From Yonhap: One year after 9.19 agreement, U.S. faces same questions, same criticisms

One year after the signing of the six-party agreement on Korea’s denuclearization, the United States faces the same question, that is, whether to engage or squeeze North Korea. It also faces the same criticism of why it won’t talk with North Korea in a way that matters.

[. . .]

“It seemed to be a good agreement at the time,” said Don Oberdorfer, a professor at Johns Hopkins University here who closely follows Korean affairs.

But looking back, the agreement was a “bridge too far,” he said. “It goes beyond what the U.S. or North Korea was willing to do.” (emphasis added)

Really? I seem to remember a different version of reality. The one where North Korea refused (and still does) to participate despite multiple offers from the U.S. So who wasn’t willing to do what it takes?

The Treasury’s decision on Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a Macau bank that allegedly laundered money for Pyongyang, was announced just days after the Sept. 19 agreement was signed. U.S. officials deny any connection between the two and say that enough evidence was gathered at about that time for the Treasury to take action, and that the U.S. has to protect itself against financial crimes separately from foreign policy.

But North Korea is using the BDA case as an excuse to boycott the six-party talks, and whether the U.S. admits it or not, Washington is under growing pressure to take the first step to untangle the deadlock.

[. . .]

Oberdorfer called the BDA designation a “broad brush action” that does not distinguish between licitly gained funds from illicitly earned money. Making this distinction through a final ruling on BDA would meet the demands of both North Korea and the U.S. by freeing up any North Korean money that is licit but freezing assets that are not, and it would also be the face-saving measure Pyongyang needs to come back to the six-party talks.

Note the glaring absence of any mention of North Korea’s statement on 20 September last year, in which it basically reneged on the 19 September agreement. It was also a bit inconvenient that Seoul undermined talks with unconditional aid.

As far as the BDA funds held up, very simple; North Korea should cease its illegal activities.

Donald Gregg, former U.S. ambassador to Seoul, argues that sincere dialogue, not sanctions, is the only solution to the North Korea problem.

Christopher Hill, chief U.S. delegate to the six-party talks, has talked directly with North Koreans in frequency and substance unprecedented, and yet, he has not been able to take the extra step that can make a difference, such as a trip to Pyongyang.

Gregg, who often visits North Korea, said he urged leaders there to make the strategic decision like Libya and voluntarily come clean with all of its nuclear stockpile.

“The problem, I think, among some in the Bush administration is that they are unwilling to contemplate a transformational change in North Korea that leaves (North Korean leader) Kim Jong-il and his people in charge,” he said.

“I think they are much more interested in pressure that would cause some kind of regime change.” (emphasis added)

At some point a sensible person will come to the conclusion that North Korea wants to keep nukes, or make the world believe that they have them, and does not want to negotiation a deal. But Gregg is still in La-La Land. Some people cannot seem to understand that diplomacy is simply not attractive to the Kim regime. That’s why the DPRK will continue to disengage.
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