The Coming East Asian Arms Race
by Richardson ~ July 25th, 2006. Filed under: Asia, China-Korea Relations, Geopolitics, Japan-Korea Relations, U.S.-Korea Relations. 
Update: For the full version of this idea, see; South Korea Must Choose Sides (Asia Times)
Original Post: As the amateurish Roh administration bumbles along seemingly attempting to do everything in its power to destroy the U.S.-ROK alliance but to come out and denounce it directly, they appear to be equally oblivious to the failure of the Sunshine Policy as they are to the ‘Consequences of Betrayal,’ (h/t Jodi at The Asia Pages):
An unidentified American expert working closely with South Korean-U.S. military officials has shed some light onto the events unfolding within the ROK including rumors of a USFK withdrawal… The source went on to stress that what this means is not just a departure of U.S. military personnel but also the exodus of American military equipment and technology including tanks and satellite capabilities. His assessment claimed that such an absence would leave the South Korean military extremely vulnerable.
Although not inevitable, if USFK leaves Korea an East Asian arms races likely will occur on a scale that would make current tensions seem trivial and far preferable. Anticipating one argument; no, USFJ is not a viable solution to this arms race problem.
After years of anti-American rhetoric and policy, Seoul finally appears to be reaping some of the consequences. Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok, no doubt at the behest of his president, has perhaps wreaked the most havoc on the alliance. The faster-than-anticipated return of wartime control to South Korea is one sign – but this post is not about that long list of transgressions.
Previously I wrote that the U.S. would not leave Korea or Japan as staying in both nations remains vital to preventing a regional arms race. As with my prediction earlier this month that North Korea would not launch an ICBM, I may be wrong about the future of USFK.
In both cases, however, I point to the adverse effects that would prevent the action if logic prevailed. North Korea has indeed needlessly incurred some of the negative effects predicted. Likewise a withdraw of USFK, while seemingly justified by the anti-American hatefest that Roh both rode to power and fanned at the same time, would have specific negative consequences that are not difficult to anticipate:
It goes like this; The U.S. pulls out of Korea, for whatever reason. South Korea predictably feels the need to beef up its security due to the absence of U.S. troops, although more from the (real or perceived) threat from Japan rather than North Korea. South Korea is also worried about Chinese designs on North Korean territory. Japan must respond to the Korean buildup, and so enhances its forces with some projection capability, which it currently lacks. This in turn causes concern in China, where Japan is viewed as a threat, although Korea is not. At some point, either Korea or Japan may consider the nuclear option, since it is too costly for them to spend scarce resources on a massive conventional build-up of equipment and forces. The other would soon follow, and East Asia would be a nuclear powder keg ready to explode over something as childish as the Tokdo/Takeshima dispute.
While the details of the race and escalation of tensions can vary in a number of ways, the overall outcome would complicate security and economic matters in East Asia even without the conflict that would probably become a world war. As long as policy makers don’t forget this, the U.S. will be in Korea and Japan.
The South Korean level of political maturity in particular makes this a dangerous situation, and makes the continued presence of USFJ irrelevant to a Korean build-up. Recent South Korean rhetoric concerning Japan only highlights the Seoul’s immaturity. The fact remains that U.S. forces in both Korea and Japan have led to a feeling of protection for both nations that has in the past few decades restrained urges to build-up military forces or opt for nuclear deterrence.
Both Japan and Korea could easily manufacture nuclear weapons if that course of action was deemed most appropriate to national security. USFK and USFJ have reinforced the nuclear umbrella offered by the U.S. making that option less attractive. If USFK were to leave completely or to drawdown to levels deemed insignificant by the ROK Army (ROKA), it probably would not take long for nuclear weapons plans dormant since 1979 to be revitalized, and now with a vastly more able South Korean scientific community.
Another argument is that the U.S. need not be involved in a future East Asian war. Like denying that a withdraw from Korea would cause a regional arms race, that is wishful thinking. The U.S. has too many political and diplomatic ties, aside from alliance obligations, to ignore such a war.
As the reality of what they have put into action is realized by South Koreans, there is hope that someone with more diplomatic and cognitive ability will be at the nation’s helm in the future.
For Americans, the notions that a withdraw is a deserved payback for the rampant anti-Americanism in South Korea, or that the few billion we spend on defense there is a catastrophic waste, need to be discarded. The potential cost of a war would be far greater in both American lives and in dollars, the benefits of continued peace immeasurable.
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July 25th, 2006 at 9:37 pm
Another excellent post Richardson!
ROK armed forces and ROK Army in particular rely on USFK’s ELINT, anti-long range artillery (240mm MRL and 170mm Koksan SP guns) and about 200 F16s/A10s. It would cost billions for ROK to buy, train and replace the void left over by USFK withdrawal.
Case in point is ROK’s rather embarassing selection of unproven JOKE elint jets procured via ex-beauty queen turned nightclub owner (Tango in glory days in Ktown in LA) turned prostitute who slept with few ROK Defense Ministry old farts.
Simply ROK will not be ready to assume the command of combined ROK/USFK let alone defend ROK alone come 2010…
July 25th, 2006 at 10:48 pm
Joshua?
Advantage Richardson.
Richardson, I don’t believe Australia, Singapore or Japan will take comfort knowing that the US really knows how to sock it to silly, stupid people like Roh. What if the Aussie’s elected somone like Roh in a few years time? They are a democracy, could happen. Would the Yanks desert them too?
If we can put up with the Euros for over 50 years, I think we can give the Koreans a couple more years before setting up a new chess board.
July 25th, 2006 at 10:59 pm
I would argue that an arms race has alredy begun within the region.
With Japan reconsidering its constitution (not to mention its already impressive Navy defense forces), North Korea already possessing nuclear weapons, China investing heavily in its growing military and South Korea recently demonstrating that it has the capability to extract uranium (as well as some hefty purchases with those fighter jets and a future satellite defense project), who isn’t to say that with or without USFK troops in Korea the race is already underway?
Would a US departure speed things up? If you ask me, things are happening at a quick pace already.
July 25th, 2006 at 11:22 pm
Arms race in north asia is in full swing from naval point of view.
Why does ROK need KDX with Aegis like combat system destroyers? III is bigger than II and so on KDX I 3,800 ton, II 5,000 ton and III 7,000 ton classes? DPRK air force is a joke and won’t be able to attack ROKN ships so why arm these ships with latest Standard SAM? To defend “East Sea” and shallow “Yellow Sea”?
And what’s the deal with new AIRCRAFT carrier Dokdo class just launched this summer? This class of “landing” ship up the ante by being bigger than comprable JMSDF’s Osumi 8,900 ton landing ship?
Now as for ROKN’s sub force is understandable. But why introduce the region’s 1st AIP (air independent propulsion) sub last month? What’s this BS talk about 4,000 to NUCLEAR powered sub ROKN is planning?
WHY NOT PUT THE MONEY INTO ROK ARMY? Hell ROKA need more MLRS to counter the thousands of MRL of DPRKA and more of advanced K9 Thunder 155mm SP gun (one of the best in the world)?
Oh, no no no! These army artillery tubes are pointed at MURDERER midget sugar daddy.
http://brd3.chosun.com/brd/view.html?tb=BEMIL104&pn=1&num=755
July 26th, 2006 at 12:20 am
“… East Asia would be a nuclear powder keg ready to explode over something as childish as the Tokdo/Takeshima dispute.”
http://blog.goo.ne.jp/pandiani/e/bcb4b5cdfb438682261570b0025825e7
The women who’s interview is being shown at the very top of that page (and again in the middle) says after seeing 한반도, “I think it would be good if (this type of thing) really did happen”. I’m not certain exactly as to what she means by ‘this type of thing’ as I haven’t seen the movie, but could it be possible she is referring to Japan and Korea going to war over the rocks?
Sure the potential of Japan’s right wing taking over and doing something isn’t zero, but it’s a heck of a lot closer to zero then the chance of Korea doing something stupid when there are no ‘wings’ as even the normal people are crazy.
Perhaps some will say that she’s just a loon and doesn’t represent the rest of the nation, but she’s definitely not alone in her way of thought when you look at all the protests (both ‘peaceful’ and violent) going on in Korea at extreme times calling for nuking Japan and death to the Japanese race at times, compared to not a single one in Japan.
July 26th, 2006 at 3:32 am
The arms race would cripple the DPRK. I’m not so sure it’d be a bad thing.
July 26th, 2006 at 4:59 am
S Korea is already initiating an arms buildup.
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2006/7/11/150037.shtml
SK’s arms industry is growing quite nicely too, although not the capability the USA has, but good reletive to the region and much more capable than the North. (except missiles)
If the USA wanted to get the far-left the hell out of power in SK and clean up it’s image, what would it need to do? I wonder if the USA is just giving the impression, while having the option of following through, of pulling out of SK in order to take away URI/Roh’s old faithful way to garner support from the public. The far-left could no longer scream of imperialist US intentions or that anyone supporting USFK is a puppet of the USA, if the USA is putting out the message “we no longer feel welcome here, and won’t stay unless we do.”
If the GNP gains the prez again in 07 things could get a lot better.
Who know’s… there could be a SK version of McCarthyism if the GNP ‘uncovers highly treasonous evidence involving menbers of the URI Party including Roh.’
Wouldn’t that be nice…..
July 26th, 2006 at 5:23 am
USFK leaving South Korea would make the current pace of armament – which at historically normal or low levels – seem relatively insignificant. There would be a big jump in spending, and perhaps a regression of the recent changes lessening mandatory military service time. Ever seen some of the large shipbuilding facilities like Daewoo? Imagine it changing (at least some) gears towards military production. Or a Hyundai or Kia factory pumping military hardware on large scale. And how would Japan react? And China to Japan? Etc.
I’m not sure North Korea would need to compete too much in such a race as they already have Seoul hostage with artillery and claim to have a nuclear deterrent. If they felt threatened it could trigger a call to China for help, which could have even more devastating consequences if it led to PRC troops and equipment in North Korea.
If North Korea collapsed, however, the situation would change in at least three ways that would push the south towards nuclear weapons. First, the financial drain would make a conventional buildup extremely difficult. Second there would be access to North Korea’s nuclear scientist community, and although South Korea equivalents would be far more advanced, the North Koreans would likely bring some valuable practical and hands-on knowledge. Third, North Korea does have more experience with missiles, as South Korea (under U.S. pressure) has limited itself. North Korea nuclear and SRBM/MRBM/ICBM technology under South Korean control could be quickly and vastly improved.
And how long would Japan sit by, even with USFJ, with a nuclear armed China and Korea a missiles launch away?
July 26th, 2006 at 8:40 am
“Japan must respond to the Korean buildup”
I’m curious about this leap of reasoning. How threatened does Japan really feel by South Korea? I’d suspect that Japanese fears stem more from North Korea’s missiles and China, thus USFJ remains a deterrent (or helpful excuse) to Japan spending its treasury on a wasteful arms race.
However, if SK was successful in driving away its American protectors, it would embolden anti-American groups in Okinawa and elsewhere.
July 26th, 2006 at 10:03 am
When or if USFK withdraws, East Asia will become more unpredictable and among nuclear nations, that isn’t good.
Which nations currently feel threatened in Asia? I’d list China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Australia, Philippines and even Vietnam as countries that aren’t relaxed about their neighbors. Now withdraw USFK.
Japan with a GDP of about 4 trillion dollars could afford another 1% for defense per year. That is 40 billion dollars.
Korea as is well known, under spends on defense. Its current GDP of about 800 billion could support another 8 billion annually too.
China lies about its defense money, but I think we all know its rising fast and wants to match Japanese levels.
Throw in more money from those other countries and its easy to see additional $70 billion ANNUALLY in Asian defense spending if those countries wish it.
I don’t argue that USFK will keep these countries from increased defense spending, but I do argue there is plenty of money UNSPENT on defense in ASIA because of American security. Weaken that guarantee and UNSPENT becomes SPENT.
What would these Asian countries spend their money on? Rifles? Uniforms? Tanks? I think attack weapons such as missiles, aircraft, submarines and command and control such as satellites, UAV’s, AWACS and air/missile defense. These offensive weapons would only threaten other countries and that keeps the tensions high and defense spending high as well.
One final consideration. With the currently low levels of defense expeditures in Asia, America has successfully kept the Euro’s from selling their vast array of defense goods to China. If Asia begins to spend at a higher level, Europe will lift their self control and sell to China and everyone else, whatever they want.
You may not like USFK, but it is a cork that has kept the firewater in the bottle.
July 26th, 2006 at 10:08 am
Richardson, Another excellent, well-reasoned post. I agree with most of your assertions and reasoning, but I don’t really see an arms race as necessarily as bad a thing for the United States or the region as you do — nor do I think that unconditional U.S. protection would prevent one in any event if the region’s democracies decide to move the strategic goalposts from Pyongyang to Tokdo.
I agree with Jodi that there already is an Asian arms race, and would add that it began with China’s massive arms buildup, which includes a defense budget that’s rising by 10-15% per year, much faster than its GDP. I concede that arms races are expensive things, but the first goal is the prevention of war. Do arms races cause wars? I would argue that unilateral arms races cause wars, but parity of forces prevents wars. Nations launch wars when they see strategic imbalance – when they perceive that they have the capacity to overpower a weaker neighbor.
Once you accept the reality of China’s growing strength (and North Korea’s asymmetric and proliferation threat) you’re faced with a variety of ways to address that imbalance.
The traditional way to address it is to abdicate most of its costs to Uncle Sam. For years, the United States just managed to counter that imbalance despite disadvantages of distance and other commitments – the Fulda Gap, Viet Nam, and now terrorism and Iraq. Even so, the balance was more of a fighting withdrawal in Korea in the 1950’s, and in S.E. Asia in the 1960’s and 1970’s. We were able to maintain some sense of strategic parity since then because China posed less of a strategic threat, because the Soviets were similarly distracted by us at the Fulda Gap, and because China and the USSR were deadly enemies. We now face a rising, increasingly strong China whose forces are far less dispersed than our own and not distracted by a weakened Russia. The United States is justifiably more concerned about threats to its homeland that emanate more from other regions. Nor is there much clarity in Washington (quite the opposite) about how to deal with the growing Chinese threat. For now, I don’t see the U.S. having much interest in continuing to carry the burden of prosperous Asian democracies while matching China’s buildup in the region on its own. So that balance probably isn’t sustainable, and I think Japan sees that. Look at Taiwan, a nation that is dangerously neglecting its own defenses in the (misplaced) expectation of U.S. protection, as an example.
The second way is what Japan is doing – building its own forces toward an independent defense. Now, there is an obvious problem with this, which is a dangerous lack of coordination among the region’s democracies. Japan can’t focus on legitimate threats to its security when such irrelevancies as Tokdo or textbooks muddle objective threat analysis. One hopes that the passing of the Roh Administration will mean that Asian democracies will stop wasting money on preparing for war with each other. That’s more a diplomatic and political problem than a military one, and I think that we’re helping our position there by making credible threats for force reductions so that Korea is forced to make hard choices. Again, and as I’ve argued at length here, I only favor a complete U.S. withdrawal from Korea if Korea simply doesn’t share our broader strategic interests in checking Chinese hegemony and North Korean proliferation. We’ll know in 2007.
The third option is for the United States to coordinate a regional defense alliance among East Asian democracies, but limiting its own military contribution to areas where it’s strongest — air and naval power, intelligence, missile defense, and other key, expensive, technology-intensive pieces of a national defense give us much influence to forestall bad defense planning. I’ve never been opposed to the United States keeping such forces in the region, or even in Korea, provided Korea again shares broader U.S. interests. Our air and naval forces won’t leave Korea before the next Korean presidential election, and I doubt that the South Koreans would call our bluff. The majority of our ground forces will go, however, because their presence is more strategic liability than asset. If the restoration of a sustainable U.S.-Korean alliance means that the U.S. air umbrella still covers Korea, Korea will be in a better place to build other components of that defense, such as its own ground forces and helicopters.
So the question then is whether that will lead to war. That depends not on the presence of 37,000 U.S. hostages on Korean soil but the overall balance of forces, where Korea is the most able and responsible for maintaining that balance. I think that Korea has been relieved of the burden of serious thought about the true meaning of independence – as opposed to interdependence – thus far, and that a downgrading of the alliance will foster better quality thinking by South Korean voters and defense planners.
July 26th, 2006 at 10:47 am
hello.
i love this site. lots of forward thinking people in here.
re: Roh’s administration. how did he get to power? i remember that the ‘internet’ gave him a lot of help with the younger generation’s votes.
i am asssuming that there are way more people younger than 40, then there are over 40.
if that’s the case, then won’t there be a chance that the URI will win again, and there will be another term of failed sunshine policy?
July 26th, 2006 at 10:59 am
Outstanding post! Really a good wakeup call to 1) Koreans who are mired in silly nationalism and 2) huffy American policy makers who will sacrifice long-term American security interest in the region to “sock it to” the ungrateful Koreans.
Like it or no, sometimes we Americans have to be the adults.
I agree with much of what Richardson wrote, with the possible exception of the following:
ROK nuclear industry needs ZERO, ZIP, NADA, ZILCH assistance from North Korean scientists in nuclear technology. And I am not talking about just civilian nuclear technology either.
July 26th, 2006 at 11:12 am
This is an excellent piece, Richardson. You said what I wanted to say and what laziness and other issues prohibited me from saying.
The fundamental dilemma for the U.S. in Koea is this: It has to create within the Korean government the sense of urgency that it will leave without actually leaving or taking steps that would necessitate its leaving.
Another aspect of this issue that you do not broach is that I think, in spite of the recent good-will promoted by the Koizumi administration, the pressure for the USJK to leave or significantly downsize will be overwhelming once the USFK leaves. And the U.S. must avoid being completely shut out in this region or even shut out from its major or mid-level players.
May 26th, 2007 at 8:30 am
[This is yet another post in which all comments did not make it in the export/import process from the Korea Liberator. The original post had 43 comments, 14 made it. The rest are posed in this single comment.]
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Rather than look at USFK or USFJ, we Americans need to look at USFP, as in Pacific forces. Historically America had a Pacific strategy that prized military control of sea lines of communications; denying other country’s military basing within the Central Pacific; keeping Japan a coastal military power; focusing Asian nationalism on the US rather than each other as a way to keep the peace; align itself with the richest countries in the area including Taiwan.
This strategy is no longer workable because Japan is becoming a regional power; nationalism is increasingly directed towards each other and China is intent on dominating the Pacific region.
America will have an extraordinary challenge in the Pacific to defend its interests with USFK as a part of the solution. The ground pounders in Korea are modest. The airpower, surveillance, command and control is invaluable because of location. I’d suggest we think of USFK as a tool to remake American strategy in the Pacific and not look at it as a pacifier to the Korean people. Configure USFK to dominate the air and sea from southern Japan to Taiwan; configure it to conduct surveillance along China’s coastal region; configure it to be the western anchor of air and missile defenses stretching from Alaska to Taiwan. Call the force USFK, certainly provide value to the Korean’s, but in reality make its primary mission projecting American power into Asia.
By changehappens on 26 July 2006 1:31 pm
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“Who know’s… there could be a SK version of McCarthyism if the GNP ‘uncovers highly treasonous evidence involving menbers of the URI Party including Roh.’
Wouldn’t that be nice….. ”
Good point Kevin!
How I dearly wish something like this would happen…
Where art thou great president Park who helped ROK become economic power all the while had no slush acct like ahole DJ and reported to ear t-shirt with holes and belt so worn could not hold his pants…
By Duke on 26 July 2006 1:57 pm
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I am still hoping that the full extent of DJ’s illegal and treasonous behavior is unearthed after the GNP comes to power.
And he deserves the same prison time some of his (arguably less deserving) predecessors Chun and Roh got.
By Won Joon Choe on 26 July 2006 2:15 pm
While, indeed, President Park was not personally corrupt, there was plenty of corruption in his regime during his rule.
And, yes, one can make good arguments that his vision led to today’s ROK economic successes. Park was an admirable figure in many ways, a man of his times.
But let us not forget that he was a repressive dictator who set the stage for Chun, Roh (Tae-Woo) and Kwangju.
By James J. Na on 26 July 2006 5:14 pm
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@ Pelagius; Perhaps “would” is a better choice than “must,” but I believe the outcome would be the same. If South Korea ramped up military production, Japan would follow, especially with the jumps China has made over the years. The overall point remains that Korea won’t do this with a significant USFK still there.
@ Joshua; I would not say the region is currently in an arms race as Korea/Japan aren’t racing; China is building up, but it takes more than one to race. Perhaps differentiating “build up” from “arms race” is nitpicking, but the dynamic of the race is what I’m focused on and concerned with.
Well have to agree to disagree about the potential repercussions for the U.S. of an East Asian arms race. I believe that a race in this case will lead to South Korea obtaining nuclear weapons, followed by Japan. With South Korea’s mind boggling capacity for ludicrous policy, statements, and actions, I think a much greater potential for a conflict would exist, particularly with a reunified Korea. Assuming political maturity improves 100 percent, its still a close call.
The U.S. staying in Korea counters the vast majority of these concerns. If, as you say, the U.S. is losing the strategic upper hand in the region, a drawdown of USFK hardly improves the position. It’s a lose-lose for all but China.
As for China, the next 10-25 years are critical; it is those years in which China must face the double demographic blows of a) the male-female imbalance, and b) the rapidly aging society brought on by the one-child policy. I believe that, unless some unknown comes into the picture, these challenges will for the most part halt and reverse China’s raise. In other words, in three decades I doubt China will be the major player that some fear it will be (like the predictions of the 80s that by now Japan would be a superpower).
@ Na; Maybe the South Koreans could use the North Korean scientists as ‘rod changers’?
@ Choe; I agree that we must maintain a presence in East Asia, including Korea. In fact, I would like to see a base of operations reopened in the Philippines (who have been losing the Spratlys to China since they asked the U.S. to leave).
@ change; The option of pulling a smaller but still very powerful USFK to the southern end of the peninsula is a good one. I still think the role of a “pacifier,” in the sense of putting off sentiment leading to an arms race, would be accomplished.
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Overall, pulling out of Korea will help us a lot less than staying.
By Richardson on 26 July 2006 5:14 pm
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My proposal is that we keep a couple of air bases, a naval base, and only the ground forces needed to defend them — all contingent on South Korea exercising some responsible statecraft and behaving like a U.S. ally (and yes, of course, some policy disagreements among democracies are compatible with that model).
What I’m saying, in a roundabout way, is that we’re not that far apart. I think the main difference is that I am prepared to abandon South Korea if it freely opts to feed beasts that threaten and lunge at us. Such nations are not allies, and a hostile population eventually renders one’s military presence untenable. To borrow a phrase, I think this is an alliance that will have to become more “independent” and “balanced” if it is to survive. I don’t see the status quo as sustainable. To be fair, I don’t think you’re saying it is.
For the moment, I believe the main struggle to keep Korea secure is political, and paring down to a leaner, meaner USFK advances that goal. The perfect defense posture is useless if the teachers are flogging juche, the government employees are organized under the KCTU (also infiltrated by the North Koreans), and the police won’t enforce the law against leftist thugs who’ve trampled a short cut through the democratic process. And while I take into account that conservative papers have a motive to exaggerate some of those trends, those trends are consistent with my own observations and backed by a very alarming statistical picture of how Koreans view America and North Korea.
Something has to alarm the silent majority of the Korean people into consciousness and break the spell of ovine obedience to nationalist manipulation. My greatest hope for making Korea responsible for its own protection is that it will inspire some maturity and sensible statecraft. If that happens, the alliance that emerges will be more sustainable and better for both countries. If not, our military alone cannot save Korea from the consequences of its own decisions, as much as we might wish otherwise.
By Joshua on 26 July 2006 7:05 pm
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Joshua,
We’ve had a few discussions over this, and I do fully share your frustration with the South Korean government, but I still think you are over-reacting at times. You are essentially taking a lunatic Leftist fringe (which unfortunately did capture the presidential office) for the South Korean public at large.
In fact, you yourself at times realize this. For instance, you refer to the “silent majority” who are not lunatic Leftists.
So I would wait until at least the results of the 2007 presidential election to seriously debate whether the U.S. should leave or not, esp. given that the Uri are getting pummelled everywhere, including the voting booths and every imaginable polls.
Also, another seldom discussed irony in all this–though I do not necessarily direct this criticism at you–is the American complicity, hypocrisy, or at least ignorance in contributing to the situation in South Korea. For decades the U.S. has mercilessly bashed Park Chung Hee and undercut that great man’s credibility both within Korea and abroad solely because he was not a Western-style liberal democrat. Well, guess what? The perfect is the enemy of the good. The alternative to a dictator in some authoritarian societies is not a liberal democrat but another dictator. But blissfully ignorant of the God-given limits, the U.S. contributed to discrediting all forms of conservatism in South Korea.
The end result of all this irresponsible democratic rhetoric is Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun.
By Won Joon Choe on 26 July 2006 7:30 pm
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This is a great site. Very interesting and highly thought-provoking comments.
I think we all share the same general view and hope for ROK’s future.
We all need to wait and pray that the right person from the GNP becomes the next president and is supported by lawmakers who treasure a strong US alliance. If not, SK will no longer be a relevant or key player in world politics or economics (as if it isn’t already to some degree). More importantly, the US will leave and the alliance will go down the toilet.
“But let us not forget that he was a repressive dictator who set the stage for Chun, Roh (Tae-Woo) and Kwangju.”
I take issue with the above comment made by James Na. James, I disagree with your assessment that President Park set the stage for Kwagju. I believe the Kwangju student activists (led by NK sympathizers and possibly NK spies) are to blame for the unfortunate incident. Those ruthless, disobedient, radical thugs were hellbent on causing a disturbance at all cost. Chun had to put down those thugs for national security sake. Had he acted weak and indecisive and let the demonstrations get more out of hand, NK would have been very tempted to get actively involved and possibly infiltrate SK at even more levels.
By Hope on 26 July 2006 8:38 pm
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James,
Sorry dude but I disagree.
“But let us not forget that he was a repressive dictator who set the stage for Chun, Roh (Tae-Woo) and Kwangju”
How did GREAT president Park set up the stage for Chun and his sidekick Roh? Sure Chun took a page of coup d’tat playbook but that’s it.
Gwanju? It was armed rebellion by often looked down Cholla people. I personally avoid Cholla people based on my OWN personal experienceS (big time plural). Armed rebellions are crushed by goverment incluidng countless armed rebellion in US during the 1800 to 1930’s. It’s way to maintain order and not allow bunch of CRIMINAL elements like in Gwanju to run wild. And there way too many LIES surrounding the what happened and makes me sick to see the criminals turn into heros by DJ and now NO’s cronies. Not to mention US being blamed to allow it to happen.
By Duke on 26 July 2006 8:47 pm
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James,
While I think Kwang-ju was a regrettable tragedy, I do believe that there is more than meets the eye. It wasn’t exactly a wanton massacre of peaceful democratic activists, as the event is often portrayed as. I have talked personally with some of the people who were directly involved, and in the least, there may have been a heavy presence of genuine communist agents and the crowds were certainly provocative. In the least, I think we should perhaps wait until the Pyongyang archives are opened for a definitive judgment.
By Won Joon Choe on 26 July 2006 8:58 pm
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Richardson, you are sometimes too funny.
I categorically and absolutely reject this attitude. This is the precisely the kind of attitude that led to the U.S. forever being tainted as anti-democratic hyporcrite complicit with repression rather than the great force for democracy it actually has been in ROK.
This is also the same kind of mentality that still pervades among some conservatives in the U.S. that leads them to sing praises of Augusto Pinochet and others like him.
Compromises with repression in name of stability and gradual progress are what lead to cynicism about American moral stature and desire for spreading representative governments around the world. Such compromises might be useful in the short-term, but they do enormous damage to our public diplomacy in the long-term.
That is a straw man argument, to which I never subscribed. Nonetheless, a strong causal factor for the Kwangju massacre was the emergence of the Chun-Roh military coup and junta (that’s armed rebellion, too, for that matter — and a more egregious one given that the military is given arms to defend the society from external threats, not use them to grab power).
And the rise of Chun and Roh was made possible by Park’s precedent of a military coup, his long repression and the silencing of virtually all opposition during his rule. Furthermore, his clinging to power after the Yushin episode when he had lost all legitimacy in the public eye led to his assassination and the rise of yet another group of military strongmen.
On a personal note, in many ways, I am a product of the Park era. He was no doubt a visionary that helped to create the economic miracle of the ROK today. But such an appreciation of his contribution should not blind one to forget the terrible excesses of his regime.
By James J. Na on 26 July 2006 11:52 pm
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And, Duke, I am not going to argue with you about people from Cholla. I tend to see people engaging in such regional prejudices as being boorish (not at all different to those who knock, say, Southerners or Midwesterners in this country).
I will say one good thing about Roh. Unlike Park or Chun, Roh had the courage (however calculated and manipulated) to submit himself to a free election, and set a crucial precedent for power transfer based on electoral mandate.
He is to be commended for this though in my view he seemingly receives very little credit for it.
By James J. Na on 26 July 2006 11:58 pm
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James,
Roh was forced into open election by the loud democratic protests of 1987 where even the middle class joined the ranks. I spent much time in Korea on business back then and even got caught in my hotel unable to leave due to party convention Chun held to elect Roh in summer of 1987 in Seoul Hilton.
Roh with courage? No way as he was meek sidekick of his mentor Chun. By product of the democratic protest of mid to late 1980’s were the many of of PIG Uri 386 lefitst commies including most of PIG leadership and lawmakers. If anything, Chun and Roh “produced” today’s PIGs.
As for Cholla, most of gangster thugs hail from Cholla - it’s a fact. DJ’s administration was full of Cholla people and talk about mess and DECEIT LIES LIES and more LIES - trait of you guessed it. Many Cholla people including Koh the ex-PM do not admit to others that their “hometown - gohyang” is Cholla. And lest not forget that only province PIG Uri won in last election was north Cholla and until recently PIG Uris pretty much got voted in most of Cholla at expense of DJ old party. This is why Cholla gets it bad name.
By Duke on 27 July 2006 12:36 am
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James,
Regarding my skepticism of messianic faith in democracy, you say:
“I categorically and absolutely reject this attitude. This is the precisely the kind of attitude that led to the U.S. forever being tainted as anti-democratic hyporcrite complicit with repression rather than the great force for democracy it actually has been in ROK.”
Yet how many countries do you know that have successfully gone from being an autocracy (in Korea’s case for over two-thousand years) to a democracy overnight? I know that you are too knowledgeable to not know all the arguments that I want to trot out (and for that reason, I will desist for most part), but the verdict of history shouldn’t be completely dismissed–as the Communists tried to do with disastrous results. Even in the U.S. the progress of democracy was fitful and halting at best, accompanied by what some would term “genocide” of the native Americans and the enslavement of a large segment of the population. You cannot create a liberal or democratic culture instantaneously, and the attempt to do so will almost always backfire. In fact, I would only be slightly exaggerating if I said such a millennarian faith in the capacity of human engineering mimicks that of communism itself!
Perhaps more important, a lot of those who pontificate about the evils of dictatorship in Korea forget or never knew that a genuine effort at democratization did take place and failed miserably with the parliamentary regime of Chang Myun. Chang’s democratic regime, much like the democratic regime in Weimar Germany, could not halt the downward spiral of the economy and could not even maintain basic civil peace. I think it was the political scientist Kim Se-jin who said South Korea under Chang was akin to a “state of nature.” So in pre-Park Korea, it was democracy that was discredited so thoroughly among the Korean populace. Every account I have read said that South Koreans were actually relieved when there was a military coup ending the ineffectual chaos that was parliamentary government. Perhaps most telling, even the president of that regime, Yun Po-sun, told a worried General MaGruder that South Korea needed a strong man, given the circumstances. The fundamental problem was, as we have both agreed that Korea has not yet been from even now, the country’s almost primordial culture of violence and lawlessness. Let’s have a culture of civility and law-abidingness first before we have democracy.
Now you say:
“This is also the same kind of mentality that still pervades among some conservatives in the U.S. that leads them to sing praises of Augusto Pinochet and others like him.
Compromises with repression in name of stability and gradual progress are what lead to cynicism about American moral stature and desire for spreading representative governments around the world. Such compromises might be useful in the short-term, but they do enormous damage to our public diplomacy in the long-term.”
But Pinochet is itself a “straw man” argument, and you are in some sense reflecting the typical American tendency to paint all dictators in black and white (or in black entirely), with no shades or hues in between. There is a qualitative difference between men like Pinochet and men like Park Chung-hee or Lee Kuan Yew. While I am admittedly not too familiar with Pinochet, Park’s rule was much milder and he certainly didn’t run up the body count in the thousands. I also believe his coup itself may have been entirely bloodless.
Nonetheless, I agree with this:
“Compromises with repression in name of stability and gradual progress are what lead to cynicism about American moral stature and desire for spreading representative governments around the world. Such compromises might be useful in the short-term, but they do enormous damage to our public diplomacy in the long-term.”
But that to me seems to be a problem with American rhetoric or, in your terms, Americans “public diplomacy,” rather than American policy. If the Americans were more honest or realistic in their articulation of the possibilities and limits of democracy rather than trumpeting it as a instant panacea, then others may be less cynical and certainly less jaded. But in some sense, Americans push, at least in rhetoric, the type of democracy that even they themselves are not capable of adhering to. Perhaps the Americans cannot help it because democracy for them is not merely a system of government, an expedient, but literally a religion, a civil religion. Hence the unalloyed faith.
By Won Joon Choe on 27 July 2006 1:48 am
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Addendum: I agree with James and disagree with Duke on Roh. He was a moderating influence on Chun and probably the only person who could’ve stopped Chun from using tanks on civilians in those venomous pre-Olympic protests.
By Won Joon Choe on 27 July 2006 1:49 am
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A little more fuel for discussion:
By Joshua on 27 July 2006 5:27 am
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In an email discussion with Lost Nomad I told him that:
Part of his response was the question (paraphrased); at what point does the USFK troop level – 25k, 10k, 5k, etc. – kick in with this psychological impact that I’m speaking of?
Now I hadn’t put it that way, but of course it’s a psychological that would drive the arms race. So at what point would South Korea finally realize that the pittance left behind is more apt to evacuate than to be able to defend its position while logistically supporting a the massive influx that would be called upon during a conflict?
Perhaps a built up of air and naval power would offset a vast reduction in ground forces, but air/navy do require force protection themselves. As long as a balance is met I think it will prevent – pacify – South Korea. I’m not sure what the threshold would be, but have a feeling that once levels dip below 15k some will begin to freak out.
By Richardson on 27 July 2006 4:54 pm
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It’s more a matter of positioning than of numbers. If you have 500 Americans dispersed in outposts along the DMZ, an American president would have to try to relieve and avenge them if they were attacked.
If we had 50,000 dug into hardened positions surrounding Osan and Pyongtaek, we could opt to send them north, reinforce them, or fly them to Guam while the South Koreans fought to defend Uijongbu. In other words, if we’re down to 24,000 troops at Pyongtaek and Osan, President Dean could decide to flee at the first shot, and the Koreans would have to plan for that.
By Joshua on 27 July 2006 5:03 pm
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The logistical capabilities of the right forces to handle both defense (of USFK) and influx is possible in lower numbers but doesn’t address the reason for an arms race, which is psychological, and in this case illogical.
The article Joshua links to above also says this;
If Rumsfeld actually indicated and wants that, I have lost a lot of respect for him.
By Richardson on 27 July 2006 7:58 pm
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Maybe I’m too optimistic, but I see a highly armed Northeast Asia as being quite responsible. No matter how immature South Korean policies or pronouncements, official or otherwise, I just cannot see the country starting a war, let alone a nuclear one, over Dokdo or any other grievance. All the “bad guys” have nukes already, or are trying to get them, so it makes sense for South Korea and Japan to get them, too. Once everyone is armed to the teeth, a kind of MAD doctrine should prevent any untoward conflicts. Meanwhile, its forces withdrawn from the peninsula, the US could deploy them to other places where they are needed much more. A current post of mine offers a few more thoughts on this.
By Nathan B. on 27 July 2006 8:46 pm
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The problem with the MAD doctrine is that it can actually lead to what its name says - mutual destruction. This can especially happen if there’s a misunderstanding or miscalculation.
A better solution is disarmament of every nuclear nation, which is hard to achieve but worth trying. That’s why I think that Korea and Japan should be nuclear-free. Hopefully, the Middle East can be nuclear-free, as well as the Superpowers.
The US should take the lead towards global disarmament. The Clinton Admin. was working towards that goal, but the Bush Admin. is against disarmament of America.
By Mi-Hwa on 27 July 2006 9:35 pm
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Nathan’s post is here. I’ve quoted from it below, with responses.
A withdraw from the Philippines didn’t really hurt the U.S. much although it did lessen to a degree the ability to project to Taiwan in a snap (the PI govt did screw themselves, however). South Korea is entirely different. If Rumsfeld did say that, perhaps he’s not the idiot, but the analysts who came up with that sure are. It might give some vindictive satisfaction to withdraw, but it would break what has been working since the Korean War.
The idea that nuclear proliferation with MAD is a good thing is a bit crazy (lame pun intended). I take firm exception to the notion that such proliferation would ever be a positive development. MAD in the cold war was basically the U.S. and a smattering of nations vs. the USSR and perhaps China. But there was a balance – once that was almost shattered many times, with only two ‘players.’ Do you like to gamble?
Add a dozen or more nations and the potential for proliferation to the wrong people will happen, as we’ve seen. MAD assumes that each nation, or its leader, will be a rational player and not destroy his own nation. Two completely different situations that look deceptively similar on the surface.
Kim Jong-il, for one, may be rational but likely is also a sociopath who has demonstrated a near complete lack of concern for human life (the “near” being the caveat for keeping enough people alive to serve his regime). If faced with collapse or imaginary attack, he could miscalculate badly. The southern half actually scrambled jet fighters to intercept a Japanese Cessna heading for Dokdo. Another administration may be less – or more – neurotic (that is just one example - no, not basing the judgment that SK is immature on that alone - not by far).
China likes its buffer zones; Mongolia, Eastern Turkistan, Burma, Tibet – and North Korea. If the DPRK collapsed, there is a real possibility that China might try to “help” by sending in troops in a de facto extension of said buffer zone. All for peace and stability, of course.
What the North wants is to stop living under the risk of a US-led invasion, something so many US ground troops in South Korea causes. Withdraw those forces, and the North can relax and stop its sabre-rattling.
I also must take exception to this; the U.S. has less than 30k on the ground in USFK, which is a drop in the bucket for what would be required to invade North Korea. There is no military calculus that would make that a force to recon with the KPA, without the afore mentioned influx. It is however the ‘tripwire’ that deters an attack, by anyone, on South Korea. Furthermore the U.S. has zero intention of invading the north and didn’t even before becoming overextended in Iraq. North Korean propaganda preaches that, but it has nothing to do with reality – it is however a control mechanism to control its own people and justify a military first policy. If USFK left North Korea would use the same tactics but in regard to USFJ, not far enough away.
Another reason not to invade is that Seoul would be flattened by DPRK artillery on the border. This is also the reason that the north did not need nuclear weapons to deter the fantasy U.S. invasion, has been for decades.
This is based on logic from a Western point of view; arms races are (usually) not logical affairs, especially when it comes to the history of China-Japan-Korea, which is laden with betrayal, mistrust, atrocities, etc. No, it is not a region where even a conventional arms race would be healthy, but it would not be only that kind of race. And at that point they’d not be worrying about North Korea, but each other. It’s not logical, they have no reason – but the rub is that that’s the reality.
In the end, “downgrading” the alliance with a withdraw of USFK would likely cause much more harm than the troops could do good elsewhere. The DoD is insurance – leaving Korea would be a tragic error.
By Richardson on 27 July 2006 9:43 pm
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I agree with Richardson in toto for the same reasons he articulated:
1. Taiwan is different from South Korea in terms of its strategic and economic importance to the U.S.
2. MAD becomes less certain a deterrent with proliferation.
The Cold War didn’t erupt into a World War III partly because there were essentially two nuclear players, and for most part both sides were rational. But increase the number of nuclear players, and in particular the number of nuclear players who are either actuated by visions of the beatific afterlife (i.e. religion-diven) or by visions of military glory, you dramatically increase the possibility of a catastrophe.
3. The suggestion that the presence of a small contingent of U.S. ground troops in South Korea sends alarm bells to Pyongyang about an imminent U.S. land invasion is rather farcical.
While I do not discount the possibility that the paranoid Pyongyang regime does genuinely believe a U.S. invasion is imminent, their sense of threat derives from something other than the presence of a U.S. ground force perhaps less than one-thirtieth of their own.
The only place where I may differ slightly with Richardson is that I think a re-armed and perhaps more assertive Japan may not be an entirely bad thing, as far as injecting a dose of reality into the Korean geo-political mind. I tend to think that South Korea’s irritating truculence toward Japan is really a pose; it roars toward Japan knowing that Japan, for a variety of reasons including colonialist guilt, will not retaliate nor even respond vigorously. With Japan back on its feet, South Korea will no longer act the bully toward Japan and recognize how precarious its situation really is amidst the geo-political titans in the Far East. It will then either try to go nuclear in search of a supreme deterrent (an option whose actualization that I have expressed some fears in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed) or become a more responsible actor in the region.
By Won Joon Choe on 27 July 2006 10:26 pm
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Interesting comments, Richardson. I agree with you that nuclear proliferation makes a nuclear war (or even an accident) more likely. However, I think that the US and its allies can still work to stop proliferation by rogue regimes, while holding onto their own arsenals. Such efforts can only go so far, of course.
Even if the US were to swear off all nuclear weapons, however, as some would desire (not you, I know), that still wouldn’t stop terrorists or rogue regimes from acquiring nuclear weapons. The acquiring of nuclear weapons by many capable, but belligerent countries appears to be a fait accompli. The pursuit of nuclear weapons by the “good” countries in the region, then, together with MAD, (which was successful during the Cold War) acts as a counterweight to this proliferation. It’s not so much a positive development as the best one can do under the circumstances.
Some other thoughts: Richardson is correct that the US has too few forces here to mount an invasion (I should probably have written “attack”). While the regime in Pyongyang does seem paranoid, it is not out of the question for the US to use the forces it has to threaten the North, hence the oft-quoted line that “all the options are on the table.” I think the North would relax without a US presence here. A nuclear-armed Seoul would keep the North Koreans out.
-I would totally support an occupation and annexation by China of North Korea. I don’t see how things could get any worse in the latter under a Chinese regime.
I still think that the US forces would be better deployed in response to the new challenge of the century, Islamofascism, not the old Cold War.
By Nathan B. on 27 July 2006 10:49 pm
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Removing USFK would not reduce the ability or effectiveness of a hypothetical U.S. attack one bit. We could easily attack by ICBM from the U.S., by sub, from USFJ, Guam, Hawaii, etc. With the status quo I’m not concerned about a DPRK attack on the south; it is preventing an arms race and maintaining regional stability that I’m concerned with.
Again, not concerned with that; ROKA conventional forces are enough to do that already.
Don’t say that to a crowd of Koreans as there would only be tufts of hair and skid marks left after they finished with you!
Seriously, Korea should be reunified and China has no right to occupy the northern half. Russia might be complacent about that, but the ROK, Japan, U.S., and probably the UN would recognize it for what it would be. That would be perhaps the single most dangerous move that China could make, and would definitely set the region up for major instability. I think South Korea would not hesitate to go nuclear in such a case.
I’d rather keep a system that works than to gamble by dismantling it and hoping that MAD works as well. I guess that’s the internal locus of control speaking; I don’t trust chance when I know a certain level of effort and control does work.
By Richardson on 28 July 2006 1:16 pm
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I don’t have time to read all the comments, but I wanted to state — once again — how much I agree with Richardson on this matter. Pulling USFK out would not be bad just for Korea, as I’ve also stated a number of times.
I just hope reasonable people in Washington still realize this (and I hope voters in Korea realize this, too).
I also liked this comment by James Na:
Outstanding post! Really a good wakeup call to 1) Koreans who are mired in silly nationalism and 2) huffy American policy makers who will sacrifice long-term American security interest in the region to “sock it to” the ungrateful Koreans.
Agree on both points (and it applies to both lefist nationalists in Korea and rightist nationalists, but right now more to leftists).
By kushibo on 28 July 2006 8:30 pm
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Now you just need to agree with Joshua and your conversion is all set!
By James J. Na on 29 July 2006 12:15 am
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That may be asking a bit much. Kushibo is a defender of the Sunshine Policy (in our defense, Kushibo, we’ve been very critical of China, too). Give Kushibo credit for independent thought; I know of no other commenters outside the South Korean government and its core supporters who believe that the United States should continue to subsidize South Korea’s military while South Korea subsidizes North Korea’s military (now increasingly focused toward “asymetic” capabilities like WMD, which it loves to sell to Middle Eastern despots).
I think that position is particularly at odds with U.S. interests. I’m not inherently against the alliance, I just think that we can’t have a healthy alliance by unilaterally wishing it to be so. South Korea is an independent nation, and our military commitment to South Korea ought to reflect the degree such a commitment serves our interests, and the extent to which the benefits outweigh such risks as being targeted by the North Koreans without being able to count on the support of ROK forces. With today’s political climate in South Korea, that’s now a risk we have to face for the first time. As with the FTA, that’s a result of political decisions by this Korean government.
By Joshua on 29 July 2006 6:36 pm
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As far as U.S. interests are concerned, of course it’s not in our interest to prolong the miserable failed and ineptly executed Sunshine Policy. But neither is an arms race, which I believe is far more important to stave off (and simple to do so; just by staying at credible numbers).
By Richardson on 30 July 2006 2:37 pm
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June 6th, 2007 at 7:33 am
[…] co-opts the early Korean Shilla and Bakje kingdoms for Chinese history.” Like a game of chess, planning many moves in advance of a North Korea collapse. Share and Enjoy: These icons link to social bookmarking sites where […]
September 25th, 2007 at 8:29 am
[…] Korea, but South Korea worries about North Korea, China, and Japan, in that order. Fits nicely with theories of an East Asian arms race. Share and Enjoy: These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and […]