to maintain a friendly economic relationship. The business lobby and wing of the Republican party are favorably inclined to this arrangement, it is said, since their members feel that the economic wellbeing of the U.S. is inexorably tied to the continued economic growth of China.
The sinister part of the rumor is that the administration will keep up the “tough talk” or the confrontational rhetoric to “buy off,” or attempt to buy off, the conservative base while slowly but surely redirecting the actual policy implementations.
As with other D.C. chatter, it is impossible to obtain verification for this kind of rumors. But it does appear that there is a furious battle going on behind the scene between “realists” and “neo-cons.” It is also true that the administration will, as with all lameduck administrations, inevitably fall into the legacy mode.
As it concerns the Korean Peninsula, the speculation is an alarming one. If true, this will mean a definitive end of the U.S.-ROK alliance; the end of the U.S. as a substantial Asian power (as opposed to a “mere” Pacific power); an effective retrenchment to Japan-Singapore-India perimeter and either an acceleration of the arms race as predicted by Richardson or, perhaps worse, a geopolitical domination of the zone north of that line by a mercantilist, oligarchical China.
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September 19th, 2006 at 2:45 am
If true, quite stunning news. Koreans should be very worried.
September 19th, 2006 at 2:58 am
I think we’ll be getting some news in the very near future that will tell whether or not this will occur.
At any rate, this is what the Koreans have been aligning themselves for for the past several years.
I think it’s going to be just another addition to the “be careful what you wish for” list.
September 19th, 2006 at 5:21 am
Don’t hate the player, hate the game.
September 19th, 2006 at 6:41 am
“concessions provided to both Iran and North Korea in exchange for a respite”
This is good news. Perhaps the financial sanctions will not last too long, and real negotiations can start.
I read that Barbara Bush is one of the ‘realists’ who is upset at Cheney and Rumsfeld for misleading her son. She supports Condi Rice and is probably influencing the president in this direction. Mother knows best.
September 19th, 2006 at 8:30 am
When wasn’t there tension in the GOP over business interests(pro China for example) versus ideological(pro human rights, religous freedom, anti communist) interests?
I’ve always thought that withdrawal from ROK under some circumstances is a defeat for the US. But the US position in Asia doesn’t revolve around the ROK.
September 19th, 2006 at 1:10 pm
I expected Mi-Hwa to express her jubilation.
True. But the balance of power has been leaning toward what you call the “ideological” side during the first administration. Now that balance is shifting to the pro-China crowd. Yet another significant change is China itself, which is becoming stronger everyday and poses a greater security threat with its rise. That geopolitical fact is likely to exacerbate the tension to a breaking point soon.
To the extent that it is the most forward base in continental East Asia that has managed to keep peace in the China-Japan-Russia-Korea nexus, it sure does.
September 19th, 2006 at 2:09 pm
“Now that balance is shifting to the pro-China crowd. Yet another significant change is China itself, which is becoming stronger everyday and poses a greater security threat with its rise. That geopolitical fact is likely to exacerbate the tension to a breaking point soon.”
I have seen this “pro China”, “anti China” talk ever since Nixon. I think its a healthy debate we have on how to engage China. In fact, we’ll continue to have it as China chases its global ambitions. I don’t think Bush came into office either Pro or Anti China. The downing of the P-3 and Chinese handling of the aftermath chilled relations in his first few months in office. Personally I view China as a competitor in all aspects of the global competition, more on the neo-con side if you will.
“To the extent that it is the most forward base in continental East Asia that has managed to keep peace in the China-Japan-Russia-Korea nexus, it sure does.”
What keeps the peace in Asia is overwhelming US power administered by the US Navy and Airforce, offshore from ROK. While I like having USFK on Korean soil as an annoyance to China, I think I’m beginning to understand the madness in Donald Rumsfeld’s recent musing. The US has decided to leave as quick as good manners permits. A nuke NORK with delivery systems might have something to do with it. USFK being an easy target for example. The other reason though is the US’s demonstrated ability to fight from afar.
The US has ample means offshore in Guam especially, plus Japan and even CONUS to decisively influence Asian militaries for years to come. With or without USFK.
September 19th, 2006 at 2:35 pm
That’s half the story. Having U.S. troops on the ground in Korea moderates responses/tensions to/from Korea.
Mostly true.
False. Keeping troops in both Japan and Korea is key to maintaining stability and staving of an East Asian arms race.
September 19th, 2006 at 7:21 pm
I take your point on an arms race. I think what you mean though is a Nuclear Arms race in Asia? From a conventional standpoint, the arms race has been brisk for years. Whatever the true dollar amount the Chinese are spending on defense, its seen double digit increases for many years. I think many countries have begun to respond to that while USFK exists.
Japan’s response has been obvious and high profile.
Australia buying long range offensive weapons(Jassm) is interesing.
Singapore buying long range strike fighters is another.
Need we say anything about India?
Lets look at the US. Its moving more bombers(nuclear capable), submarines and long range strike fighters to Guam every year. Its adding F-22’s to Alaska(sure to get Chinese & Russian attention). Its positioning ABM assets in the region. All of this happening with USFK extant.
Taiwan may one day be the country to surprise everyone as China’s headlock gets too tight. They could legitimately go nuclear as an act of self preservation.
I fear that Asia is in for rough sledding even with a USFK sitting in ROK.
September 19th, 2006 at 7:46 pm
It is true that there have been some selective modernization programs in India, Singapore, Australia, Japan and ROK, but certainly not to the across-the-board scale of the PRC.
The reason is simple: these regional powers rely to varying extent on the U.S. military might in the region.
Of course, the presence or withdrawal of USFK does/will not create dramatic and immediate effects, but they will be substantial in the long run nonetheless. Should the USFK withdraw completely and (eventually) sever the U.S.-ROK alliance, we will see a real arms race with real rearmaments of Japan and ROK.
Taiwan’s case is curious. Their Air Force is practically dropping out of the sky, yet the domestic politics angle is holding up any significant modernization.
As I have mentioned before, the ROC on Taipei, too, is too reliant on the American uncle who may not go to bat for it in the end, given the increasing amalgamation of Sino-American business interests and their considerable political leverage.
As far as naval and air power alone, they are obviously critical, but their impact is most decisive in short high-intensity wars. When conflicts are unexpectedly long and sustained (being redundant there), ground presence becomes an absolute necessity for victory.
Lastly, we need to distinguish between (military) force and (geopolitical) power. Force is physical and mechanical. No one doubts that our comparative capacity for force is overwhelming even over a great distance… for now.
Power, on the other hand, is a function of physical capacity and psychological conditions of both the projector and the recipient (i.e. willpower, perception, commitment and etc.). Ground presence adds value in the psychological element far more than mobile force.
I might also add that force, if used, is consumed, but power, if used, usually grows.
September 19th, 2006 at 11:39 pm
James,
You mention thatthe loss of USFK would cause Japan to rearm, but USFJ will still exist (and will likely grow as a result of the USFK loss). Sooo, what would be the reason for the Japanese rearmament?
September 19th, 2006 at 11:49 pm
Your thoughts on power go to the heart of this matter. Military power is the sine qua non of a nation’s standing. But as you say there is more to it.
How does dissolving USFK dilute American power?
Doubt is one way. Will the Head of Govt of Singapore have confidence that the US will defend its interests in Asia? Will the Prime Minister of Australia have the confidence all PM’s have had since 1942?
Those questions no doubt will be asked if USFK dissolves. However, the US isn’t simply saying soothing words. It is building a power base on Guam that is far more intimidating than anything we’ve had in Korea. We are funding a partnership with Japan that controls the airspace and seas from the Russian coast down to Guam. Australia is projecting power, jointly with America, out to Guam and west of Indonesia.
We are cultivating the Indians in the hopes of bridging Australia to the Arabian sea. All is not lost by far. I wonder what Chinese planners think as they daily charter tankers to ply the seas from Bandar Abbas through thousands of miles of water patrolled by America and its allies?
At bottom I think the ROK mess is caused by Roh expressing ROK’s vital interests as unification over maintaining his American friendship.
Whatever, the man has made his choice, he’s the elected head of state, the US has reacted in a way that defends its own vital interests.
September 20th, 2006 at 1:06 am
Absolutely. However, Roh is a temporary head of the state (as all elected leaders are). He is clearly unpopular, as are many of his policies.
We ought to base our calculations and policies on our long-term interests in the region, rather than temporary waxing and waning of domestic politics in the region. There is such a thing as throwing the baby out with the bath water.
As for what China thinks about the encirclement, I wrote of it previously in The Seattle Times: The roadblock to Beijing runs through New Delhi.
When encountering bottlenecks, they attemp to bypass.
September 20th, 2006 at 1:19 am
There is always a cost to relying on someone else (even one as benevolent as the U.S.) for national security.
Plus the U.S. is always pushing Japan to assume a greater security responsibility in East Asia. Combine that with one of the Japanese Right’s pet projects (real Japanese rearmament), mixed in with a judicious political pitching of the “crazy threat next door” (i.e. North Korea), presto, a real Japanese rearmament that will seriously irk Beijing’s master plan for Asian hegemony.