Update: While China has taken some action against North Korea for its nuclear test on 9 October, it is clear that China still prefers the status quo as far as keeping North Korea and the Kim regime intact. An excuse has been that China wants stability before the 2008 Olympics, the flow of refugees, etc. But it is no more likely that China would want to give up regional stability after the games than before. Meanwhile the DPRK advances its WMD programs.

The solution to the nuclear issue is not about bombs or missiles, it is about regime change, and China is the only nation currently in positions to do that without firing a shot.

Original post: American policy makers need to come to terms with the fact that, under present circumstances, China prefers the status quo in North Korea over the sort of progress the U.S. and Japan desire. China is the only nation that currently has the credible non-military ability to pressure North Korea back to productive talks, and South Korea is worse than useless in dealing with this problem.

And by productive I don’t mean like 1994, I mean “complete, verifiable, and irreversible,” or to achieve regime failure. But simply waiting for China to do the right thing will achieve nothing; China must be motivated, and the U.S. does have an appropriate carrot and stick combination, if only we would use it.

The Six-Party approach, as Joshua notes, clearly is not going to achieve anything meaningful:

By now, it should be clear that the conventional diplomatic and military options aren’t going to solve the North Korean problem. Kim Jong Il isn’t interested in making a deal; he’s even less interested in complying with one. The only feasible military option, a blockade, will reduce Kim Jong Il’s killing power, but won’t install a better, freer alternative.

As things stand, Washington frets while Beijing makes weak excuses:

The U.S. nuclear envoy said Thursday that Washington was likely to give Chinese diplomatic efforts over North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs only a few more days before pushing for a tough U.N. resolution.

[. . .]

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu appealed for help from other countries, saying Beijing alone can’t draw North Korea back to nuclear talks or stop it from conducting future missile tests.

“The effort of China alone is not enough,” Jiang said. “We hope all parties concerned can take positive actions and push forward the issues in order to push the situation in a positive direction.” (emphasis added)

However, it is not that China cannot influence North Korea, it is that it will not do so (even if embarrassing at times). The difference is significant and leads to the question, why not?

China’s support for Pyongyang ensures a stable nation on its northeastern border, as well as providing a buffer zone between China and democratic South Korea. North Korea’s allegiance is also important for China as a bulwark against U.S. military dominance of the region and the rise of Japan’s military. . . Chinese trade and investment in North Korea now totals $2 billion per year. “They’re becoming a stakeholder in the North Korean economy,” Pinkston says.

The third point is a bit specious as North Korea has done far more to justify a rise of Japan’s military than it could ever do to counter it, while the fourth point is addressed below. But the first two points are key; they are why China is reluctant to use the leverage it has.

While some experts are rightly skeptical that China will assist the U.S. by applying pressure to North Korea, there some potential policies that would help push them in that direction – if the U.S. has the wherewithal to apply them.

The objective is to convince China to use the leverage is has – oil, energy, etc. – to either a) force North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks and to the completion of a genuine agreement, or b) to isolate North Korea into collapse should Pyongyang not capitulate.

THE CARROTS: U.S. policy makers need to address China’s concerns of an influx of refugees and fear of having USFK on their border with two specific proposals.

First, a comprehensive plan to assist North Koreans in their country in the event of collapse by a) having ample aid ready and waiting to be delivered to the North Korean people; b) having teams trained for all major localities ready to deploy to direct aid help keep order; c) help China foot the bill for deploying and maintaining troops on its border with North Korea, and d) carry out an intense psych-ops campaign leading up to and during this event to prepare the North Korean people.

Second, a U.S. policy that USFK units will remain below the 38th parallel and not setup bases or deploy north except in the event of a war, with the exception of military advisors and related personnel. Security functions north of the border to be assigned to ROK units who are quite capable and do not fact a language barrier. In this way the buffer zone China prefers would be maintained, and in all likelihood USFK would see more of a drawdown, particularly along the DMZ, as the KPA threat is removed.

THE STICK: This one is on the blunt side; tell China to choose between propping up Kim Jong-il and having access to the U.S. economy. Begin with the loss of Most Favored Nation trade status and escalate from there. It’s a double-edged threat that would hurt many American business in the short term, but might convince China that the U.S. is indeed so serious about the North Korea issue that the next step might be military. Above Pinkston notes that China is becoming a stakeholder in the DPRK economy – use this stick to make China realize who is more important to their finances.

As James points out, while there is corporate resistance in the U.S. to pressuring China over North Korea, the ability to apply that pressure may expire within the timeframe that negotiations with North Korea usually occur due to foot-dragging:

As China grows stronger, this economic leverage the U.S. has on China will decline. It will be less likely to cooperate with the U.S. on North Korea, say, ten years from now than it is today.

And, yet, because economy trumps national security in Washington, except in moments of great national distress from external aggression (Pearl Harbor, 9/11, etc.), there is little likelihood that the Bush administration will choose to play chicken with China over North Korea.

I share that skepticism but still have some hope.
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