If Bruce Cumings is the dean of the moonbat, leftie “It’s all America’s fault” school of Korea-related policy in the United States, surely Don Oberdorfer is the American dean of “the Establishment” view on Korea.

Oberdorfer wrote for the Washington Post for years and eventually retired from journalism to the comfy surroundings of Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at John Hopkins University in northwest D.C. His book on the Koreas, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (reviewed by our own Richardson) is considered a must for anyone seriously examining Korea-related issues.

I recently had a chance to observe him in person at a Sejong Society event in D.C. If Cumings can be summarized as “It’s all America’s fault,” Oberdorfer’s current views can be summarized as “Engagement works” and “It’s all Bush administration’s fault.”

Without a doubt Oberdorfer knows much about Korea, having first served there as a U.S. military officer in the aftermath of the Korean War. His many interviews with the “great men” of both Koreas have added much value to English-speaking audiences interested in Korea.

And he is right about one thing. At the recent talk, he spoke of the rather spotty mainstream media coverage of Korea, especially about the fact that, too often, Korea has been covered by Western journalists resident in Tokyo (he became a bit trite, however, when he went on to say that Japan and Korea are opposites, the Japanese are subtle while Koreans are as subtle as Kimchi, and that he “really felt for Koreans” when he left Korea while he felt no such thing when he left Japan).

His recommendation to the mostly young audience, thus, was that if you wrote a book on Korea (as he did), “you can get on everybody’s Rolodex.”

Or — if you are as lazy as I am and don’t want to write a whole book — you can start a blog on Korea with two people who know what they are doing. I don’t know about Rolodexes, but you sure do get on people’s Blackberry’s rather quickly (more so when Kim Jong-il is firing off missiles, of course).

More seriously, I do not share Oberdorfer’s lamentations of the episodic coverage that the mainstream American media give to Korea. After all, that is what a blog like this is for. By nature, it is impossible for a mainstream media outlet that aims to serve 50 million general viewers or readers to cover a topic like North Korea in depth. A blog that caters to, say, 10,000 people who are more than casually interested in Korea can be much more effective and, I dare say, erudite (not to mention timely). Call it the power of niche specialization.

During the talk, Oberdorfer largely minimized the latest provocations from Pyongyang, stating that since the North Korean missile moratorium was “self-declared only because of pressure from the U.S.,” the North Korean violation of the same was not a big deal. In other words, these are their missiles, and they can do what they wish with them.

He further went on to declare that the Clinton administration was working on a viable deal with North Korea when the 2000 election intervened. Then the Bush administration came to power, according to him, and “was against everything Clinton was for,” thus suggesting that the current North Korea problem is of Bush’s making. This view is remarkably similar to the rash of revisionist “Clinton had it under control” myth being perpetuated by the former Clintonites of late. In other words, if only the Bush administration gave Kim Jong-il what he wanted for his poor starving people, all would be well.

One woman in the audience asked in a thick Asian accent (looking a little like a North Korean agent — or a South Korean one, for that matter — but I jest a little) how the North Korean missile tests are different from Indian missile tests, and why (in an accusatory tone) the U.S. is treating the two differently. Oberdorfer’s answer was “There is no difference. The differences are of political nature. There is no difference, legally.” At this response, I struggled to remember the last time the Indian government threatened to turn Islamabad or anywhere else, for that matter, into “a sea of fire.”

Oberdorfer’s mantra is “engagement.” It is true, there are not many good options in dealing with North Korea’s regime, but engagement, especially the likes of “Sunshine,” has been an utter failure (please somebody read him “Dane Geld” which Joshua so helpfully reproduced on TKL).

On refugees and defectors, too, there was a revealing moment. Another person in the audience asked whether Oberdorfer has interviewed any defectors. Oberdorfer paused for a moment and then said Hwang Jeong-Yop was the only one he interviewed. He said he simply did not have an opportunity to interview other defectors (you know, the ordinary types who only know of suffering, repression and hardship and none of the benefits of being close to Kim Il-sung). Then somewhat strangely, he began to answer what the questioner did not ask, and talk about how he “believe[s] what they [the defectors] saw, but not what they think.”

I, for one, would be the first to argue that one always ought to treat testimony from defectors with a healthy dose of skepticism. Defectors are, indeed, ofen eager to please their hosts. Whatever they say should be vetted with other known information. Oberdorfer’s tone and choice of words on this topic, however, were dismissive of defectors and their relevance to the larger Korea isssues.

What dawned on me as I listened to Oberdorfer was that he represented the classic Establishment view about North Korea — that it is a dangerous country only because we treat it belligerently, and that a sustained American effort at “dialogue” with the North would coax it out of its isolation and hostility. It is, essentially, the view of those who are quite comfortable with the status quo on the Korean Peninsula as exists today. Despite the occasional rhetoric otherwise, people who subscribe to this view are not particularly concerned about the suffering of million in North Korea nor are they deeply concerned about the potentially lethal threats of North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation.

The Establishment still lives in the Age of the Nation-State and, frankly, the Cold War. Just as they were willing to accept the Soviet Union as a fact of life to live with so long as its behavior could be ameliorated a little, they see the existence of North Korea’s vile regime as an established fact of the international system. They think they can coax a bit better behavior out of it by “engaging” with it rather then attempt to demolish the monstrosity that it is.

And that, I think, is the problem with the likes of Don Oberdorfer.