Ulchi Focus Lens – What’s the Fuss About?
by Richardson ~ August 22nd, 2006. Filed under: DPRK Military, History, ROK Miltary, U.S. Military, U.S.-Korea Relations. 
North Korean media recently announced that the DPRK has the, “right to launch a pre-emptive attack to counter” Ulchi Focus Lens, commonly referred to as UFL. So what is UFL and why might the North Korean leadership feel threatened?
UFL is a U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) large scale warfighting command post exercise (CPX) conducted annually on the Korean Peninsula since 1975. The exercise is usually conduct in the August/September timeframe:
The exercise focuses on how U.S. and South Korean forces would defend against a North Korean attack. . . The exercise combines the Republic of Korea’s annual National Mobilization Field Training Exercise “Ulchi” with the annual theater level Command Post Exercise “Focus Lens.” The scenario of the exercise is a coordinated land, sea and air attack by conventional forces against friendly forces on the Korean peninsula. . . Ulchi Focus Lens is the world’s largest dynamic, simulation-driven battle staff training exercise.
[. . .]
The purpose of UFL is to exercise joint and combined plans and procedures associated with the execution of the OPLAN for the defense of the Republic of Korea. The focus is on the strategic, operational, and tactical aspects of military operations on the Korean Peninsula; and demonstrates US resolve to support the ROK against external aggression while improving US/ROK combat readiness and interoperability. This joint and combined political-military training exercise emphasizes flexible deterrent options, ROK mobilization, U.S. reinforcement, and synchronization of deep, close, and rear battles.
Unless North Korea plans to attack sometime soon, they shouldn’t feel too threatened by UFL as it’s a defensive rather than, “an undisguised military threat and blackmail against the DPRK (North Korea) and a war action.” In fact the ROK Ulchi exercise was a response to the 1968 attempted raid on the Blue House (Korea’s version of the U.S. Whitehouse).
The South Korean portion of the exercise name, Ulchi, is in honor of a Koguryo general, Ulchi Mundok (을지문덕):
. . . was a noted military leader of early 7th century Goguryeo, one of the Three Kingdoms of Korea. Often numbered among the greatest heroes in Korean military history, he defended Goguryeo against the Sui Chinese.
Mundeok was born in the mid-6th century and died sometime after 618, although the exact date is unknown. At the time of his birth, the kingdom of Goguryeo had grown to a powerful and belligerent empire, constantly warring with its neighbours, Chinese states to its north and west, and its fellow Korean kingdoms Silla and Baekje to its southeast and southwest respectively.
Image from here.
Related:
- U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)
- Combined Forces Command (CFC)
- OPLAN 5027 | 5029 | 5030
- Command Post Exercise (CPX)
- Ulich Mundok
August 22nd, 2006 at 9:04 pm
I was always amused by the NORK sabre rattling over UFL while I struggled to keep my eyes open in the Sim Center.
August 22nd, 2006 at 10:15 pm
I am glad that Richardson provided the background information to the name “Ulchi” in “Ulchi Focus Lens.”
Ulchi Moonduk is indeed considered one of the greatest military heroes in Korean history. He existed in that rare occasion in history where a Korean kingdom determined the fate of a mighty Chinese dynasty and was responsibile for the fall of the latter (of course, “Korean” and “Chinese” lose their meaning as we understand them today in the context of the period).
It should be noted that the numbers often cited in the Wiki account of the Battle of Salsu River (which are likely based on Korean literary traditions) are outlandishly wrong.
There was no way Sui could have mobilized 3 million troops let alone maintained them in the field.
Before the rise of industrialization (including food preservation) and, especially, locomotive power, it was nearly impossible to maintain such bodies of men in the field.
Armies, like locusts, ate through the areas they traversed, provided that these areas were populated and farmed in the first place. Thus they generally could not stay in one place more than a few days at most (and the travel routes were often determined by available natural water sources, on top of that).
Before Napoleon’s time, it was exceedingly difficult to maintain more than, say, 40,000 to 60,000 men in the most abundantly farmed of areas. Most armies were usually substantially smaller (20,000 to 30,000).
The Sui invasion force was declared to be 1 to 3 million, but (just as with Persian armies of Darius and Xerxes that invaded Greece) was in all likelihood a tiny fraction of that number.
My own estimation is that the Sui invasion force was likely less than 100,000 (counting everyone, not just the warriors), probably substantially less.
The area that the Sui force traversed was sparsely populated at the time with exceptionally unforgiving winters.
Once the Goguryeo forces started to engage in the scorched earth policy, Sui failure to capture the few significant Goguryeo border forts with food stockpile essentially doomed the project from the start, as did the failure of the Sui naval forces to link up with the land invasion force (the only time the constraints of the ancient military logistics did not apply was when an army could be supplied by sea or river as the self-consumption rates of sea transport was dramatically lower than horse/camel/cow/human-ported, land transport).
The initial Sui strategy to bypass these forts and head straight for the capital of Goguryeo gravely weakened its forces on the march.
It is not certain whether the Battle of Salsu River was really a major, climactic battle or simply the last skirmish before the Sui morale cracked and its forces began to retreat (after having failed to capture Pyongyang).
I suspect the great slaughter of the Sui forces occurred during the retreat when they were constantly harried by Goguryeo forces (and its Malgal nomadic tribal allies).
The claim that only 2,000-3,000 were left by the time they made it back to Sui controlled territory is likely true.
Ulchi Moonduk’s strategy was thus the classic Russian strategy — retreat into fortified population centers, draw the enemy deeper into a hostile, harsh terrain, bleed them outside the fortifications and then counter-attack as they retreat, thus annihilating them.
When Tang defeated Goguryeo, it corrected many of the mistakes Sui made by improving coordination with the naval forces, reducing the border forts first before proceeding deeper into Goguryeo territory (and often capturing food stockpiles intact) and opening a second front by Shilla in the South.
Tang also waited until there was a great dissension among the Goguryeo nobles to launch the coupe de main.
August 23rd, 2006 at 5:48 am
Thanks for that info; I’d always wondered what the name meant. My one UFL experience was to have been a week in a bunker answering hypothetical questions about targeting. Fortunately, a severe bout of food poisoning struck me just as I arrived in the bottom of the bunker. I was excused. And of course, it was impossible to convene a court-martial panel during UFL, which means I mainly spent the time giving Article 15 advice to soldiers who violated the no-drinking ban.
August 23rd, 2006 at 6:47 am
Great commentary by James Na. Obviously whoever wrote up the “historical” account of the battle never read Sun Tsu’s comment on nine families being required to keep a single Chinese soldier in the field. Likewise, the numbers are so wonderfully round. Great observations.
August 23rd, 2006 at 7:44 am
James, thanks for the great commentary. You may want to consider correcting that small corner of Wikipedia?
August 23rd, 2006 at 11:21 am
Is “Ulchi” deliberately named to remind historically-minded South Koreans that this isn’t the first time they’ve had a belligerent and aggressive neighbor to the north?
August 23rd, 2006 at 12:28 pm
It could always be worse…you could be living on Snickers and Gatorade, staring at computer screens with a sore butt for 14 hours a day, and then listening to field grades bitch and moan about you hanging your towel out to dry or not locking and loading a freaking blank into the chamber of your M16 or forgetting your goddamn ballistic sunglasses.
August 24th, 2006 at 4:47 am
What’s more, given the constraints of logistics in the pre-industrialization era, even 1,000 families supporting one soldiers was not enough.
The problem was very simple — land transport in the pre-modern period could never carry enough weight. It always consumed its own supplies to a great degree, making it virtually impossible to move more than a few days (usually 3-4 days) unless local supplies could be obtained.
When substantial cavalry forces were added to the army, the problem became much more acute unless the army traversed a rich grass country.
For a more detailed examination of this idea see: Hans Delbrueck or Donald Engels.
I simply applied their ideas to Sui.
Delbrueck, by the way, estimates the Persian invasion forces during the Persian-Greek Wars at about 10,000-20,000.
Engels gives a greater figure to Alexander’s forces in the invasion of Persia than Delbrueck does. I tend to side with Delbrueck on the matter since he also factors in issues such as political organization and internal mobilization rates as well as population studies that Engels does not.