Ted Galen Carpenter’s article, Bringing Down Kim, offers a solution for convincing China to brink down the North Korean Regime; for the U.S. to end the U.S.-ROK “security alliance and withdraw all its forces from the peninsula.”

That is probably the single worst course of action the U.S. could take in regard to regional security and stability. It would practically guarantee a regional arms race that would end the stability that the U.S. has worked for six decades to maintain.

A carrot/stick approach would be far better. Two carrots would be to a) create a comprehensive plan to assist North Koreans in their country in the event of collapse, and; b) a U.S. policy that USFK units will remain below the 38th parallel (but not withdraw). The stick would be to suggest China to choose between propping up Kim Jong-il and having access to the U.S. economy.

Some excerpts from, Bringing Down Kim:

[I]t’s time to test the radical alternative of encouraging China to overthrow Kim’s regime, in return for America agreeing to end its military presence on the peninsula.

China is concerned enough about the behavior of its long-time ally that such incentives might just be enough to tempt Beijing to act.

[…]

China is also the one country with the ability to bring down Kim’s regime, since it provides much of the energy and food that keeps the impoverished regime afloat.

[…]

That could produce two consequences which Beijing fears, a massive influx of refugees and a reunified Korea that would continue Seoul’s security alliance with the U.S., so bringing American forces to China’s border.

While there is relatively little the U.S. can do to ease Beijing’s fears of being swamped with refugees, beyond offering to help with financial assistance, the second fear is easily addressed. Washington can pledge that, if China helps bring down Kim’s regime and end North Korea’s nuclear-weapons programs, the U.S. would end that security alliance and withdraw all its forces from the peninsula. This would, of course, be conditional on China also agreeing not to deploy any military forces on the peninsula.

Such a concession would do no more reflect the reality that Seoul is already drifting into Beijing’s orbit.

[…]

That’s unlikely to be the only concession Beijing would demand, in return for agreeing to bring down Kim’s regime. Chinese leaders have hinted in the past that they would expect U.S. concessions on Taiwan… That’s a concession Washington can never make, since it’s not America’s place to dictate to a fellow democracy what policies to adopt.

But a full troop withdrawal and an end to the security alliance with Seoul fall into a very different category. This simply involves relinquishing a waning strategic asset in return for something important. Nor is there any downside to making the offer. The worst that Beijing can do is say no. If, on the other hand, Chinese leaders respond positively then America will have found a cost-free way to prevent the emergence of a volatile nuclear power.

That’s a bit like praising the virtues of all the money you’d save by giving up your insurance policy.
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